JUDGMENT : N. P. Singh, J. - This writ application has been filed on behalf of the petitioner for quashing an ORDER :dated 20.3.1980 passed by the Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, Patna Circle (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Bank') imposing punishment against the petitioner in a disciplinary proceeding. 2. According to the petitioner; he assumed charge as Branch Manager of the Bank at Saharsa in June, 1970. On 19.9.1970 the Regional Manager of the Bank asked certain clarification. On 16.10.1970 the petitioner gave clarification sought for by the Regional Manager. On 5.8.1971 a criminal case was registered by the C.B.I. against the petitioner and others. On 20.11.1972 the petitioner was put under suspension. On 3.1.1973 charge sheet was submitted by the C.B.I. against the petitioner and some others. On 27.2.1976 the Special Judge, C.B.I. Patna found the petitioner not guilty of the charges levelled against him and he was acquitted. By a letter dated 26.6.1978 statement of charges was served on the petitioner directing him to submit his written statement in defence within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the same. Petitioner submitted his written statement on 18.10.1978. Thereafter, a writ application was filed on behalf of the petitioner before this Court in October, 1978 making a prayer to quash the ORDER :of suspension. On 9.1.1979 a Bench of this Court directed that the enquiry be completed, preferably within six months. On 3.4.1979, after the petitioner had attained the age of superannuation, the ORDER :of suspension was lifted and the petitioner was transferred to Bettiah, because the departmental proceeding which had been initiated against the petitioner could not be completed. 3. On 11.2.1980, Shri R.N. Prasad, who had been appointed as the Enquiring Officer, submitted his finding saying tha1 the-charges, which had been levelled against the petitioner, had not been proved. The Disciplinary Authority, however, differed with 1he enquiry report and by the impugned ORDER :came to the conclusion that there was lapse on the part of the petitioner while he was posted at Saharsa Branch. 4. It is well known that the Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the opinion of the Enquiring Officer in a. departmental proceeding. It is upto the Disciplinary Authority either to agree with those findings or to take a contrary view. 4. It is well known that the Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the opinion of the Enquiring Officer in a. departmental proceeding. It is upto the Disciplinary Authority either to agree with those findings or to take a contrary view. Reference in this connection may be made to the cases of Union of India v. H.C. Goel ( AIR 1964 SC 364 ), Railway Board, New Delhi and another v. Niranjan Singh ( AIR 1969 SC 966 ) and Tara Chand Khatri v.Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others ( AIR 1977 SC 567 ). As such, it cannot be urged that the Disciplinary Authority could not have come to the conclusion on the materials on record that the charges levelled against the petitioner had been proved, merely because the Enquiring Officer had exonerated the petitioner of those charges. But the Disciplinary Authority in the impugned ORDER :having mentioned that the Enquiring Officer has held that the charges against the petitioner were not proved, has simply observed as follows: "Upon examination of the proceeding of enquiry I differ from the findings of the Enquiry Officer because by a reference to the exhibit PE(2) I am satisfied that you were responsible for the lapses which occurred at Saharsa Branch during your incumbency as Branch Manager there at, inter alia, sanctioning small Business advances without security." He has passed the ORDER :of punishment in the following words:- "Having regard to the gravity of lapses noticed against you, I have decided to impose upon you the punishment of censure in terms of Rule 49 (a) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules. You are accordingly hereby censured. It has also been decided that the period spent by you under suspension vide para 3 of our letter No. RM II/23/8616/420 dated the 3rd April 1979 be treated as such." From a bare reference to the aforesaid ORDER :it is apparent that the Disciplinary. Authority has merely referred to Exhibit PE(2) on basis of which he was satisfied that the petitioner was responsible for the lapses which occurred at the Saharsa Branch and because of which he was differing from the report of the Enquiring Officer. 5. Authority has merely referred to Exhibit PE(2) on basis of which he was satisfied that the petitioner was responsible for the lapses which occurred at the Saharsa Branch and because of which he was differing from the report of the Enquiring Officer. 5. On behalf of the petitioner It has been stated on affidavit that during the course of the departmental enquiry neither he was confronted with the said Exhibit PE(2) nor he was called upon to explain the said document in particular. From the ORDER :impugned it appears that the Disciplinary Authority has differed with the enquiry report merely on basis of Exhibit PE(2). On basis of Exhibit PE(2) the Disciplinary Authority was satisfied that the charges against the petitioner was established. Unfortunately, it was not even mentioned in the ORDER :as to what was Exhibit PE(2) which established the charges against the petitioner, that he had sanctioned small business advances without security. In the case of Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others ( AIR 1977 SC 567 ) it was observed :- "We would like to make it clear that while it may be necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its ORDER :if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the enquiring officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment or the rules made thereunder, it would be laying down the proposition a little too broadly to say that even an ORDER :of concurrence must be supported by reasons." From the enquiry report it appears that the Enquiring Officer had referred to different materials and circumstances on the basis of which he came to the conclusion that the petitioner had not indiscriminately sanctioned loans to undeserving persons. The Enquiring Officer had also pointed out that within a period of six months the petitioner had sanctioned only 26 loan applications covering small amounts which cannot be held to be indiscriminate sanctioning of loans so as to be held guilty of the charges levelled against him. It is true that the Disciplinary Authority is not required to discuss the evidence on record like a court, but it must appear from his ORDER :that while differing with the enquiry report he has applied his mind to the materials on record. It is true that the Disciplinary Authority is not required to discuss the evidence on record like a court, but it must appear from his ORDER :that while differing with the enquiry report he has applied his mind to the materials on record. In the facts and circumstances of the present case I am of the opinion that the petitioner can legitimately make a grievance in respect of the cryptic ORDER :passed by the Disciplinary Authority which is under challenge in the present writ application. 6. On behalf of the petitioner it was also urged that the Disciplinary Authority has held him guilty of a charge which was never communicated to him. In other words there was no charge that the petitioner had sanctioned small business advances without security. In this connection our attention was drawn to the statement of charges aforesaid (Annexure 6). In may opinion, there is force in this argument. From a bare reference to the statement of charges it appears that the petitioner had been called upon to show cause as to why he had sanctioned large number of advances indiscriminately without examining the needs, credit worthiness of the borrowers. Thus, the charge in substance was of indiscriminate financing to undeserving parties which caused a loss to the tune of Rs. 64,700/- approximately. There is no clear statement in the charges that the petitioner had sanctioned small business advances without security. According to the learned Advocate-General, who has appeared for the respondent-Bank, this charge was implicit when it was stated, "...as a Branch Manager, acted in a most irresponsible manner, showed scant regard for the Bank's norms, its security which has proved to be highly detrimental to the interests of tile Bank." I am unable to accept this contention. Ii is well settled that the charges should be clearly stated so that the person who has to file his show cause must know what he has to explain in his defence. 7. It was then submitted that from the impugned ORDER :it is not clear as to what punishment has been awarded against the petitioner when the Disciplinary Authority said:- "It has also been decided that the period spent by you under suspension vide para 3 of our letter no. 7. It was then submitted that from the impugned ORDER :it is not clear as to what punishment has been awarded against the petitioner when the Disciplinary Authority said:- "It has also been decided that the period spent by you under suspension vide para 3 of our letter no. RM II/23-/8616/420 dated the 3rd April 1978 be treated as such." Learned Advocate General, who appeared for the respondent Bank took pains to explain the aforesaid finding to mean that the petitioner shall not get anything beyond the subsistence allowance during the period of suspension, i. e. with effect from 29.11.1979, for more than 7 years which will be deemed to be the punishment imposed against the petitioner. In my view, a quasi-judicial authority is required to pass an ORDER :of punishment which should be intelligible to the person against whom such punishment is inflicted. 8. It is well known that the High Court is generally reluctant in interfering with the ORDER :s passed by a Disciplinary Authority against its employees in a departmental proceeding, but taking all the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration I am of the opinion that it is only just and proper that the Disciplinary Authority should apply his mind afresh. Accordingly, I allow this writ application and quash the impugned ORDER :dated 20.3.1980 (annexure-9) .and direct the Disciplinary Authority to apply his mind afresh on the materials on record and to pass a fresh ORDER :in accordance with law. It is expected that the proceeding shall be disposed of as early as possible preferably within three months from the date of production of this ORDER :. There shall be no ORDER :as to costs. M. P. Varma, J.-I have heard the JUDGMENT : delivered by my learned brother. I fully agree. The JUDGMENT : purports to be like an ORDER :of remand for the Disciplinary Authority to reconsider the whole case against the petitioner. Placing reliance on some of the decisions of the Supreme Court, as quoted by my Learned Brother, it has been rightly said that the Disciplinary Authority may reasonably differ with the reports of an Enquiring Officer, but the Disciplinary Authority is not supposed to travel beyond the evidences brought on record, in course of an enquiry nor should it act On any extraneous matters. In the present case under discussion it appears that the Disciplinary Authority could not make a clear appraisal of the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties. The petitioner very categorically stated that he was never confronted with the document referred to as Exhibit PE (2) in the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and I do not find any denial to this assertion of the petitioner in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Bank, and, therefore, I would like to say that the Disciplinary Authority should not have based its findings on a document, in respect of which, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to meet. Since there has not been a clear appreciation of the evidence nor correct application of mind on the report submitted by the Enquiring officer with which the Disciplinary Authority has differed, I also feel that the case be remanded for a fresh consideration on the materials available, before imposing any punishment on the delinquent. I, therefore, quite agree with the ORDER :s proposed by my learned Brother.