JUDGMENT - DHABE H.W., J.: - In this revision the defendant has challenged the order of the learned trial Court dated 26-6-1984, by which it directed that the occupation charges from 1-3-1980 to 30-6-1984 amounting to Rs. 4,980/- at the rate of Rs. 95/- per month should be deposited by the defendant by the monthly instalment of Rs. 1000/- plus the future monthly occupation charges from the month of July, 1984. It also directed that he should deposit the first instalment of Rs. 1000/- plus Rs. 95/- for the month of July, 1984 on or before 16-7-1984 and thereafter he should deposit the amount every month on or before the 16th day of each month according to the British Calendar month and after the past dues are satisfied by the defendant, the defendant should continue to deposit the occupation charges at the rate of monthly rent every month till the decision of the suit. The above order was passed by the Court upon the application by the plaintiff dated 24-1-1984 for direction to deposit the rent made under Order 39, Rule 10 read with section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short the C.P.C.). The application was opposed by the defendant on the ground that since the tenancy was itself void, the learned trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and had, therefore, no jurisdiction to direct the defendant to deposit the past rent or dues. According to the defendant, the application of the plaintiff under Order 39, Rule 10 read with section 151 for direction to deposit the rent was not, therefore, maintainable. 2. The principal contention raised on behalf of the applicant in the instant revision is that the rule making power of the High Court is contained under section 122 read with section 128 of the C.P.C. It is by virtue of the power conferred under section 122 of the C.P.C. that the High Court has enacted the rules under the newly introduced Order 15-A in the C.P.C. It may be stated at this stage that by the notification of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay No. 0182/1977 Order 15-A and other amendments to the C.P.C. were brought into force with effect from 1st day of October, 1983. The said rules were framed after the approval of the Government of Maharashtra. The said rules were framed after the approval of the Government of Maharashtra. At this stage, it may be noticed that the impugned order is passed by the learned trial Court under Order 15-A, Rule 1, although the application is made under Order 39, Rule 10, under which as held by this Court, the Court has power to direct the tenant to deposit the rent. Vide (Chandrakant Shankarrao Deshmukh v. Haribhai Tukaramji Kathane)1, 1983 Mh.L.J. 88. However, since there is a specific provision made by amendment by the High Court in this regard, the Court passed the order under Order 15-A, Rule 1. 3. The main submission on behalf of the applicant is that the provision of Order 15-A, Rule 1 are substantive provisions. The power which is conferred upon the High Court under section 122 of C.P.C. is a power to frame the procedural Rules. The submission, therefore, is that the provisions of Order 15-A, Rule 1, which do not indicate that they are procedural rules are outside the scope and power of the High Court under section 122 of the C.P.C. The learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of (Ramrao Bhagwantrao Inamdar and another v. Babu Appanna Samage and others)2, A.I.R. 1940 Bom. 121 in support of his proposition that the rules framed under Order 15-A are substantive rules and not procedural rules. The above case is concerned with the interpretation of the expression “grounds” occurring in Order 23, Rule 1(2)(b) which has been interpreted as analogous to the ground stated in Rule 1(2)(a). The question considered in the said case is entirely different from the question in this case. Here in this case the question raised is whether the impugned rule is procedural or not . 4. In my view, the Rule impugned in this revision, namely Order 15-A, rule 1 is purely a procedural rule. To pass interlocutory orders in the interest of the parties to the lis is a procedural matter, which has been recognised even by the original Rule framed under the C.P.C. Order 39 itself deals with temporary injunctions as well as interlocutory orders. In appeals also the Appellate Court can always put the parties to conditions while passing orders of stay. The purpose of Rule is very clear. In appeals also the Appellate Court can always put the parties to conditions while passing orders of stay. The purpose of Rule is very clear. It had been the experience that in a suit between the landlord and the tenant after the tenancy was determined by the landlord, no payment was made by the tenant at the agreed rate and it was only when the decree for mesne profits was passed that the landlord could get the compensation or money for use and occupation by the tenant of his premises after the decision in the suit and after the enquiry into the mesne profits was completed. It is in order to mitigate the agony of the landlord in not receiving the payment for use and occupation by the tenant atleast at the agreed rate of rent for a long period till the decision of the suit, that the power to pass an interlocutory order in the nature of Order 15-A, Rule 1 was conferred upon the Court, so that till the tenant is using the premises of the landlord, he should continue to pay him the rent at the agreed rate . Otherwise due to the procedural delays caused in the final adjudication of the suit, the interest of the landlord was adversely affected. The power to direct the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent and to direct him to continue to make the payment to the landlord at the agreed rate is, therefore, a procedural power conferred upon the Court to do justice looking to the nature of the lis. 5. The learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon the provisions of Order 20, Rule 12 to show that the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 15-A are inconsistent with the said provisions. In my view, there is no inconsistency between the two provisions. Instead of prolonging the agony of the landlord to get the mesne profits after the decision of the suit and after the completion of the enquiry into mesne profits, what is done by Order 15-A, Rule 1 is that during the pendency of the proceedings itself, he is entitled to get rent and mesne profits at the agreed rate of rent. It is also not correct to say that there would not be any enquiry under Order 20, Rule 12 after the suit is decreed. It is also not correct to say that there would not be any enquiry under Order 20, Rule 12 after the suit is decreed. Whatever is paid for use and occupation is at the agreed rate of rent and, therefore, if the landlord claims mesne profits at the higher rate, the enquiry into the question of the mesne profits is necessary under Order 20, Rule 12 after the decision of the suit. At any rate, even assuming that the mesne profits are claimed at the agreed rate of rent, there is no inconsistency between Order 20, Rule 12 and Order 15-A, Rule 1. There is, thus, no merit in the above submission on behalf of the applicant. 6. Although the Small Causes Court is not empowered to pass an order in this regard under Order 39, Rule 10 because of the exclusion under section 7 C.P.C., the said Court has certainly powers to pass an order under Order 15-A, Rule 1, because there is no exclusion of the said provision under section 7 of the C.P.C. Even though the application is styled as one under Order 39, Rule 10 of the C.P.C. if the Small Causes Court has power under Order 15-A, Rule 1 to pass an order prayed for by the plaintiff, the order can be justified under the said provision and as shown above, in fact the Court has exercised the power under Order 15-A, Rule 1 in the instant case. There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that the Small Causes Court has no power to pass an order directing the deposit of rent as contemplated by Order 15-A, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. 7. On merits it is contended that the tenancy in the instant case according to the applicant/defendant, was void, because as per the allegations in the plaint, the plaintiffs had stated that the defendant was inducted as tenant by Smt. Rukhmanibai the mother of the plaintiffs, after whose death the tenancy was continued with them (plaintiffs) as her legal heirs. However, according to the defendant, Rukhmanibai was dead before they were inducted as a tenant and in fact according to the defendant, he was inducted as a tenant by the plaintiffs. It is admitted in this case that the defendant had been paying rent to the plaintiffs which would prima facie show that he accepted them as his landlords. However, according to the defendant, Rukhmanibai was dead before they were inducted as a tenant and in fact according to the defendant, he was inducted as a tenant by the plaintiffs. It is admitted in this case that the defendant had been paying rent to the plaintiffs which would prima facie show that he accepted them as his landlords. It cannot, therefore, be said that the order passed by the learned trial Court is not one within the scope of Order 15-A, Rule 1. There is also no dispute about the agreed rent between the parties. What is directed is payment of occupation charges at the agreed rate of rent and, therefore, in my view, the order was justified under the provisions of Order 15-A, Rule 1. The impugned order does not, therefore, need any inference by this Court. 8. However, it is urged on behalf of the applicant that the direction of the trial Court about the payment of arrears of occupation charges at the rate of Rs. 1000 plus future occupation charges should be modified. According to him, this Court should direct that the payment of arrears of occupation charges should be at the rate of Rupees 500 plus future occupation charges from the month of July 1984. It appears that as per the condition in the order of stay granted by this Court in this revision, the defendant had deposited an amount of Rs. 500/- in the trial Court, the defendant is ready to pay Rs. 1000/- towards the arrears o rent on or before 1-11-984 and thereafter pay at the rate of Rs. 500/- till the arrears are fully paid. He also agrees to continue to pay the rent at the agreed rent thereafter in future. In my view, the request on behalf of the applicant-defendant is just and proper. On behalf of the plaintiff, however, it is contended that a condition should be attached to the order that in case there are two defaults, the defence of the applicant-defendant should be struck off. 9. In the result, the impugned order of the Court is modified as follows: The defendant is directed to deposit on or before 1-11-1984 Rs. 1000/- plus the future occupation charges for the month of July, 1984. He is further directed to pay the balance of arrears of occupation charges as determined by the trial Court in the monthly instalment of Rs. 1000/- plus the future occupation charges for the month of July, 1984. He is further directed to pay the balance of arrears of occupation charges as determined by the trial Court in the monthly instalment of Rs. 500/- per month plus the future occupation charges from the month of August, 1984. The defendant is directed to pay the above sum of Rs. 500/- plus future occupation charges on or before 10th of every calendar month till the arrears are completely paid off. He should thereafter continue to deposit on or before 10th of each calendar month the rent at the agreed rate of Rs. 95/- per month. In case the defendant commits any two defaults in payment as stated above, his defence would be liable to be struck off. In the result, the revision application is partly allowed and the impugned order of the learned trial Court is modified to the extent shown above. However, there would be no order as to costs. Revision partly allowed. -----