JUDGMENT : B.K. Behera, J. - Over and after a petty quarrel between the members of the families of Ainthu Bag (hereinafter to be referred to as the deceased) and of the appellant Sudam and the co-accused Brusabha for plucking of the fruits of a tree standing in between their houses in village Debadihi in the district of Sambalpur, on February 8, 1979, in the course of which the appellant and the co-accused, one of them, namely, Sudam, being armed with a lathi (M. O. I), threatened to pull out the board of the deceased and the deceased challenged them as to how they would do it, the appellant Sudam, it was alleged, dealt a blow by means of M.O. I. on the head of the deceased which resulted in his death and in the course of the occurrence, the co-accused Brusabha allegedly caught hold of the beard of the deceased and attempted to deal slapi on him. Both the appellant and the co-accused stood charged u/s 302 read with Section. 34 of the Indian Penal Code (the Code, for short) with having committed the murder of the deceased in furtherance of their common intention. The trial court held that the charge of murder had not been brought home to them and there was no case against the co-accused, but accepted the case of the prosecution against the appellant and held that he was liable to be convicted u/s 304, Para II of the Code and accordingly he was convicted and sentenced there under to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years while the Co accused was acquitted of the charge. 2. The order of conviction has been rested mainly on the evidence of P.Ws. 5, 9 and 10 out of the eleven witnesses examined for the prosecution. It is not disputed at the Bar that the deceased died a homicidal death. The order of conviction has been assailed on behalf of the appellant as unfounded on facts and unsustainable in law as the appellant's act, even accepting the case of the prosecution as true was protected by the right of private defence of his person. The learned Additional Standing Counsel has not seriously pressed into service the evidence of P. W. 5 with regard to an extra judicial confession said to have been made by the appellant. The learned Additional Standing Counsel has not seriously pressed into service the evidence of P. W. 5 with regard to an extra judicial confession said to have been made by the appellant. He has submitted on behalf of the State that the evidence of P. Ws. 9 and 10 was no doubt, discrepant and some persons named as witnesses to the occurrence in the first information report had not been examined, but the substantial parts of the evidence of P. Ws.9 and 10 implicating the appellant as the author of the crime were not to be discarded. 3. Coming first to the extra judicial confession said to have been made by the appellant before P. W. 5, it is noticed that according to this witness, when he told the appellant that the villagers had been telling that he had killed the deceased, the appellant gave out that if the villagers had been accusing him of having killed the deceased, he was guilty. P. W. 5 had further deposed that later the appellant had given out that when the deceased gave a lathi on him, he (appellant) gave a lathi blow in return as a result of which the deceased died. As has rightly been submitted on behalf of the appellant, the evidence of P. W. 5 had not received any corroboration from any other evidence and none of these two statements allegedly made by the appellant would amount to an extra judicial confession because the first statement would not amount, in law, to a confession and the second one would indicate that the appellant had claimed to have the right of private defence of his person and thus contained a self-exculpatory part which, if accepted, would negative the offence. A confession must either admit, in terms, the offence or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession. A statement that contains self-exculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession, if the exculpatory part is of some fact which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. (See AIR 1939 47 (Privy Council) . 4. Following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Rahim Beg and Another Vs. State of U.P. it has been held in Heramba Brahma and Another Vs. (See AIR 1939 47 (Privy Council) . 4. Following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Rahim Beg and Another Vs. State of U.P. it has been held in Heramba Brahma and Another Vs. State of Assam, that the evidence relating to an extra judicial confession is not to be accepted without examining the credentials of the witness, without ascertaining the words used, without ascertaining the reason or motive for the confession and the person selected in whom the confidence is reposed. If the evidence of P. W. 5 is tested in the light of the principles laid down in this case, the only reasonable conclusion would be that the evidence relating to the extra judicial confession was far short of the mark. 5. Coming to the evidence of P. Ws. 9 and 10, it may be kept in mind that both these witnesses are the close relations of the deceased. A novel proposition has been propounded by the trial court that the evidence of relations of the deceased, in order to be accepted, must be corroborated by circumstantial evidence of such a character as would be incompatible with the innocence of an accused person. If persons related to the deceased are natural and competent witnesses and their evidence deserves credence, there is no reason to discard their evidence as normally, the relations of a deceased person would implicate the real assailant of the deceased instead of implicating falsely another person. The rule of caution which may be kept in mind is that the evidence of such witnesses should be examined with care before the same is accepted. (See Ravulappalli Kondaiah and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, State of Rajasthan Vs. Smt. Kalki and Another and 1981 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 774 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Soresh alias Chhavan and Ors.,) 6. Examining their evidence and keeping in mind the fact that no independent eye-witness had come forward to support their testimony, the trial court found that both these witnesses had not given a substantially true story about the occurrence in that they had suppressed in the court what they had stated in the course of investigation that the deceased was the first to assault the appellant by means of M. O II. As a matter of fact, in the course of investigation, P.W.II, the Investigating Officer, had sent the appellant for medical examination although the doctor (P.W.I) did not notice any external injury on his person. It is pertinent to keep in mind that although P. W. 9 was no other person than the niece of the deceased and therefore, in the natural and normal course of human conduct and action, would have informed Pi W. 10, the son of the deceased, before the latter lodged the first information report that she had witnessed the occurrence, the name of P W. 9 had not specifically found a place as a witness to the occurrence in the first information report. On the other hand, P. W. 10 had stated therein that his mother, his wife (P. W. 8) and Manbodh Magar besides other had seen the occurrence. P. W. 8 did not depose about the assault on the deceased by the appellant and her evidence would indicate that she was a post-occurrence witness. In the circumstances of the case, Manbodh Magar who bad beer, named as a witness in the first information report and had been examined by P. W. 11 in the course of investigation was a most material witness, but unjustifiable and without offering any reasonable explanation, the prosecution had withheld the evidence of this witness. The prosecution is not obliged to examine each and every witness to the occurrence. This is not, however, to say that the prosecution may examine only witnesses who are related to the deceased or interested for a successful termination of the trial against an accused person and can with hold the examination of independent witnesses. The non examination of Manbodh Magar, in the circumstances of the rase, would cast a serious reflection on the fairness of the trial. In this connection, reference may be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Habeeb Mohammed v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1954 SC 51 . This would undoubtedly affect the bona fides of the case of the prosecution. 7. The evidence of P. Ws. 9 and 10, whose statements at different stages some of which had been referred to by the trial court, would bring about their condemnation, could be but had not been supported by independent evidence. This would undoubtedly affect the bona fides of the case of the prosecution. 7. The evidence of P. Ws. 9 and 10, whose statements at different stages some of which had been referred to by the trial court, would bring about their condemnation, could be but had not been supported by independent evidence. That apart, as the evidence of P. W. 10 would itself indicate, P. W. 9 was not on the scene and could not have witnessed the occurrence as according to this witness, P. W.9 was inside the house at the time of the assault and he saw her coming out of the house when the deceased was falling down on the village lane. The same witness had reiterated in his cross-examination that at the time of the quarrel he, the deceased and both the accused persons were outside their house and none else was present there. Keeping in mind these contradictory statements and suspicious features, no reliance could be placed on the testimony of P. W. 9 as a witness to the occurrence. It would not be reasonable and proper, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, to unreservedly accept the evidence of P. W. 10 which could be, but had not been corroborated by independent evidence and record a conviction thereon. I have no doubt in my mind that P. Ws. 9 and 10 had not presented a true and complete picture about the occurrence and it would be hazardous to accept any part of there evidence. 8. I am not at one with the trial court in its finding that the appellant had dealt a blow by means of M. O. I on the head of the deceased which had resulted in his death. 9. Coming next to the legal contention relating to the exercise of the right of private defence of person, no doubt, the appellant had taken a plea of denial and had not specifically pleaded such a right. It is, however, well-settled that even if an accused person has taken a plea of denial, he can raise such a plea if it can be spelt out of the prosecution evidence. Section 96 of the Code provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. It is, however, well-settled that even if an accused person has taken a plea of denial, he can raise such a plea if it can be spelt out of the prosecution evidence. Section 96 of the Code provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. Even assuming and accepting the case of the prosecution that the appellant did deal a blow by means of M. O. I on the head of the deceased which proved fatal, there was no paucity of evidence to indicate, as has been submitted by the learned counsel for both the sides, that it was the debased who hid started the assault by means of M. O. II which he was undoubtedly holding at the time of the occurrence. P. Ws. 9 and 10 had made a strenuous effort in their evidence in the court to suppress this part of the story by giving a go-bye to what they had stated in the course of investigation. The deceased had challenged the appellant and the co-accused and had told them that he would see as to how they would pull out his beard and he was the aggressor as he first dealt a blow by means of the lathi (M. O. II), described as Merha in the evidence, where upon the appellant dealt but one blow by M. O. I on his head. The Medical Officer had not found any external injury on the person of the appellant, but the fact remains that the deceased had dealt a blow on the person of the appellant. In the circumstances in which the appellant had been placed, he could reasonably apprehend that death or grievous hurt would otherwise be the consequence if he did not ward off the attack from the side of the deceased. He was, therefore, entitle to exercise the right of private defence of his body extending to causing the death of the deceased, as provided in Section 100 of the Code. 10. The right of private defence is a valuable right and this provision has been made with a social purpose. This right should not be construed narrowly. (See AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1857 Vidya Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh). 10. The right of private defence is a valuable right and this provision has been made with a social purpose. This right should not be construed narrowly. (See AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1857 Vidya Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh). As the appellant was himself under attack by the deceased who had been armed and who had already dealt a blow on his person, he had the right of private defence of his person and he could proceed to the extent of causing the death of the deceased in exercise of his right The act of the appellant was, therefore, protected by the right of private defence of his person. 11. For the aforesaid, reasons, I would hold that the prosecution had failed to establish by clear and acceptable evidence that the appellant was the author of the crime by dealing a blow on the head of the deceased by means of M. O. I. and in my view, even if the appellant had dealt a blow in the manner alleged by the prosecution which had resulted in the death of the deceased, his act would not be rendered culpable being excepted by the right of private defence available to him under the law. 12. The appeal must succeed and the same is allowed. The order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant is set aside. Final Result : Allowed