Judgment :- 1. The appellants are the plaintiffs and defendants 12 and 13. Having heard counsel on both sides, we are of the view that the only question which really arises in this Appeal is whether or not defendants 2, 4, 5, 7, 8,10 and 11 (the "contesting respondents") are a class of people protected by S.43 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929 (Madras Act XIV of 1930), so as to attract the proviso to clauses (i) to (vii) of S.3 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964 If the proviso applied, the position would be that none of the exemptions provided in clauses (i) to (vii) of S.3 would take away the fixity of tenure enjoyed by these respondents. 2. S.3 of the KLR Act provides: "3 Exemptions. (1) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to (vi) tenancies in respect of land or of buildings or of both created by persons having only life interest or other limited interest in the land or in the buildings or in both: (vii) ... Provided that nothing in clauses (i) to (vii) shall apply in the cases of persons who were entitled to fixity of tenure immediately before the 21st January, 1961, under any law then in force or persons claiming under such persons; or The question is whether the contesting respondents enjoyed fixity of tenure before 21-1-1961 under any law which was in force at the relevant time. It is common ground that the law in force at the relevant time was the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929. S.43 of this Act provided: "43. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract, a cultivating tenant or the holder of a kudiyiruppu shall be entitled to continue on the holding as such, although the rights of his immediate landlord or of any superior landlord have been extinguished, whether by eviction or by redemption of a mortgage or otherwise, subject, however, to a liability to pay fair rent and to the provisions of this Act applicable to a cultivating tenant or the holder of a kudiyiruppu, as the case may be." 3. Referring to this Section, counsel for the appellants. Referring to this Section, counsel for the appellants. Sri P. N. K. Achan contends that the Section did not save a lease created by a person having only a life-interest, for such a person could not, as held in Vareed v. George, 1970 KLT. 739, create a subordinate interest which would continue after the termination of the life-interest The general principle of law; Sri. Achan says, was well recognised in Manabir Gope v. Harbans Narain, AIR 1952 SC. 2051 where the Supreme Court pointed out: "The general rule is that a person cannot by transfer or otherwise confer a better title on another than he himself has. A mortgagee cannot, therefore, create an interest in the mortgaged property which will enure beyond the termination of bis interest as mortgagee" It was with reference to that general principle, as stated by the Supreme Court, that this Court in Vareed v. George, 1970 KLT. 739, 742 held that the subordinate interest could not continue after the termination of the limited interest of the landlord. 4. That was indeed the position in general law, and it was that principle which was applied by this Court in that decision in construing S.4 of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act, 1118 which read: "Notwithstanding any law, custom or contract to the contrary, every verumpattamdar shall have fixity of tenure in respect of bis holding and shall not be evicted therefrom except as provided in S.8 of this Act." Construing the term "fixity of tenure", this Court applied the general principle so as to confine that term within the limit pointed out by the Supreme Court in Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain. AIR. 1952 SC. 205 5. That was precisely the position which had been deliberately altered by the legislature as early as 1929 when it enacted S.43 of the Malabar Tenancy Act. The Section provided that, notwithstanding the. general law, the extinguishment of the limited interest of the immediate or the superior landlord, whether by eviction or by redemption or otherwise, would not adversely affect the tenure of the cultivating tenant or the holder of a kudiyiruppu. Fixity of tenure was thus guaranteed, notwithstanding the limited interest of the landlord. Whether he be a tenant -landlord or mortgagee-landlord, or any other landlord having only limited interest, the tenant under him enjoyed fixity of tenure, notwithstanding the extinguishment of the right of the landlord. Fixity of tenure was thus guaranteed, notwithstanding the limited interest of the landlord. Whether he be a tenant -landlord or mortgagee-landlord, or any other landlord having only limited interest, the tenant under him enjoyed fixity of tenure, notwithstanding the extinguishment of the right of the landlord. That the expression "otherwise" in S.43 of the Malabar Tenancy Act is not limited in its connotation by the principle of ejusdem generis is clear from Madhavi v. Kanaran,1968 KLT. 738, where it was held that that expression would take in other limited owners whose rights were extinguished otherwise than by volition of the parties. 6. In the circumstances, as far as this argument of Sri. Achan is concerned, it has to be held, as we do, that the contesting respondents are protected by the proviso to clauses (i) to (vii) of S.3 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. 7. Sri. Achan further contends that, in any view of the matter, the contesting respondents have not, on the facts of this case, acquired any right. We shall now refer to the relevant facts. Janakiammal, a brahmin lady, died in 1933 leaving a will, Ext. A7 dated 22-5-1929. Her children were daughters Lakshmiammal and Sundariammal and son Ramaswamy Iyer. The Will provided that the two daughters as successors were entitled to enjoy during their life the benefit of the suit properties, and, for that purpose, even to encumber the same, but could not for any other purpose deal with them. On their death, the properties were to vest in Ramaswamy Iyer or in his children. 8. At the time at which the Will was executed, leasing of properties was undoubtedly a reasonable and practical mode of management of the properties with a view to enjoyment of its fruits. This is particularly so in the case of these two Brahmin women. Lakshmiammal was a widow and the elder of the two sisters. She was aged 67 and in poor health at the time when she leased out the properties in 1959 to the ninth defendant under Ext. B44. The ninth defendant thus became a lessee under her and the contesting respondents here are assignees under the ninth defendant. Lakshmiammal was a widow and the elder of the two sisters. She was aged 67 and in poor health at the time when she leased out the properties in 1959 to the ninth defendant under Ext. B44. The ninth defendant thus became a lessee under her and the contesting respondents here are assignees under the ninth defendant. Reading the Will, as we do, bearing in mind its terms, the surrounding circumstances in which it was executed, and the subsequent conduct of Lakshmiammal, we have no doubt that the learned judge has rightly held that a lease was validly created in favour of the ninth defendant in the ordinary course of management and the lease was subsequently assigned by him in favour of the contesting respondents. 9. In the circumstances, we see no merit in this Appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. The fate of this Appeal will not, however, affect the finding of the learned judge in regard to items 1 to 7. In view of what we have stated above we do not find it necessary to consider the merits of the cross-objection filed by the first respondent. It shall stand dismissed. 10. In view of the circumstances of this case, we do not make any order as to costs. Dismissed.