JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Project Engineer (Civil) in the pay scale of Rs. 550-1200 temporarily on probation for a period of two years by order December 7, 1976 of the Chief Executive Officer, New Okhla Industrial Development Authority. Subsequently on 22nd December, 1979 he was appointed Project Engineer (Civil) in the pay scale of Rs. 800/-1450)-. On completion of the period of probation this was regularised by order dated 8th April, 1982. On 19th December, 1983 the services of the petitioner were terminated on payment of 3 months' pay in lieu of notice. The petitioner has sought the writ of certiorari to quash this order and also mandamus directing the respondent to continue to treat him as Project Engineer (Civil) and entitled to all benefits as such. 2. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioner being a 'workman' as defined in the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is excluded from the purview of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 vide Sec. 1(4) (c) thereof and hence he cannot agitate the matter before the Public Services Tribunal. In para 4 of his supplementary affidavit the petitioner has specified his duties as under: - "Overall responsibility for constructions and maintenance of buildings, roads, sheds and other constructions as also design, construction and maintenance." 3. From Sec. 2(z) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 referred to by the petitioner it would appear that the expression 'workman' does not include a person employed in any industry "Who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding Rs. 500/- per mensum or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature." 4. The submission for the petitioner is that the order of termination is bad in law because it is not in conformity with Sec. 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We assume without deciding, as Sri Bhatnagar the learned counsel contends, that the petitioner is a 'workman'. It would follow that he cannot agitate the matter before the Public Service Tribunal, but there appears nothing in that event to preclude him from raising an industrial dispute and seeking alternative remedy before the Tribunal provided under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which is both adequate and efficacious. It would follow that he cannot agitate the matter before the Public Service Tribunal, but there appears nothing in that event to preclude him from raising an industrial dispute and seeking alternative remedy before the Tribunal provided under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which is both adequate and efficacious. It was argued that the petitioner cannot approach the Tribunal directly and that the State Government might not on being approached make the reference. Similar argument raised in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay, (1976) 1 SCC 496 case was repelled by the Supreme Court observing :- "If the refusal is not sustainable in law, appropriate directions can be issued by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. But it does not follow from all this that the remedy provided under the Act is a misnomer. Reference of industrial disputes for adjudication in exercise of the power of the Government under Sec. 10 (1) is so common that it is difficult to call the remedy a misnomer or insufficient or inadequate for the purpose of enforcement of the right or liability created under the Act. The remedy suffers from, some handicap but is well compensate don the making of the reference by the wide powers of the Labour Court or the Tribunal. The handicap leads only to this conclusion that for adjudication of an industrial dispute in connection with a right of obligation under the general or common law and not created under the Act, the remedy is not exclusive. It is alternative. But surely for the enforcement of a right or an obligation under the Act the remedy provided uno flatu in it is the exclusive remedy. The Legislature in its wisdom did not think it fit and proper to provide a very easy and smooth remedy for enforcement of the rights and obligations created under the Act. Persons wishing the enjoyment of such rights and wanting its enforcement must rest content to secure the remedy provided by the Act. The possibility that industrial dispute under Section 10 on the ground of expediency is not a relevant consideration in this regard." 5. It is true that an alternative remedy does not operate as a complete bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Court acts in its discretion taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case. The possibility that industrial dispute under Section 10 on the ground of expediency is not a relevant consideration in this regard." 5. It is true that an alternative remedy does not operate as a complete bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Court acts in its discretion taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case. In Shitla Prasad Singh v. U. P. State Cement Corporation Ltd. (Writ Petition No. 5897 of 1983) decided recently on 16-8-1983 by a Division Bench of this Court of which one of us (M. N. Shukla, J.) was a member, the dispute was with respect to an order of termination simpliciter. It was held that the petitioner should avail himself of the remedy of an industrial dispute and should it transpire that the petitioner's earnest endeavour to obtain a reference by way of an industrial dispute is actually found abortive, this Court would not be reluctant to exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Bench in that case also noticed the decision in Basant Kumar v. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd., AIR 196 4 SC 1260 where taking a strict view the Supreme Court declined to entertain a writ petition on account of the availability of alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hon'ble M. N. Shukla, J. (as he then was) observed in Shitla Prasad Singh (Supra) "We are not inclined to endorse the view that this Court should be so immoderately precipitent in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction so as to make other useful tribunal set up for compelling reasons, either defunct or partially inoperative 22-Rep. (Suppl.) in the discharge of their functions. Tribunals are being created in various countries to afford a less dilatory and legalistic and more pragmatic and comprehensive remedy to litigants for the settlement of their disputes and increasingly larger chunks of litigation are being diverted to them with a view to relieving the pressure on the law courts. It is desirable that such tribunals should be allowed to strike roots in the soil, grow and evolve their own healthy norms and traditions. They should not be made to wither in the shade which is cast by the 'sanctum sanctorum', which is the High Court. It would be against the legal 'ethos' of the times to endorse a judicial approach which would truncate the jurisdiction of the tribunals. They should not be made to wither in the shade which is cast by the 'sanctum sanctorum', which is the High Court. It would be against the legal 'ethos' of the times to endorse a judicial approach which would truncate the jurisdiction of the tribunals. Hence, by and large, we would expect the petitioner in such a case as the one before us first to try the remedy of an industrial dispute and in case it is found either elusive or uncommonly dilatory, the petitioner would not be precluded from seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution." 6. In the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, AIR 1964 SC 1617 the Supreme Court observed that if the appropriate Government refuses to make a reference for irrelevant considerations, or on extraneous grounds, or acts mala fide, a party would be entitled to move the High Court for a writ of mandamus. This the Supreme Court explained in the Govind Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Hind Mazdoor Sabha, (1976) 1 SCC 60 stating that the mandamus would be to reconsider the matter. This was also the view taken in Mjs. Mahabir Jute Mills Ltd. Gorakhpur v. Shri Sibban Lal Soxena, (1975) 2 SCC 818 . In Premier Automobiles Ltd, (1976) 1 SCC 496 (supra) noticed above the court said that if the refusal by Government to make the reference is not sustainable in law, "appropriate directions" can be issued by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In Sahkari Cement Alai Thozhialar Munnetra Sargam, Tamil Nadu v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 1 SCC 304 the petitioner sought reference of the industrial dispute arising from alleged invalid termination of the service of workmen under Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was found that the State Government had failed to perform the duty imposed by the statute for reasons which were irrelevant. The Supreme Court directed the Tamil Nadu Government "to make a reference of the said industrial dispute to the appropriate tribunal" within the specified period. It was found that the State Government had failed to perform the duty imposed by the statute for reasons which were irrelevant. The Supreme Court directed the Tamil Nadu Government "to make a reference of the said industrial dispute to the appropriate tribunal" within the specified period. Sri Bhatnagar urged that in Writ petition No. 355 of 1976 this court had abated the petition on 22-1-1979 holding that the petitioners had an alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1917 and, therefore, by reason of clause (3) of Article 226 introduced by the Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976 the petitioners were not entitled to maintain the writ petition. The record of that petition shows that the Division Bench followed the decision given in writ petition no. 2246 of 1977, Ram Singar v. Union of India on the same date. The decision is reported in 1979 Lab. I. C. 37". The petitioners in writ petition No. 355 of 1976 took the matter to the Supreme Court which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 5312 of 1983 and decided summarily on 22nd May, 1983. Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Division Bench, held that Clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution introduced by the Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act did not constitute a valid ground on which the writ petition should have been dismissed without going into the merits. The argument of the learned counsel is that in view thereof the writ petition cannot be dismissed on ground that the petitioner has alternative remedy available of seeking reference of the industrial dispute to the appropriate Tribunal. 7. Having given our careful consideration to the subject, we are unable to agree that this is the correct interpretation or effect of the Supreme Court's decision dated 22nd May, 1983. The writ petition giving rise to that decision had been abated on the sole basis that in view of Clause (3) of Article 226 as amended by the Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976 the Court was left with no other option. The fetter imposed under the amended clause (3) against the exercise of writ jurisdiction of the High Court was absolute. This in itself, it would appear, was of doubtful validity. The fetter imposed under the amended clause (3) against the exercise of writ jurisdiction of the High Court was absolute. This in itself, it would appear, was of doubtful validity. In Minorva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 at page 678 it was observed by Bhagwati, J.: "The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional system and without it, there will be no government of laws and the rule of law would become a teesing illusion and promise of unreality. I am of the view that if there is one feature of our Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial review and it is unquestionably to my mind, part of basic structure of the Constitution." 8. The decision summarily disposing of Civil Appeal No. 5312 of 1983 dated 22nd May, 1983 relied for the petitioner is clearly in the back ground of doubtful constitutional validity of Clause (3) of Article 226 introduced by the Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act. The position is different altogether where under the general principles governing the exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction, the High Court in its discretion declines to interfere until the petitioner has exhausted the alternative remedy which is equally efficacious. We are not persuaded to assume that the Supreme Court has struck a departure from the well settled authorities which firmly recognise that recourse to Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may in an appropriate case be equally efficacious alternative remedy and if there is unreasonable denial of the State Government to refer the High Court may give directions as are appropriate. More recently also in Jai Bhagwan v. Management of the Ambala Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 286 the Supreme Court reiterated .- "Raising an industrial dispute is a well recognised and legitimate mode of redress available to a workman, which has achieved statutory recognition under the Industrial Disputes Act and we fail to see why the statute-recognised mode of redress should be denied to a workman because of the existence or availability of another remedy." The petitioner before us asserts that he is a 'workman' which may not be free from dispute taking into account the nature and character of his duties and the definition given in Sec. 2 (z) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, quoted above. The question is of mixed facts and law. If the petitioner persists in contending that he is a 'workman' the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides appropriate forum to resolve the industrial dispute. In case, however, he is not a workman, he would be a public servant within the scope of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 in which case he may approach the Public Services Tribunal. In either case, we do not regard this a fit case to entertain the writ petition at this stage. 9. The petition is dismissed accordingly. Petition dismissed.