JUDGMENT B. D. Agarwal, J. 1. The writ petitions have been referred to this Full Bench since doubt was raised in regard to correctness of the decision of a Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 14069 of 1981 (Umesh Singh v. Vice Chancellor, Gorakhpur University) and connected petitions dated January 15, 1982 and a question of general importance affecting a large number of examinees is involved. 2. On September 12, 1981 the Examinations Committee, Gorakhpur University resolved accepting the report of a sub-committee that if the Centre Superintendent, the Observer, the Centre Invigilator, the Flying Squad or the Examiner reports that mass copying has been resorted to in relation to any examination paper at a Centre, and, in case there is no report from the Examiner, upon confirmation by him that mass copying has taken place, there may be deduction made upto 30% out of the maximum papers (numbers ?) in the concerned paper affecting all the examinees at the particular Centre, under the order of a Sub Committee comprising of the Dean of Faculty, the Head of the Department and a Teacher nominated by the Head of the Department. In Writ Petition No. 10552 of 1982 the petitioner secured 55 out of 75 marks in English II Paper in B.A. (Part II) Examination wherin she appeared in April/May, 1982 as a regular student in the St. Andrews College, Gorakhpur. Due to the deduction made to the extent of 30% from the maximum in this paper she was left with 33 marks only-the aggregate being 300 out of 450. The contention is that but for this deduction she would have topped the merit list. In B.A. (Part I) she got 66.6% marks in English and the total was 327 out of 450. In the Intermediate examination 1980 conducted by the U. P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education she obtained First Division with distinction in Sanskrit securing 65% in English and 66.3% in the aggregate. In the High School Examination, 1978 also she got First Division with distinction in English, Sanskrit, Home Science having secured 77% marks in English. 3. In Writ Petition No. 11275 of 1983 the eighteen petitioners appeared in the M.A. (Previous) Examination in politics as the regular students of the K. B. Post Graduate College, Mirzapur affiliated to the Gorakhpur University. In the High School Examination, 1978 also she got First Division with distinction in English, Sanskrit, Home Science having secured 77% marks in English. 3. In Writ Petition No. 11275 of 1983 the eighteen petitioners appeared in the M.A. (Previous) Examination in politics as the regular students of the K. B. Post Graduate College, Mirzapur affiliated to the Gorakhpur University. The examination in paper II (Theory and Practice of Modren Government) took place on April 19, 1983. To pass, a candidate has to secure 36% marks in the aggregate. Due to the deduction made to the extent of 30% out of the maximum of 100 in Paper II aforesaid, the petitioners Nos. 3 to 18 were declared "failed" while petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 passed but suffered loss in Division. 4. The five petitioners in Writ Petition no. 11530 of 1983 appeared in B.Sc. (Agriculture) (Part I) Examination as regular students of the Murli Manohar Post Graduate College, Ballia affiliated to the Gorakhpur University in April 1983. On account of the deduction of 30% marks in paper VI (Animal Husbandry) they were declared 'failed' though in other papers they secured nearly First class marks. In Writ Petition No. 11528 of 1983 the three petitioners appeared in the B. Ed. (Final) Examination, 1983 at the Shri Durgaji Sant Kottar Mahavidyalaya, Chandeshwar, Azamgarh affiliated to the same University as regular students. The marks sheets sent to the College showed them as passed with the aggregate of 225, 245 and 227 marks out of 500 in relation to the petitioners 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Later there was deduction made of 30 marks out of 100 in Theory papers I and II answered by each of these candidates and in the result all of them were declared as having failed. 5. The petitioner Om Prakash Pandey in Writ Petition No. 10554 of 1982 was a candidate at the B.Sc. (Part II) Examination held in April 82 at the Kisan Degree College, Basti of which he was a regular student. In paper 1 (Physical Chemistry) he obtained 11 out of 33 and in paper III (Organic Chemistry) he secured 19 out of 34. Subsequently, however, he was deprived of 9 marks in Paper I and 10 marks in Part III on basis of 30 % cut and in the result he was declared failed and as eligible to supplementary examination. 6. Subsequently, however, he was deprived of 9 marks in Paper I and 10 marks in Part III on basis of 30 % cut and in the result he was declared failed and as eligible to supplementary examination. 6. Aggrieved the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Sri G. P. Mathur learned counsel for the petitioners in two of these petitions urged that the decision taken by the Examination Committee to deduct 30% marks out of the maximum is entirely arbitrary. There was no opportunity in any shape or form accorded to the petitioners to submit their explanation. It is not found that any of them were guilty of adoption of unfair means. The deduction resorted to affect their carreer adversely. If the University authorities were satisfied that there had been mass copying (on) a large scale, the examination could have been cancelled whereby the petitioners would have had another chance to show their merit. The examination in that event, it is submitted, became nonest. Sri R. N. Singh and Sri R. K. Jain learned counsel in other petitions have adopted these arguments and urged further that in an examination the assessment is upon merit. The petitioners could not be denied the fruits of their labour upon extraneous considerations without being accorded opportunity to have their say. The action taken, it is contended, is violative of fair play and is neither reasonable nor just. 7. Sri B. D. Agarwal learned counsel for the Gorakhpur University sought to justify the resolution of the Examinations Committee dated September 12, 1981. Resort to unfair means at the examinations was growing. Cancellation of Examinations on the charge of mass copying was found ineffective apart from being expensive. The deduction of marks might prove a deterrent. The court has to give due weight to the decision taken by the University. The rules of natural justice are flexible. An opportunity to the examinees before taking decision by the academic bodies would have been destructive of pragmatic realism. To accord the opportunity, moreover, would have been empty formality and no prejudice can be said to have been caused because the deduction of marks was in pursuance of a general decision aimed to curb recourse to mass copying. 8. An opportunity to the examinees before taking decision by the academic bodies would have been destructive of pragmatic realism. To accord the opportunity, moreover, would have been empty formality and no prejudice can be said to have been caused because the deduction of marks was in pursuance of a general decision aimed to curb recourse to mass copying. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted also though feebly that the U. P. State Universities Act, 1973 (for short, the Act) or the Statutes framed thereunder do not authorise the Examinations Committee to resort to deduction of marks on the basis of alleged mass copying at the centre of examination. The contentions, in our opinion, are untenable. Gorakhpur University is 'an existing University' of the State within the meaning of section 2 (8) of the Act. The Examination Committee is one of the authorities of the University vide section 19. It is left to the discretion of the University to provide for the constitution thereof in the Ordinances framed by it vide section 29 (1). Sub sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 29 are relevant in connection with the powers and functions of the Examination Committee. They read as under :- (2) Except as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 42, the committee shall supervise generally all examination of the University, including moderation and tabulation, and perform the following other functions, namely- (a) to appoint examiners and moderators and, if necessary, to remove them ; (b) to review from time to time the result of University examinations and submission of reports, thereon to the Academic Council ; (c) to make recommendations to the Academic Council for the improvement of the examination system ; (d) to scrutinise the list of examiners proposed by the Board of Studies, finalise the same and declare the result of the University. (3) The Examinations Committee may appoint such number of sub committees as it thinks fit, and in particular may delegate to any or more persons or sub committees the power to deal with and decide cases relating to the use of unfair means by the examinees, (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, it shall be lawful for an Examinations Committee or, as the case may be, for a sub-committee or any person to whom the Examinations Committee has delegated its power in this behalf under sub section (3) to debar an examinee from future examinations of the University, if in its or his opinion, such examinee is guilty of using unfair means at any such examination." Sub section (4) was introduced by the U. P. (Amendment) Act 75 of 1977. This was in sequence of a Division Bench decision of this court in Agra University v. Ashok Kumar Arora, 1976 ALJ 183. In reference to sub section (3), it was held in that case that it was within the powers of the Examinations Committee to cancel the examinations only in relation to which the use of unfair means by an examinee has been proved but it has no power to debar him from appearing at the future examination. The power to bebar an examinee from future examinations is now expressly conferred upon the Committee. Statute 8.16 of the Gorakhpur University Act provides that the Examinations Committee may debar an examinee from appearing in any future examination if in the opinion of the Committee such examinee was guilty of misbehaviour or using of unfair means at any examination conducted by the University. Sub section (3) of section 29, moreover, authorises the examination committee to appoint sub committee and to delegate to the sub committee "the power to deal with and decide cases relating to the use of the unfair means by the examinees." 9. The powers of the Examinations Committee are thus extensive. The general supervision of examinations of the University is evidently inclusive of power to detect cases of adoption of unfair means and to take suitable remedial measures. The Committee also declares the result. This would cover assessment upon merit under the direction or control of the Committee and the elimination of unsuitables. The general supervision of examinations of the University is evidently inclusive of power to detect cases of adoption of unfair means and to take suitable remedial measures. The Committee also declares the result. This would cover assessment upon merit under the direction or control of the Committee and the elimination of unsuitables. Under sub section (3) then as mentioned alone, there is the express provisions 'to deal with' and decide cases (relating to the use of unfair means by the examinees. To 'deal with' signifies inter alia "to act between two persons, to intervene, or to have to do with" (Blacks' Law Dictionary 5th Edition Page 359). To "decide cases" denotes till more specifically, the power to make "a determination arrived at after consideration of facts, and in legal context, law............It may be employed as referring to ministerial acts as well as to those that are judicial or of a judicial character" (Blacks' Law Dictionary, Page 366). 10. Section 51 (:) of the Act empowers the University to frame ordinances providing inter alia "the conditions under which students shall be admitted to the examinations degrees and diplomas of the University and shall be eligible for the award of such degree and diplomas "clause c" and 'the conduct of examinations clause '. The Agra University framed Ordinance providing that the Examinations Committee may cancel the examination upon evidence that there had been copying on large scale in a paper or hooliganism by the examinees during the period of examination in an examination hall or in the Centre premises. The validity of this Ordinance was upheld by a Division Bench of which the Hon'ble M. N. Shukla, J. (as he then was a member in writ petition no. 10060 of 1975 Anil Kumar Agarwal v. Agra University decided on 23rd September 1975, relying upon section 51 (2) (c) (m) read with section 29 (2)/(3) of the Act. We are informed at the Bar that there is no Ordinance on the subject framed by the Gorakhpur University but that is of little consequence considering the general provision contained in section 29 (2), (3), (4). We are informed at the Bar that there is no Ordinance on the subject framed by the Gorakhpur University but that is of little consequence considering the general provision contained in section 29 (2), (3), (4). The competency of the Examinations Committee, therefore, to decide upon the method of deduction of marks in dealing with or deciding cases of use of unfair means in the examination of the University may not be doubted provided the procedure envisaged is not arbitrary, but fair, just and reasonable, Mass copying in examinations conducted by the University and certain other examining bodies is indisputedly a growing malady. The citadels of learning get polluted with this disease that is highly injurious to the health of the society. Whether this unfortunate phenomenon is due to increasing unemployment on account of which greater importance has come to be attached to the degrees or diplomas than the acquisition of knowledge or sense of frustration and lack of self restraint permeating a section of the youth or on account of fall in the standards and values or the decency and morals is not for us to investigate. It is in the fitness of things that this invokes serious thinking among the educationists and the public administrators. This indeed is the motivating force behind the method evolved by the Gorakhpur University under challenge in these cases. 11. The petitioners' counsel argued that the remedy would be ineffective and defeat the end because it is said, the unscrupulous among the examinees may take recourse to copying and even if they loose 30% of the maximum marks they would not be worse off. If, on the contrary, the examination is cancelled, they would find the adoption of unfair means non rewarding. - In reply the contention for the University is that, if re-examinations were directed, there is no guarantee that they would not re-indulge in copying, that this is highly expensive too and that the deduction of marks may prove a deterrent. These are some of the various factors for these incharge of the affairs to weigh and consider. We neither have the requisite material and dates before us nor the expertise to pronounce authoritatively upon this. 12. The courts have normally regarded it both wise and safe to leave the decisions of academic matters to experts who are familiar with the problems they face. We neither have the requisite material and dates before us nor the expertise to pronounce authoritatively upon this. 12. The courts have normally regarded it both wise and safe to leave the decisions of academic matters to experts who are familiar with the problems they face. It has been said for instance that if the recommendations made by the body of experts, keeping in view the relevant rules and regulations, manifest due consideration of all the relevant factors, the court should be very slow to interfere with such recommendations-University of Mysore v. C. D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 . See also Dr. M. C. Gupta v. Dr. Arun Kumar, (1979) 2 SCC 339 ; State of Bihar v. Dr. Asis Kumar Mukherjee, (1975) 2 SCR 894 . In dealing especially with cases of adoption of unfair means in examinations where the experts have on relevant material and the probabilities after giving opportunity to the individual candidates reached the finding that the examinees were guilty. The courts have been slow to interfere with their assessment on the principle that the problem which the educational institutions have to face from time to time is a serious problem and the courts should not substitute their wisdom unless there be ample justification to do so, vide: Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Bagleshwar Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 875 ; Suresh Kashy George v. University of Kerala, AIR 1969 SC 198 (See also Vice Chancellor, Utkal University v. S. K. Ghosh, AIR 1954 SC 217 . The Supreme Court in Dr. J. P. Kulshrestha v. Chancellor, Allahabad University, AIR (?) SC 2141 observed, however, that "while dealing with legal affairs which have an impact on academic bodies, the views of educational experts are entitled to great consideration but not to exclusive wisdom". In P. K. Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India (Writ Petition No. 587 of 1975) decided by the Supreme Court on December 16, 1983 Desai, J. observed :- "Undoubtedly, the Court must look with respect upon the performance of duties by experts in the respective fields as has been said in Dr. M. C. Gupta's case (supra). In P. K. Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India (Writ Petition No. 587 of 1975) decided by the Supreme Court on December 16, 1983 Desai, J. observed :- "Undoubtedly, the Court must look with respect upon the performance of duties by experts in the respective fields as has been said in Dr. M. C. Gupta's case (supra). However, the task of ushering a society based on rule of law is entrusted to this Court and it cannot abdicate its functions." Assuming that the method devised by the Gorakhpur University may serve as a deterrent or be effective, the question remains whether this meets the basic requirements of fair procedure, and, if not, its effect. The idea of acting fairly in the circumstances of the particular case, is given special prominence since the dictum of Lord Parker, C. J. in Re H. K. (an Infant), (1967) 2 Q. B. 617 at page 630 "it is not, as I see it, a question of acting or being required to act judicially, but of being required to act fairly." In the words of De Smith: Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edition (1980) page 238:- "Since 1967 the concept of a duty to act fairly has often been used by Judges to denote an implied procedural objection. In general it means a duty to observe the rudiments of natural justice for a limited purpose in the exercise of functions that are not analytically judicial but administrator. Given the flexibility of natural justice, it may not have been strictly necessary to use the term "duty to act fairly" at all, but its usage is now firmly established in the judicial vocabulary. Its value has lain in assisting the discharge of functions that are not analytically judicial, and in emphasing that adors in accordance with natural justice does not mean forcing administrative procedures into a straitjacket." 13. In Re Pergaman Press, (1971) Ch. 388 at page 402 Sachs L. J. illustrated the use of fairness when he referred to "that measure of natural justice (which a reasonable mean would regard as fair procedure in particular circumstances" (see; also Pearlberg Varty (1972) 1 WLR 534: Rex v. Secretary of State for the Home Department: Ex. p. Hosenball, (1977) 1 WLR 766 at page 781: Natural justice ; Paul Jackson, 1979 page 103. 14. p. Hosenball, (1977) 1 WLR 766 at page 781: Natural justice ; Paul Jackson, 1979 page 103. 14. The Supreme Court in E. P. Rovappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3 at page 38 observed that where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. Krishna Iyer, J. observed in M/s. Fatehchand Hummatlal v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 670 at page 690, "of course, reasonableness has a processual facts and if the law is lawless in its modalities, it becomes unlaw constitutionally." The concept of 'fair play in action' with which natural justice is equated in administrative or executive sphere has gained new dimensions with the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi's case, (1978) 1 SCC 248 . It was held at page 284 that:- "The Principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality of non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be "right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied. The inquiry must, therefore, his lordship laid down, "always be does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected ?" In the words of Lord Denning, M. R. in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, (1969) 2 Ch. D. 149: "The speeches in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 shows that an administrative body may, in a proper case, be bound to give a person who is affected by their decision an opportunity of making representations." It all depends on whether he has some right or interest, or I would add some legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say." (Emphasis ours) 15. 'Fair play in action' demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action is taken against a person, he must be given an opportunity to be heard. 'Fair play in action' demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action is taken against a person, he must be given an opportunity to be heard. The basic requirement is that the decision be arrived at in a just and objective manner with regard to the relevance of the materials and reasons. The rule, as stated by Lord Morris of Borth-V-Gest at p. 278 in Wiseman v. Borneman, (1969) 2 All. ER 275 is "The principles and procedures are to be applied which, in any particular situation or set of circumstances, are right and just and fair." 16. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequence must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The question as to what are civil consequences was answered by the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 and endorsed also in S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379 :- " "Civil consequences" undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence." It is well established that in a case where the examination result of an individual examinee is cancelled on ground of adoption of unfair means by him there is a charge against him and the cancellation is in the nature of a penalty. The Committee acts quasi-judicially in such a case on the basis of objective consideration of the relevant material and therefore, the principles of natural justice which require that the examinee must be heard must apply to proceedings before the Committee, vide Board of High School and Intermediate Education U. P. v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, AIR 1962 SC 1110 , Board of High School and Intermediate Education U. P. v. Bagleshwar Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 875 . 17. In Ghanshyam Das Gupta, the Supreme Court held that in exercising power to take action on account of adoption of unfair means the Examinations Committee acts quasi judicially and the principles of natural justice which require that the other party, (namely, the examinee in the case) must be heard, will apply to the proceedings before the Committee. 17. In Ghanshyam Das Gupta, the Supreme Court held that in exercising power to take action on account of adoption of unfair means the Examinations Committee acts quasi judicially and the principles of natural justice which require that the other party, (namely, the examinee in the case) must be heard, will apply to the proceedings before the Committee. Observed then further the Supreme Court ;- "It is urged on behalf of the appellant that there are a large number of cases which come up before the Committee under R. 1 (1), and if the Committee is held to act judicially as a quasi-judicial tribunal in the matter it will find it impossible to carry on its task. This in our opinion is no criterion for deciding whether a duty is cast to act judicially in view of all the circumstances of the case. There is no doubt in our mind that considering the totality of circumstances the Committee has to act judicially when taking action under R. 1 (1). As to the manner in which it should give an opportunity to the examinee concerned to be heard, that is a matter which can be provided by Regulations or Bye-laws if necessary. As was pointed out in Local Government Board v. Alridge, 1915 AC 120 all that is required is that the other party should have an opportunity of adequately presenting his case. But what the procedure should be in detail will depend on the nature of the tribunal. There is no doubt that many of the powers of the Committee under Chap. VI are of administrative nature, but where quasi-judicial duties are entrusted to an administrative body like this it becomes a quasi-judicial body for performing these duties and it can prescribe its own procedure so long as the principles of natural justice are followed and adequate opportunity of presenting his case is given to the examinee. It is not however, necessary to pursue this matter further, for it is not in dispute that no opportunity whatsoever was given to the respondents in this case to give an explanation and present their case before the Committee." 18. In the Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Km. Chitra Srivastava, AIR 1970 SC 1039 the result was cancelled due to shortage in attendance of the respondent without notice to her. In the Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Km. Chitra Srivastava, AIR 1970 SC 1039 the result was cancelled due to shortage in attendance of the respondent without notice to her. This was nullified on the footing that "to deny her the fruits of her labour cannot but be called a penalty" (See also Suresh Kashy George v. University of Kerala, AIR 1969 SC 198 ; Prem Prakash Kabuniya v. The Punjab University, AIR 1972 SC 1408 ; Tribendra Lal Chowdhery v. Gauhuti University, AIR 1983 Gauhati 73 (Division Bench). Needless it is to add that the distinction observed at one time between administrative and quasi-judicial function in the matter of application of principles of natural justice is now 'scotched'. Learned counsel for the University argued that a case of mass copying stands on a different pedestal. Reliance is placed upon the decision in Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Singh, (1970) 1 SCC 648 which constitutes the sheet anchor of the contention that no kind of hearing or opportunity needs to have been given to the petitioners in order to deduct 30 per cent marks from the maximum. In that case Hidayatullah, C. J., speaking for the Supreme Court repelled the plea of natural justice when a whole examination was cancelled by the concerned University authorities. The Court examined the grounds for cancellation of examination and satisfied itself that there was undoubted abundance of evidence that students generally had outside assistance in answering questions. His Lordship observed "This is not a case of any particular individual who is being charged with adoption of unfair means but of the conduct of all the examiness or at least a vast majority of them at a particular centre. If it is not a question of charging any one individually with unfair means but to condemn the examination as ineffective for the purpose it was held, must the Board give an opportunity to all the candidates to represent their cases ? We think not. It was not necessary for the Board to give an opportunity to the candidates if the examinations as a whole were being cancelled. The Board had not charged any one with unfair means so that he could claim to defend himself. The examination was vitiated by adoption of unfair means on a mass scale. We think not. It was not necessary for the Board to give an opportunity to the candidates if the examinations as a whole were being cancelled. The Board had not charged any one with unfair means so that he could claim to defend himself. The examination was vitiated by adoption of unfair means on a mass scale. In these circumstances it would be wrong to insist that the Board must hold a detailed inquiry into the matter and exa-(sic) play were not observed in this case. Reliance was placed upon Ghanshyam Das Gupta's case, 1962 Supp. 3 SCR 36 = AIR 1962 SC 1110 to which we referred earlier. There the examination result of three candidates were cancelled, and this Court held that they should have received an opportunity of explaining their conduct. It was also said that even if the inquiry involved a large number of persons the Committee should frame proper regulations for the conduct of such inquiries but not deny the opportunity. We do not think that case has any application. Surely it was not intended that where the examination as a whole was vitiated, say by leakage of papers or by destruction of some of the answer books or by discovery of unfair means practised on a vast scale that an inquiry would be made giving a chance to every one appearing at that examination to have his say. What the Court intended to lay down was that if any particular person was to be proceeded against, he must have a proper chance to defend himself and this did not obviate the necessity of giving an opportunity even though the number of persons proceeded against was large. The Court was then not considering the right of an examining body to cancel its own examination when it was satisfied that the examination was not properly conducted or that in the conduct of the examination the majority of examinees had not conducted themselves as they should have. To make such decisions depend upon a fullfledged judicial inquiry would hold up the functioning of such autonomous bodies as Universities and School Board. To make such decisions depend upon a fullfledged judicial inquiry would hold up the functioning of such autonomous bodies as Universities and School Board. While we do not wish to whittle down the requirements of natural justice and fair play in cases where such requirement may be said to arise, we do not want that this Court should be understood as having stated that an inquiry with a right to representation must always proceed in every case, however, different." 19. The predominent feature of that case upon which the Supreme Court laid considerable stress was that the examination was condemned as 'ineffective' for the purpose it was held; the examinations as a whole were being cancelled; the examination was treated in its entirety as vitiated; "the examination as a whole had to go". No particular examinee was being proceeded against; the right upheld, in other words, was of an examining body to cancel its own examination when it was satisfied that the examination was not properly conducted". This constitutes the foundation of that decision. To extend that decision to a case where/the examination is not treated as ineffective or vitiated as a whole and individual examinees are dealt with but without opportunity of any kind being accorded is, in our opinion, unwarranted. 20. In Subhas Chandra, it is no less significant, the case of Ghanshyam Das Gupta, AIR 1962 SC 1110 (supra) is distinguished, but not dissented from. 20. In Subhas Chandra, it is no less significant, the case of Ghanshyam Das Gupta, AIR 1962 SC 1110 (supra) is distinguished, but not dissented from. The distinction made is a premise that in Ghanshyam Das Gupta "it was not intended that where the examination as a whole was vitiated, say by leakage of papers or by destruction of some of the answer books or by discovery of unfair means practised on vast scale;" there be detailed enquiry held giving a chance to every one appearing at the examination to have his say, if there is no cancellation of examination as a whole, as in the instant case, and the University decides to treat this as effective, the dictum of Ghanshyam Das Gupta governs namely, that "even if the inquiry involved a large number of persons the Committee should frame proper regulations for the conduct of such inquiries but not deny the opportunity." Undoubtedly what is binding on the court in a subsequent case is not the conclusion arrived at in a previous decision but the ratio of that decision, for it is the ratio which binds as a precedent and not the conclusion-See S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 (Supplementary) SCC 87 at page 271. Does the ratio in Subhash Chandra exclude hearing or opportunity in any form even in a case where the examination as a whole in the centre is not cancelled but there is deduction of marks to the extent of 30 per cent of the maximum despite there being no finding that there is anything in the answer book to suggest that the concerned candidate received any external aid and would that be fair, just and reasonable? Can that be classed as fair play in action? This is the crux of the dispute. 21. In the system under which the examination is conducted by the University, the underlying assumption is that there is the element of secrecy in the sense that there is no leakage of papers; there is the requisite serenity observed in the examination hall sans disturbance of law and order; the candidates do not take assistance of any material other than that authorised and there is fair assessment of the merits of candidates on their academic performance. The cancellation of examination at a centre has therefore, been held valid on the theory that there was no examination conducted in conformity with the basic norms. The University in such a case declines to give recognition to it; the candidates get the opportunity to reappear; since examination has not taken place, they can have no cause of grievance nor a right to be heard. The examination in that event is non est or has become void. In Shiv Prakash Varma v. Vice-Chancellor, 1983 Education Cases 98 a Division Bench of which one of us (B. D. Agarwal, J.) was a member explained that when due to premature leakage of a particular paper, the event of an examination in that paper itself is cancelled, it is improper to call it cancellation of the result, because the factum of giving of that examination itself becomes irrelevant or redundant. The answer books of none of the candidates are examined or assessed. In that case the University authorities found that the mathematics paper had been prematurely leaked out. For that reason they cancelled it and directed that it will be held again on a future date. This was upheld observing :- "When the result of a particular candidate is cancelled, the examination held for the various papers for the particular course remains in existence as a recognizable entity. The examination of all such papers is enforceable and operative. It is utilized for assessing the worth of other candidates who have not used unfair means and whose results have not been cancelled. But where the holding of an examination in a particular paper or papers is itself nullified by the university, it is incorrect to say that the result in the examination has been cancelled. The correct way of putting it is that the examination in that paper itself has been cancelled or quashed, with the result that the fact that an examination in that paper was held is of historical significance only. It has no operational afficacy. Such an examination cannot be used by the University for any practical purpose in relation to any of the candidates. The examination becomes non est. It is held again". 22. It has no operational afficacy. Such an examination cannot be used by the University for any practical purpose in relation to any of the candidates. The examination becomes non est. It is held again". 22. If an examination becomes void, it is difficult to accept the position that it can be treated as a valid examination only for the purpose of awarding punishment to an individual candidate for using unfair means at that examination. In the event, however, of the deduction of marks as provided in the present the consequences ensuing are materially different. The examination is treated as valid and operative; in view of the deduction of marks as resorted to herein to the extent of 30 per cent of the maximum (without a finding, it may be emphasised at the cost of repetition that the candidate is guilty of deriving assistance through unfair means some of the candidates who would have been successful otherwise as in the instant case were declared 'failed' and some other like the petitioner in writ petition no. 10551 of 1982 who would have found place in the merit list were deprived of it. There was clear loss of division without a chance to re-appear in the examination for the concerned degree. Evidently, the method adopted in the present leads to denial to the candidates the fruits of their labour. If A secures 70 marks out of 100 on assessment by the examiner in the normal course applying the standard relevant to the examinees in general, the compulsory deduction would cut this down to 40. Likewise if he gets 40, the marks would be slashed to 10 only. Prejudice caused to the petitioners in the process is writ large at its face. Growing unemployment among the educated youth is a matter of common knowledge. Competition naturally gets tougher every day. The academic performance in the University examinations carries weight in competitions and the loss of a year may react adversely. There can be no denying that this hits at the legitimate expectations of the students and it is difficult to treat this as different from imposing a penalty. The petitioners have had no option in the matter of the selection of particular examination centres. It is none of their seeking that they happened to find their seats in particular rooms. There can be no denying that this hits at the legitimate expectations of the students and it is difficult to treat this as different from imposing a penalty. The petitioners have had no option in the matter of the selection of particular examination centres. It is none of their seeking that they happened to find their seats in particular rooms. It is not found that they instigated, connived at or encouraged those taking recourse to unfair means. It did not lie in their power to exclude them or to prevent them from taking this course. The Superintendent Examination Centre or the Invigilator had not reported that any of the petitioners was noticed resorting to copying; the Examiner is not stated to have detected or even suspected that these petitioners for themselves availed of any unauthorised aid. The petitioners have had no occasion absolutely to plead their innocence. In our opinion even if the scheme devised were to serve as a deterrent on its procedural aspect this suffers from arbitrariness and it cannot be classed as fair, just or reasonable. This certainly is not what one might claim as fair play in action. 23. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. In so far as the assessment of examiners upon the academic performonce is concerned, no body claims a right of representation or of hearing. That is within the exclusive domain of the academicians. But where considerations such as of disciplinary control or the eradication of the social evil of mass copying creep in and the resultant is not the restoration of status quo by cancellation of examination but compulsory deduction of marks, the Court would step in to ensure in its supervisory jurisdiction that the action taken does not suffer from arbitrariness. The argument that this compulsory deduction of marks be itself regarded as forming part if the evaluation of the answer books upon merit is untenable. In the counter affidavit of the University there is absolutely no averment that upon scrutiny of the answers recorded by these candidates they were suspected of having relied on crutches. The deduction of marks was resorted to because some others whose identity remains undisclosed adopted unfair means. In Jawaharlal Nehru University v. B. S. Narwal, (1980) 4 SCC 480 the respondent had not cleared a single 'core course' upto the end of three semesters. The deduction of marks was resorted to because some others whose identity remains undisclosed adopted unfair means. In Jawaharlal Nehru University v. B. S. Narwal, (1980) 4 SCC 480 the respondent had not cleared a single 'core course' upto the end of three semesters. Due to the authorities of the University being dissatisfied with the performance of the respondent he was upon the recommendation of the Centre of Russian Students removed from the rolls of the University. The question arising was whether the respondent was entitled to an opportunity of being heard before action was taken removing him from the rolls of the University. This was answered in the negative by the Supreme Court, Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Court observed :- "What should be mentioned right at the outset is that this is not a case of expulsion of a student pursuant to a claim, by the authorities of a University, to discipline the student at their discretion and that right of the student to freedom and justice. The case, is merely one of assessment of the academic performance of a student which the prescribed authorities of the University are best qualified and the courts perhaps, are least qualified to judge. Nor can there be any question of any opportunity to be heard being given. One does not hear of a claim to be heard when a candidate fails to qualify at an aptitude or intelligence test, written or oral. When duly qualified and competent academic authorities examine and assess the work of a student over a period and declare his work to be unsatisfactory we are unable to see how any question of a right to be heard can arise. The duty of an academic body in such a case is 'to form an unbiased assessment of the student's standard of work based on the entirety of his record and potential. That is their function. The very nature of the function of academic adjudication (if the use of the word adjudication is permissible in the context) appears to us to negative any right to an opportunity to be heard. If the assessment by the academic body permitted the consideration of 'non-academic' circumstances also, a right to be heard may be implied. But if the assessment is confined to academic performance, a right to be heard may not be so implied." 24. If the assessment by the academic body permitted the consideration of 'non-academic' circumstances also, a right to be heard may be implied. But if the assessment is confined to academic performance, a right to be heard may not be so implied." 24. His Lordship, as noted above, remarked that "if the assessment by the academic body permitted the consideration of 'non academic' circumstances also, a right to be heard may be implied." The observations of Donaldson, J. in Regina v. Aston University Senate Ex-parte Proffey, (1969) 2 Q. B. 538 are illustrative of a case where the examiners took into consideration a "wide range of extraneous factors, some of which by their very nature, for example personal and family problems might only have been known to the students themselves." At page 554 Donaldson, J. observed ; "I can understand it being argued in the regulations that regard was to be had primarily and possibly exclusively to the examination results and performances in non-examinable subjects. However, the examiners themselves did not adopt this approach, as I think rightly, and they considered a wide range of extraneous factors, some of which by their very nature, for example personal and family problems, might only have been known to the students themselves. In such circumstances and with so much at stake, common fairness to the students, which is all that natural justice, is, and the desire of the examiners to exercise their discretion upon the most solid basis, alike demanded that before a final decision was reached the students should be given an opportunity to be heard either orally or in writing, in person or by their representatives as might be most appropriate. It was, in my judgment, the examiner 'duty and the students' right that such audience be given. It was not given and there was a breach of the rules of natural justice." In the case of Jawaharlal Nehru University v. B. S. Narwal (supra) this case was distinguished because therein the assessment of the examiners was not confined to the academic performance. 25. The decision in Subhas Chandra (supra) came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench in Mohinder Singh Gill, (1978) 1 SCC 405 (supra). 25. The decision in Subhas Chandra (supra) came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench in Mohinder Singh Gill, (1978) 1 SCC 405 (supra). The observation made significantly was that the fact that the enquiry involved a large number of persons is, as observed in Ghanshyam Das Gupta's case not material and that the position may have verified if in Mohinder Singh Gill poll had been 'Cancelled'. It follows clearly, therefore, that Subhas Chandra's case cannot be made applicable where the examination has not been cancelled or treated as non est. In the words of Krishna Iyer, J. :- "Even in the case of University examinations it is not a universal rule that notice need not be given. Ghanshyam Das Gupta's case illustrates this aspect. Even there, when an examination result of three candidates was cancelled the Court imported natural justice. It was told that even if the enquiry involved a large number of persons, the committee should frame proper regulations for the conduct of such enquiries but not deny the opportunity. That case was distinguished in Subhas Chandra the differentia being that in one case the right exercised was of the examining body to cancel its own examinations since it was satisfied that the examination was not properly conducted. It may be a parallel in electoral situations if the Election Commission cancels a poll because it is satisfied that the procedure adopted has gone away on a whole sale basis." At page 434 also it was said :- "Nor is there ground to be frightened of dealy, inconvenience and expense, if natural justice gains access. For fairness itself is a flexible, pragmatic and relative concept, not a rigid, ritualistic or sophisticated abstraction. It is not a bull in a china shop, nor a bee in one's bonnet. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation;' nothing more-but nothing less." 26. The argument advanced in Ghanshyam Das Gupta was also that there were a large number of cases which came up before the Committee and if the Committee were held to act judicially as a quasi judicial tribunal in the matter it would find it impossible to carry on its task. The argument advanced in Ghanshyam Das Gupta was also that there were a large number of cases which came up before the Committee and if the Committee were held to act judicially as a quasi judicial tribunal in the matter it would find it impossible to carry on its task. This was repelled stating: "This in our opinion is no criterion for deciding whether a duty is cast to act judicially in view of all the circumstances of the case." In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 at page 685, Sarkaria, J. speaking for the majority said; "The rule cannot be sacrificed at the alter of administrative convenience or celerity; for "convenience and justice as Lord Atkin felicitously put it" are often not on speaking terms". In his dissenting note Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed at page 713:-"Even incases of pre-emptive action, if the statute so provides or if the courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation." Sri Agarwal lenrned counsel for the University urged also that the case in hand be upon practical consideration treated to fall within the category of exception to those governed by the rule of fair play in action. We are unable to agree. The principle is well settled. Analysing the exceptions enumerated in De Smith's Judicial review of Administrative Action (4th Edition) pages 183-194, Bhagwati, J. remarked in Maneka Gandhi (supra) ;- "The word 'exception' is really a misnomer because in these exclusionary cases, the audi-alteram partem rule is held inappplicable not by way of an exception to "fair play in action", but because nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case". (The italicising is ours). This as well appears in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) in the words of Krishna Iyer, J. :- "The exception to the rules of natural justice are a misnomer or rather are but a shorthand form of expressing the idea that in those exclusionary cases nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case." 27. To call such cases an exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude 'fair play in action' but adopt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing-vide, Swadeshi Cotton Mills Case (supra) page 688. Chinnappa Reddy, J. has put this as under in S. L. Kapoor, (1980) 4 SCC 379 at page 395 :- "In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal." 28. In the opinion of Paul Jackson, Natural Justice 1979 page 133, of all the grounds for excluding the rules of natural justice none is more vague than that of practical considerations. "The learned author posed the question which in itself is suggestive of the answer, viz.". Might the courts not hold that "fairness or public policy required that each case was propoerly examined on its merits and even, in extreme cases, that a fair decision could only be reached after interviewing a particular applicant?" The civil consequences ensuing to the concerned candidates as discussed above are not meagre or negligible so as to say that there is nothing unfair in the rules of fair play in action not being observed. It may not also be contended that if an opportunity were given, the candidates would have had nothing to submit in defence. The contents of the answer books may have been depended upon as constituting intrinsic evidence in their favour. There are indeed recognised justification for requiring a hearing even where there appears on its face no answer to a charge. The contents of the answer books may have been depended upon as constituting intrinsic evidence in their favour. There are indeed recognised justification for requiring a hearing even where there appears on its face no answer to a charge. First, experience shows that unanswerable charges, may, if the opportunity be given, be answered; inexplicable conduct be explained. Secondly, the party condemned unheard will feel a sense of injustice, Thirdly, suspicion is inevitable that a body which refuses a hearing before acting does so because of the lack of evidence and not because of its strength vide Natural Justice : Paul Jackson Page 137. Whether a duty arises in a particular case to issue a show cause notice before inflicting a penalty does not depend on the authority's satisfaction that the person to be penalised has no defence but on the nature of the order proposed to be passed-vide Km. Chitra Srivastava, AIR 1970 SC 1089 (supra). In the case of S. L. Kapoor (supra) the law stated was "where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approves the non observance of natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs. But it will be a pernicious principle to apply in other situations where conclusions are controversial, however, slightly, and penalties are discretionary." The instant case fall squarely in the second category. In Triambak Pati Tripathi v. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, AIR 1973 Allahabad 1 (Full Bench) cited for the University the finding was of mass copying but the material fact is there was enquiry held relating to the individuals suspected (including the petitioner). This, therefore, stands on a different footing. In considering the scope of enquiry, it was held no doubt that personal hearing is not an ingredient of natural justice and that unlike Article 311 (2) of the Constitution (as it then was) the rules of natural justice do not require that second show cause notice be given regarding the proposed punishment. In Umesh Chandra Pathak v. Gorakhpur University, 1982 Education Cases 161 also the case was of mass copying. In Umesh Chandra Pathak v. Gorakhpur University, 1982 Education Cases 161 also the case was of mass copying. The Division Bench of this Court held that this could not preclude the University from proceeding, as it did, with the examining of each individual case of students appearing from the Centre and taking action against those who are guilty of using unfair means. In their Lordships' view the course adopted was 'fairer' than the cancellation of examination suggested for the petitioner therein. It was submitted before us for the University that in the event of cancellation of examination also the candidates may be deprived of the benefit of their performance and, may be, on being re-examined they do not fair so well. The answer to this line of reasoning is given by a Division Bench in Miss Blaise Louis v. Nagpur University, AIR 1973 Bombay 5 with which we respectfully agree. That case also arose from a resort to mass copying. In order to protect the interest of those students who were likely to be adversely affected in their further educational and professional career on account of mal practices adopted at the concerned centres the Executive Council cancelled the examinations held in those centres. It was argued that the University should have sorted out students who indulged into the mal practice. It was held that this was based on misapprehension of "the nature of the action taken by the Executive Council". The enquiry was directed into the conduct of the examination as a whole which, if found to be vitiated by use of unfair means on a large scale, the examinations of all the students, whether they did or did not use unfair means, were liable to be cancelled. This would, it was observed, no doubt result in hardship to some honest students but in the very nature of the circumstances it would not be possible to find out which of the students did or did not use unfair means and it appeared to their Lordships that cancellation of examinations was "the only course" which was open to the University. 29. The emphasis is not upon a set pattern of enquiry being followed in all cases. There is no rigidity about the procedure; the concept of fair play admits of real flexibility; the principle of natural justice is not put into a strait jacket. 29. The emphasis is not upon a set pattern of enquiry being followed in all cases. There is no rigidity about the procedure; the concept of fair play admits of real flexibility; the principle of natural justice is not put into a strait jacket. The test is what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances. In the off quoted words of Tucker L. J. appearing in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 All. ER 109: "The requisites of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with and so forth." What opportunity may be regarded as reasonable would necessarily depend on the practical necessities of the situation but "Whatever standard of natural justice is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case." Audi Alteram Partem rule, it has been held, is "a rule of vital importance in the field of administrative law and it must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands." (See Maneka Gandhi, (1978) 1 SCC at page 291.) It is in this sense that Bhagwati, J. refers to the touchstone of pragmatic realism and administers the caution namely that "The court must make every effort to salvage this cordinal rule (audi alteram partem) to the maximum extent possible in a given case." Our objection is not to circumscription dictated by circumstances, but to annihilation as an easy escape from a benigant, albeit inconvenient obligation." (Mohinder Singh Gill (1978) 1 SCC at page 437). The rules may undoubtedly be tailored to suit the nature of the proceeding in relation to which the particular right is claimed as a component of natural justice, vide : A. K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 27 (see also : Shri Krishnadas Tikara v. State of M. P., AIR 1977 SC 1691 ). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the status, the subject and the situation; Swadeshi Cotton Mills' case, (1981) 1 SCC at page 713. The decision in Hira Nath Mishra v. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi, AIR 1973 SC 1260 and the Keseva Mills Co. Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the status, the subject and the situation; Swadeshi Cotton Mills' case, (1981) 1 SCC at page 713. The decision in Hira Nath Mishra v. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi, AIR 1973 SC 1260 and the Keseva Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 389 are illustrative on the point. The respondent is not right however, in our view, in stretching this flexibility as implying the total exclusion even though without compulsive necessity shown to exist. If cancellation of examination is considered ineffective, the authorities may perhaps think of certain basic charges such, for instance, as the open book examinations; setting of questions on objective pattern; putting in problems and insisting upon reasoning instead of bare narratives the answers to which depend on cramming; attaching greater weight to the performance in the classes, the seminar, periodical tests round the academic year and so on. It is upto the educationists to find the solution. If the decision is to deduct marks as devised by the Gorakhpur University, the deduction must in all fairness, be preceded by an opportunity may, be, short to the candidates to put in their representation on the subject and consideration whether their conduct or performance has, in any manner, been blameworthy. 30. Shri Agarwal learned counsel appearing for the University relied on N. Ramanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 2641 and argued that where Government takes decision to abolish a post there needs be no opportunity accorded to the incumbent of the post. This is also the view taken in K. Rajendran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1982) 2 SCC 273 . We do not find that this bears analogy to the facts of the case before us. The power to create or abolish a post is a matter of governmental policy dictated by exigencies of circumstances and administrative necessity. In the abolition of post there is no element of personal blameworthiness of the Government servant. The abolition of post is not a personal penalty against the incumbent thereof. This does not confer on the person holding the abolished post any right to hold the post or be provided for against some alternative assignment. In the abolition of post there is no element of personal blameworthiness of the Government servant. The abolition of post is not a personal penalty against the incumbent thereof. This does not confer on the person holding the abolished post any right to hold the post or be provided for against some alternative assignment. For the petitioners it was also contended that the complete absence of any guidelines in the impugned resolution of the Examination Committee to determine the extent of deduction of marks further accentuates the element of Arbitrariness. We are not impressed with this argument. The task has been entrusted to a sub committee comprising of senior teachers and it is reasonably expected that they may evolve norms consistent with reason and fairness and keeping in view the object to be subserved. The sting lies however in the complete exclusion of opportunity to the candidates at any stage to plead their innocence. 31. In Umesh Singh v. Vice Chancellor, Gorakhpur Univerity, Writ Petition No. 14069 of 1981 decided on January 15, 1982 the Division Bench was seized with the same question that is raised before us. Their Lordships relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Subhas Chand (supra) and observed :- "It is true that it was open to the Gorakhpur University to cancel the result but if the University did not do so and taking students' interest into account a method which was more beneficial to them, the petitioners are not within their rights to complain about the same. As a result of this method some of the students must have passed B.Sc. (Ag.) Part I Examination which they would have otherwise failed if the examination was cancelled in its entirety. The action has been taken in pursuance of the report of the sub-committee which considered the matter in all its aspects. Since we find that the method adopted by the Gorakhpur University is just and fair, we cannot interfere in this case." 32. In our considered opinion this does not meet the point. The fundamental distinguishing features of the decision in Subhas Chand do not appear to have been taken notice of. Since we find that the method adopted by the Gorakhpur University is just and fair, we cannot interfere in this case." 32. In our considered opinion this does not meet the point. The fundamental distinguishing features of the decision in Subhas Chand do not appear to have been taken notice of. As we have stated above also the ratio of a judgment is the logic and reasoning thereof and not merely its conclusion as was authoritatively held in Quinn v. Leathern, 1910 AC 495 followed in State of Orissa v. Sudansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647 . Moreover, the new dimensions of Article 14 of the Constitution as high lighted in E. P. Royappa, (.1974) 1 SCC 248 fsupra) and Mohinder Singh Gill, (1981) 1 SCC 405 and Maneka Gandhi, (1978) 1 SCC 248 cannot be overlooked. We have explained above the unfairness and great prejudice involved to the candidates. In our judgment the decision of the Examination Committee does not pass the test of fair play in action. The case of Umesh Singh (supra) does not lay down good law. For the discussion made in the above, these writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The resolution No. 13 of the Examination Committee, Gorakhpur University dated September 12, 1981 is quashed. The Examinations Committee is directed to consider expeditiously the cases of the petitioners afresh without taking the above mentioned resolution into account. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.