JUDGMENT : Anand Prasad Sinha, J. - The appellant has been found guilty for the offence punishable under section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. One Baban Chaudhary had also been put on trial along with the appellant for the same offence, and in the same case, but he has been acquitted. 2. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is that Deopati Kumari, daughter of informant Paras Chaudhary (P.W. 1) had gone to Bahiar for scrapping grass. The appellant was also then in the Bahiar and was scrapping grass. When Deopati Kumari did not return even by 7 P.M., the informant became anxious and he questioned the appellant with regard to the whereabouts of Deopati Kumari. The appellant pleaded complete ignorance. On 3.9.1976 the informant had gone to village Barba, Dhumnagar and Pipra probably, in search of his daughter but she could not be traced. On 4.9.1976 one Bansi Nonia had disclosed that some foul smell was coming from a cane field and when the informant with Jagarnath Chaudhary (P.W. 6) Jataban Nonia and Kishori went there, the dead body of Deopati had been recovered. Necessary information had been given to the concerned police station on 5.9.1976. The Sub-Inspector of Police arrived in the village and took up the investigation. 3. Some notable development in the case took place. According to the prosecution, Baban Chaudhary had confessed before Dehi Raut, Ghanshayam Pandey and Baldeo Raut accepting his guilt that he along with the appellant had killed Deopati Kumari. Further it appears that on pointing out of the appellant, a siakle had been found from the Bhansar of her house. 4. The confessional statements of Baban Chaudhary and the appellant had been recorded by Shri Binodanand Mishra (P. W.17). 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has mainly confined his argument on the appreciation of evidence. 6. There is no eye witness of the occurrence. Further it would appear that absolutely no such connecting link is existing indicating close association of the appellant with the deceased whatsoever. The complicity of Baban Chaudhary as claimed by the prosecution is not based upon cogent or reliable material. The only factor which has been picked up for establishing the charge against the appellant being the confessional statement (Ext. 3/1), is too feable to establish the charge. The complicity of Baban Chaudhary as claimed by the prosecution is not based upon cogent or reliable material. The only factor which has been picked up for establishing the charge against the appellant being the confessional statement (Ext. 3/1), is too feable to establish the charge. The Magistrate who has recorded the statement had not given the warning which is a legal obligation based upon the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. In the instant case, it was incumbent upon the Magistrate that before recoding the statement of the appellant, the Magistrate ought to have made known to her that the statement made by her may be used against her in support of the guilt. In absence of such warning the alleged confessional statement by the appellant cannot be said to be clean and readily acceptable. In addition, there is another factor worth consideration and that is that the appellant had been produced by the police before the Magistrate and after her statement had been recorded she had been handed over to the police. This is the evidence of the Magistrate. That being so, under this situation the appellant had not been free fr6m police influence and it is necessary that the appellant ought to have been separated from the influence of the police for such period which may be termed reasonable to get free from such influence. In the instant case, it appears that the appellant was not wholly free from the influence of the police and that will make her statement infirm. It is because when an. accused apparently is under the influence of the police and there being no material or evidence to indicate before making confessional statement to any Magistrate that precaution had been taken to break the link such confessional statement suffered from such infirnity rendering it suspicious and thus un-acceptable. 7. It appears that the appellant had taken the police and had shown some place where trampling of grass and sugar cane plant could be found by the Investigating Officer but this cannot be said to be either discovery or recovery. This is a type of statement by the accused to the police. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is confined to the discovery of material thing and such discovery cannot be said to be within the knowledge of the police but exposed from the information given by the accused. This is a type of statement by the accused to the police. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is confined to the discovery of material thing and such discovery cannot be said to be within the knowledge of the police but exposed from the information given by the accused. Trampling of plants is such a fact which can be said to be existing within the knowledge of the police while making the inspection of the place of occurrence by way of objective findings. The pointing out of place without any material discovery but limply finding of trampling of the plant, is in fact mixed with the statement of the accused. That being so as discussed above, that will not be a part of evidence against the appellant. 8. The claim of the prosecution that a sickle had been recovered from the Bhansar of the house of the appellant cannot be said to be a conclusive element or piece of evidence because it appears that in her statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure she had stated that, as a matter of fact, she had been coerced and forced by the police to make such statements. However, independent in itself, the finding of the sickle in absence of connecting chains and links cannot be said to be sufficient to fasten the guilt upon the appellant conclusively at all. 9. In the result, there is no legal evidence in support of the charge against the appellant and thus the appeal is allowed, the JUDGMENT : and ORDER :of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the trial court is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charge. She shall be discharged from the liability of bail bond forthwith.