JUDGMENT : B. K. Mehta, J. The petitioner who has joined the Indian Police Service in the year 1957 and who was at all the relevant time of this petition Additional Inspector General of Police, has moved this Court by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ of Mandamus enjoining the State Government as well as the Union of India allowing the petitioner to retire voluntarily under the provisions of Rule 16 of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 on completion of 50 years of age from the Indian Police Service. Before we refer to the relevant correspondence whereby the petitioner intimated his intention to retire voluntarily it would be advisable to refer shortly the circumstances which prompted him to seek the voluntary retirement. 2. The petitioner claims that he was assigned 4th rank in the list of the successful candidates at the All India Services Competitive Examination of 1956 for entry in the Indian Police Service. The petitioner claims to have brilliant academic career and stood First Class First from the Punjab University in the examination for the degree of LL.B. before he appeared for competitive examination. According to the petitioner, his services have been considered to be meritorious for which he was awarded Presidential Police Award on the Republic Day of 1973. Having regard to his excellent performance in the services, the petitioner claims that he was deputed to attend the National Defence Course in New Delhi in 1975 where the officers from all India and Central Services arc deputed only if the officer concerned has excellent service records with the possibility of his reaching the top position in his service. It is an admitted position that the petitioner was promoted as Deputy Inspector of Police in 1973 in preference to many of his senior colleagues. He was promoted as Deputy Inspector General of Police and was placed in the charge of a Range and thereafter he was promoted as Additional Inspector General of Police in September, 1982. He was posted as a Commissioner of Police, Baroda after the post was upgraded from the rank of Deputy Inspector General to that of Additional Inspector General of Police. He was posted as a Commissioner of Police, Baroda after the post was upgraded from the rank of Deputy Inspector General to that of Additional Inspector General of Police. The petitioner claims that lie was posted at Baroda specially with a mission to look after the riotous city and it is his claim that by his untiring and relentless efforts he brought about the normalcy in the city of Baroda in spite of many anti-social elements were at large in the city. The petitioner claims further that it is a matter of record that his services were appreciated in dealing firmly with these elements and curbing the riots in the city of Baroda by the Chief Minister and the Home Minister of the State. In spite of his meritorious services at Baroda, the petitioner was summoned by the Additional Chief Secretary Shri R. V. Chandramauli on December 13, 1982 when he was told about the decision of the Government to transfer him; but before the transfer order is issued, the Government wanted to know from him whether the petitioner would like to go on leave or would like to be posted elsewhere. According to the petitioner, the decision for transferring him was taken somewhere on 9th December, 1982 by the Government in presence of the Home Minister, the Director General and the Inspector General of Police. The decision for his transfer was taken since in the opinion of the Government, the petitioner was not able to handle the situation in Baroda effectively. The grievance of the petitioner is that the situation in Baroda deteriorated clearly after 9th December, 1982 and, therefore there could not have been any justification for the Government to take the decision of transfer. The petitioner has imputed that the decision of his transfer was clearly biased and actuated by malafides on the part of the Government. It should be noted at this stage that we are referring to these averments in the petition only for purposes of indicating what were the circumstances which prompted the petitioner ultimately to seek voluntary retirement from the service. The petitioner, in this connection, also refers to some preliminary inquiry initiated by the State Government through one Shri M. J. Jadeja, who happened to be Director of Anti-corruption Bureau, Ahmedabad somewhere in February, 1983. The petitioner, in this connection, also refers to some preliminary inquiry initiated by the State Government through one Shri M. J. Jadeja, who happened to be Director of Anti-corruption Bureau, Ahmedabad somewhere in February, 1983. The petitioner alleges that neither Shri Jadeja nor the Government supplied him with the necessary documents which he requested for in order to enable him to send a reply to the information called for by Shri Jadeja vide his letter of February 27, 1983. The petitioner also has made some grievance about the communication of the adverse remarks by the then Chief Secretary for the years 1982-83 entered in his service records in his confidential rolls - which, according to the petitioner, were not communicated within the prescribed period. Though the Government decided to transfer the petitioner he was riot given any posting till June, 1983 as two citizens of Baroda had filed civil suit and obtained interim order restraining the State Government from transferring the petitioner which was vacated in June, 1983. The petitioner was thereafter posted as In charge Computer Centre at Gandhinagar after upgrading the said post which was held by a person of the rank of DIG. The petitioner has challenged the upgrading of the post since according to the petitioner this post was upgraded and down-graded having regard to the cadre of the incumbent and not according to the relevant prescribed criteria under the rules for upgrading such posts. The grievance of the petitioner is that the Government wanted the petitioner to work on a lower rank than the one which was befitting his status. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner addressed a letter of September 27, 1983 to the Chief Secretary of the State Government about his intention to seek voluntary retirement. He intimated by the said letter to the Government that he sought voluntary retirement from the services. However, in the said letter, he requested the Government that he should be treated as having retired from the Indian Police Service with effect from 1st November, 1983. He prayed for issuance of appropriate orders in the matter of terminal benefits in the said letter. 3. Unfortunately, however, the State Government did not respond immediately to this letter of the petitioner with the result that he was required to address another letter on October 6, 1983 which was also addressed to the Chief Secretary. He prayed for issuance of appropriate orders in the matter of terminal benefits in the said letter. 3. Unfortunately, however, the State Government did not respond immediately to this letter of the petitioner with the result that he was required to address another letter on October 6, 1983 which was also addressed to the Chief Secretary. In this letter of October 6, 1983, the petitioner referred to his earlier letter of September 27, 1983 wherein he had intimated the Government about his intention to retire with effect from 1st November, 1983. In the second paragraph of this letter of October 6, 1983 the petitioner referred to the requirement of the provisions contained in Rule 16 (2) and (2A) of the aforesaid Rules of three months’ notice before retirement. The petitioner thereafter expressed his opinion that the Government can waive the requirement of three months’ notice. He, therefore, requested the State Government that the approval of the Government of India to permit him to retire from the Indian Police Service be taken and accordingly relieve him from the services with effect from 1st November, 1983. In the penultimate paragraph of the said letter, the petitioner clarified that in case the Government of Gujarat insisted on three months’ notice, the said period should be counted with effect from the date of his earlier letter, that is, September 27, 1983, and accordingly he should be allowed to retire with effect from 27th December, 1983 on expiry of the three months period. To this letter also the State Government did not respond immediately with the result that the petitioner intimated the State Government by telegram of October 25, 1983 reminding the State Government of his intention to retire as intimated vide letter of September 27, 1983 and October 6, 1983. It is only after the receipt of this telegram that the State Government responded and the Deputy Secretary to the Government in the Home Department by his letter of October 31, 1983 which was delivered in person to the petitioner in the afternoon of the said date conveyed to the petitioner that tire request of the petitioner for voluntary retirement under Rule 16 (2A) of the said Rules was not accepted by the Government and, therefore, he could not be allowed to retire voluntarily on 1st November, 1983 as required by the petitioner in his first letter of September 27, 1983. It appears that the petitioner, prior to the delivery of the letter of the State Government dated 31st October, 1983, received an envelope containing the Memorandum incorporating the Government’s decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner under All India (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1959 since the petitioner had committed breach of All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 and that in exercise of the powers vested in the Government by Rule 3 of the said Discipline and Appeal Rules, placed the petitioner under suspension with immediate effect until further orders. The petitioner wrote back to the Government by his letter of November 5, 1983 setting out in details, inter alia, the ground of his retirement and the relevant provisions of the Rules under which he was seeking retirement and also invited the attention of the Government to the clarification issued by the Government of India in the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Ministry of Home Affairs, about Rule 16 (2) under which he was seeking his retirement. The petitioner thereafter moved this court for appropriate writs, orders and directions to enjoin the respondents for allowing him to retire according to the Rules. 4. The petition has been resisted by the State Government and a short affidavit in reply has been filed of Shri Chanramauli who happens to be the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Gujarat. The short ground on which the petition has been resisted is that the petitioner was not entitled to the reliefs prayed for non-compliance of the provisions of Rule 16 (2) and (2A) of the said Rules. 5. We are, therefore, concerned with the short but interesting question as to what is the width and scope of Rule 16 (2) and (2A) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958. Before we construe the Rules and apply to the facts of the case, in order to find out whether the State Government is justified as it is seeking to urge before us as contended in the reply affidavit in its stand that the petitioner has failed to comply with the requirement of these two relevant provisions we refer to the provisions of the Rules. Rule 16 provides for superannuation, gratuity or pension. Rule 16 provides for superannuation, gratuity or pension. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 16 provides for superannuation of a member of the service which means a member of All India Service as defined in Section 2 of the All India Services Act, 1951, with effect from the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 58 years. It is not necessary to refer to the provisos to sub-rule (1). Sub-rule (2) and Sub-rule (2A) provide for voluntary retirement. Shortly stated, the effect of the combined reading of both these sub-rules is that a member of the service can seek voluntary retirement either on completion of 20 years of qualifying service, or 30 years of qualifying service or on completion of 50 years in age. When the acceptance by the State Government is required of a decision of a member of the service for his voluntary retirement is a matter which we shall deal with while construing the said Rules in question. Before he can voluntarily retire under these Rules, it has been provided that such member has to give three months’ previous notice in writing. This requirement of three months’ notice is precisely not worded in the same manner in sub-rule (2) and sub-rule (2A). The retirement takes place according to sub-rule (2) and sub-rule (2A) on the date on which he completes the qualifying period of service - either 20 years or 30 years, as the case may be, or on completion of 50 years in age. If a member of service intends to retire on a date earlier than the date prescribed in sub-rule (2) the acceptance by the State Government is called for. It is shortly this scheme which has been incorporated in sub-rule (2) and sub-rule (2A) which calls for our consideration and construction. We, therefore, read the said rule in extenso as under : “16. Superannuation, gratuity or pension - (1) .......... It is shortly this scheme which has been incorporated in sub-rule (2) and sub-rule (2A) which calls for our consideration and construction. We, therefore, read the said rule in extenso as under : “16. Superannuation, gratuity or pension - (1) .......... (2) A member of the Service may, after giving at least three months’ previous notice in writing to the State Government concerned, retire from service on the date on which such member completes thirty years of qualifying service on the date on which such member attains fifty years of age or any date thereafter to be specified in the notice : Provided that no member of the Service under suspension shall retire from service except with the specific approval of the State Government concerned. (2A) A member of the service may, after giving three months’ previous notice in writing to the State Government concerned, retire from service on the date on which he completes 20 years of qualifying service or any date thereafter to be specified in the notice. Provided that a notice of retirement given by a member of the service shall require acceptance by the State Government concerned if the date of retirement on the expiry of the period of notice would be earlier than the date on which the member of the Service could have retired from service under sub-rule (2): Provided further that a member of the Service, who is on deputation to a corporation or company wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government or to a body controlled or financed by the Government, shall not be eligible to retire from service under this rule for getting himself permanently absorbed in such corporation, company, or body.” The scheme of voluntary retirement as contained in sub-rules (2) and (2A) appears to us to be as under : 6. A member of service is qualified to seek voluntary retirement either on completion of 30 years of qualifying service or on attaining 50 years of age. Even in absence of these qualifications, a member can, with the acceptance by the Government, still seek voluntary retirement, if he has completed 20 years of his service, provided the date of his retirement on expiry of the notice is earlier than the date on which he could have retired as prescribed in sub-rule (2). Even in absence of these qualifications, a member can, with the acceptance by the Government, still seek voluntary retirement, if he has completed 20 years of his service, provided the date of his retirement on expiry of the notice is earlier than the date on which he could have retired as prescribed in sub-rule (2). The scheme, therefore, comprises of two parts, namely, the part relating to the qualifications for retirement as well the method for retirement. The qualifications for the retirement are in the nature of conditions precedent and unless these conditions are satisfied, no member can voluntarily seek retirement. Since these qualifications are in the nature of conditions precedent, we are of the opinion that they are mandatory. They arc the conditions precedent prescribed in the perspective of the public interest. The dictates of public interest enjoin that a member of the service must have put in a prescribed number of years of service, or must have attained a prescribed age in the Government service before he can qualify himself for retirement benefits. On the other hand, the method for retirement does not appear to us to be mandatory. The method of retirement is by giving three months’ previous notice in writing to the State Government concerned which notice would intimate that the member of the service concerned would retire on any of the contingencies prescribed under sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (2A) or thereafter. The question whether a particular provision of a statute is directory or mandatory might well arise in a case where merely a period is specified for performing a duty but the consequences for not performing it within time specified are not mentioned (See: Dr. Ram Subagh v. Dr. Bhargava, AIR 1975 SC 1852 ). When a provision can lie held to be mandatory or directory is a subject-matter of many decisions of High Courts as well as Supreme Court. It is axiomatic that the object of a statute is the determining factor for purpose of deciding the mandatory or directory nature of a provision (Sec : Hiralal Agrawal v. Ramapadarth Singh, AIR 1969 SC 244 at p. 246. It is axiomatic that the object of a statute is the determining factor for purpose of deciding the mandatory or directory nature of a provision (Sec : Hiralal Agrawal v. Ramapadarth Singh, AIR 1969 SC 244 at p. 246. It is equally settled that if the words of a statute are precise and unambiguous, there is no necessity to expound them since the words are the best declaration of the legislative intent: (See Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel v. Agriculture Produce Market Committee, AIR 1976 SC 263 ). It is often said that a provision of law is not mandatory unless its non-compliance is made penal (See: Jagannath v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1954 SC 210 ). If a statute requires a tiling to be done in a prescribed manner or form but does not set out the consequences for non-compliance, the mandatory or directory nature is to be judged by legislative intent as disclosed by the object, purpose and scope of the Act. (See: Bhikhraj Jaipuriya v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 113 ). The ultimate test seems to be whether a particular statute or a provision thereof is based on the ground of public policy, or whether it is intended for the benefit of a particular person or a class of persons. If it is based on a public policy, it cannot be waived and the contravention of such a provision is always considered to be a nullity. If on the other hand, it is envisaged for the benefit of a person or a party, or a class of persons or parties, then it is always held to be directory and it can be waived. No hard and fast rule can be laid down for determining whether the statutory command is to be considered as a mere direction or instruction involving no invalidating consequence in its disregard, or as imperative with an implied nullification for its disobedience beyond the fundamental one that it depends on the scope and object of the enactment. It can be generally said that nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience, but the question is mainly governed by consideration of consequence and justice. Ultimately the whole purpose and scope of the statute under consideration must be examined (See: Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 376). It can be generally said that nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience, but the question is mainly governed by consideration of consequence and justice. Ultimately the whole purpose and scope of the statute under consideration must be examined (See: Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 376). In view of this settled legal position, therefore, we are of the opinion that so far as the period of notice is concerned, it is merely a method or manner of seeking retirement and on the plain reading of it, it appears to have been envisaged with a view to enable the Government to make alternative arrangement for filling up the vacancy arising as a result of the early retirement of a member of the service. The legislative intent does not appear to be that unless the previous notice is of clear three months it would be non est for all intents and purposes. It cannot be asserted successfully that the requirement of three months’ notice is dictated solely and exclusively in public interest. In our opinion, it is designed for the convenience and benefit of the Government which can always waive such a requirement. The object and purpose of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules in general is to provide for retirement and retirement benefits for members of All India Services. The object and purpose of Rule 16 (2) and (2A) is to confer the benefit and privilege on the members who have not reached the superannuation age. The trend of the liberal legislative intent is manifested clearly in sub-rule (2) where the completion of specified years of service of 30 years is not the only qualification for seeking voluntary retirement. A member who has not completed 30 years of service but attained the age of 50 years is also entitled to seek retirement. The legislative intent of enlarging and liberalising this benefit is evident inasmuch as sub-rule (2A) has been added somewhere in 1972 by providing for retirement on completion of twenty years subject to the proviso. If, therefore, the legislature has conferred such a privilege and the move to make it more liberal is apparent, the duty of the Court in interpreting such beneficent clauses should be to so interpreter them as to advance the cause and not to construe in a manner which will defeat the legislative intent. If, therefore, the legislature has conferred such a privilege and the move to make it more liberal is apparent, the duty of the Court in interpreting such beneficent clauses should be to so interpreter them as to advance the cause and not to construe in a manner which will defeat the legislative intent. The proviso to sub-rule (2) clearly indicates that the legislative intent is that even in case of suspended members of the Services the Government may permit voluntary retirement. In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that three months’ notice as envisaged in sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (2A) cannot be said to be of a mandatory character. Our attention has been invited to sub-rule (2) where it has been prescribed that a member of service may retire “after giving at least three months’ previous notice in writing to the State Government....”. Now, if we look to sub-rule (2A) which permits a member of the service to retire on completion of 20 years qualifying service, it does not adopt the same phraseology prescribing minimum period as we find in sub-rule (2). That indicates, in our opinion, that the legislative intent does not appear to be that this should be considered to be a mandatory provision. In any case, in absence of any consequences being provided for the non-compliance of the period of notice since no consequences are prescribed to be ensued, it is a provision which has been envisaged for the benefit of the Government and a requirement which the Government can always waive, we are of the opinion that the period of notice cannot be said to be mandatory at all. We are, therefore, of the opinion that having regard to the scope, purpose and object of sub-rule (2) and (2A) the requirement of three months’ notice must be held as directory provision which, if substantially complied with, may enable the member of service to seek voluntary retirement if he is qualified under the said sub-rules. 7. There was some debate as to when proviso to sub-rule (2) would be attracted. As we have pointed out above, while describing the scheme contained in sub-rule (2) and (2A), a member of service can seek voluntary retirement either on completion of 30 years of service, or on attainment of 50 years of age. In either of these contingencies he is entitled to seek retirement. As we have pointed out above, while describing the scheme contained in sub-rule (2) and (2A), a member of service can seek voluntary retirement either on completion of 30 years of service, or on attainment of 50 years of age. In either of these contingencies he is entitled to seek retirement. He has been given further right of voluntary retirement on completion of 20 years of qualifying service under sub-rule (2). But if the date of the retirement on the expiry of the period of notice prescribed under sub-rule (2A) would be earlier than the date on which the member of the service would have retired from the service under sub-rule (2), the acceptance of the Government is required. In other words, if a member of the service seeks voluntary retirement on completion of 20 years of service, but he has not completed 50 years of age, he can retire after the acceptance by the State Government of his notice of retirement. 8. We have, therefore, to consider as to whether the State Government was justified in refusing the acceptance of the notice. The question is, whether the proviso to sub-rule (2A) is at all attracted. In order to answer this question, we may set out the material intimation from the relevant letters addressed to the State Government by the petitioner. The first letter to which we should advert to in this behalf is that of September 27, 1983 addressed to the Chief Secretary of the State Government. The subject described in the said letter is “Voluntary Retirement from the Indian Police Service”. The material part of the text of this letter reads as under : “Dear Sir, Twenty six years back, I had the privilege to join the service, i.e. the Indian Police Service, with a view to serving the people. In the best of my ability, I have served the people with sincerity and honesty, with honour and dignity. Now I feel I will be in a better position to serve the people if I leave Government service. I have put in 26 years of service. In normal circumstances I am entitled to seek voluntary retirement and I am entitled to all the retirement benefits as per rules applicable to the Indian Police Services. I seek voluntary retirement and I hereby intimate you to that effect. I have put in 26 years of service. In normal circumstances I am entitled to seek voluntary retirement and I am entitled to all the retirement benefits as per rules applicable to the Indian Police Services. I seek voluntary retirement and I hereby intimate you to that effect. Kindly issue the orders allowing me to retire from the Indian Police Service with effect from 31st December, 1983. I should be treated as having retired from I.P.S. from 1st November, 1983.” The rest of the letter is not necessary, except the last paragraph thereof which we reproduce below : “I shall be highly abliged if you could pass the orders in respect of the above mentioned subject as early as possible and treat me as retired from the Indian Police Service, i.e. 1st November, 1983.” (emphasis supplied) 9. It should be recalled at this stage that there was no immediate response to this letter of the petitioner, with the result that he was required to send reminder by his letter of October 6, 1983. The subject of the letter is : “Premature retirement from IPS vide my letter dated 27th September, 1983.” We read the material part of this letter as under : Sir, Vide my letter dated 27-9-83, I have requested you to allow me to retire from I.P.S. with effect from 1st November, 1983. Under All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement) Rules, Rule 16(2) and (2A), it is required to give three months’ notice for such retirement on the part of the officer. However, the Government are competent for condoning the said stipulation of three months. I shall be highly obliged if the Government of Gujarat with the approval of Government of India, permits me to retire from I.P.S and be relieved from the services with effect from 1st November, 1983. In case the Govt, of Gujarat would insist on three months’ notice, the said period of three months may be counted with effect from 27-9-1983 and I should be relieved on retirement from I.P.S. with effect from 27th December 1983. I request, as a special case, the Government may be pleased to relieve me from I.P.S. with effect from 1st November, 1983.” (emphasis supplied) 10. I request, as a special case, the Government may be pleased to relieve me from I.P.S. with effect from 1st November, 1983.” (emphasis supplied) 10. To this letter also there was no immediate response with the result that the petitioner was required to send a telegraphic reminder on October 25, 1983 to the Chief Secretary of the State Government which reads as under : “Ref. My Letters Dated 27th Sept. And 6th October Regarding Voluntary Retirement From Service Effective 1st Nov. No Reply Received So Far Request Immediate Action And Relief From Service (Emphasis supplied) 11. It is only after this telegraphic reminder that the State Government vide letter of the Deputy Secretary in Home Department of October 31, 1983 intimated the petitioner that his request for voluntary retirement under Rule 16(2A) of AIS (DCRRs) 1958 was considered by the Government and the Government has not accepted the same so as to allow the petitioner to retire voluntarily on 1-11-1983. 12. The contention urged on behalf of the Government is that as far as the first letter of September 27, 1983 is concerned, it does not satisfy the requirement of three months’ notice since the petitioner has categorically stated in the letter that he should be treated as having retired from the services from 1st November, 1983, and inasmuch as on the said day the petitioner had not completed 50 years in age, though he had completed qualifying period of 20 years’ service, the acceptance by the Government was necessary, and if the Government in public interest does not accept such a notice, the Government is well within its right. So far as the second letter of October 6, 1983 is concerned, the stand of the Government is that since it seeks to treat the first letter of September 27, 1983 as a notice as required under sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (2A), it cannot be a previous notice and if the letter of October 6, 1983 is considered to be a notice by itself, it was not a notice for a period of three months. 13. In spite of our best endeavour to appreciate this contention, we do not think that the contention can be sustained. The reasons are obvious. The two letters of September 27, 1983 and October 6, 1983 cannot be read separately. 13. In spite of our best endeavour to appreciate this contention, we do not think that the contention can be sustained. The reasons are obvious. The two letters of September 27, 1983 and October 6, 1983 cannot be read separately. As a matter of record, in the letter of October 6, 1983 the petitioner has clearly referred to and had drawn the attention of the Government to his earlier letter of September 27, 1983. In other words, it was merely continuation of the letter of September 27, 1983. The petitioner pointed out that according to Rule 16 (2) and (2A), a member of the service seeking voluntary retirement is supposed to give three months’ notice before such retirement. He also expressed his opinion that the Government has a right to waive such notice and he actually requested the Government to permit him to be relieved with effect from 1st November, 1983. The paragraph thereafter which we have set out above and in the material part which we have underlined it is stated that if the Government insisted for three months’ notice his earlier letter or September 27, 1983 should be treated as a notice of retirement, and that he should be relieved as retired from the services with effect from December 27, 1983. In the telegram which followed these two letters, since there was no immediate response from the Government, the petitioner referred to these two letters and requested the Government for early action in the matter. If, therefore, we read both these letters together, which we should since having regard to the nature of the provision of notice contained in the relevant sub-rules we cannot read these letters in a pedantic manner, and we must hold that the petitioner has served on the Government the requisite notice in substantial terms as required by the relevant provisions, namely, sub-rule (2) and (2A). Even if the request which had been made by the letter of October 6, 1983 is treated as a notice by itself, it is also, in our opinion, substantial compliance of the requirement of the provisions because what is prescribed is three months’ previous notice and even if we count the period of notice from October 6, 1983, it would fall short of three months by only 7 or 8 days. It can hardly be said to be a notice which does not comply with the requirement of the provisions. There is no question of the acceptance by the Government as required under the proviso to sub-rule (2A) since the date of retirement which has been notified by the combined reading of the two letters is December 27, 1983 which is falling after the date on which the petitioner attained 50 years since it is not in dispute that the petitioner completes his 50 years on December 8, 1983. In our opinion, there is substantial compliance of the requirement of the relevant sub-rules, namely, sub-rule (2) and (2A) of the Rules in question. Even if we consider that this requirement of three months’ notice is a mandatory provision, it cannot be urged successfully that the non-compliance of such a provision would result into notice being non est for all intents and proposes. It is settled on matter of principle and authority that breach of every mandatory provision does not result in nullity, and if any statutory provision is in the interest or for the benefit of a party, though mandatory in nature, it can always be waived and if a provision which appears to be in a mandatory form can be waived, the breach of such a provision would not amount to a nullity (See: Dhirendra Nath v. Sudhir Chandra, AIR 1964 SC 1300 ). If a statutory condition is inserted by the Legislature for the security or benefit of the parties to an action, and that where no public interest is involved, such a condition will not be considered as indispensable and the party for whose benefit it is inserted may waive it without affecting the substance of the transaction since every one has aright to waive the advantage of a law or a rule made solely for the benefit and protection of a person which can be always dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy (See: ‘Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes’, 11th Edition at p. 375). In that view of the matter, therefore, we are of the opinion that the two letters, namely, letter of September 27, 1983 read with the letter of October 6, 1983, should be read conjointly so as to have the combined effect of the intimation about the voluntary retirement on expiry of the period of three months, that December 27, 1983. The result is that the State Government is under duty to allow the petitioner to retire with effect from December 27, 1983. The interpretation which commends to us appears to be in consonance with the clarification made by the Government of India in the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms which has been communicated to the Chief Secretaries of the State Governments by letter dated October 16, 1978 and the operative part of which has been reproduced at page 166 of the All India Services Manual, 4th Edition, Part I. We requested the learned Advocate General to produce this letter so as to understand the occasion for issuance of the clarification. It appears that the Government of India has opined earlier that a member of service cannot be placed under suspension after the notice for retirement has been issued by him under sub-rule (2). That position was reconsidered and the State Governments were advised that in spite of such a notice, the State Government has such a power to place an erring member of the service under suspension. While reconsidering and stating the position, the Government of India has clarified as to what would be the result, if a notice has been already issued by the member of the service, on the right of the State Government to suspend him. We reproduce the entire operative part of that letter which has been set out at page 166 of the All India Services Manual and it reads as under : “(5) Under sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 ibid., retirement of a member of the Service becomes effective on the expiry of three months’ notice given by him, unless he is under suspension. Once the notice period begins to run, it may not be open to the Government a unilateral act of suspension to prevent the running of the three months’ period. Once the notice period begins to run, it may not be open to the Government a unilateral act of suspension to prevent the running of the three months’ period. - In other words, a member of the Service, who has given notice for voluntary retirement under the aforesaid rule will retire from service on the expiry of the period of the prescribed three months even if he is placed under suspension after he gave notice. However, as provided in the explanation below Rule 6 (1) ibid. a departmental proceeding in terms of the aforesaid rule shall also be deemed to have been instituted against the pensioner on the date he was placed under suspension. In view of this, if a member of the Service is placed under suspension after he gives notice for retiring from service voluntarily, the benefit of the limitation contained in Clause (b) (ii) of the proviso to Rule 6 (1) ibid. will not be available to him, and departmental proceedings under this rule for reduction of his pensionary benefits can be initiated against him, even after the date of his retirement for a misconduct committed by him while in service, although such proceeding may be in respect of an event which took place more than four years before the institution of such proceedings.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. The emphasised paraphrase of the opinion set cut in the opening part of paragraph 5 clearly indicates that the intention of the Legislature as understood by the Government of India is that a member of service who has given notice for voluntary retirement will retire from the service on the expiry of the period of prescribed three months even if he is placed under suspension after he gave the notice. That is precisely what has happened here, though no contention has been urged on behalf of the Government that since he has been suspended the notice is not valid. We have pointed out this in order to find an assurance for the interpretation which has been canvassed on behalf of the petitioner and which has commended to us. 15. The result is that this petition is allowed. A writ of Mandamus should go to the State Government to permit the petitioner to retire from the service with effect from December 27, 1983. 15. The result is that this petition is allowed. A writ of Mandamus should go to the State Government to permit the petitioner to retire from the service with effect from December 27, 1983. The petitioner shall be at liberty to apply for his salary and allowances for the period for which he has not been paid till the date of his suspension. From the date of his suspension till the date of his retirement, he will be entitled to suspension allowance as may be permissible under the Rules. This judgment and order of this Court is without prejudice to the right of the State Government to hold inquiry against the petitioner, if it is so advised. Rule is made absolute accordingly. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, there should be no order as to costs. 16. The learned Advocate General for the State Government makes an oral application that the operation of this judgment and order be stayed for a period of four weeks so as to enable the State Government to move the Supreme Court for appropriate interim orders in the matter. In ordinary course, we would not have objected to the grant of the interim relief as prayed for. But since the petitioner claims that he wants to contest the ensuing Lok Sabha elections to be held in December, 1984 for which the last date for filing nomination is November 27 1984, this Court should not exercise the discretion of staying the operation of the judgment and order. Having given anxious consideration to the rival contentions, we are of the opinion that if we give the following interim relief, it would serve the ends of justice. 17. The operation of the order passed today is stayed without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to file nomination for ensuing elections to the Lok Sabha, subject to the interim directions of the Supreme Court. Liberty to the parties to apply in case of any difficulties. Rule made absolute.