( 1 ) THIS Criminal Revision Petition is one under Ss. 397 and 401 Cr. P. C. by the petitioner Dhareppa Balappa gondaj, directed against the order dt. 29-8-1983 passed by the 1st respondent- sub-divisional Magistrate, Jarnkhandi, in exercise of his powers under S. 133 cr. P. C. directing the petitioner to shift the flour mill by 6 ft. from the place where it is now installed in his house bearing No. 93, situate in Terdal village of Jarnkhandi Taluk in Bijapur district. ( 2 ) FEW facts necessary for the disposal of this revision petition may be stated as under: the house bearing No, 93 situate in Terdal Village originally belonged to one Kallappa Siddappa Sotti. He was running a flour mill in the said house since 1969 after obtaining necessary permission and licence from the concerned authorities. The respondent is a resident of the adjoining house bearing No. 94. He has been residing. in the said house even prior to 1969. The petitioner purchased the house bearing No. 93 along with the flour mill from the previous owner Kallappa Siddappa Sotti in the year 1974. Since then the petitioner is running the flour mill in the said house. The Town Municipal Council, terdal has been issuing licences regularly and the power is being supplied by the Karnataka Electricity board. However for the first time in the year 1982, the 2nd respondent at the instigation of some persons inimically disposed towards the petitioner, made a complaint to the police stating that the running of the flour mill by the petitioner causes nuisance to him. The application was addressed to the superintendent of Police, Bijapur which was forwarded to the P. S. I. Terdal Police Station for enquiry and report. The P. S. I. after getting the matter enquired into through the head Constable and also after making personal enquiry, submitted a report dt. 9-9-1981 to the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent on receipt of the report from the P. 6. I. made an order Annexure-B dt. 27-2-1982 under S. 133 (1) (b) Cr. P. C. directing the petitioner to shift the flour mill as well as the huller to a different place within 15-3-1982 failing which appropriate action would be taken against him. The petitioner challenged the correctness of the said order in Cr. R. P. No. 262|1982 on the file of this Court. 27-2-1982 under S. 133 (1) (b) Cr. P. C. directing the petitioner to shift the flour mill as well as the huller to a different place within 15-3-1982 failing which appropriate action would be taken against him. The petitioner challenged the correctness of the said order in Cr. R. P. No. 262|1982 on the file of this Court. This court allowed the Revision Petition and set aside the order Annexure-B on the ground that the 1st respondent while making the order did not apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and made the order without taking evidence and remanded the matter to the 1st respondent with a direction to dispose of the same in accordance with law and in the light of the observation contained in the order. ( 3 ) AFTER the remand order was made and the matter was sent back to the 1st respondent, the petitioner presented an application on 2-8-1982 as per Annexure-C to the 1st respondent to take up the matter for consideration early and dispose of the same by making suitable order in his favour. About a year thereafter, the 1st respondent made the order Annexure-D dt. 29-8-1983 directing the petitioner to shift the flour mill by 6 ft. from the present place, the correct and legality of which is under challenge in this Revision Petition. ( 4 ) SRI S. G. Kulkarni, learned advocate appearing for the revision petitioner raised two points for my consideration. Firstly he contended that the dispute raised by the 2nd respondent through his application made to the police and about which the p. S. I. Terdal submitted his report does not amount to a public nuisance and it would at best constitute a private nuisance for which the remedy lies at some other forurn and not at the forum of the 1st respondent. His second submission was that even otherwise, the impugned order is wholly erroneous and illegal as it was rendered in violation of the mandatory provisions of law. ( 5 ) PER contra, Sri T. N. Raghavaiah, the learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the 1st respondent, contended that it was well within the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent to entertain the dispute and make an order under S. 133 (1) (b) Cr. P. C. since the subject matter of the dispute amounts to a public nuisance. ( 5 ) PER contra, Sri T. N. Raghavaiah, the learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the 1st respondent, contended that it was well within the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent to entertain the dispute and make an order under S. 133 (1) (b) Cr. P. C. since the subject matter of the dispute amounts to a public nuisance. ( 6 ) CONTINUING the trend of the argument canvassed on behalf of the 1st respondent, Sri S. K. Joshi, the learned Advocate appearing for the 2nd respondent maintained that the 1st respondent was well within his jurisdiction to entertain the matter by virtue of the provisions contained in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 133 cr. P. C. , although keeping of the flour mill and the huller by the petitioner and running the same in the instant case is injurious to the health and physical comfort of the 2nd respondent and the members of his family and not of the community, as they being part of the community within the contemplation of S. 133 (1) (b) cr. P. C. He further maintained that the 1st respondent, after the case was remanaed by this Court, took necessary steps for holding the enquiry and made the impugned order after holding a personal local inspection. On these grounds, he maintained that there is no ground to interfere with the order under challenge. ( 7 ) FROM the rival contentions urged, the points that arise for determination are: (1) Whether the 1st respondent has jurisdiction to entertain the matter in dispute? (2) Whether the order under challenge is valid in law? ( 8 ) I shall proceed to consider these two points in the order in which they are formulated. ( 9 ) IT is indisputable that the 1st respondent took action under S. 133 Cr. P. C. in making the impugned order. Before adverting to the material on record, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of law applicable to the facts of the case. Chapter X of Cr. P. C. relates maintenance of Public order and tranquility. Part B of Chapter X deals with Public Nuisances. S. 133 which is the first section finds place in part b provides for making a conditional order for removal of nuisance. The material portion of S. 133 reads:"133. Chapter X of Cr. P. C. relates maintenance of Public order and tranquility. Part B of Chapter X deals with Public Nuisances. S. 133 which is the first section finds place in part b provides for making a conditional order for removal of nuisance. The material portion of S. 133 reads:"133. Conditional order for removal of nuisance - (1) Whenever a District Magistrate or a Sub- divisional Magistrate or any other executive Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf by the State government, on receiving the report of a police officer or other information and on taking such evidence (if any) as he thinks fit, considers- (a ). . . . . . . . (b) that the conduct of any trade or occupation, or the keeping of any goods or merchandise, is injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community, and that in consequence such trade or occupation should be prohibited or regulated or such goods or merchandise should be removed or the keeping thereof regulated; or such Magistrate may make a conditional order requiring the person. . . . carrying on such trade or occupation, or keeping any such goods or merchandise___ within a time to be fixed in the order- (i ). . . . . . . . (ii) to desist from carrying on or to remove or regulate in such manner as may be directed, such trade or occupation, or to remove such goods or merchandise, or to regulate the keeping thereof in such manner as may be directed; or if he objects so to do, to appear before himself or some other Executive Magistrate subordinate to him at a time and place to be fixed by the order, and show cause, in the manner here in after provided, why the order should not be made absolute. " ( 10 ) THE word 'public' is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. We have to look into the meaning of 'public' as defined in the Penal code in view of S. 2 (y) of the Cr. P. C. ( 11 ) THE word 'public' is defined in s. 12 I. P. C. thus:"the word 'public' includes any class of the public or any community. " ( 12 ) NUISANCES are of two kinds. They are either public nuisance or private nuisance. Part-B of Chapter x Cr. P. C. deals with "public nuisances. P. C. ( 11 ) THE word 'public' is defined in s. 12 I. P. C. thus:"the word 'public' includes any class of the public or any community. " ( 12 ) NUISANCES are of two kinds. They are either public nuisance or private nuisance. Part-B of Chapter x Cr. P. C. deals with "public nuisances. S. 1 contemplates a conditional order to be made for the removal of the public nuisance. It empowers a district Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional magistrate or any other Executive magistrate specially empowered by the State Government on receiving of the report of a Police Office or other information and on taking such evidence as he thinks fit, considers, among other things that the cond of any trade or occupation is injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community and that in consequence, such trade or occupation should be prohibited or regulated may make a conditional order requiring the person carrying on such trade or occupation to desist from carrying on, or to remove or regulate in such manner as may be directed, such trade or occupation within a time to be fixed in the order, or if the concerned person objects so to do, to appear before himself or some other Magistrate subordinate to him at a time and place to be fixed by the order, and show cause in the manner provided why the order should not be made absolute. S. 133 undoubtedly provides for a speedy and summary remedy in case of urgency where danger to public interest or Public health is concerned. The object enshrined in S. 133 is that if immediate steps are not taken, irreparable injury will be done to the public interest or public health and that is why extra-ordinary powers are given to the concerned authorities to deal with the situation and those powers should be exercised only under extra-ordinary circumstances. In all other cases, the party should be referred to the remedy under the ordinary law. Therefore, it necessarily follows that a grievance against a private nuisance is wholly outside the scope of S. 133. A party aggrieved by a private nuisance should approach the Civil Court for redressing his grievance and obtaining the necessary relief. In all other cases, the party should be referred to the remedy under the ordinary law. Therefore, it necessarily follows that a grievance against a private nuisance is wholly outside the scope of S. 133. A party aggrieved by a private nuisance should approach the Civil Court for redressing his grievance and obtaining the necessary relief. ( 13 ) S. 133 (1) (b) specifically lays down that the conduct of any trade or occupation should be injurious to the health or the physical comfort of the community for taking action under chapter X-B. expression 'community' is used in its larger and more popular meaning. It would mean 'public' or 'neighbour 'residents of the entire locality' and not an individe or residents of a house. An individual or the member of his house-hold certainly would not constitute 'community' in its true sense. So the argument advice by Sri S. K. Joshi that the 2nd respondent and the men ol his house-hold do constitute 'community' within contemplation of S. 133 (1) Cr. P. C. as they being part ol the community may not hold water for the simple reason that the expression 'community' is not used with such a narrow meaning. Thus, it is clear that whenever a complaint is made against the conduct of any trade or- occupation on the ground that it cause injury to the health or physical comfort, it must be shown that the injury to be caused was to the health or physical comfort of the community so as to available of the speedy and summary remedy provided under 6. 133. So it follows that whenever a grievance is made in respect of a private nuisance, the authorities named in S. 133 Cr. P. C. get no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such question and give relief as provided under S. 133. Keeping these principles in minde, let me now consider the case on merits. ( 14 ) ADMITTEDLY this is the second bout of litigation in this Court between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent in respect of their inter-se dispute respecting the petitioner running the flour mill and the huller in his residential house. As stated earlier the order of the 1st respondent made in the first instance as per Annexure-B was challenged by the petitioner in cr. As stated earlier the order of the 1st respondent made in the first instance as per Annexure-B was challenged by the petitioner in cr. R. P. No. 262/1982 and he succeeded in getting it set aside per the order made by this Court in the said revision petition. The records of the Cr. R. P. No. 262/1982 have been placed before me at the time of hearing the present revision petition. It is seen from the records that the proceedings between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent were started on a complaint petition made by the 2nd respondent against the petitioner to the superintendent of Police, Bijapur and also the Chief Officer of Terdal Municipality making allegation that running of the flour mill and the hullen by the petitioner was injurious to the health and the physical comfort and also danger to his life and the life of the members of his family. He did not allege in his complaint that the running of the flour mill and the huller in the residential house of the petitioner was injurious to the health or the physical comfort or danger to the life of the general public or the resident of the locality. So was the report of the P. S. I. Terdal who conducted the enquiry on the application filed by the 2nd respondent and submitted his report to the 1st respondent. The report submitted by him was dt, 9-9-1981 upon which the 1st respondent took action under S, 133 cr. P. C. The report does not mention a word that the conduct of the trade or business of the petitioner in running the flour mill and the huller was either injurious to the health or physical comfort or danger to the life of the general public or the residents of the neighbouring houses of the locality. The report merely indicates that the disturbance caused was to the 2nd respondent and the members of his family. In other words, the report of the P. S. I, makes out at best a case of private nuisance. The report merely indicates that the disturbance caused was to the 2nd respondent and the members of his family. In other words, the report of the P. S. I, makes out at best a case of private nuisance. Even the 1st respondent had also come to the same conclusion and observed in his Order: this observation clearly indicates that the 1st, respondent having considered the report submitted by the p. S. I. and also after holding a local inspection of the place of installation of the flour mill and the huller, came to the conclusion that the disturbance caused by running the flour mill was to the 2nd res- pondent and not the residents of the locality or the general public. To put it differently, the conclusion of the 1st respondent was that the disturbance caused by the petitioner in running the flour mill constituted a 'private nuisance' and not a 'public nuisance such being the position, it seems to me that the 1st respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain1 the dispute in question and to make any order in that behalf in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under S. 133 Cr. P. C. Necessarily therefore, it follows that the impugned order is one without jurisdiction and so, it is wholly illegal. ( 15 ) IN view of my finding recorded under point No. 1, I think it unnecessary to consider in detail the second point formulated for decision. However, on the basis of the material on record, it would suffice if I say that the 1st respondent, in spite of the clear direction given by this Court in the order dt. 18-6-1982 passed in Cr. R. P. No 262/1982 at the time of remitting the matter to him for fresh disposal, clearly ignored the direction and passed the impugned order without adhering to a proper enquiry being conducted in accordance with law. ( 16 ) FROM the above discussion, it follows that the petitioner succeeds. Accordingly, the revision is allowed. The impugned order Annexure-E dt. 29-8-1983 is set aside. --- *** --- .