JUDGMENT Radhakrishna Menon, J. 1. The question arising for consideration in these Original Petitions is identical. Facts are also similar. I shall therefore refer to the facts of one petition; that being OP No. 7662 of 1982. 2. The reliefs prayed for in the Original Petitions are many. However the main and perhaps the only relief that requires consideration is the one for a declaration that paragraph 2 of R.279(4) of the Posts and Telegraphs Manual, Volume IV, viz., "An official appointed as Wireless Licence Inspector shall not ordinarily be allowed to hold such a post for more than 4 years continuously at one time. An official who has worked as Wireless Licence Inspector for 4 years should not ordinarily be appointed to hold such a post within the next 4 years. The period of tenure shall not be extended in any case except on very strong administrative grounds and the prior approval of the Director General should be obtained" as unconstitutional, ultra vires, illegal and void. The other reliefs prayed for are only consequential. 3. Facts are few. The petitioner is presently working as Wireless Licence Inspector in the Posts and Telegraphs Department. He was appointed Wireless Licence Inspector under R.14(1) of the Licensing of Wireless Receiving Apparatus Rules, 1965 and R.16 of the Indian Wireless Telegraphy (Possession) Rules, 1965 as seen from Ext. P1, the certificate of appointment. The petitioner has no case that the post of Wireless Licence Inspector does belong to a different cadre. It is not a promotion post. He thus continues to be in the cadre of Time-scale Clerks, now redesignated as postal assistants. The only noticeable difference between a Wireless Licence Inspector and the Time-scale Clerk, is that a Wireless Licence Inspector is receiving every month an additional special pay, contemplated under FR 9(25) of the Fundamental Rules. 4. The only issue discernible from these facts is whether the posts of Wireless Licence Inspectors to which Time-scale Clerks like the petitioners are appointed by selection, constituted a separate grade and hence the appointments thereto can be said to be by way of promotion. The same issue was before the Supreme Court in P. G. Joshi v. Director General., P. and T., AIR 1975 SC 1 . The same issue was before the Supreme Court in P. G. Joshi v. Director General., P. and T., AIR 1975 SC 1 . The various arguments now advanced before me except perhaps the one which I propose to deal with hereunder, by the learned counsel for the petitioners, would appear to have been advanced before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court after considering the said arguments has held thus: "There are no materials to hold that the posts of Wireless Licence Inspector and Town Inspector have been sanctioned as separate units. No separate time-scale has been provided for Wireless Licence Inspectors and Town Inspectors and, the time scale Clerks who were appointed to these posts, continued in the same time-scale of pay of Clerks". 5. Interpreting Fundamental R.9(25) the Supreme Court has held: "The provision for payment of a special pay of Rs. 30 in addition to the time scale pay of Clerks is inconsistent with the constitution of a separate cadre of Wireless Licence Inspectors and Town Inspectors. The provision for special pay shows that they continued in the cadre of Time-scale Clerks. Appointment as Wireless Licence Inspectors or Town Inspectors is not a case of transfer from one cadre to another or a case of promotion from a lower cadre to a higher cadre or from a lower post to a higher post. Though, for directly recruited Wireless Licence Inspectors, there is an avenue of promotion from those posts to the posts of Wireless Investigating Inspectors, no such avenue of promotion has been shown to exist for Wireless Licence Inspectors appointed from amongst Time-scale Clerks. Their avenues of promotion are from their substantive posts of Time-scale Clerks. The posts of Wireless Licence Inspectors to which Time-scale Clerks are appointed by selection did not constitute a separate cadre and the appointments are not by way of promotion. The posts of Wireless Licence Inspectors are in the cadre of Time-scale Clerks and carry a special pay on account of additional work." (emphasis supplied) 6. The only issue arising for consideration therefore is concluded by the above pronouncement of the Supreme Court. 7. I shall however deal with the contention, which according to the learned counsel, the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider in the above decision. The learned counsel submits that the post of a Wireless Licence Inspector carries a special pay of Rs. 7. I shall however deal with the contention, which according to the learned counsel, the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider in the above decision. The learned counsel submits that the post of a Wireless Licence Inspector carries a special pay of Rs. 40 per month and hence it must be held that the petitioners are recipients of higher emoluments than are available to time scale Clerks / Postal Assistants. He further contended that a special pay in the case of the petitioners will be counted for fixation of pay in the higher category. The said payment would also be reckoned for pension and such other benefits. If that be the position, the provision contained in R.279(4) of the Posts and Telegraphs Manual, Volume IV, restricting the appointments for a specified period is wholly arbitrary and not based on any principle and hence violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India. In support of this contention the learned counsel relied on the following passage in the decision of the Supreme Court in C. C. Padmanabhan v. Director of Public Instruction, AIR 1981 SC 64 . "We now take up the second limb of the argument of Mr. Nair, namely, that even if the post of an AEO is not regarded as higher to that of an HSA either category wise or gradewise, the impugned reversions are still hit by Art.14 of the Constitution of India. In this connection two important factors have to be taken note of. The first is that the post of an AEO carries a special pay of Rs. 50 per mouth, and, therefore, ensures for its incumbents higher emoluments than arc available to an HSA. The second is that the special pay is counted towards pension as is made out from a reading of R.12(23) and 62 of the Kerala Service Rules. According to R.12(23) special pay is part of 'pay' while Rule 62 states inter alia that emoluments which are reckoned for pension include pay as defined in R.12(23). The post of an AEO thus carries with it not only benefits enjoyable by the incumbent so long as he holds the post but also such as are available to him after retirement. The post of an AEO thus carries with it not only benefits enjoyable by the incumbent so long as he holds the post but also such as are available to him after retirement. The substantial improvements in the benefits which an HSA thus enjoys after his posting as an AEO constitute a compelling circumstance which would necessitate the formulation of rational criteria to be followed in 'transfering an HSA as an AEO and vice versa so that mere caprice does not deprive an AEO of the benefits enjoyed by him. The direction contained in the letter dated 19th May, 1977 that an AEO should be transferred back as an HSA after six years of service as AEO is wholly arbitrary and not based in any principle. It is, therefore, violative of Art.14 and we hold it to be so." 8. The learned Central Government Pleader however submitted that the said decision of the Supreme Court has no application to the facts of the case on hand in view of the decision in Joshi's case AIR 1975 SC 1 where the Supreme Court considered the scope of both Posts and Telegraphs Manual Volume IV and Fundamental R.9(25) of the Fundamental Rules governing the appointment and functioning of Wireless Licence Inspectors and Town Inspectors. In short, the question now before me, according to the learned Central Government Pleader, is no more res integra in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Joshi's case AIR 1975 SC 1 . The learned counsel called my attention to the following passage in C. C. Padmanabhan's case AIR 1981 SC 64 : "Special pay of Rs. 30 in that case, it may thus be seen, was something quite different from the special pay in the instant case which, as we have already found, was granted in lieu of a higher scale of pay consistent with higher responsibilities which are entailed in tlie performance of his functions by an AEO. All the three clauses of Fundamental R.9(25) correspond with the definition of special pay contained in sub clauses (b) and (c) of clause (31) of R.12 of the Kerala Service Rules and none of them takes within its sweep the type of special pay envisaged by sub clause (a) of R.12(31). All the three clauses of Fundamental R.9(25) correspond with the definition of special pay contained in sub clauses (b) and (c) of clause (31) of R.12 of the Kerala Service Rules and none of them takes within its sweep the type of special pay envisaged by sub clause (a) of R.12(31). The case cited is thus fully distinguishable and is of no assistance to the case propounded on behalf of the State Government." (emphasis supplied) 9. I am of the view that the above passage is a complete answer to the arguments of the counsel for the petitioners that R.279(4) of the Posts and Telegraphs Manual, Volume IV, is wholly arbitrary and hence not violative of Art.14. The said contention is therefore rejected. 10. Before I part with this judgment I wish to make it clear that nothing stated herein would disentitle the petitioners from getting any benefit they are entitled to under the relevant rules in the matter of fixation of their pay in the lower selection grade. The Original Petitions are without merit and accordingly they are dismissed. No costs.