( 1 ) ORDER:- The Sikkim Court Fees (Exemption and Miscellaneous Provisions) act, 1983, exempting all persons whose annual income does not exceed Rs, 25,000/- from the liability to pay any Court-fees in respect of any legal proceeding, has been challenged by the Petitioner as being violative of the equality clause of the Constitution. We have heard the learned counsel in support of the petition and the learned Government Advocate appearing for the State and we have no doubt that the petition must be dismissed for the reasons stated hereunder. ( 2 ) THE Preamble of the Indian Constitution states that the people of India have solemnly resolved "to secure to all its citizens : Justice - social, economic and political. . . . . . . . . Equality of stauts and of opportunity". The Objectives Resolution from which the above phrase has been carved out stated: "the Constituent Assembly declare its firm and solemn resolve to draw up for her future governance a Constitution -"a) wherein shall be guaranteed and secured to all the people of India justice social, economic and political; equality of status, of opportunity and before the law. "article 14 of the Constitution guarantees to every citizen equality before the law and equal protection before the law. But how these rights can be exercised by those poorer sections of the society who have been continuously oppressed, suppressed and exploited for years together? Though the rights enumerated in the Part III of the Constitution have been designated as 'fundamental' or enforceable rights, but if a person does not have the barest minimum of material well-being so as to be able to exercise these rights, how can he think of enforcing them. Majority of the people were accordingly unable to claim any relief from a Court of Law in absence of the means to pay Court Fees, typing charges and other fees which are generally required to be paid to knock at the door of the Court. It shook the conscience of the Parliament which led to the introduction of Art. 39a of the Constitution of India in Part IV of the Constitution. It shook the conscience of the Parliament which led to the introduction of Art. 39a of the Constitution of India in Part IV of the Constitution. And now that the new Art. 39a, inserted in 1976 as one of the Directive Principles of the State policy, has mandated that "the State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on the basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or scheme or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities", any measure, seeking to abolish payment of court-fees, cannot but be regarded to be a further and welcome step towards implementation of the aforesaid Directive. It is true that even though Art. 37 declares the Directive Principles to be "fundamental in the governance of the country" and mandates, "the State to apply these principles in making laws", yet that very Article also declares that these Directives "shall not be enforceable by any Court". Therefore, however fundamental these principles may be in the governance of the country, no person can move the Court for the implementation or enforcement of these principles. But notwithstanding such non-enforceability, if the concerned Legislature in the discharge of its Constitutional obligation imposed by Art. 37 makes a law implementing one or more of the Directives, it becomes the law of the land and the Judiciary would be under the same Constitutional obligation to apply the law and in fact would be failing in its duty if it does not give effect to the provisions of such a law at the instance of a person who has obtained any right or benefit under the legislation. Time barred debt, for example, is obviously unenforceable by the creditor against the debtor; but if the debtor nevertheless chooses to pay the debt to the creditor, the right of the latter to the amount paid becomes absolute and indefeasible and entitled to all protections in law, even though the payment thereof was not enforceable at all. Time barred debt, for example, is obviously unenforceable by the creditor against the debtor; but if the debtor nevertheless chooses to pay the debt to the creditor, the right of the latter to the amount paid becomes absolute and indefeasible and entitled to all protections in law, even though the payment thereof was not enforceable at all. Therefore, even though the implementation of these Directives is unenforceable at the instance of a private individual against the State, yet if the State proceeds to implement any of them by making a law in accordance with the Constitutional mandate in Art. 37, then the rights of the beneficiaries under the law would, like all other legal rights, be legally enforceable. The Legislatures are under a Constitutional obligation imposed by Art. 37 to make laws implementing the directives and, if they make any such law, the Courts would also be under a similar Constitutional obligation imposed by that very Article to apply that law in their decisions. This is what has been pointed out by Mathew, J. in Kesavananda Bharati, AIR 1973 SC 1461 at p. 1949 where the learned Judge has further observed that the State, which has been commanded by Art. 37 to apply and implement the Directives, would include its judicial organ also as judicial function is both making and application of laws. In enforcing a law implementing the Directives, the Courts are not enforcing the Directives themselves, which, as such, have been declared to be unenforceable by Courts, but are only enforcing a law which the Legislature has made to implement the Directives in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution. ( 3 ) OUR apex Court has, since the decision in Chandra Bhawan, AIR 1970 SC 2042, expressed its great care and anxious advertence towards the implementation of the Directives; but it was nevertheless realised that even a law implementing the Directives may not always appear to be wholly consistent with the one or the other of the fundamental rights and thus may run the risk of being void to the extent of such inconsistency, unless the relevant fundamental rights are outweighed by express declaration to that effect as in Art. 31 A, Art. 31c and the like. Our apex Court has, therefore, evolved a new principle of construction of reading the Directives into the Fundamental Rights so that they may co-exist with, and not strike at, each other. In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh, AIR 1981 SC 298, Chinappa Reddy, J. , has pointed out (at 335) that "it follows that it becomes the duty of the Court to apply the Directive Principles in interpreting the Constitution and the laws", "the Directive Principles should serve the Courts as a Code of Interpretation" and "fundamental Rights should thus be interpreted in the light of the Directive Principles and the latter should, wherever possible, be read into the former". The learned Judge observed further that "every law attacked on the ground of infringement of a Fundamental Right should, among other considerations, be examined to find out if the law does advance one or other of the Directive Principles or if it is not in discharge of some of the undoubted obligations of the State, constitutional or otherwise, towards the citizens, flowing out of the Preamble, the Directive Principles and other provisions of the Constitution. " In a later decision in Randhir Singh, AIR 1982 SC 879 the Supreme Court, speaking through the same learned Judge, has observed (at 881) that the "directive Principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court, have to be read into the Fundamental Rights as a matter of interpretation" and in that case the equality clause in Arts. 14 and 16 was construed in the light of the Preamble of the Constitution and the Directive Principle contained in Art. 39 (d) and the constitutional goal of the State was almost converted into a constitutional right of the citizen. We have adverted to all these at some length only to bring home that the age-old assurance in favour of the constitutionality of a Statute would, in view of the Code of Interpretation evolved by our apex Court as pointed out above, stand all the more assured and fortified if the Statute concerned is found to have as its main objective the implementation of one or more of the Directive Principles. Not that a directive-implementing statute can not be void for violating the Fundamental Rights; our apex Court has not, as yet, taken us that far; but that the Court must make utmost endeavour to hold that a Statute implementing the Directives does not affect the Fundamental Rights, by reading the former into the latter, unless such reading is patently and manifestly impossible. The command of the Constitution to apply the Directive Principles in making laws must, as pointed out by Chinnappa Reddy, J. for the Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board, (AIR 1979 SC 65 at p. 69), ever be present in the mind of the Judges when interpreting statutes which concern themselves directly or indirectly with the matters set out in the Directive Principles of the State Policy and while the Courts are not free to direct the making of legislation, Courts are bound to evolve, affirm and adopt principles of interpretation which will further and not hinder the goals set out in the Directive Principles. The net result appears to be that while, as already noted, the approach of the Courts to all Statutes, which are always clothed with the presumption of constitutionality, should be "ut res magis valeat quam pereat", i. e. to allow it to flourish than to perish, our approach must be all the more so when a Statute proceeds to implement any of the Directive Principles. ( 4 ) BUT notwithstanding all these presumption and Code of Interpretation, a law, even though implementing the Directives, may still be infringing any of the Fundamental Rights to such an extent which may be beyond the reach of the curative antidote of all such presumptions and the doctrine of reading the directives into the Fundamental Rights, so long the veto in Art. 13 in favour of the Fundamental Rights would stand where it does. For otherwise, the anxious and repeated attempts on the part of the Parliament to expressly outweigh Art. 13 in respect of some of the Fundamental Rights in favour of certain types of directives-implementing laws, by inserting Art. 31a, Art. 31c and the like, would have been unnecessary. For otherwise, the anxious and repeated attempts on the part of the Parliament to expressly outweigh Art. 13 in respect of some of the Fundamental Rights in favour of certain types of directives-implementing laws, by inserting Art. 31a, Art. 31c and the like, would have been unnecessary. Therefore, the Sikkim Court Fees (Exemption and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1983, even though purporting to implement the Directives in Art. 39a, may still be void for violation of one or more of the Fundamental Rights, because implementation of the Directives cannot, by itself, overthrow or repel all challenges to constitutionality on the ground of violation of the Fundamental Rights; we have not come to that as yet. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has not disputed that the Legislature, which can levy court-fees can also abolish court fees and the learned counsel in fact has urged that the petitioner would welcome wholesale abolition of Court-fees as a wholesome implementation of the Directives in Art. 39a. But the learned counsel has, however, urged that the impugned Act has made an arbitrary and unjustified classification of litigants into two groups, one of persons whose annual income from all sources does not exceed Rs. 25,000/-, the other of persons whose annual income exceeds that amount. Now a statute, in order to justify imposition of tax, is not required to tax everyone or to exempt everyone in order to justify exemption in favour of some. The observations of Willis on "constitutional Law" to the effect that in matters relating to taxation, the State "is allowed to pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods and even rates of taxation, if it does so reasonably" and that the American Supreme Court "has been practical and has permitted a very wide latitude in classification for taxation", have been approved and accepted by our Supreme Court in a series of decisions in, among others, East India Tobacco Co. , AIR 1962 SC 1733 at p. 1735 and Kherbari Tea Co. , AIR 1964 SC 925 at p. 941. In East India Tobacco Co. , AIR 1962 SC 1733 at p. 1735 and Kherbari Tea Co. , AIR 1964 SC 925 at p. 941. In East India Tobacco Co. (supra), it has been observed that "in deciding whether a taxation law is discriminatory or not, it is necessary to bear in mind that the State has a wide discretion in selecting the persons or objects it will tax, and that a Statute is not open to attack on the ground that it taxes some persons or objects and not others". It has again been pointed out by the Supreme Court in, among others, Khandige Sham Bhat, AIR 1963 SC 591 at p. 594, Gopal Narain, AIR 1964 SC 370 at p. 375, that in matters relating to taxation laws, "the power of the Legislature to classify is of 'wide range and flexibility' so that it can adjust its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways". Reference may also be made to the rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Special Bearer Bonds Case, (R. K. Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138) where (at 2147) the majority has ruled that "laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion, etc. " and, relying on Justice Holmes and Justice Frankfurter, has advised judicial self-restraint, if not judicial deference, to the judgment of the Legislature in these matters and allowance of "some play in the joints". Even though "tax" and "fee" have different characteristics, there is, as pointed by this Court in Union of India v. Ashok, AIR 1981 Sikkim 34 at p. 37, no generic difference between the two and both are different forms in which the taxing power of the State manifests itself. ( 6 ) HOWEVER undesirable and regrettable the existence of indigence and economic inequality may be in a country like ours committed to socialism and to secure Economic Justice, the stark facts would evidently justify classification of our people into those who are economically disabled and those who are not, as an eminently reasonable one. ( 6 ) HOWEVER undesirable and regrettable the existence of indigence and economic inequality may be in a country like ours committed to socialism and to secure Economic Justice, the stark facts would evidently justify classification of our people into those who are economically disabled and those who are not, as an eminently reasonable one. Even Art. 39a of the Constitution has expressly contemplated the existence of a class of people who suffer from economic disabilities and has mandated the State to ensure that the people belonging to that class are not deprived of access to justice by reason of such economic disability. The Sikkim Court Fees (Exemption and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1983, therefore, having classified litigants into those who are economically disabled and those who are not, has made an evidently permissible and eminently reasonable classification. Once the classification is reasonable and permissible, then, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Anant Mills Co. , (AIR 1975 SC 1234 at p. 1244), "mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required". And if perfect classification with mathematical precision is neither required nor possible, then the classification made by the impugned Sikkim Law must be regarded to be good enough as there should be no doubt that people belonging to the Rs. 25,000/-annual income-group and people belonging to the annual-income-group exceeding Rs. 25,000/-, cannot be regarded to be equally situated and if the latter are excluded from the benefit of the exemption granted by the impugned Legislation to the former, it cannot be argued that the equals have been treated unequally. Access to Courts is a very important aspect of socio-economic justice and if the State enacts a legislation to ensure that the poor or the poorer shall not be prized out of the Court of justice by insistence on court-fees, it can hardly be accused of violating the equality clause by discriminating among the equals by unequal treatment. To grant exemption from the operation of taxing statutes is a well-recognised legislative exercise. As already noted, the Legislature could have exempted all persons from the liability to pay court-fees and it can undoubtedly grant such exemption to a section of the people also, unless classification of such a section as a different group or class is patently or mainfestly unreasonable. As already noted, the Legislature could have exempted all persons from the liability to pay court-fees and it can undoubtedly grant such exemption to a section of the people also, unless classification of such a section as a different group or class is patently or mainfestly unreasonable. We have amply made it clear that the classification of litigants made by the impugned legislation for the purpose of exemption from payment of court-fees has not appeared to us to be in any way unreasonable. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has also urged that it would be extremely difficult for the Courts to ascertain the annual income of a litigant and the Courts cannot be expected to convert themselves into some sort of income-assessment tribunals. This argument has not impressed us at all. In pauper proceedings under the Civil P. C. , the Courts have got to ascertain the income of the party concerned to determine as to whether he is or is not entitled to sue or appeal as a pauper. In suits relating to recovery of possession of immovable properties, the Courts are to ascertain the value of the suit property or the income therefrom in order to determine the valuation of the suit and the Court-fees payable thereon. We should not have any doubt that our Courts with their special training and background would be able to ascertain the annual income of the litigant concerned in order to determine his entitlement to the exemption from the payment of court-fees under the impugned Legislation. And if, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Courts are required to do the extra job of an income-assessment tribunal in every case so that this directive-implementing law may be effectively implemented, one should have no doubt that our Courts would readily shoulder that extra burden. And if, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Courts are required to do the extra job of an income-assessment tribunal in every case so that this directive-implementing law may be effectively implemented, one should have no doubt that our Courts would readily shoulder that extra burden. As to the contention of the learned counsel that this exemption is likely to be abused in the absence of as to the income of the litigant concerned, we would only say, as reiterated again in the Special Bearer Bond's case, (AIR 1981 SC 2138) (supra, at 2147), that"there may even be possibilities of abuse, but that too cannot of itself be a ground for invalidating the legislation, because it is not possible for any Legislature to anticipate, as if by some divine prescience, distortions and abuses of its Legislation which may be made by those subject to its provisions and to provide against such distortions and abuses. " ( 8 ) THOUGH we are dismissing this Writ Petition on merits as we have found no substance therein, we are also of the opinion that the petitioner has not been able to make out any cause of action for this proceeding and any locus to maintain the same. In spite of the spectacular expansion of the concept of 'locus' during the last decade by our apex Court, a mere busybody cannot be allowed to move the Courts of the land unless he can make out some cause and locus for him. But in this case the petitioner has not spelt out any semblance of any cause or locus; the petition does not disclose as to whether the petitioner belongs to that income group which has been exempted from the payment of Court Fees by the impugned Act or belongs to the higher income group which has not been exempted, as to whether he has instituted or is going to institute any civil proceeding requiring payment of Court Fees. With no cause of action made out for the petition, he has filed this Writ Petition which, if allowed, would have prevented the poorer section of the State from getting their due through the process of the Court, though according to the dictum of our apex Court in the Asiad case, AIR 1982 SC 1473 at p. 1478, "time has come when the Courts must become the Courts for the poor and the struggling masses of this country". Such a litigation, as this, without any cause is a litigation for the mere fun of it and an idle luxury and must be discouraged. The observations of Mr. Justice Brennan of the American Supreme Court may profitably be reproduced here : "nothing rankles more in the human heart than a brooding sense of injustice. Illness we can put up with. But injustice makes us want to pull things down. When only the rich can enjoy the law, as a doubtful luxury, and the poor, who need it most, cannot have it because its expense puts it beyond their reach, the threat to the continued existence of free democracy is not imaginary but very real, because democracy's very life depends upon making the machinery of justice so effective that every citizen shall believe in and benefit by its impartiality and fairness". We accordingly dismiss this Writ Petition and direct the Petitioner to pay Rs. 1,000/- as cost to the Respondent. Petition dismissed. --- *** --- .