JUDGMENT - Chandurkar, C.J. - This petition has been referred to the Division Bench by the learned Single Judge (Sawant, J.), because according to the learned Judge the decision in Sahinabibi v. Tukaram1 which was also a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court, required reconsideration. In Sakinabibi's case the learned Judge (Pendse, J.) has taken the view that in an Inquiry under section 32P(2) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) there are only two; restrictions on the right of the landlord contemplated by the provi sions of section 15(2) of the Act. These restrictions, according to the learned Judge, are (l)that the land should be resumed for the purpose. of either cultivating personally or for non-agricultural purpose and (2)that the land should be resumed only to the extent of the ceilling area. The learned Judge held that the other restrictions in sections 31 and 31A of the Act could not be read into section 15(2) of the Act. 2. The facts in this petition are not in dispute. The field in questioin is survey No. 51/1 having an| area of 8 acres 19 gunthas excluding the Pot Kharaba area of 1 acre 21 gunthas which originally belonged to two persons Vithal1 and Vishnu. The said field was cultivated by a trust called Dang Seva Mandal, Nasik. The statutory purchase in fa vour of the tenant was declared ineffective under section! 32G(3) of the Act on 13th February 1963. Almost after about ten years, one of the landlords applied to the Tahsildar for starting a proceeding under section 32P of the Act. In that proceeding the Tahsildar held that one-half of the land should be restored to the landlords according to their respective shares. This order was however set aside. Later on. on remand the Tahsildar once again went into the question as to whether the surviving landlord, the other landlord having been dead by that time, was entitled to get the land surrendered under section 32P of the Act. The Tahsildar took the view that it was essential for the landlord to prove that the income from the land in question of which he was entitled to take possession was the principal source of his maintenance. The Tahsildar took the view that it was essential for the landlord to prove that the income from the land in question of which he was entitled to take possession was the principal source of his maintenance. On facts he found that the income from the cultivation of the land in question would be the principal source of the landlord's maintenance. He. therefore, ordered under section 32P(2) (c) of the Act that possession of the land should be restored to the landlord. 3. The tenant challenged this order by an appeal which was decided by the Assistant Collector, Nasik Division, Nasik. The Assistant Collector took the view that the total income of the landlord from the sugarcane cultivation was about Rs. 20,000/-annually in addition to his salary income of Rs. 3.744/-per annum. The income from the said land was found, to be Rs. 1,500/-and the Assistant Collector, therefore held that the income from the suit land would not be the principal source of maintenance of the landlord. Taking the view that the condition in section 31A(c) of the Act is not satisfied, he reversed the order of the Additional Tahsildar. The landlord's application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal also came to be rejected and the Tribunal1 confirmed the view of the Assistant Collector that the condition in section 31A(c) of the Act was required to be satisfied by the landlord. The order of the Tribunal does not disclose the figures of the comparative income from different sources of the landlord. The landlord has now filed this petition against the said order of the Tribunal. 4. The contention raised on behalf of the petitiomer-landlord is that in an enquiry under section 32P of the Act, the requirement of section 31A (c) is not required to be satisfied! and, therefore, both the Tribunal and the Assistant Collector were in error in holding that the landlord was not entitled to possession of the tend in question. Undoubtedly, the learned counsel for the petitioner is supported in his contention by the view in Sakinabibi's case referred to above. As already pointed out the learned Judge on a construction of the provisions of section 32P(2)(b) and section 15 of the Act took the view that no other condition except the requirement for personal cultivation and the extent of the area to be resumed is required to be satisfied. As already pointed out the learned Judge on a construction of the provisions of section 32P(2)(b) and section 15 of the Act took the view that no other condition except the requirement for personal cultivation and the extent of the area to be resumed is required to be satisfied. Though there is no express reference in the judgment; of the learn-ned Judge to the requirement of clause (c) of section 31A of the Act; it is obvious that the effect of the decision of the learhed Judge was that by implication the requirement of section 31A(c) was not required. to be satisfied. The learned Judge referred to the provisions of sec-tiohl5(2) of the Act and made a reference to the fact that the land-lord is entitled to retain the land as surrendered for the like purposes and to the like extent and in so far as the conditions are applicable, subject to the like conditions as are provided in sections 31 and 31A of the Act. The learned Judge referred to the purpose which is mentioned in section 31 of the Act viz-, either to cultivate personally or to use for non-agricultural purpose. The learned Judge pointed out that the extent of land which the lendlord can resume is mentioned in section 31A of the Act which provides that the landlord can resume only that much area of the land which would not exceed the ceiling area as provided in the Act-The learned Judge then observed as follows (page 306) : “...Section 15(2) of the Act enables the landlord to resume the land for the purpose of either cultivating personally or for the non-agricultural purpose and to the extent of a ceiling area. These are the only two restrictions on the right of the landlord to resume the land under section 15(2) of the Act. It is not possible to read any more restriction in section, 13(2) of the Act and, in my judgment, the other requirement of section 31 or section 31A which imposes several restrictions on the right of the landlord to resume the leased land are not applicable while considering the provisions of section 15(2) of the Act. It is not possible to read any more restriction in section, 13(2) of the Act and, in my judgment, the other requirement of section 31 or section 31A which imposes several restrictions on the right of the landlord to resume the leased land are not applicable while considering the provisions of section 15(2) of the Act. As stated earlier the other restrictions mentioned under section 31A of the Act are that the cultivation of the Hand which landlord desires to resume should be a principal source of income for his maintenance and the leased land stands in the record of rights in the name of landlord or his ancestors on January 1,1952 and there after till the appointed day and right of resumption can be exercised only in respect of tenancies which are shortest in duration in cases where more tenancies than one are held under the same landlord. The right of the former landlord to resume the land under section 32P read with section 15(2) of the Act is subject to the satisfaction of only one condition under section 31A and that is the extent of area to be resumed. In my judgment the ''other restrictions in Section 31A would not be applicable to the cases of former landlord covered by section 15 (2V of the Act-” A doubt as to' the correctness of “this-view persuaded Sawant, J. to refer this petition to the Division Bench. 5. Mr Karandikar, appearing on behalf of the petitioner-landlord, has contended that the view taken by Pendlse, J. is the Ctorrec view and that except for the two conditions referred to by Pendse J., no other condition is required to be satisfied while dealing with a case of ineffective purchase under section 32P of the Act. Section 32P provides that where the purchase of any land by tenant Under section 32 becomes ineffective under section 32G or 32M or Where a tenant fails to exercise the right to purchase the land held by him within the specified period under sections 32F, 320. 33C or 43-TD, the Tribunal may suo motu or on) an application made in this behalf and in cases other than those in which the purchase has, become ineffective by reason of section, 32G or 32M, after folding a formal ihquiry direct that the land should be disposed of in the manner provided in subsection (2) of section 32P. 33C or 43-TD, the Tribunal may suo motu or on) an application made in this behalf and in cases other than those in which the purchase has, become ineffective by reason of section, 32G or 32M, after folding a formal ihquiry direct that the land should be disposed of in the manner provided in subsection (2) of section 32P. Sub-section (2) of section 32P in bo far as is relevant, provides as follows : “(2) Such direction shall provide- (a) that the former tenant be summarily evicted; (b) that the land shall, subject to the provisions of section 15-be surrendered to the former landlord; (c) that if the entire land or any portion thereof cannot be surren dered in accordance with the provisions of sectiton 15, the entire land or such portion thereof, as the case may be. not withstanding that it is a fragment, shall be disposed of by sale to any person in the following order of priority (hereinafter called “the priority, list”): ……………………………………………………… The priority list need not be reproduced as it is (not relevant for our purpose. The other provisions of sub-section (2) of section 32P are also not relevant for the purpose of this petition. 6. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 32P of the Act is unambiguous. The effect of that provision is that the land, purchase of -”, v. which by the tenant has become ineffective, shall be surrendered to the former landlord subject to the provisions of section 15 of the Act. 'Section 15 deaes with termination of tenancy by surrender thereof. . Under sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Act it is provided that a tenant may terminate the tenancy in respect of any land at any time by surrendering his interest therein in. favour of the land-lord, while the proviso to that sub-section provides that such surrender shall be in writing and has to be verified by the Mamlatdar in the prescribed manmerr. Sub-sections (2A) and (3) of section 15 being material may now be reproduced : “(2A) The Mamlatdar shall in respect of the surrender 'verified under sub-section (1), hold an inquiry and decide whether the landlord is entitled under sub-section (2) to retain the whole or any portion of the land so surrendered, and sipecify the extent and particulars in that behalf. (3) The land or any portion thereof, which the landlord is not entitled to retain under sub-section (2), shall foe liable to be disposed of in the manner provided under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 32P.” The effect of sub-section (2) of section 15 is that even in a case where a tenant surrenders his tenancy, there are restrictions on the right of the landlord to retain the land so surrendered and those restrictions are with reference to the purposes, the extent and the conditions which are provided in sections 31 and 31A for the termination of tenancies. Such other conditions as are provided in sections 31 and 31A .and as are applicable, therefore, fasten themselves on the right of the landlord to retain the lanp. surrendered by the tenant. Subjection (2A) requires the Mamlatdar to hold an enquiry and decide whether the landlord is entitled to retain the whole or any portion of the land so surrendered having regard to the provisions of sub-section (2). The Tahsildar has, therefore, under suo-section (2A) to make an enquiry and decide with reference to the requirements of sections 31 and 31A of the Act whether the landlord is entitled to retain the entire area or a portion thereof. If it is found by the Tahsildar that having regard to the cotnditions specified in sections 31 and 31A the landlord is not entitled to retain) the entile area, then such other land which the landlord is entitled to retain has to be disposed pf in. the manner provided in clause (c) of sub-section,-(2) of section 32P of the Act. As already pointed out clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 32F gives a priority list for the purpose pi disposal of land by sale in case the landlord is not entitled to retain the surrendered land. 7. Now, the main question in this petition is, what are the conditions which the landlord is required to satisfy before he can be allowed to netain the land which is treated as surrendered under Section1 32P of the Act. When clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 32P refers to the land being surrendered to the former landlord subject to the provisions of Section 15, it is obvious that the right of the landlord to retain the land will he regulated by the provisions of Section 15 (2) of the Act. When clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 32P refers to the land being surrendered to the former landlord subject to the provisions of Section 15, it is obvious that the right of the landlord to retain the land will he regulated by the provisions of Section 15 (2) of the Act. Section 15 (2)-refers to Sections 31 and 31A of the Act. In the instant case, reference to Section 31 is not very material. Section 31 which deals with the landlord's right to terminate tenancy either for personal cultivation or for non-agricultural purpose further lays down the manner of such termination. The two purposes specified in Section 31 for which the tenancy can be terminated are (a) for cultivating personally, or (b) for any non-agricultural purpose. It is not the case of the landlord in the instant case that he needs the land for non-agrioultural purpose. We need not, therefore, deal any more with Section 31 of the Act. When we come to Section 31A it is marginally headed “Conditions of termination of tenancy” and it reads as follows : “31 A. The right of a landlord to terminate a tenancy for cultivating the land personally under Section 31 shall be subject to the following condition :- (a) If the landlord at the date on which the notice is given and on the date on which it expires has no other land of his own or has not been cultivating personally any other land, he shall be entitled to take possession of the land leased to the extent of a ceiling area- (b) If the land cultivated by him personally is less than . the ceiling area of the land leased as will be sufficient to make up the area in his possession to the extent of a ceiling area. (c) The income by the cultivation of the land of which he is entitled to take possession is the principal source of income for his maintenance. the ceiling area of the land leased as will be sufficient to make up the area in his possession to the extent of a ceiling area. (c) The income by the cultivation of the land of which he is entitled to take possession is the principal source of income for his maintenance. (d) The land leased stands in the record of rights or in any public record or similar revenue record on(the 1st day of January 1952 and thereafter during the period between the said date and the appointed day in the name of the landlord himself, or of any of his ancestors (but not of any person from' whom title is derived, whether by assignment; or Court sale or otherwise), or if the landlord is a member of a joint; family, in the name of a member of such family. (e) If more tenancies than/ one are held under the same landlord, then the landlord shall be competent to terminate only the tenancy ox tenancies which are the shortest in point of duration.” Now, when Section 15(2) provides that the extent of the land as well as the conditions subject to which the landlord, is entitled to retain' the land are provided, inter alia in Section 31 A, we must find out which are the conditions in Section 31A that are applicable in the case of a statutory purchase becoming ineffective under Section 32P of the Act. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section/ 31A deal with the extent of the land which the landlord is entitled to resume. Under clause (a) if the landlord has no other Land or has not been cultivating personally any other land on the date on which the notice is given and on the date on which it expires he is entitled, to take possession of the land leased to the tenant to the extent of the ceiling area-Under clause (b) if the land cultivated by the landlord is less than the ceiling area, the landlord is entitled to take possession of So much area of the land leased as will be sufficient to make up the area in his possession to the extent of the ceiling area. The expression “ceiling area” is defined in Section 2(2D) as meaning in; relation to land held by a person, whether as an owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant, the area of the land fixed as ceiling area under Section 5 or 7. In so far as the proceedings under Section 32P are condemned, the lard in personal cultivation of the landlord referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 31A will be determined as on the date of which a direction under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 32P is to be given. Even according to Pendse, J. this Condition with regard to the ceiling area will have to be satisfied before an order under Section 32P(2) is made in favour of the landlord. Now, it is obvious that so far as the conditions in clauses (d)l arid (e) of Section 31A are concerned, they are not relevant in a proceeding (under Section, 32P and the right of the landlord to retain the land surrendered will not be controlled or regulated by conditions in clauses (d) and (e) of Section 31A. Clause (d) refers to the land leased standing in, the record of rights on the specified date in the revenue record either in the name of the landlord or any of his ancestors, and clause (e) refers to the order in which a tenancy can be terminated if there are more than one tenancy. These questions do not arise in the case of a surrender. 8. The crucial question is whether the condition in clause (c) that the income by the cultivation of the land, of which the landlord is entitled to take possession is the principal source of income for his maintenance is required to be satisfied, in the case of the land which is surrendered and is required to be dealt with as provided in Sections 15(2) and (2A) of the Act-The provisions of Sections 15 and 32P of the Act, themselves contemplate that in a given case the landlord will not be entitled to retain the entire land and that in a given case a part of the surrendered land may be available for distribution by way of sale in the manner provided in Section 32P (3)'. The first circumstance under which the landlord, may not be held entitled to retain the entire land surrendered is that he may already have land more than the ceiling area or the land in his possession may exceed the ceiling area if he is allowed to retain the entire land surrendered. That is so far as clauses (a) and (b) of section 31A are cotcerned. 9. When sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act refers to the right of retention of land being controlled by the conditions provided in sections 31 and 31A in so far as the conditions are applicable” it is necessary to find out as to which of the conditions in section, 31 A are or are not applicable. We have already referred to the conditions in clauses (a) and (b) of section 31A as being applicable .and conditions in clauses (d) and (e) as being not applicable. So far as clause (c) is concerned, unless there is good justification for saying that the condition in clauae (c) is not applicable, we must proceed on the footing that the condition in clause (c) will also be applicable to a case which is governed by section 15(2) of the Act. It is oibvious -that by enacting restrictions in section 15 the legislature did not want an uncontrolled right to be given to the landlord to take possession of the land even though the land was voluntarily surrendered by the tenant. The scheme of the Act is clearly that there is to be a res-tricion of the total holding of the land and only such land as can be the principal source of maintenance of the landlord is allowed to be resumed under the flaw. We are not able to find any ground on which we can exclude the condition in clause (e)l for the purpose of section 15(2) of the Act especially when section 15(2) refers to sections 31 and 31A and not to any particular clause thereof. Section 15(2) has always been understood as implying that even in the case of the land surrendered by a tenant only.such of the land as can become the principal source of the landlord's maintenance will be allowed to be retained by him. 10. Section 15(2) has always been understood as implying that even in the case of the land surrendered by a tenant only.such of the land as can become the principal source of the landlord's maintenance will be allowed to be retained by him. 10. A Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the scheme of section 15(2) of the Act in the context of the question as to whether the provisions of section 37 of the Act are attracted to a case where the land is surrendered by the tenant under section 15 of the Act. That decision is reported in Vithal v. Murlidhar (A.I.R.1975 Bombay 358). The argument there was that even in the Case of land which was surrendered by the tenant under section 15 the tenant will be entitled to restoration of possession under section 37 if the landlord does not use the land in the manner and within the time referred to in section 37 of the Act-After pointing out the distinction between the resumption of land under section 31 and getting the land from the tenant by virtue of the unilateral surrender by the tenant under section 15, the Division Bench observed as follows (page 365): “..... There is yet one more difference. In proceedings in stituted under section 31. if the landlord were to fail to prove his bona fide requirement personal cultivation, his application for possession would fail, and the tenant would become the owner of the entire land on the tiller's day. But in proceedings instituted under Section 15 of the Act upon the surrender being found voluntary, even if the landlord were to fail to establish his re quirement for personal cultivation or any requirement for non-agricultural use. and for that matter, even if the landlord were to Say that he did not want the land for himself, such land would not revert back to the tenant but it would form part of the pool distributable under Section 32P of the Act.” The Division Bench, therefore, took the view that even in proceedings under section 15 of the Act. the landlord has to establish his requirement for personal cultivation or for non-agricultural use. as the case may be, and if the landlord fails to establish this, then: the land forms part of a pool to be dealt with under section 32P(3) of the Act. the landlord has to establish his requirement for personal cultivation or for non-agricultural use. as the case may be, and if the landlord fails to establish this, then: the land forms part of a pool to be dealt with under section 32P(3) of the Act. It Appeared to us that this decision was not cited before Pendse, J because this decision positively proceeds under the footing that even in an enquiry under section 15 of the Act requirement of clause (c) of section 31A has to be satisfied. We have gone through the judgment in Sakinabibi's case and we have not been able to find any reason why the learned Judge was persuaded to hold that the requirement of clause (c) of section 31A of the Act must be excluded for the purpose of section 32P(2) read with section 15 of the Act. We are therefore, unable to agree with” the view expressed by Pendse, J. in Sakinabibi's case that there are only two conditions which are required to be satisfied While dealing with a case under section 32P of the Act. and we must hold that even the condition in clause (c) of section 31A is required to be satisfied before the Tahsildar can give a direction that the landlord is entitled to retain either the whole or a part of the land which is statutorily treated as surrendered under section 32P of the Act. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that once a purchase has become ineffective the Tahsildar is entitled to give a direction that the former tenant shall be summarily evicted and the tenant has no locus standi to file an appeal against the order holding that the landlord is entitled to retain possession of the entire tend. The contention, therefore, is that the appeal before the Assis tant Collector is without jurisdiction and untenable and, therefore. the finding recorded by the Assistant Collector that the. requirement of clause (c) of section 31A was not satisfied was liable to be set aside* and both the orders of the Assistant Collector and the Triunal should also be set aside. 12. Reference was made before us to a decision of Joshi, J. in (Mohamed Abdul Niik v. Anut. Hari Nadgonda)1. requirement of clause (c) of section 31A was not satisfied was liable to be set aside* and both the orders of the Assistant Collector and the Triunal should also be set aside. 12. Reference was made before us to a decision of Joshi, J. in (Mohamed Abdul Niik v. Anut. Hari Nadgonda)1. In that case Joshi, J. has taken the view that a tenant who was absent at enquiry under Section 32G and an ex parte order was passed by the Agricultural Land Tribunal declaring the purchase ineffective and he did not file a review application within sixty days though an intimation of such order was served on him, the tenant not only loses his right of purchase but that he has1 no 'locus standi in the subsequent proceedings under Section 32P and, therefore, the Agricultural Land Tribunal is not bound to give him any notice of those proceedings. It Appeared to us that the right of the tenant to file an appeal before the Assistant Collector was not challenged either before the Dower appellate Court or in the proceedings before the Revenue Tribunal. Apart from the question as to whether the tenant has a right of appeal against an order under Section 32P, it is difficult for us to see how we can now interfere with the finding recorded by the Assistant Collector and the Revenue Tribunal with a view to work out the beneficial provisions of Section 32P of the Act. The Assistant Collector had clearly revisional jurisdiction against the order of the Tahsildar under Section 76A of the Act. He could have suo motu exercised his revisional powers under Section 76A of the Act. Therefore-even assuming that the appeal was not competent on facts the Collector has reached a conclusion that the landlord's income from other sources was so large that he did not satisfy the condition in clause (c) of Section 31A of the Act. Interference with that finding is not warranted in exercise of the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, more so when) the effect of the findings of the Assistant Collector and the Revenue Tribunal is to correctly apply and give effect to the provisions of sections 32P and 15 of the Act. 13. In the view which we have taken the petition must fail. The rule is, therefore, discharged. 13. In the view which we have taken the petition must fail. The rule is, therefore, discharged. However, in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----