Judgment Prabha Sanker Mishra, J. 1. Two questions have been raised in this appeal. It has been urged that an error of law has been committed by the learned 3rd Additional Sub-ordinate Judge, at Arrah in rejecting a certified copy of a certified copy of a decree in the absence of the original (Ext. K/1) as not admissible in evidence. To my mind learned Sub-ordinate Judge has undoubtedly erred in not admitting the said document in evidence and considering its effect. But, as I shall presently consider, I am satisfied that even after admitting Ext. K/1 in evidence it is not possible to reverse the judgment and decree of the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, on the issues of fact. The second contention raised on behalf of the appellants is whether the suit of the plaintiff respondents for declaration of title and recovery of possession over the disputed house described in Schedule/A of the plaint after adjudicating that it was the separate property of the plaintiff No. 1 whose right, title and interest therein has not been affected by its auction, sale and purchase by the defendant appellants in Execution Case No. 26/64 of the Court of 1st Sub-ordinate Judge, Arrah ; and in the alternative that the said execution case having been levied for satisfaction of decree obtained by the defendant appellants in S.C.G. Suit No. 177/52 of the Court of 1st Sub-ordinate Judge, Arrah in relation to a decree against only of the three co-sharers of the property, is governed by Article 11-A of the Limitation Act, 1908 or by Article 142 of the said Act. I am of the view that Article 11-A of the said Limitation Act in no manner inhibits the reliefs sought in the suit, and Article 142 of the said Act applies to it. I shall consider in some details the said two contentions of the learned Counsel for the Appellants but before I do so, I propose to set out some facts. 2. The defendant appellants instituted S.C.C. Suit No. 177/52 in the Court of the 1st Sub-ordinate Judge, Arrah impleading Radhika Raman Prasad Srivastava alias Madan Jee and Mostt. Kamleshwari Kuer and Rewti Raman Prasad, the first two sons of late Gaya Prasad and the third his widow, for recovery of Rs. 490.00 (principal and interest) on a hand note dated 26-6-50. At the relevant time Rewti Raman was a minor. Kamleshwari Kuer and Rewti Raman Prasad, the first two sons of late Gaya Prasad and the third his widow, for recovery of Rs. 490.00 (principal and interest) on a hand note dated 26-6-50. At the relevant time Rewti Raman was a minor. The suit, however, was decreed ex-parte. The decree holder, namely, the defendant appellants in the present suit levied execution, being Execution Case No. 26/54. The execution terminated with the auction sale of the disputed house. The defendant appellants auction purchased and obtained delivery of possession of the house on 12-12-1955. The plaintiffs respondents filed an application under Order 21 rule 100 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter to be referred as the Code) for possession of the disputed house in the said execution proceeding alleging that the defendant appellants had wrongly included them in the category of the judgment debtor in the execution case and executed the decree against a property in which they had present possession. The said application under Order 21 rule 100 of the Code was, however, dismissed for default. The plaintiffs thereafter instituted the instant suit. They alleged that the house in question belonged exclusively to the plaintiff No. 1 namely Mostt. Kauleshwari Kuer and so it could not be attached or sold in execution of a decree against Radhika Raman Prasad Srivastava alias Madan Jee (her son) who had no interest in the property. The plaintiffs further alleged that since the decree in the S.C C. suit was against Radhika Raman Prasad alone and he alone was the judgment debtor, therefore, if at all, the execution could proceed against his share in the house and not against the shares to which the plaintiffs were entitled to. They accordingly sought a declaration that the suit house belonged to the plaintiff No. 1 only and no other person had any interest therein or in the alternative that the house being one belonging to Radhika Raman Prasad Srivastava, Rewti Raman and Mostt. Kauleshwari Kuer jointly, their 2/3rd interest could not either be attached or sold in execution of a decree obtained against Radhika Raman Prasad Srivastava. 3. Both the courts below have found that the suit house belonged to Rewti Raman, Radhika Raman and Most. Kauleshwari Kuer together each having 1/3rd interest therein. Learned 1st. Addl. Kauleshwari Kuer jointly, their 2/3rd interest could not either be attached or sold in execution of a decree obtained against Radhika Raman Prasad Srivastava. 3. Both the courts below have found that the suit house belonged to Rewti Raman, Radhika Raman and Most. Kauleshwari Kuer together each having 1/3rd interest therein. Learned 1st. Addl. Munsif, Arrah, however, found that the decree in the S.C.C. suit was against Radhika Raman as also the plaintiffs and thus the plaintiffs were judgment debtors along with Radhika Raman. He also found that the plaintiffs had filed their suit after expiry of the period of one year, that is to say, the period of limitation prescribed under Article 11-A of the Limitation Act, 1908 and since the suit in question was one governed by the said provision it was barred by limitation. Learned 3rd Additional Sub-ordinate Judge on appeal by the plaintiffs, has, however, found that the decree in the S.C.C. suit was against Radhika Raman only and accordingly the properties belonging to the plaintiffs could neither be attached nor sold in execution of the said decree. On the question of limitation he has taken the view that the suit in question does not fall within the mischief of Article 11-A of the Limitation Act, but, it is one governed by Article 142 of the Limitation Act and accordingly not barred by limitation. 4. There are two documents on the record one produced by the plaintiff respondents (Ext. 6) and the other produced by the defendant appellants (Ext. K/1). Ext. 6 is a certified copy of the decree in S.C.C. Suit No. 177/52. Its contents show that the S.C. G. suit was decreed against defendant No. 1 only. Ext. K/1 also purports to be a certified copy of a certified copy of the S.C.C. suit decree but its recitals go to show that the S.C.C. suit was decreed against not only Radhika Raman but the other two defendants of the said suit namely the plaintiffs of the instant suit. Learned sub-ordinate Judge has rejected Ext. K/1 on the ground that it is not admissible, Mr. Dinesh Charan, learned Counsel for the appellants has urged before me that the learned Sub-ordinate Judge has committed error in rejecting this document as inadmissible. He has pointed out that the original decree had already been destroyed when Ext. Learned sub-ordinate Judge has rejected Ext. K/1 on the ground that it is not admissible, Mr. Dinesh Charan, learned Counsel for the appellants has urged before me that the learned Sub-ordinate Judge has committed error in rejecting this document as inadmissible. He has pointed out that the original decree had already been destroyed when Ext. K/1 was obtained by the defendant appellant from a certified copy of the decree filed in another suit by one of the judgment debtors of the S.C.C. suit No. 177/52, namely, Radhika Raman Prasad Srivastava. Mr. Charan has submitted that since the original decree was not available and even the certified copy of the said document is in custody of the plaintiffs, the defendant appellant had no other means to prove the decree except through a certified copy of the certified copy. He has submitted that Ext. K/1 has wrongly been rejected from consideration by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge which is as good a secondary evidence as any other certified copy compared with the original document. Mr. Vinod Kumar Roy, learned Counsel for the plaintiff respondents has, however, submitted that secondary evidence has been denned under Sec. 63 of the Evidence Act and according to the law defining the secondary evidence copies made from or compared with the original are admissible but as illustration (c) of the Evidence Act shows a copy transcribed from a copy but not compared with the original although the copy from which it was transcribed was compared with the original is not admissible as a secondary evidence. 5. Secondary evidence relating to documents may be given as prescribed under Section 65 of the Evidence Act when the original is shown or appear to be in the possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of the reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it in the event of, inter alia, it being shown that the original has been destroyed or lost. It is not disputed that the original decree of the S.C.C. suit has been destroyed. The defendant knew about the decree against Radhika Raman as also the plaintiffs and executed it. Accordingly, the suit house was auction sold in execution of the decree. It is not disputed that the original decree of the S.C.C. suit has been destroyed. The defendant knew about the decree against Radhika Raman as also the plaintiffs and executed it. Accordingly, the suit house was auction sold in execution of the decree. But the plaintiffs in the present suit have relied upon the judgment in the S.C.C. suit (Ext. 5) and accordingly contended that the S.C.C. suit was decreed against Radhika Raman only Ext. 5 which is a certified copy of the operative portion of the judgment in the S.C.C. suit runs as follows;- Plaintiffs claim proved as against defendant No. 1. As far defendant Nos. 1 and 3, it appears that the loan in question was taken by defendant No. 1 to start a new business for manufacture of Ghee cream. There is nothing to show that this business was started with consent, express or implied of defendant Nos. 2 and 3, or to show that they adopted it as a family business. As such they are not liable for loan. Hence the suit is decreed ex-parte with cost and hearing fee 2 1/2% p. a. as against defendant No. I alone and is dismissed against defendant Nos. 2 and 3 ex-parte. Ext. 6 however which is nothing but a formal expression of the order in the judgment shows at one place "amended" V. O.D. 11-12-53 Sd/ K.K. Dutta, S.C.C.J 11-12-53. The case pleaded by the defendant appellants has been that the original decree stood amended and by a review the court concerned extended the decree not only to touch the defendant No. 1 of the suit namely Radhika Raman but the other defendants of the suit as well namely the plaintiffs of the present suit. The defendant relied upon the fact that a copy of the decree filed in another suit by Radhika Raman contained recitals clearly showing that the decree was passed not only against him but against the other defendants of the S.C.C. suit also. They wanted a copy of the decree and accordingly when they applied for a copy thereto they learnt that the judgment and the decree of the suit had been destroyed. They were left therefore, with no alternative but to obtain a copy of the document, that is to say, the certified copy of the decree filed by Radhika Raman in a criminal case. They were left therefore, with no alternative but to obtain a copy of the document, that is to say, the certified copy of the decree filed by Radhika Raman in a criminal case. They accordingly applied for a certified copy thereof and the certified copy issued to them was produced by them before the trial Court. The said document was marked as Ext. K/1 which contain all other endorsements similar to those in Ext. 6 but besides that in the main part it contains: Defendant do pay Rs. 486/- principal and interest besides Rs. 83/- as cost of the suit to the plaintiff future interest at 6% per annum. 6. The question of admissibility of this document is somewhat ticklish but to my mind, it will be improper to reject it on the sole ground that it purports to be a certified copy of a certified copy of a decree. Illustration (c) of Sec. 63 of the Evidence Act says: A copy transcribed from a copy, but afterwards compared with the original is secondary evidence ; but the copy not so compared is not secondary evidence of the original, although a copy from which it was transcribed was compared with the original. 7. The emphasis of the law is that the copy produced should be one which is compared with the original and there is a proof thereof that it contains that which the original contains. Assuming for a moment that the contents of Ext. K/1 may not betaken to have been proved as secondary evidence in absence of any attestation of the same having been compared with the original, atleast for the purpose of showing that a copy of a decree containing endorsements and statements as Ext. K/1 contains was filed by Radhika Raman in the criminal case. Relevancy even of this fact that Radhika Raman had filed a certified copy of the decree in the S.C.C. suit in criminal case which contained, inter-alia, a statement contrary to what is said by the plaintiffs in the suit, however, cannot be denied. In that sense atleast as a proof of a relevant fact as to the conduct of Radhika Raman one of the judgment debtors in the S.C.C. suit and further that at some stage a stand had been taken that the decree in the S.C.C. suit was against all the defendants, Ext. K/1 is relevant. In that sense atleast as a proof of a relevant fact as to the conduct of Radhika Raman one of the judgment debtors in the S.C.C. suit and further that at some stage a stand had been taken that the decree in the S.C.C. suit was against all the defendants, Ext. K/1 is relevant. Such a fact which is found to be inconsistent with any fact in issue in a suit is a fact relevant and evidence to that effect is a legal and valid evidence under Sec.11 of the Evidence Act. To that extent atleast learned Sub-ordinate Judge, in my opinion, has erred in law. 8. The difficulty of the appellant, however, is not solved even if the contents of the Ext. K/1 are taken into consideration. Sec.2(2) of the Code defines a decree as the formal expression of adjudication. Such formal expression of adjudication according to the definition also includes the adjudication of a plaint and determination of any question within Sec.144 of the Code. Order 20 Rule 6 of the Code states what the decree should contain. According to it the decree has to agree with the judgment and has to state the names and descriptions of the parties their registered addresses and particulars of the claims. Rule 5 of Order 22 says that the court has to state its findings or decision with the reason therefor upon each separate issue unless the finding upon any one more each separate issue unless the finding upon any one or more of the issue is sufficient for the decision of the suit as available in Ext. 5 (quoted above) shows that the Court unequivocally the declared the Suit dismissed against defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and decreed it only against defendant no 1. While Ext. 6 is consistent with the said pronouncement, Ext. K/1 is wholly inconsistent with it. The defendant appellant has relied upon some review allegedly with it. The defendant appellant has relied upon some review allegedly made y the small Cause. Review by Way of substantially altering the courts Pronouncement of the court in its judgment will be invalid and illegitimate. The Judgment by the small cause Court could be altered other under order 47 Rule 1 of the code, or under Sec.151 of the code but in any event such review could not have been done without affording opportunity of hearing to the affected parties. The Judgment by the small cause Court could be altered other under order 47 Rule 1 of the code, or under Sec.151 of the code but in any event such review could not have been done without affording opportunity of hearing to the affected parties. There is no material on the record to show that the plaintiffs were ever noticed about any review of the judgment was ever at all reviewed by the small cause Court. The only material produced on behalf of the defendant appellant in support. The only materiel produced on behalf of the defendant appellant in support of the so called review is Ext. K/1 I have already indicated that Ext. K/1, in absence of a review of the judgment is inconsistent with the Courtss Pronouncement on the issues before it. Ext. K/1, therefore, has to be rejected as not a true copy of the adjudication of the controversy between the parties before the small cause Court 9. Coming to the question of limitation it is necessary to notice it is admitted that the plaintiffs respondents filed an application under Order 21 rule 100 of the Code before the learned Subordinate Judge while the S.C.C. decree was under execution. The said application was however dismissed for default. Mr. Dinesh Charan learned Counsel for the appellants has submitted that dismissal of the said application under Order 21 rule 100 of the Code for default notwithstanding, the instant case is one in which there has been an order of the Court on an application by the plaintiff in course of the execution proceeding, and the instant suit is nothing but a suit to raised a dispute as to the validity of the order upholding the Auction sale thereby dispossessing the plaintiff in the delivery of possession of the suit house to the decree holder purchaser in the auction sale, a claim to the present possession of the property comprised in the order passed by the Order 21 rule 100 of the Code. Accordingly, the suit, howsoever intelligently frame, is one by a person dispossessed of such property in which he wants to establish his right he claimed under Order 21 rule 100 of the Code. There are several authorities of different Court and some of appear to conflict with each other. Accordingly, the suit, howsoever intelligently frame, is one by a person dispossessed of such property in which he wants to establish his right he claimed under Order 21 rule 100 of the Code. There are several authorities of different Court and some of appear to conflict with each other. For this Court however there is judgment of a Division Bench in the case of Dwarika Sahu Amandi (AIR 1950 Patna 25). Speaking for the Court Reuben J Is he Then was has referred to a catena of cases decided by different Court include this Court and has stated the law in the following words including I am of the opinion that Article 11-A has no application where in the summary proceedings arising out of the claim in he execution case, there has been no investigation execution 10. A post script has been added in the judgment of the Court by Narain, J only for the purpose of pointing out that the decision of the Court in Raziuddin Hasan V/s. Bindeswari Prasad Singh which apparently has taken a contrary view, is one in which for some reason or other Article 11-A was not, considered at all. In the instant case admittedly the application filed on behalf of the plaintiffs under Order 21 rule 100 of the Code in course of the execution of the S.C.C. decree was summarily dismissed and there has been no investigation whatsoever of the claims of the parties. Order 21 rule 100 of the Code before its amendment by the Amending Act of 1976 contained=- Where any person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of decree for the possession of such property or where such property has been sold in execution of a decree by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to this Court complaining of such dispossession; (ii) the Court shall fix a date for investigating the matter and shall summon the party against whom the application is made to appear and answer the same. 11. On the application made by the plaintiffs the Court fixed a date for investigating the matter. No investigation, however, was made and the said application stood dismissed for default. Had there been any investigation as contemplated under sub-rule (2) of rule 100 of Order 21 of the Code ? 11. On the application made by the plaintiffs the Court fixed a date for investigating the matter. No investigation, however, was made and the said application stood dismissed for default. Had there been any investigation as contemplated under sub-rule (2) of rule 100 of Order 21 of the Code ? In the instant case there has been no investigation at all as the application was dismissed for default on the date fixed for investigation. It is a case in my opinion squarely covered by the pronouncement in Dwarika Satins case. Even though Dwarika Safins case is distinguishable on facts, the principle laid down in the said case in the words of Justice Reuben that Article U-A deals with a later stage of the execution proceedings ; he who has obtained the decree for possession and auction purchased is not bound to obtain delivery of the property in execution proceeding itself; There is nothing to prevent them from proceeding by way of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. Such a suit would be governed by the ordinary rules of limitation. Where however the party claiming a right to possession has out the matter in issue under Order 21 rule 100 of the Code and investigation has been made by a Court, the law insists that a suit challenging the summary decision must be instituted within one year. In short where there has been investigation of the facts under Order 21 rule 100 (2) of the Code, the law of limitation governing a suit for such property shall be Article 11-A. Where there is on investigation the ordinary rule as to limitation shall apply. 12. There is yet another aspect of the matter. One of the question invariably posed by the courts in examining whether a suit shall be governed by Article 11-A of the Limitation Act is stated in the case of Shamugam Pillai V/s. Panchali Ammal and Ors., AIR 1926 Mad 683: What was asked for in the claim proceeding and what was asked for in the present suit, the law provides usit fints litium that a person defeated in claim proceedings shall not ask for the same relief that was denied to him in those proceedings which are summary except in a suit filed within a year of the order.... In the case of Rukhmabai Datusa Powar V/s. Fakirsa Hanmantsa Chavan, AIR 1927 Bom 184 it has been pointed out that Article 11-A of the Limitation Act shall have no application where the basis of the application in the suit is distinct and different and the possession claimed is not present possession but only by way of consequential relief of the decree being set-aside. 13 With a little variation but nonetheless in the same perspective on the facts of the instant case one can notice that the relief claimed by the plaintiffs is one which could not have been adjudicated in a summary proceeding for the present possession by way of investigation of claim of the party under Order 21 rule 100 of.