TATA FINLAY LTD. v. DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER — 1984 DIGILAW 29 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The first petitioner is Tata Finly Ltd., Munnar, and the 2nd petitioner is Mr. Abraham Varghese, Regional Office, Tata-Finlay Ltd., Munnar. The first petitioner is successor-in-interest of Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co, Ltd., Anglo American Direct Tea Trading Co., Ltd, and Amalgamated Tea Estates Co., Ltd., which were sterling companies carrying on the business of growing and manufacturing tea. The major portion of the petitioners' land in Devicolam originally belonged to the Poonjar Chief, a jenmi of Meenachil Taluk in the erstwhile Travancore State. The Poonjar Chief was the absolute owner and proprietor of the land. By a deed of 11th July, 1877 (corresponding to 29th Mithunam 1052 M E ) executed by the then Poonjar Chief, or Rajah as be was called, and registered at the office of the District Registrar of Meenachil as Document No. 733 of 1052 (since, usually called, the first Poonjar Concession), the Poonjar Chief conveyed the said concession area to one John Daniel Munroe, a predecessor-in-title to the first petitioner, for a cash consideration of Rs. 5000/-and a deferred perpetual annual payment of Rs. 3000/-from 1059 ME. onwards..Ext P4 is the true-copy of the first Poonjar Concession. The petitioners have also produced an English translation of Ext. P4 as published in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual and the Travancore Forest Manual under the authority of the Government. By a further deed between the Poonjar Chief and the said John Daniel Munroe dated 26th July, 1879 (corresponding to 12th Karkadagam 1054 M.E ) (since, also called, the second Poonjar Concession) the terms and intent of the said first Poonjar Concession deed was further confirmed and clarified, inter alia, to the effect that the said grant was to the said John Daniel Munroe and his heirs executors, administrators and assigns to be held absolutely and for ever with right to make all kinds of cultivations and improvements thereon. Ext. P5 is the copy of the said deed dated 26th July, 1879. 2. It would appear that at the time when Exts. P4 add P5 documents were executed and got registered, there was a rule or usage which required that Europeans and Americans desiring to acquire land within the Dominion of the Maharajah of Travancore should obtain the previous permission of the Government. 2. It would appear that at the time when Exts. P4 add P5 documents were executed and got registered, there was a rule or usage which required that Europeans and Americans desiring to acquire land within the Dominion of the Maharajah of Travancore should obtain the previous permission of the Government. On Munroe's application, therefore, permission to hold the land was granted by means of a ratification deed dated November 28,1878 executed by the then Government of Travancore. By this deed of ratification, Government permitted and ratified and grant made by the Poonjar chief in favour of Munroe and according to law and usage of the time, in respect of jenmom or freehold lands transferred by jenmies and chiefs levied (independently of the annual payment to be made to the Chief by Munroe) a land tax of half a rupee per acre of the Concession Land, excepting grass lands and a land tax of two annas eight pies per acre of such grasslands as were occupied for homesteads, farmsteads or cultivation, and provided that transfers of any land by the holder should be made known to the Government to enable due apportionment of land-tax. Ext. P6 is a true copy of the said deed of ratification dated November 28, 1879. 3. On the application of the North Travancore Land Planting and Agricultural Society Ltd.. the successors-in-interest to the aforesaid John Daniel Munroe, an agreement was executed between the Government and the said Society on August 2,1886, whereby the Government inter alia reduced the land tax levied by the said Deed of Ratification. Ext. P7 is a true copy of that Deed dated August 2, 1886 Ext P1 is the copy of notice dated 27-12-1980 sent by the first respondent Divisional Forest Officer, Munnar Division, Devicolam to the petitioners as well as 2 others, requiring them to supply within 7 days of that notice an account of all timber and firewood cut and removed by them since the date of the Kerala Grants & Leases (Modification of Rights) Ordinance No. 4 of 1980, which came into force on 25th June, 1980 and arrange for the remittance of the seigniorage value for timber cut and removed from the concession area. They were also threatened of action under the provisions of the Ordinance in case they failed to comply with the demands, in the notice. They were also threatened of action under the provisions of the Ordinance in case they failed to comply with the demands, in the notice. The first of the addressees in the notice, Ext. P1, is the first petitioner. Ext. P2 is the true copy of another notice sent by the first respondent dated nil addressed to the petitioner No. 1 and others (the first petitioner being the first addressee) reiterating the demands made in Ext. P1 notice with the difference that the demands were made under the provisions of Ss.3 and 4 of the Kerala Grants (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980, instead of Ordinance No. 4 of 1980 referred to in Ext. P1 notice. Ext.P3 is copy of another notice which was also dated 27th December 1980 (the same date as of Ext. P1), addressed to the first petitioner and two others (the first petitioner being the first addressee) drawing the attention of the addressees to the coming into force of the Forest (Conservation) Ordinance No. 17 of 1980, promulgated by the Central Government which came into force on 25-10-1980. Exts. P4, P5, and P6, as we have already noticed, are the first concession deed, the second concession deed, and the ratification deed, Ext. P7, we have already noticed, is the copy of the agreement for modification of taxes dated November 23, 1871. Ext. P8 is the copy of the letter dated 14th January, 1981 sent by the first petitioner to the first respondent in reply to the letters received by it on 7-1-1981 and 8-1-1981, taking the stand that the Act has application only to "all grants and leases of lands made or granted by or on behalf of the former State of Travancore or Cochin for cultivation", and that in as much as the grant in respect of the concession area held by the first petitioner-company was from the Poonjar chief, who at that time was the proprietor of the region, it had no application to that grant. A detailed reasoning was given in that letter by the first petitioner. Ext. P9 is the copy of the letter from the first respondent to the first petitioner informing him that Ext. A detailed reasoning was given in that letter by the first petitioner. Ext. P9 is the copy of the letter from the first respondent to the first petitioner informing him that Ext. P8 letter sent by that Company has already been referred to the Government and that in the meanwhile the Company should adhere to the procedures in the matter of cutting and removal of trees to facilitate maintenance of correct account of firewood collected and removed. Ext. P10 is the copy of the letter dated 14th January, 1981 sent by the 1st petitioner-company to the first respondent informing the first respondent in reply to Ext. P3 notice that that has no application to the lands held by that Company. Ext. P11 is the copy of the letter dated 16-1-1981 sent by the first respondent to the first petitioner-Company pointing out that the Central enactment (The Forest (Conservation) Ordinance No. 17 of 1980) prohibited the clearance of any forests for non-forestry purposes. Ext. P12 is the copy of the document No. 1519 of 1897 dated 25-2-1897 executed by the erstwhile Government of Cochin in favour of the first petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, whereunder Malkiparai Estate was leased to that Company by the Diwan of Cochin representing the Maharajah of Cochin. Ext. P13 is the true copy of the letter dated 17-1-1981 from the 2nd respondent, Divisional Forest Officer, Divisional Forest Office, Chalakudi, drawing the attention of the first petitioner-company to the provisions of the Act, and reminding the first petitioner that the cutting of timber should be effected only after the approval of the Divisional Forest Officer concerned was obtained. Ext. P14 is the copy of the order passed by the Land Board, Kerala under the Kannan Devan Hills (Assumption of Lands) Act, 1971. 4. The material prayers in the writ petition are: (i) To declare the Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980, or any provisions thereof, as unconstitutional and void? Ext. P14 is the copy of the order passed by the Land Board, Kerala under the Kannan Devan Hills (Assumption of Lands) Act, 1971. 4. The material prayers in the writ petition are: (i) To declare the Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980, or any provisions thereof, as unconstitutional and void? (ii) To call for the records connected with Exhibits P1, P2, P3, P9, P11, and P13 and to quash the same by issue of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ, order or direction; and (iii) To prohibit the respondents by a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ, or order from interfering with the felling of eucalyptus and other trees for the first petitioner's own requirements and from levying seigniorage on such trees and firewood under the Act. 5. We have already noticed that the Ordinance came into force on 25th June, 1980 and that subsequently it was replaced by the Act, which received the assent of the President on 7-8-1980 and was published in the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No. 565 dated 7-8-1980. It is an Act to provide for modification of rights under Grants and Leases of lands made or granted by or on behalf of the former States of Travancore and Cochin for cultivation. It is an Act to provide for modification of rights under Grants and Leases of lands made or granted by or on behalf of the former States of Travancore and Cochin for cultivation. Preamble to the Act states: "WHEREAS the former States of Travancore and Cochin had made grants and granted leases of lands to certain persons on nominal assessment of rent; AND WHEREAS under such grants and leases the grantees and lessees had been given right to appropriate trees standing on the lands granted or leased with obligation to pay nominal value or without any obligation for payment of any value; AND WHEREAS the assessments and rents charged on the grantees and lessees are only nominal; AND WHEREAS such grants and leases, if allowed to operate without modifications, will result in heavy loss to the Government and huge un-earned profits to the grantees and lessees: AND WHEREAS the effect of such grants and leases is that the ownership and control of large extents of lands and many valuable trees belonging to the Government are vested in a few persons without any liability to pay reasonable assessment or rent or value of trees; AND WHEREAS for the purpose of securing the principles laid down in clauses (b) and (c) of Art.39 of the Constitution of India, it is necessary in the public interest that such undue profits to a few persons are utilised for the common benefit of the general public". S. 2(b) defines 'grant' as any grant to which the Act applies; S.2(c) defines 'grantee' as the person in whose favour a grant has been made and includes his heirs, successors and assigns; S.2(d) defines 'lease' as any lease to which the Act applies. S.3, with which we are concerned mostly in the writ petition, is extracted below: "Grants and leases to which Act applies. This Act shall apply to all grants and leases of lands made or granted by or on behalf of the former State or Travancore or Cochin for cultivation, which contain all or any of the following terms and conditions, namely; (a) the grantees or lessees may appropriate for their own use all trees standing on the land, except teak, blackwood, ebony, karunthali. and sandalwood or any two or more of those categories, subject to payment of seigniorage at the rates specified in the grant or lease deed in respect of the timber taken out of the land; (b) a fine shall be paid when timber is extracted in violation of the grant or lease deed; (c) no timber rights are reserved for the Government and the grantees or lessees can appropriate the timber standing on the land without any restriction or limitation; (d) certain categories of trees like ebony, teak and blackwood may be felled and removed by the Government within a specified period failing which they shall become the property of the grantee or lessee on payment of royalty, kuzhikanam or fee at a nominal rate specified in the grant or lease deed; (e) rights of the Government to the trees standing on the land are fully reserved, the lessees are prohibited from cutting those trees without prior permission of the Government and they are liable for payment of the value of the timber when the trees are cut and removed; (f) tree's value at a nominal rate has to be paid when the land is cleared; and (g) the grantee or lessee is not liable to pay any assessment or rent or he is liable to pay only nominal assessment or rent for the grant or the lease, as the case may be." 5. Shri Soli Sorabjee, the counsel for the petitioners, contended that the Act in terms of S.3 has application only to such of those grants and leases of lands as are made or granted by or on behalf of the former States of Travancore or Cochin for cultivation which contain all or any of the terms and conditions contained in clauses (a) to (g). He emphasised that for the application of the Act, the grants/ leases of lands made or granted should have been by or on behalf of the former State of Travancore or Cochin and secondly such grants or leases should contain all or any of the terms and conditions enumerated in clauses (a) to (g) of S.3 of the Act It was his argument that inasmuch as Exts. P4 and P5 evidence grant or lease in perpetuity granted by the Raja, who was the jenmi of the property, in spite of Ext.P6 ratification deed, it could not be said that the grant or lease of land was made by the Maharajah The contention that the ratification deed Ext. P6 was between the Maharajah and the said Sri Munroe. the predecessor-in-title of the first petitioner, and therefore, the lease of the land should be deemed to have been made by the Maharajah, and as such by the State of Travancore, was sought to be met by arguing that the fact that the ratification deed was made necessary would not make the grant or lease of land by the jenmi non est or invalid. Once subsequent to the grant or lease, a deed of ratification was executed and registered, so long as it is not inconsistent with the terms and conditions of the lease or grant, the grant or lease would not become invalid. It was also pointed out, though not in specific terms, impliedly atleast, that the ratification deed proves and recognises the lease granted by the Poonjar Chief, by reserving a right in his favour to receive a sum of Rs. 3000/-per annum from the lessee It was argued by Shri Soli Sorabjee that by this act of ratification, it could never be said that there was privity of contract between the two. 6. We find considerable force in the arguments advanced by Shri Soli Sorabjee that merely for the reason that as a matter of policy the grant or lease was ratified by the Maharaja it would not render the grant or lease as one granted by the Maharaja himself. The correct position, in our view, seems to be that the lease or grant was by the Poonjar Chief and the ratification deed has only fastened the seal of approval over it, without changing the identity of the person who granted the lease or grant in favour of the predecessor¬in-interest of the first petitioner-Company. 7. The correct position, in our view, seems to be that the lease or grant was by the Poonjar Chief and the ratification deed has only fastened the seal of approval over it, without changing the identity of the person who granted the lease or grant in favour of the predecessor¬in-interest of the first petitioner-Company. 7. Sri Soli Sorabjee argued that if at all there was any semblance of applicability of the Act to the facts of the case, it could only be by placing reliance on clause (g) of S.3 of the Act, which also, according to him, would not really be available to the respondents inasmuch as by no stretch of imagination could it be said that the grantee or the lessee was not liable to pay any assessment or rent or he was liable to pay only nominal assessment or rent for the grant or the lease as the case might be in the instant case. He pointed out that for Ext. P4 grant there was a consideration of Rs. 5000/- for the land and rent in perpetuity at Rs. 3000/- per annum, was required to be paid. The word'nominal', he pointed out, according to Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, means: "Titular, existing in name only; not real or substantial; connected with the transaction or proceeding in name only, not in interest. Park Amusement Co. v. Mc Caughn, D. G. Pa. 14F 2d 553, 556. Not real or actual; merely named, stated, or given, without reference to actual condition; often with the implication that the thing named is so small, slight, or the like, in comparison to what might properly be expected, as scarcely to be entitled to the name e. g., a nominal price Lehman v. Tail, C. C. A. Md. 58 F 2 d 20, 23. In Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, the meaning of the word 'nominal' is given thus: "pertaining to, or of the nature of, a name or noun; of names; by name; only in name; so called, but not in reality; inconsiderable, hardly more than a matter of form; " Shri Soli Sorabjee submitted that in considering the value of the currency as it prevailed a century ago, neither the premium paid nor the rent stipulated to be paid annually in perpetuity, could be said to be nominal 8. The Additional Advocate-General Dr. The Additional Advocate-General Dr. George Mathew, however, submitted that it was not on clause (g) of S.3 of the Act but on clause (a) of that section he would rely in support of the claim put forward by the respondents. We have already found that clause (a) of S.3 reads "the grantees or lessees may appropriate for their own use all trees standing on the land except teak, blackwood, ebony, karunthali and sandalwood or any two or more of those categories, subject to payment of seigniorage at the rates specified in the grant or lease deed in respect of the timber taken out of the land". This, according to him, meant that except for the excepted trees the right of the grantee or the lessee to appropriate for his own use the trees standing on the land was subject to payment of seigniorage at the rates specified in the grant or lease in respect of the timber taken out of the land. 9. Reliance was placed on the recital in Ext. P5, the second Poonjar concession (reference was made to the English translation at pages 34-35 of the first paper Book), which reads: "and shall observe and perform all the other conditions or stipulations of the said agreement." which, according to the counsel, would mean the liability to pay the customary dues including seigniorage in the event of the trees being cut. 10. This contention was however squarely met by Shri Soli Sorabjee with reference to clause(7) of Ext. P7 agreement for modification of taxes and that reads as follows: "The Society, its successors and assigns may use and appropriate to its own use within the limits of the said tract of land all timber except the following (and such as may thereafter be reserved) name I y, Teak, Kole-teak, Blackwood, Ebony, Karunthali, and Sandalwood, but such Society, its successors and assigns shall not fell any timber beyond what is necessary for clearing the ground for cultivation and for building furniture and machinery within the limits of the grant. No unworked timber or articles manufactured therefrom shall be carried outside the limits of the grant except in conformity with the rules of the Forest and Customs Department for the time being in force. No unworked timber or articles manufactured therefrom shall be carried outside the limits of the grant except in conformity with the rules of the Forest and Customs Department for the time being in force. In the case of the excepted timber, the Society for itself, its successors and assigns agrees to pay seigniorage according to the undermentioned scale, Teak, ten rupees per candy, Ebony, five rupees per. candy, Kole-teak, four rupees per candy, Blackwood, ten rupees per candy, Korunthaly, eight rupees per candy and sandalwood, twenty five rupees per candy. The society for itself, its successors and assigns, agrees to, deliver to the said Poonjar Raja or Chief to enable him to make over the same to the said Government of Travancore all ivory, cardamoms and other Royalties produced in the land and all captured elephants on payment by the said Poonjar Raja or Chief according to the agreement with him the regulated prices for such articles of produce and the regulated reward for the said captured elephants". From this clause it is crystal clear that the seigniorage was payable only for the excepted categories of timbers, not for the type of timber like eucalyptus which the first petitioner-company used by way of fuel for its factories. 11. Shri Soli Sorabjee has yet another ground to urge in support of his contention that clause (a) of S.3 has no application to the facts of the case as, according to him, in terms of the clauses of the deed it is only for timber which is cut out of the land, clause (a) would apply. He has two submissions: (a) what was being used as firewood or fuel does not amount to timber; and (2) it is only for those timbers which were taken out of the Land the clause would apply. He has two submissions: (a) what was being used as firewood or fuel does not amount to timber; and (2) it is only for those timbers which were taken out of the Land the clause would apply. What he pointed out is that timber, according to the dictionary meaning, is: "wood suitable for building or carpentry, whether growing or cut; standing trees of oak, ash, elm or (locally by custom) other kinds, forming part of an inheritance; material generally; a beam, or large piece of wood in a framework, as of a house, ship etc; familiarly a wooden object or part, a wooden leg (See Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary.) In New Webster's Dictionary, the meaning of the word 'timber' is given thus: "building material, timber, wood suitable for building or for use in carpentry; the wood of growing trees suitable for structural uses; growing trees themselves; a single beam or piece of wood forming, or capable of forming, part of a structure" Wood used as fuel or firewood does not constitute 'timber' in contemplation of the section. Equally important is to note that the timber has to be taken out of the land; it being not sufficient that the timber is made use of inside the land. In fact, towards the end of Ext. P1 notice the first petitioner and others are directed to arrange for remittance of the seigniorage value with respect to trees cut and removed from the concession area (underlining provided). To satisfy the requirements of the notice, it is reasonable to contend, and it is needless to add, that unless there is actual cutting and removal of timber from the concession area, the section would not attract 12. On a true construction of the provisions contained in clause (a) of S 3 of the Act. on which alone, the Additional Advocate-General relied to sustain his case, that the Act is applicable to the grant or lease evidenced by Exts. P4 and P5-ratified by Ext. P6-as also to Ext. P12 which for all practical purposes is identical to that of Ext. P4, we are of the opinion that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the grants and leases referred to above. Moreover, by a Division Bench of this Court, in A.S. No. 32 of 1967 and 267 of 1969, it was held that the trees in the list evidenced by Ext. P4, we are of the opinion that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the grants and leases referred to above. Moreover, by a Division Bench of this Court, in A.S. No. 32 of 1967 and 267 of 1969, it was held that the trees in the list evidenced by Ext. P21 deed dated 25-7-1982 got vested in the lessee/ grantee; the State was not entitled to claim seigniorage; and that that right would arise only where the title to the trees was retained by the State. This decision, rendered by a Division Bench on 4-1-1971 has been subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court in the judgment dated 8th September 1981 in Civil Appeal Nos. 1049-1050 of 1972, rendered by Justice Koshal, Justice Balakrishna Eradi and Justice Misra. 13. A Full Bench of this Court in the judgment dated 14th August' 1977 in A.S. No. 640 of 1971, after having considered the relevant clauses in Exts. P4, P5 and P6, took the view that the State was not entitled to claim seigniorage with respect to trees cut from the lands covered by Exts. P4, P5 and P6. Speaking for the Bench, Subramonian Poti J. as he then was, stated as follows: "The said Concession Area is situated within the lands scheduled under the said Rules. On the basis of the Rules taking into account Clause.7 of the Agreement of 1886, Ext. P64, along with Clause.6 of the Deed of Notification, for transporting timber from the Concession Area, the plaintiff need only take free passes from the Forest Department and the Department and the Government are bound to give such free transit passes. The timber belongs to the grantee. In effect it is as if they are timber on private property. The grant is by the absolute proprietor of land. Whatever be the conflict of claims between Travancore Government and Poonjar Chief, the grant was accepted by the Travancore Government. The timber belongs to the grantee. In effect it is as if they are timber on private property. The grant is by the absolute proprietor of land. Whatever be the conflict of claims between Travancore Government and Poonjar Chief, the grant was accepted by the Travancore Government. The grant allows cutting down of trees." It is true that sub-section (1) of S.4 of the Act states: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, or in any grant, lease deed, contract or agreement, or in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, with effect on and from the commencement of this Act, every grantee and every lessee shall be bound to pay to the Government the seigniorage rates in force for the time being for the timber cut and removed from any land held by him under the grant or lease." 14. It was argued, therefore, on behalf of the respondents that notwithstanding the judgments of this Court by the Division Bench confirmed by the Supreme Court, and the Full Bench of this Court referred to above, it was open to the State to hold that seigniorage would be paid by the lessee or the grantee, in respect of timber cut and removed from any land held by him under the grant or the lease. 15. In this context, it would be useful to refer to sub-section (5) of S.4 of the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 (Act 5 of 1971), which deals with resumption of land in certain cases, which reads as follows: "Any person put in possession of any land under sub-section (4) shall be entitled to possess that land on the same terms and subject to the same conditions on or subject to which he was holding such land immediately before the appointed day". The provisions of the said Act remained in the Statute book and therefore any lessee or grantee in respect of the resumption of the land by the State is entitled to hold on to the land on the same terms and subject to the same conditions under which he was holding such land immediately before the appointed day. The provisions of the said Act remained in the Statute book and therefore any lessee or grantee in respect of the resumption of the land by the State is entitled to hold on to the land on the same terms and subject to the same conditions under which he was holding such land immediately before the appointed day. What the terms and conditions in the lease or grant, and what the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to the trees on the lands under the lease of grant, have already been interpreted by decisions referred to above; and they have become final. Inasmuch as the right to possess the land on the same terms and conditions on which the lessee or the grantee had been holding having been preserved by sub-section (5) of S.4 of the said Act referred to above, that interpretation continues to hold the field in spite of the non-obstante clause contained in sub-section (1) of S.4 of the Act. It has also to be noticed that whereas the Ordinances preceding the Act came into force on 22-6-1980 and the Act itself came into force on 7-8-1980. the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 1049 and 1050 of 1972 was rendered on 8th September, 1981. Even assuming for the sake of arguments that the non-obstante clause is capable of taking away the effect of the judgments rendered prior to the coming into force of the Act, by no stretch of imagination could it be said that it is capable of yielding an interpretation that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court after the coming into force of the Act also could be ignored while deciding the question as to whether the provisions of the Act are applicable or not to the lease or grant covered by the particular deed. The respondents are estopped from taking that stand, after having invited a decision by the Division Bench, confirmed by the Supreme Court, both in respect of the conclusion and reasoning. 16. There is a prayer in the writ petition for declaring the provisions of the Act as unconstitutional and void. The respondents are estopped from taking that stand, after having invited a decision by the Division Bench, confirmed by the Supreme Court, both in respect of the conclusion and reasoning. 16. There is a prayer in the writ petition for declaring the provisions of the Act as unconstitutional and void. We have assumed for the purpose of this writ petition, without examining or deciding the question as to whether the provisions of the Act are constitutional or not, that the Act is valid, and even on that assumption we have found that the Act does not apply to the case on hand. There is no need for examining whether the whole or part of the Act is constitutionally valid or not. Prayer No.1 is therefore left open without being decided. 17. For the forgoing reasons, we allow the writ petition quashing Exts. P2, P3, P9, P11 and P13. We also issue a writ of prohibition prohibiting the respondents from interfering with the cutting of eucalyptus and other trees for the first petitioner's own requirements and from levying seigniorage on such trees and firewood under the Act. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced, the Additional Advocate General made an oral request that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court may be granted. We do not find any substantial question of law of general importance which, in our opinion, requires to be decided by the Supreme Court. Hence the leave requested for is declined. Leave Refused.