Judgment :- 1. The second appeal has a theme on which social scientists and academic writers have written much. 'Islamic Perspective' Vol. I dealing with'Status of Women in Islam', published by the Institute of Islamic Studies, Bombay, is one of the latest on the topic. It is inexpedient for the courts to attempt more than a resolution of the factual controversy and an interpretation of the statutory provisions arising in a case. The facts of the case centre round the tragic life of a Muslim girl The statute to be interpreted is the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. Suhara was just about 17 when she got married on the 5th of February, 1971. In August 1972 she delivered a child. About an year later, the husband returned from Visakhapatnam, where he was having a trade at the time of his marriage He settled down in Badagara thereafter, with a hotel business. The second child was born in July 1974. That was admittedly at the residence of the wife at Tellicherry. On 19-6-1976, the wife presented the petition seeking a divorce from the husband. She alleged cruelty on the part of her husband and a total neglect on his part to maintain her, after she had been taken to her house in April, 1973. She stated that thereafter, there was only a solitary occasion on which he had come to her house but had returned without making any enquiry whatever about her welfare. 3. The husband threw the blame on the cousins of his wife. According to him, they had pressurised her to seek a divorce. The petition was not a voluntary act of his wife. He claimed to have remitted money by money orders. Towards the later period it was the wife who declined to receive the money order or even his letters. He denied the allegation of cruelty levelled against him. 4. The courts below dismissed the suit, concurrently. The wife had not established the acts of cruelty by independent evidence. According to them, a case for dissolution on the ground of default in maintaining the wife had not been established. 5. The wife has come up in second appeal. The evidence in the case is not elaborate. Only the parties have given evidence in respect of the respective versions. According to them, a case for dissolution on the ground of default in maintaining the wife had not been established. 5. The wife has come up in second appeal. The evidence in the case is not elaborate. Only the parties have given evidence in respect of the respective versions. The documentary evidence (a money order coupon of 12-6-1976) is totally useless as it does not throw any light on the controversy between the parties. 6. The trial court misdirected itself in confusing the issue about the failure of the husband to maintain the wife by mixing it up with the omission of the wife to establish acts of cruelty and the absence of any justification on her part to withdraw from the company of the husband. Even that court, however, observed that "the testimony of the defendant as dw.1 remains uncorroborated." In stronger terms, were the later observations: "It may he mentioned that the defendant has not produced any letter which would show that the plaintiff is not acting willingly or voluntarily. The letter referred to in the written statement of the defendant has not been produced and exhibited in the suit. The defendant has not either established by any convincing evidence that the plaintiff expressed her unwillingness to go with the defendant in an application for the same alleged to have been preferred by the defendant." 7. The appellate court considered the question of non-payment of maintenance in a more pointed manner. It referred to the evidence of the wife about the omission of the husband to visit her or to pay her anything for a period of 31/2 years. It was, however, not prepared to act on her testimony for the reason that "she was not in a position to say when exactly defendant visited her." She had admitted that the husband had gone to her house at the time of the second delivery. That was on 29-7-1974. When the visit of the husband on 29-7-1974 has been admitted by the wife herself, according to the appellate court, it was safe to infer that he had met the necessary expenses The suit was filed on 19-6-1976 within two years from 29-7-1974, the date of the visit of the husband. According to the appellate court, there was no neglect or failure on the part of the husband to maintain the wife for two years. According to the appellate court, there was no neglect or failure on the part of the husband to maintain the wife for two years. As a corollary, she was disentitled to get divorce on the ground of neglect or failure to maintain for the period of two years. 8. The question for consideration in the second appeal is whether the view so taken by the courts below is vitiated by any substantial error of law so as to warrant interference in the limited jurisdiction of the second appeal. I am clearly of the view that the conclusion has been so vitiated. The reasoning behind the view needs elaboration. 9. The pleadings, the evidence and even the relevant findings of the courts in the case would justify the following inferences: (1) There is total lack of evidence to support the plea of the husband about his having paid anything by way of maintenance except his interested testimony. (2) Ever since April 1973, she had been in her own bouse. (3) The husband had chosen to visit the wife only once, and that too on the occasion of the delivery of the premature child who passed away within three weeks of its birth. 10. Could a casual visit, even as found by the lower appellate court, on one day (29-7-1974) within a period of two years, and even an offer then to present her some money and some clothes, amount to a provision for maintenance to the wife as provided under the law, is the question. The answer is better attempted by extracting that provision itself, which reads: "2. A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of the following grounds namely:- (ii) that the husband has neglected or failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years;" 11. The historical and social background of the legislation can be usefully borne in mind in understanding the above provision. That the status and respect the Prophet gave to women transformed the basic character of the medieval society is now well recognised. According to Qurratulain Hyder, "Some of the Quranic injunctions regarding women were interpreted or codified in a way which became disadvantageous to women. Male chauvinism is not a new phenomenon." (See "Indian Women", edited by Devaki Jain, page 190). According to Qurratulain Hyder, "Some of the Quranic injunctions regarding women were interpreted or codified in a way which became disadvantageous to women. Male chauvinism is not a new phenomenon." (See "Indian Women", edited by Devaki Jain, page 190). Even then, in the Middle East, the women continued to divorce and remarry with great ease. To the medieval Hindu society of Northern India, however, divorce and widow remarriage were virtually unknown. There appears to have been some inter-play in the Indian Society arising out of the fusion of the customs of those in the Middle East and the equally strong ones in force in India. The resultant position as it emerged, is pictured as: "A woman enters her lord and master's house in a bridal palanquin and leaves it only on the bier, became the unwritten law among the well-to-do Muslims." (See page 192) 12. After the dawn of the 20th century, there had been remarkable awakening of the Muslim women. The movement received considerable momentum from lawyers like Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah and judges like Justice Karamat Hussain. The immediate background of the Act is sketched by Qurratulain Hyder at page 199 in the following words: "Nevertheless, social reforms and educational activities remained confined to the urban middle classes. It is true that women succeeded in their agitation against the custom in Punjab where the Muslims traditionally followed the Hindu Law of inheritance and denied their daughters the one-third share in property as commanded by the Muslim Shariat. Also, as a result of women's agitation the Shariat Act was passed in 1939, which safeguarded the women's right to obtain divorce". 13. The difficulties the Muslim women were having in their matrimonial relations is reflected in some of the judicial decisions of the time. The grounds on which a wife would claim divorce were limited. (See Mt. Ghulam Fatima v. Nur Ahmad, AIR. 1931 Lahore 721). A husband quitting the conjugal domicile without making any provision on her behalf was even then recognised as a ground for divorce. (See Ameer Ali's Mahomedan Law, Vol. 2, 5th Edn., page 520). The quitting of the conjugal domicile was equated to desertion in Ghulam Fatima's case supra 14. (See Mt. Ghulam Fatima v. Nur Ahmad, AIR. 1931 Lahore 721). A husband quitting the conjugal domicile without making any provision on her behalf was even then recognised as a ground for divorce. (See Ameer Ali's Mahomedan Law, Vol. 2, 5th Edn., page 520). The quitting of the conjugal domicile was equated to desertion in Ghulam Fatima's case supra 14. Some insight is also obtained about the background in which the Act was made from the Statement of Objects and Reasons: "There is no provision in the Hanafi Code of Muslim Law enabling a married Muslim woman to obtain a decree from the Court dissolving her marriage in case the husband neglects to maintain her, makes her life miserable by deserting or persistently maltreating her or absconds leaving her unprovided for and under certain other circumstances. The absence of such a provision has entailed unspeakable misery to innumerable Muslim women in British India. The Hanafi Jurists however, have clearly laid down that in cases in which the application of Hanafi Law causes hardship, it is permissible to apply the provisions of the "Maliki, Shafi or Hambali Law" Acting on this principle the Ulemas have issued fat was to the effect that in cases enumerated in Clause.3, Part A of this Bill (now see S.2 of the Act), a married Muslim woman may obtain a decree dissolving her marriage A lucid exposition of this principle can be found in the book called "Heelat-um Najeza" published by Maulana Ashraf Ali Sahib who has made an exhaustive study of the provisions of Maliki Law which under the circumstances prevailing in India may be applied to such cases. This has been approved by a large number of Ulemas who have put their seals of approval on the book. As the Courts are sure to hesitate to apply the Maliki Law to the case of a Muslim woman, legislation recognising and enforcing the above mentioned principle is called for in order to relieve the sufferings of countless Muslim women". 15. Legislative intervention of great impact was not unknown even in the earlier times. In 1829,the practice of "driving widows into flames by a diabolical complication of force and fraud" was outlawed by Lord W. Bentinck. 15. Legislative intervention of great impact was not unknown even in the earlier times. In 1829,the practice of "driving widows into flames by a diabolical complication of force and fraud" was outlawed by Lord W. Bentinck. Referring to that situation, Alfred Lyall in his book'Asiatic Studies, states: "These and other similar domestic institutions (as slavery or suicide) were gradually disallowed upon the plea that such errors were so unanimously condemned by every system of secular law and morality in the world, that even genuine religious convictions must in such instances yield to the necessity of civilised police,"(emphasis supplied) 16. The provisions of the enactment came to be construed by Tyabji J. in Asmabai v. Umer Mahomed, AIR. 1941 Sind 23. We are not directly concerned with the point that actually arose for decision in that case. The question turned on the interpretation of two years during which the neglect of the husband to maintain the wife continued Tyabji J. observed that "the payment of maintenance during two years preceding the suit did not debar the wife from relying on S.2(ii) of the Act in respect of the earlier period of neglect of a substantially long duration (10 years) To similar effect were the observations of Thandani J. in Khairul Nissa v. Hubdar, Suit No. 278 of 1943 O Sullivan J. expresses a different view on that topic in Satgunj v. Rahmat Dil, AIR. 1946 Sind 48. 17. More relevant for the purpose of the present case would be the observations of Beckett J. in Manakkhan v. Mt. Mulkhan Bano, AIR. 1941 Lahore 167. A liberal construction which protected the women's right was adopted in that case. The reason for the inability of the husband to maintain was held to be irrelevant while considering the wife's application for divorce under S.2(ii) of the Act. According to the learned judge, it was absolutely immaterial whether the failure to maintain was due to poverty, failing health, loss of work, imprisonment or any other cause whatsoever. 18. The section received elaborate consideration at the hands of O. Sullivan J. in Satgunj's case supra. Throwing away some pittance to the wife could not be termed 'maintenance' as the term is used in the section. The learned judge said: "It appeals to me that the maintenance contemplated in cl. 18. The section received elaborate consideration at the hands of O. Sullivan J. in Satgunj's case supra. Throwing away some pittance to the wife could not be termed 'maintenance' as the term is used in the section. The learned judge said: "It appeals to me that the maintenance contemplated in cl. (ii) is maintenance-the provision of food, raiment and lodging adequate for the wife, always of course taking into consideration the husband's station in life; and that the statute cannot be defeated by halfhearted attempts at providing maintenance or providing maintenance which is not reasonably adequate. What is adequate is naturally a question of fact to be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of each case." 19. Imagine the case where a husband maintains his wife for a day or perhaps for a few days during the two year period; could the wife in such a situation seek the protective provision of S.2(ii) of the Act? A narrow interpretation may in that situation entail a dismissal of the wife's claim. According to O. Sullivan j such a limited interpretation was not permissible. He observed: "It is a question of fact whether the husband has neglected or failed to provide for the wife's maintenance for a period of two years. The statute cannot, in my opinion, be defeated by what might be termed "illusory" maintenance the provision of maintenance for an intermittent period made without the intention of continuing to maintain and it would be a question of fact in each case as to whether the maintenance was merely illusory. All the surrounding circumstances would have to be taken into consideration in arriving at a conclusion on the point, as for example the previous conduct of the husband and the length of the periods during which he had neglected to maintain his wife." 20. In giving the interpretation so given by him, Sullivan J. drew upon the views expressed by the English Court in Thurston v. Thurston, (1910) 26 TLR. 388. The case concerned the interpretation of the term 'desertion'. The court observed: "Intermittent visits to the wife by husband during the statutory period necessary for desertion, without the intention of remaining or of resuming martial intercourse, did not constitute a return to cohabitation." The principles so laid down in Thurston v. Thurston supra, appear to hold the field even now. (See Raydon on Divorce, 14th Edn. Page 298). The court observed: "Intermittent visits to the wife by husband during the statutory period necessary for desertion, without the intention of remaining or of resuming martial intercourse, did not constitute a return to cohabitation." The principles so laid down in Thurston v. Thurston supra, appear to hold the field even now. (See Raydon on Divorce, 14th Edn. Page 298). The principle was found by O. Sullivan J. to be equally applicable in the interpretation of S.2(ii) of the Act. It was accordingly held that there would be a failure to maintain, when there is only an intermittent maintenance without an intention to continue it. 21. I am in respectful agreement with the reasoning and conclusion of O. Sullivan J. in the aforesaid decision. 22. The only other later decision on the topic, Munnawarbai v. Sabir Mohammed. 1970 M P. L. J. Notes 23, does not shed additional light on the statutory interpretation. 23. The view in Satgunj's case supra is understandable when one, bears in mind the history of matrimonial legislation. As observed by the. Supreme Court in Reynold Rajamani v. Union of India, (1982)2 SCC. 474: "The history of all matrimonial legislation will show that at the outset conservative attitudes influenced the grounds on which separation or divorce could be granted. Over the decades, a more liberal attitude has been adopted, fostered by a recognition of the need for the individual happiness of the adult parties directly involved." The decision emphasised that "in construing the language in which the grounds are incorporated the courts should give a liberal construction to it Indeed, we think that the courts must give the fullest amplitude of meaning to such a provision." (emphasis supplied) 24. In the light of the principles gatherable, and giving the liberal interpretation such a well-meant legislation requires, I am of the view that in order to claim that the husband has maintained his wife, he must clearly establish that he had attended to the food, clothing, shelter and other reasonable comforts of life of the wife, of course consistent with his capacity, and the status and standards of the couple. An occasional visit, or a half-hearted offer of some clothes or some money at long intervals, would not in law amount to a maintenance of the wife. 25. An occasional visit, or a half-hearted offer of some clothes or some money at long intervals, would not in law amount to a maintenance of the wife. 25. If the above principles are to be applied to the present case, it is clear that the husband has failed to maintain the wife. He had a business while at Visakhapatnam. Even after the return, he was running a hotel at Badagara. He bad therefore reasonable financial capacity. Even accepting his evidence in its totality, his visits to the wife were few and far between during the two year period preceding the filing of the suit. Presenting himself at the wife's house on the occasion of her delivering the child and offering some clothes or some money, could not be treated as the husband's maintenance of the wife, when maintenance to the wife is a duty cast on the husband. The husband in the present case thus clearly failed to maintain his wife. The wife was therefore justified in invoking the provisions of the Act which would give her relief from such a marriage bond, when she could receive only bad batterings and not proper maintenance from the husband. The legal principles applicable have been totally overlooked by. the courts below. The dismissal of the suit filed by the wife was therefore totally unjustified. 26. In the light of the above discussion I have no hesitation to decree the suit as prayed for. The marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant would stand dissolved. The second appeal is accordingly allowed with costs throughout. Allowed.