JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. - This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Agra, dated December 23, 1969. 2. The appellant is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. An institution known as the M.D. Jain Higher Secondary School, Agra, belongs to it and is managed through its Committee of Management. The respondent was employed in this institution as a trained graduate teacher on July 12, 1949 on temporary basis. He was confirmed on July 1, 1950. From about the year (sic) he was officiating as the Principal. On March 21, 1961, the Committee of Management resolved to place him under suspension. A charge-sheet under the signature of the Manager dated April 16, 1961 was served upon the respondent on April 19, 1961. An additional charge-sheet was also served subsequently on September 15, 1961. In the meanwhile, however, the Committee of Management took decision on June 26, 1961 to terminate the services of the respondent. The Manager wrote to the District Inspector of Schools, Agra on June 30, 1961 to accord permission for terminating the services of the respondent. The respondent was not allowed to join his duties, nor was he paid the salary. He brought the suit on February 1, 1967, giving rise to this appeal, seeking the relief of declaration to the effect that the plaintiff's services not been determined and he continued to be in the service of the defendant. In the alternative, declaration has been sought to the effect that the impugned order of termination of the services of the plaintiff dated June 26, 1961 is illegal and ultra vires and the plaintiff continued to be in the service of the defendant. He has also claimed a sum of Rs. 20,642.11 being the arrears of his pay and D.A. for the period of February (sic), 1961 to January 31, 1967. 3. The suit was resisted by the defendant pleading that contract of personal service of the plaintiff could not be specifically enforced and its termination did not require prior sanction of any person except that of the employer. It was refuted thus that the order of termination impugned in this case was bad on account of the previous permission of the District Inspector of Schools being not obtained as contended by the plaintiff. It was refuted thus that the order of termination impugned in this case was bad on account of the previous permission of the District Inspector of Schools being not obtained as contended by the plaintiff. The services of the plaintiff were duly determined and it was wrong also to say that the plaintiff became aware of the order dated June 26, 1961 for the first time on February 1,1964, as alleged by him. The suit in respect of the amount claimed by the plaintiff was stated to be moreover barred by limitation. 4. The trial court came to the finding that the notice dated June 26, 1961 terminating the services of the plaintiff was invalid since this was not preceded with the approval accorded by the District Inspector of Schools. The plaintiff continued to be in the service of the Institution and entitled as such to receive the emoluments. The termination was communicated to the plaintiff for the First time on February 1, 1964. The cause of action for the amount claimed by the plaintiff accrued on that date and hence the suit instituted on February 1, 1967 was within limitation. The suit has accordingly been decreed in the plaintiff's favour by the trial court. 5. Aggrieved, the defendant has preferred this appeal. 6. Sri Swami Dayal, learned counsel for the appellant urged that the plaintiff respondent could not maintain the suit for declaration against the appellant which is not a statutory body, nor could he seek reinstatement. The relief asked for by him could not be granted under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The plaintiff not having claimed damages, there could be no decree passed for the amount claimed by him either. For the respondent Sri S.P. Srivastava the learned counsel argued, on the other hand, that the invalidity alleged in relation to the order dated June 26, 1961, being founded upon the breach of statutory provisions and not the contravention of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties, the plaintiff did have the right to maintain the suit claiming the declaration asked for by him. It is argued also that the amount claimed may, in the alternative, be treated as being by way of damages or the plaintiff be permitted to amend the plaint for this purpose. 7. Before adverting to these contentions it is relevant to refer to certain admitted facts. It is argued also that the amount claimed may, in the alternative, be treated as being by way of damages or the plaintiff be permitted to amend the plaint for this purpose. 7. Before adverting to these contentions it is relevant to refer to certain admitted facts. There is no dispute that the respondent joined the institution as a trained graduate teacher on July 12, 1949 on temporary basis and was confirmed in that capacity on July 1, 1950. At the relevant time he was officiating as the Principal. The Committee of Management placed him under suspension by its resolution dated March 21, 1961. A charge-sheet dated April 16, 1961 was served upon him and this was followed by a resolution of the Committee of Management passed on June 26, 1961 whereby the services of the plaintiff-respondent were terminated. The Manager wrote on June 30, 1961 to the District Inspector of Schools for permission being accorded to determine the services of the plaintiff. In his statement on oath, D.W. Babu Lal Jain, the then Manager, testified that a copy of this resolution was sent to the plaintiff also under registered cover on June 30, 1961. The plaintiff denied that any such copy was served upon him. He stated that he could know of the termination of his services on February 1, 1964 for the first time. The court below has accepted this version of the plaintiff-respondent. Section 16G(3)(a) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, as introduced by Notification dated April 8, 1959 and in force during the relevant period, read as under: "(3)(a) No Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. The decision of the Inspector shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulations. 7. Regulation 44, Chapter II, provided: "44. The Inspector or Regional Inspectress shall communicate his/her decision to the management within six weeks of the receipt of its proposal in complete form for action mentioned in sub-section (3)(a) of section 16G of the Act. The decision of the Inspector shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulations. 7. Regulation 44, Chapter II, provided: "44. The Inspector or Regional Inspectress shall communicate his/her decision to the management within six weeks of the receipt of its proposal in complete form for action mentioned in sub-section (3)(a) of section 16G of the Act. If incomplete papers are received from the management the approving Officer shall require it to re-submit its proposal in complete form within two weeks, and the period of six weeks prescribed in this regulation shall be reckoned from the date on which complete papers are received by the approving officer. These papers shall either be sent by registered post or by special messenger." 8. Assuming as the appellant contended in the Court below that a copy of the resolution dated June 26, 1961 terminating the services of the respondent was communicated to him under registered cover on June 30, 1961, the fact remains that this was without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools. Section 16G(3)(a) prohibits discharge, removal or dismissal from service or even service of notice to terminate the service of the teacher except with the prior approval in writing of the District Inspector of Schools. The Manager had, it has been stated, written to the District Inspector of Schools on June 30, 1961 vide Ex. A-16, for permission to dispense with the services of the respondent. On June 30, 1961 itself there could not arise a presumption as to the District Inspector of Schools having accorded approval within the meaning of Regulation 44, quoted above. It would thus appear to be clear that the resolution terminating the services of the respondent was sought to be given effect to by the appellant without the approval of the District Inspector of Schools. This is the invalidity relating to the impugned order dated June 26, 1961, referred to for the plaintiff-respondent. 9. It is settled that under the common law the Court will not ordinarily force an employer to retain the services of an employee whom he no longer wishes to employ. The well-recognised Exceptions to this Rule are: 1. It is open to a Court in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant, who is dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution, continues to remain in service; 2. The well-recognised Exceptions to this Rule are: 1. It is open to a Court in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant, who is dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution, continues to remain in service; 2. Under the Industrial Law, jurisdiction of the Labour and Industrial Tribunals to compel the employer to employ a workman who he does not desire to employ is recognised; and 3. The Courts are invested also with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by the statute. 10. The appellant in the instant case is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. The affairs of the College were looked after by a Committee of Management constituted by the appellant in conformity with the requirements of Section 16-A of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act. The appellant Society or the Committee of Management is not a creature of statute. It is a body constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder to carry out certain specific objects. The decision in Vaish Degree College case, 1976 (2) S.C.C. 58 settles that the Society as such as the appellant before us on the Committee of management cannot be treated as a statutory body. 11. The criteria laid down by Fazl Ali, J. speaking for himself and H.R. Khanna, J. at page 65 is: "It seems to us that before an institution can be a statutory body it must be created by or under the statute and owe its existence to a statute. This must be the primary thing which has got to be established. Here a distinction must be made between an institution which is not created by or under a statute but is governed by certain statutory provisions for the proper maintenance and administration of the institution. There have been a number of institutions which though not created by or under any statute have adopted certain statutory provisions, but that by itself is not, in our opinion, sufficient to clothe the institution with a statutory character. In Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi this Court clearly pointed out as to what constitutes a statutory body. There have been a number of institutions which though not created by or under any statute have adopted certain statutory provisions, but that by itself is not, in our opinion, sufficient to clothe the institution with a statutory character. In Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi this Court clearly pointed out as to what constitutes a statutory body. In this connection my Lord A.N. Ray, C.J. observed as follows; SCC p. 435 SCC (L&S.) 115, para 25). "A company incorporated under the Companies Act is not created by the Companies Act but comes into existence in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is not a statutory body because it is not created by the statute. It is a body created in accordance with the provisions of the statute. It is, therefore, clear that there is a well marked distinction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. In other words the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe its very existence to a statute which would be the foundation of its powers. The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned, but is merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory body." 12. In that case the affairs of the Vaish Degree College, Shamli, were managed by the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee registered under the Co-operative Societies Act was the appellant. The College was affiliated to the Agra University and was governed by the Provisions of the Agra University Act and the Statutes and Ordinances made thereunder. The plaintiff respondent in that case had been dismissed from service by a resolution passed by the Executive Committee. He had brought a suit in the civil court praying for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his duties as the Principal of the College. The plaintiff respondent in that case had been dismissed from service by a resolution passed by the Executive Committee. He had brought a suit in the civil court praying for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his duties as the Principal of the College. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of any of the three Exceptions taken note of as above and that the Executive Committee of the College not being a statutory body, the case of the plaintiff-respondent could not be claimed to be covered even under the Exception (3) and there could be no declaration or injunction granted in his favour. 13. Sri S.P. Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent, referred to the observations of Bhagwati, J. in the case of Vaish Degree College (Supra). Similar argument was advanced in Arya Vidya Sabha, Kashi v. Krishan Kumar Srivastava, AIR. 1976 SC 1073 : (1976 Lab IC 698) and the Supreme Court repelled the contention observing: "Whatever might have been the prior state of the precedents, in the light of the decision in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain, Civil Appeal No. 1543 of 1974, decided on 12.2.1975 we are satisfied that the institution which is the appellant before us is not a creature of statute but an entity like a company or a co-operative society or other body which has been created under the operation of a statute. This makes all the difference as has been pointed out by the majority decision in Lakshmi Narain's case, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 888. May be, there is much to be said in favour of the opposite view set out by Sri Justice Bhagwati, but we are bound by the decision of the Court as expounded by the majority view." 14. In Vidya Ram Misra v. Managing Committee, Jai Narain College and another, AIR 1972 SC 1450 : (1972 Lab IC 829) the petitioner was appointed as Lecturer by the Managing Committee of a College affiliated to the Lucknow University. Statute 151 provided that the terms and conditions mentioned therein must be incorporated in the contract to be entered into between the College and the teacher concerned. The Managing Committee resolved to remove the petitioner from his service. The petitioner took recourse to a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Statute 151 provided that the terms and conditions mentioned therein must be incorporated in the contract to be entered into between the College and the teacher concerned. The Managing Committee resolved to remove the petitioner from his service. The petitioner took recourse to a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The contravention found by the Court was of contractual obligation. The Supreme Court held that the Exception (3) referred to above was not of avail to the petitioner because in order that this Exception may apply the order must be the order of a statutory body acting in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute and that the College or the Managing Committee in question was a statutory body. The remedy of the petitioner could only lie by a suit for damages. A Full Bench of this Court was of the view in the case of Aley Ahmad Abidi v. District Inspector of Schools Allahabad, AIR 1977 All 539 . that a recognised Intermediate College which is required by Section 16A of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act to have a Scheme of Administration cannot by any stretch of imagination, be regarded as a statutory body. The Scheme under Section 16A is not a subordinate legislation: the committee is not a body constituted under a statute, but is merely governed by the provisions of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. The Court observed also that a writ petition filed against it is maintainable, if such a petition is for the enforcement or performance of any legal obligation or duty imposed on such Committee by statute. We are in the present case not concerned with this observation since the respondent has taken recourse to a suit in the civil court. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court is also of the view following the decision of the Supreme Court in Vaish Degree College (Supra) that the Managing Committee is neither a statutory body nor a public authority deriving powers from statutory provisions vide the Managing Committee, High School, Jammu v. Sheonandan Sinha 'vikas' (1977) (2) Serv LR 492 : (1978 Lab IC NOC 82). (see also Smt. Usha Das (Roy) v. Smt. Arati Kar, AIR 1982 Cal 174 . (see also Smt. Usha Das (Roy) v. Smt. Arati Kar, AIR 1982 Cal 174 . The case of Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, (1980) 3 SCC 459 : ( AIR 1980 SC 840 ) cited for the respondent stands on a different footing altogether because the Corporation constituted under the Statute therein was an agency or instrumentality of the Government and therefore it was found to be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 15. Since the appellant is not a statutory body, as discussed above, the Exception (3) is not attracted. The plaintiff-respondent not being an industrial workman, there is no question to invoke the Exception (1) in picture because there is no contravention alleged or shown of Article 311 of the Constitution. The remedy of the plaintiff appellant in the circumstances lay in a suit for the recovery of damages and he is not entitled to the declaration prayed for against the defendant-appellant. 16. The submission of Sri Srivastava then is that the case in the present arises from the breach of statutory provision contained in Section 16G(3) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act and not a contractual obligation and hence the general Rule excluding the relief of declaration in these matters should not apply. This contention, in our view, is devoid of merit. In the Vaish Degree College case (supra) also the plaintiff's case was that on being affiliated to the Agra University and thereafter to the Meerut University and adopting the provisions of the Act the Statutes of those Universities the appellant College became a statutory body and had no jurisdiction to terminate the services of the plaintiff-respondent without seeking the previous approval of the Vice Chancellor. The plaintiff further submitted that after his appointment he entered into an agreement with the Executive Committee in accordance with the Statute of the University and the appellant was bound by the terms of the provisions of the Statute under which his services could not be terminated without the previous approval of the Vice Chancellor. The plaintiff, therefore, contended that his removal from service was without jurisdiction and he must be deemed to have continued in service. This is at par with the facts in the instant case. The plaintiff, therefore, contended that his removal from service was without jurisdiction and he must be deemed to have continued in service. This is at par with the facts in the instant case. The plaintiff-respondent herein contends that the order terminating his service is vitiated because this is claimed to have been communicated without the prior approval in writing of the District Inspector of Schools and also that on December 12, 1955, there was an agreement executed between the Committee of Management and himself subject to the statutory provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act. Paragraph 10 of this agreement provided that the notice terminating the services of the plaintiff would not be valid unless the Inspector had approved the same. Section 16G(1), it may further be noticed, lays down that the person employed in a recognised institution shall be governed by such conditions of service as may be prescribed by Regulations and any agreement between the Management and such employee in so far as it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or with the Regulations shall be void. The agreement, therefore, hold good only to the extent and in so far as it does not contain anything inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. In the instant case as also in the case of Vaish Degree College, (Supra) the breach alleged by the plaintiff-respondent on the basis of which the relief was claimed is essentially that of statutory provision. Irrespective of whether the contravention is of the provisions contained in the statute or of contract, the material fact is that the relief of declaration sought being against a non-statutory body, the plaintiff-respondent is not eligible to the same. 17. Faced with this Sri Srivastava, the learned counsel, urged that degree be passed in favour of the plaintiff respondent for damages for the period of February 1, 1961 to January 31, 1967 calculated at the rate of the pay and allowances which the plaintiff-respondent might have received, if continued in employment and amounting to the sum of Rs. 20,642.11. Sri Dayal, counsel for the appellant, argued and rightly in our opinion that the Court may not grant the relief for damages. The claim raised by the plaintiff, as well appear from the averments contained in the plaint, is on a different premise altogether. 20,642.11. Sri Dayal, counsel for the appellant, argued and rightly in our opinion that the Court may not grant the relief for damages. The claim raised by the plaintiff, as well appear from the averments contained in the plaint, is on a different premise altogether. In paragraph 14 the allegation is that the plaintiff is entitled to his pay and D.As. for the period of 1.2.1961 till 31.1.1967 amounting to Rs. 20,642.11. In paragraph 5 he referred to his pay of Rs. 200/-. per month and Rs. 10/- as Dearness Allowance. From the averments of the plaint taken in their totality it is not possible to cull out a case for a claim of damages instead of the arrears of pay and allowances. In Sitaram Kashiram Konda v. Pigment Cakes and Chemicals Manufacturing Co., (1979) 4 SCC 12 : (1979 Lab IC 1378) the plaintiff instituted a suit against his employer claiming various reliefs including a declaration that he had been removed from his service illegally, asking for reinstatement and, in the alternative, the compensation. The Supreme Court emphasised that the plaintiff had, in the alternative, prayed for awarding compensation to him. It was half heartedly then urged also that the Court may permit the plaintiff-respondent to amend the plaint. An amendment in this behalf cannot justifiably be permitted at this stage since that would amount to a change in the nature of the suit and deprive the defendant appellant from the plea on the point of limitation. It was argued that issue No. 2 framed by the trial Court was to the effect whether the plaintiff was entitled to any damages or compensation for wrongful dismissal. This frame of the issue does not take away the tenor or the contents of the plaint which nowhere refer to a claim for compensation or damages even in the alternative. The contention for the appellant that in case the plaintiff-respondent had set up a case of damages or compensation, the defendant could have as well shown that the plaintiff took no steps to mitigate the damages is also not without force. 18. Reliance for the appellant is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. J. Tewari v. Smt. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir, 1981 U.P. Labour Bodies and Education Cases 34 : ( AIR 1981 SC 122 ) which is on all fours applicable to the case in the present. 18. Reliance for the appellant is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. J. Tewari v. Smt. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir, 1981 U.P. Labour Bodies and Education Cases 34 : ( AIR 1981 SC 122 ) which is on all fours applicable to the case in the present. The appellant in that case was the Principal of the College at the relevant time. The Working Committee of the Society registered under the Societies Registration Act to which the College belonged passed a resolution terminating the services of the appellant. The appellant instituted a suit in the civil Court asking for a declaration that she continued in the service of the respondent and for setting aside the order terminating her services. She also claimed in the suit a decree for specific amount by way of salary. According to her, in issuing the notice of termination, the required procedure was not followed and the Inspectress of Schools had not been consulted. For the appellant it was argued in that case that the respondent No. 1 was a public body or a statutory authority and therefore the appellant would be entitled to obtain the declaration prayed for. This was repelled by the Supreme Court which held: "We are unable to accept the contention strenuously advanced before us by the appellant's learned counsel that respondent is a public body or a statutory authority and therefore the appellant would be entitled to obtain a declaration that she continued to be in the service of respondent since the order terminating her services has been found to be unlawful. The regulations of the University or the provisions of the Education Code framed by the State Government may be applicable to respondent 1 and if the provisions thereof are violated by respondent 1, the University may be entitled to disaffiliate the institution and the Government may perhaps be entitled to withdraw the education grant payable to the institution. That does not, however, mean that respondent 1 is a public or a statutory body. Respondent 1 is a private institution which is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It was established by one Nand Lal, a retired Deputy Collector, who named it after his wife Smt. Jwala Devi. That does not, however, mean that respondent 1 is a public or a statutory body. Respondent 1 is a private institution which is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It was established by one Nand Lal, a retired Deputy Collector, who named it after his wife Smt. Jwala Devi. The Society was established for the purpose of managing the institution." Deciding the appeal this Court had treated the claim of the plaintiff for three years' arrears of salary as being payable to the appellant on account of damages. The Supreme Court disapproved it observing that this was not a right approach to the problem. The appellant admitted in her evidence that she did not make any attempt to mitigate the damages by trying to obtain an alternative employment during the preceding 20 years. The difficulty of obtaining employment was an argument, it was observed, which could not be permitted to a person who on her own saying had made no effort to obtain any employment. 19. For the discussion in the foregoing, the appeal succeeds and is allowed accordingly. The judgment and decree of the Court below are set aside. The suit shall stand dismissed. In the circumstances costs shall be borne by the parties throughout.