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1984 DIGILAW 307 (KER)

VARGHESE v. R. T. O.

1984-11-05

K.K.NARENDRAN, PARIPOORNAN

body1984
Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal from the judgment of our learned brother, Bhat, J. dated 24th August, 1984 rendered in O. P. No. 6482 of 1984. The appellant herein was the petitioner in the O. P. He impugned Ext, P13 judgment of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam dated 12th June, 1984 rendered in M.V.A.R.P. No. 82 of 1984. The main question that was urged before the learned Single Judge was that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal erred in adjudicating the matter on merits, since the revision was barred by limitation. It is common ground that the order that was revised by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in exercise of the powers vested in it under S.64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was rendered by the R. T. A. on 13-2-1984. It was despatched to the 3rd respondent in the O.P.-the revision petitioner before the S.T.A.T.-on 21-2-1984. The 3rd respondent filed the revision before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal on 19-3-1984. This is admittedly within 30 days of the actual knowledge of the order passed by the RTA. A copy of the order sought to be revised should be filed along with the revision and it was so done. The learned Single Judge after a review of the relevant decisions held that the words occurring in S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, to the effect, "30 days from the date of the order" means 30 days "from the date on which he had (the party had) actual or constructive knowledge of the order". The learned Single Judge, held that the time will begin to run only from the date on which the revision petitioner had actual or constructive knowledge of the order, as the case may be. In this view of the matter, the revision filed before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was held to be within time. On the merits, the learned Single Judge held that no ground was made out to interfere with the impugned order of the Tribunal ordering a remit. The Original Petition was dismissed. 2. The petitioner in the Original petition has come up in Writ Appeal. Counsel for the appellant, Mr. K. C. Sankaran, very vehemently attacked the order of the learned Single Judge. The Original Petition was dismissed. 2. The petitioner in the Original petition has come up in Writ Appeal. Counsel for the appellant, Mr. K. C. Sankaran, very vehemently attacked the order of the learned Single Judge. Counsel contended that the time for filing the revision is only 30 days from the date of the order and in the context of S.64-A, it cannot be said that the aggrieved party can file the revision within 30 days from the date on which he had actual or constructive knowledge of the order. S.64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act reads as follows: "64-A. Revision. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may, either on its own motion or on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final: Provided that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty-days from the date of the order: Provided further that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time: Provided also that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard." Bhat J. in the judgment under appeal referred to and relied on the decisions reported in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer (AIR. 1961 SC. 1500). The Asst. Transport Commr., Lucknow v. Nand Singh (AIR. 1980 SC. 15) and Joseph v. Deputy Collector (1982 KLT. 904) to hold that time will begin to run only from the date on which the aggrieved party has actual or constructive knowledge of the impugned order. 1961 SC. 1500). The Asst. Transport Commr., Lucknow v. Nand Singh (AIR. 1980 SC. 15) and Joseph v. Deputy Collector (1982 KLT. 904) to hold that time will begin to run only from the date on which the aggrieved party has actual or constructive knowledge of the impugned order. In repelling the contentions to the contra, the learned judge distinguished the decisions reported in Municipal Board v. State Transport Authority (AIR. 1965 SC. 458), G.R. Nanjundaswami v. The Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal (AIR 1972 Mys. 6), Channa Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (AIR. 1973 MP 218) and Chhotey Lal Singh v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal (AIR. 1975 All 393). We have gone through the decisions aforesaid. We are of opinion that the reasoning and conclusion of the learned Single Judge are fully justified and we agree with the same. 3. In this connection, we may usefully refer to an unreported Division Bench decision of this Court in T. R. C. Nos. 15 and 16 of 1981 dated 7-6-1982. Speaking for the Bench, Poti, Ag. C. J., observed: "Any authority on which power is conferred, the exercise of which power would affect the rights of parties, is to communicate its order to the party against whom the order would operate. The mere preparation of an order or even keeping the order signed in the files of the office would not render it an effective order, an order which is operative. The exceptions are cases where there is requirement of pronouncing the orders and they are pronounced on notified dates. Then, irrespective of the actual presence or otherwise of the parties, notice to the parties is assumed. In other cases, if the authority making the order fails to communicate the order, the order could not be said to have been made, for, communication of such order is an essential part of making such order. This is naturally so, for, any authority who writes out an order and signs it is free to change it at anytime before it is communicated. It is not final at all, for, the authority may become wiser on information supplied to it or otherwise and may choose to change the order at any time before it is despatched to the party against whom it operates." After an exhaustive review of the decisions reported in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh's case (AIR. 1961 SC. It is not final at all, for, the authority may become wiser on information supplied to it or otherwise and may choose to change the order at any time before it is despatched to the party against whom it operates." After an exhaustive review of the decisions reported in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh's case (AIR. 1961 SC. 1500: 1962 (1) SCR. 676), Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1963 SC. 395), State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram (AIR.1970 SC.214), and B J. Shelat v. State of Gujarat (AIR.1978 SC.1109), the learned Chief justice held: "We have no hesitation to find that the order of the Sales Tax Officer, assuming that it was made, signed and kept in the files, was not effective and complete until it was issued to the party." We agree with the ratio laid down in the said decision as well. 4. We are of opinion that the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the revision filed before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal by the 3rd respondent was not barred by limitation. The words "30 clays from the date of the order" must be understood as 30 days from the date on which the aggrieved party had actual or constructive knowledge of the impugned order. The revision filed before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is within time. The sole ground on which Ext. P13 judgment was sought to be assailed before the Single Judge and also before us, is devoid of force. We hold accordingly 5. There is no merit in this writ Appeal. It is dismissed in limine.