JUDGMENT - Ginwala A.A. J.J.-Since a common question of law is involved in both these Revision Applications, they are being disposed of by one judgment. The facts leading to these revision applications, stated briefly, are as follows. 2. Devkinandan Bhojraj, non-applicant in Civil Revision Application No. 305 of 1980, had filed a suit against Deorao Patilbuwa Raut who is applicant in both the revision applications, being Regular Civil Suit No. 276 of 1978 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division at Malkapur for recovering an amount of Rs. 10,150. Defendant Deorao appeared in that suit through a counsel. On 17-10-1979, the counsel for the plaintiff and the counsel for the defendant in the suit filed an application for recording” a compromise as stated in the said application and for drawing up a decree accordingly. Both the counsel stated below their signatures that they had authority to compromise. The learned-Civil' Judge allowed the application and passed a decree in terms of” the compromise. Being aggrieved by this decree, defendant Deorao preferred an appeal iff the District Court at Buldana being Civil Appeal No. 255 of l979. 3. Bhagwandas, non-applicant in Civil Revision: Application No. 306 of ?980, had also instituted a suit against applicant Deorao being Regular Civil Suit No.. 277 of 1978 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division; at Malkapur for recovering an amount of Rs. 8,300: Deorao appeared through a counsel. As in the other suit so in this suit also, on 17-10-1979,. both the counsel filed an application for recording a compromise and passing a decree accordingly. This application Appeared to have been; signed by plaintiff Bhagwandas-himself, while if was; signed by the counsel for defendant Deorao. By Ms order passed by the learned Civil Judge-on the application on the same day, he accepted the compromise and-directed a decree to be drawn accordingly. Being aggrieved by this decree, defendant Deorao preferred an appeal in the District Court at Buldana being Civil Appeal No-. 254 of 1979. 4. Both the aboves said appeals were heard together by the learned' district Judge. Being aggrieved by this decree, defendant Deorao preferred an appeal in the District Court at Buldana being Civil Appeal No-. 254 of 1979. 4. Both the aboves said appeals were heard together by the learned' district Judge. On behalf of the respondents in both these appeals., namely, Devkiriandan and Bhagwandas, objection was taken to the main tainability' of the appeals-on the ground that the decrees against which these appeals had been filed being consent decrees, no appeal could lie against them as provided by sub-section (3) of section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure,. 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code'). On behalf of appellant Deorao in both these appeals, it was contended that even, assuming that the appeals were barred by section 96(3) of the Code, the appeals could be fifed and maintained under Rule 1A of Order XLIII of the Code. The learned District Judge, by a common judgment delivered on 19-2-1980, upheld the contention of the two respondents and held that the appeals having been: filed against decrees passed by the lower Court “with the consent of both the sides”, were not maintainable, Inasmuch as they were prohibited specifically by section 96(3) of the Code. In the view which he took, he rejected the appeals and it is against this order of rejection of the appeals that the present revision applications have been filed by the appellant in those two appeals, 5. Mrs. V. A. Naik, the learned counsel for the applicant in both these revision applications, submitted that sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order XLIII of the Code contemplates an appeal even against a decree passed In a suit after recording a compromise, assuming that the appeal is barred under section 96(3) of the Code. She further contended that at any rate if the validity of a compromise itself is challenged in the appeal, It would not be an appeal against a decree with the consent of the parties and would not come within the mischief of sub-section (3) of section 96 of the Code. She further contended that at any rate if the validity of a compromise itself is challenged in the appeal, It would not be an appeal against a decree with the consent of the parties and would not come within the mischief of sub-section (3) of section 96 of the Code. She submitted that even though appellant Deorao, hile filing the appeals, had styled them as appeals under Order XLIII, Rule 1A of the Code in the cause title of the appeal memos, the learned appellate Judge ought to have treated these appeals as under section 96 of the Code and ought to have disposed them of as such holding that the appeals not being against a consent decree, were tenable under sub-section (1) of section 96 of the Code. 6. Mr. L. Mohta, the learned counsel for the non-applicants in both these revision applications, however, supported the view taken by the learned appellate Judge and submitted that Rule 1A of Order XLIII of the Code itself does not confer a right of appeal against the order record ing a compromise but what it merely says is that in an appeal filed against a decree, it would be open to the appellant to challenge the decree on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded. Mr. Mohta submitted that even if the appellant challenges the validity of the com promise, the decree drawn up on the basis of the alleged disputed compromise does not cease to be a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties within the meaning of sub-section (3) of section 96 of the Code and hence an appeal against such a decree would be barred by the provisions of that sub-section. 7. The question which, therefore, falls for consideration in these two revision applications is as to whether an appeal can lie against a decree which has been passed on the basis of a compromise alleged to have been arrived at between the parties when in appeal the appellant disputes such a compromise. 8. The submission made on behalf of the applicant that an appeal challenging or disputing the recording of a compromise can lie as provid ed for in sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order XLIII of the Code does not appear to be tenable. Rule 1A is in the following terms: “1A. 8. The submission made on behalf of the applicant that an appeal challenging or disputing the recording of a compromise can lie as provid ed for in sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order XLIII of the Code does not appear to be tenable. Rule 1A is in the following terms: “1A. (1) Where any order is made under this Code against a party and thereupon any judgment is pronounced against such party and a decree is drawn up, such party may, in an appeal against the decree, contend that such order should not have been made and the judgment should not have been pronounced. (2) In an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not, have been recorded.” A plain reading of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A would indicate that it postulates an appeal against a decree for its operation. In other words, sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order XLIII would come into operation only in an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording or refusing to record a compromise. This sub-rule only enables the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that a compromise should, or should not, have been recorded. The language of Rule 1A and for that matter of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A, contrasted with the opening words of Rule 1 of Order XLIII, learly indicates that Rule 1A does not contemplate conferring a right of appeal as is done under Rule 1 of Order XLIII. As said above, Rule 1A is merely an enabling provision entitling the appellant in an appeal against a decree to dispute or to challenge the orders passed in the suit which are not otherwise appealable under Rule 1 of Order XLIII. As said above, Rule 1A is merely an enabling provision entitling the appellant in an appeal against a decree to dispute or to challenge the orders passed in the suit which are not otherwise appealable under Rule 1 of Order XLIII. Rule 1A has been inserted by the amending Act of 1976 in all probability to dispel any doubt as to whether in an appeal against a decree it is open to the appellant to contend that order which is otherwise not appealable and which is the basis of the judgment pronounced against him leading to the drawing up of a decree, should not have been made and judgment should not have been pronounced or that a compromise should, or should not, have been recorded. In this connection, it may be noted that prior to the amendment of the Code by the Amending Act of 1976, clause (m) of Rule 1 of Order XLIII provided for an appeal against an order under Rule 3 of Order XXIII recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction. This clause has been deleted by the amending Act of 1976 with the result that now no appeal can lie against such an order. It Appeared that it is in order to make the position clear that even though no appeal lies against such an order after the amendment of 1976, it would be open to the appellant to dispute the validity of the order in an appeal against the decree, that sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A has been enacted. This sub-rule has, therefore, to be understood in the background of this legislative history. It is not, therefore, possible to agree with the learned counsel for the applicant that sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order XLIII confers a right of appeal on a party which is dissatisfied with the order passed by the trial Court recording or refusing to record a compromise. 9. The question then is whether such an appeal can lie under section 96 of the Code when a compromise is accepted by the Court and a decree is drawn up accordingly. If an appeal has to be filed against it, it would be against the decree passed by the Court and if such a decree is passed by the Court by exercising original jurisdiction, an appeal would normally lie under sub-section (1) of section 96 of the Code. If an appeal has to be filed against it, it would be against the decree passed by the Court and if such a decree is passed by the Court by exercising original jurisdiction, an appeal would normally lie under sub-section (1) of section 96 of the Code. However, sub-section (3) of section 96 says that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. Now it can be said that if a decree is drawn up on the basis of a compromise which has been recorded by the Court it is a decree passed with the consent of parties and hence it would be hit by sub-section (3) of section 96 of the Code debarring the aggrieved party from preferring an, appeal under section 96(1). If this view is upheld, a party which intends to challenge the very recording of the compromise and consequent drawing up of a decree would be left without any remedy, since clause (m) of Rule 1 of Order XLIII, which as seen above permitted such a party to file an appeal, is not now available after the amendment of 1976 and Rule 3A of Order XXIII which has also been inserted by the Amending Act of 1976 bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful, It would, therefore, appear that a person who feels aggrieved by the compromise which is recorded by a Court under Rule 3 of Order XXIII would be left without any remedy at all. It is in this background that we have to construe the language of sub-section (3) of section 96 of the Code. 10. In my view, sub-section (3) of section 96 would only debar those appeals which are filed against a decree in which the appellant does not dispute the recording of a compromise. In other words, if the appellant files the appeal accepting the decree as having been passed with the consent of parties, then, sub-section (3) of section 96 would debar such an appeal. However, in my view, this sub-section would not operate if the appellant disputes the very fact of the decree having been passed with the consent of the parties. In other words, if the appellant files the appeal accepting the decree as having been passed with the consent of parties, then, sub-section (3) of section 96 would debar such an appeal. However, in my view, this sub-section would not operate if the appellant disputes the very fact of the decree having been passed with the consent of the parties. If such a dispute is raised in the appeal itself, then it would not be hit by the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 96 of the Code and in that case, it would be tenable as an appeal against a decree as provided by section 96(1) of the Code. 11. In the present case, the applicant sought to challenge the decrees passed in the abovesaid two suits on several grounds and one of the grounds is that he had not authorised his Counsel to compromise the suit. If that is so, he does not admit that the decrees against which the appeals have been filed were passed with the consent of the parties and in that view of the matter the two appeals ought to have been treated as appeals lying under section 96(1) of the Code. The bill of costs appended to the judg ment of the appellate Court in each appeal would show that court-fee had been paid by the appellant in each appeal on the basis of its being a regular appeal and not a miscellaneous appeal under Order XLIII. If that was so, there was no difficulty on the part of the appellate Court to have enter tained the appeals as regular appeals provided under section 96(1) of the Code. In the view which I take, the revision applications would have to be allowed and the lower appellate Court would have to be directed to dispose of the appeals on merits as being tenable. 12. In the result, both the revision applications are hereby allowed and the order passed by the lower appellate Court in both the abovesaid appeals is hereby set aside and that Court is hereby directed to dispose of the appeals on merits. The cost of these revision applications shall be costs in the appeals. Revision applications allowed. -----