Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff. The suit was for recovery of the plaint schedule property, and alternatively for a declaration that the plaint schedule properties are Trust properties. The plaintiff further requested the court to frame a scheme for the proper management and utilisation of the income of the plaint schedule property on the basis that it is Trust property. 2. The plaint reveals, that the suit property originally belonged to Ranched Das Khathsee. Ranched Das Khathsee is the grand-father of the plaintiff. Ranched Das Khathsee died in February 1920. Some of the properties of Ranched Das Khathsee came into the possession of the plaintiff's father Damodar Ranched Das under a will of Ranched Das Khathsee. Damodar Ranched Das has three sons, plaintiff is one of the sons. Damodar Ranched Das died on 2-1-1962. The two brothers of plaintiff died in 1967. The will of Ranched Das Khathsee is exhibited in the suit as Ext. A-1. It is dated 26-7-1095. The plaint property is an item of property included in the will Ext. A-1. According to the plaintiff this item was set apart by plaintiff's grand-father for the purpose of certain charities to be done by plaintiff's father. The plaintiff came to know of this Will only very late. By the time the plaintiff came to know about this will, the property in question was sold by the plaintiff's father to the father of defendants 1 to 3. The sale was on 27-5-1100. The sale deed is Ext. A2. The case of the plaintiff is that this sale deed Ext. 2 is invalid in so far as the properties sold under Ext. A2 are Trust properties and plaintiff's father had no right to alienate the property. On these facts the plaintiff wants recovery of the property alternatively a declaration that the plaint schedule properties are Trust properties and a declaration that the sale deed Ext. A2 is invalid. 3. The suit was filed on 12-7-1968. The plaintiff explained the inordinate delay in filing the suit by saying that he came to know about the will only somewhere about 13-7-1965, the date on which the plaintiff got the copy of the Will. He came to know about the fraud in the matter of the sale of property only after perusing the will and making enquiries. As stated earlier the plaintiff filed the suit only on 12-7-1968. He came to know about the fraud in the matter of the sale of property only after perusing the will and making enquiries. As stated earlier the plaintiff filed the suit only on 12-7-1968. 4. Defendants 1 and 3 in their written statement contended that the sale deed is perfectly valid. They submitted that there was absolutely no fraud or collusion as stated in the plaint in respect of the sale. It was a bona fide purchase made by their father. Their father purchased the property by paying proper consideration. Their father paid the full consideration for the property and got exclusive possession of the property. After the death of their father, they are in possession and enjoyment of the properties. The suit has been filed to coerce the defendants to pay some money to the plaintiff. There is absolutely no bona fides on the part of the plaintiff in filing the suit. The statement that the plaintiff came to know about the Will only very late is not a true and correct statement. The defendants contended that the suit is barred by limitation. 5. The defendants also submitted that the suit property is not a Trust property. The recitals in the will, will convince the court that the property is not at all impressed with any obligation of Trust. On these facts the defendants wanted the court to dismiss the suit with costs. 6. The trial court held after an evaluation of evidence that Ext. A-1 will did not create a Trust in respect of the suit property. The sale deed was found to be valid. The court also held that the suit was barred by limitation. On the above findings the trial court dismissed the suit. Now the plaintiff appeals before this court. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that in regard to 'B' Schedule properties in Ext. A-1, which is the suit property there is a clear intention on the part of the testator to create a trust for certain charitable purposes. The first question we are called upon to decide in this case is; whether Ext, A-1 creates a Trust in regard to the plaint schedule property. 8. Ext. Al is the copy of the Will of the Grand-father of the plaintiff. The Will is dated 26-7-1095 (MR). Under Clause.4 of Ext. The first question we are called upon to decide in this case is; whether Ext, A-1 creates a Trust in regard to the plaint schedule property. 8. Ext. Al is the copy of the Will of the Grand-father of the plaintiff. The Will is dated 26-7-1095 (MR). Under Clause.4 of Ext. A-1 the plaint schedule property has been given to the father of the plaintiff. A particular motive of the testator for allotting this property to the father of the plaintiff is seen stated in the Will. What motivated the testator to allot the plaint Schedule property to the father of the plaintiff is stated in Clause.4 of the will. It is stated in Clause.4 that the property has been given since the donor is bound to perform certain religious ceremonies for the solace of the departed souls of the forefathers of the family of the testator and for his soul after his death. The acts to be performed by the donee are ]nXriAiv It is stated clearly that the property is given exclusively to the plaintiff's father. The words used are given below in the testator's own words, 9. The respondent's counsel tells us that the words in Clause.4 of the Will relied on by the appellant are precatory words or words of supplication. The documents which are in the nature of 'precatory trust' that is transfers or bequests of properties to another coupled with words of direction, entreaty, recommendation, expectation, and desire, are difficult of interpretation when they come before a court of law. It is more difficult because of the conflict between the modern decisions and those of an earlier age. True that it is only a question of mere interpretation of the document which contains the precatory words. Different principles of interpretation of similar documents, laid down by the decisions of the Court makes the task of interpretation more difficult but what Lord Lindlay observed obviates the difficulty considerably. "When I see an intention clearly expressed in a Will, and find no rule of law opposed to giving effect to it, I disregard previous cases". We do not propose to cite decisions of apparent conflict in the matter of interpretation of a precatory trust. "When I see an intention clearly expressed in a Will, and find no rule of law opposed to giving effect to it, I disregard previous cases". We do not propose to cite decisions of apparent conflict in the matter of interpretation of a precatory trust. The modern view when precatory words are used in a document can be summarised thus: "If a gift in terms absolute is accompanied by a desire, wish, recommendation, hope or expression of confidence that the donee will use it in a certain way, no trust to that effect will attach to it, unless, on the Will as a whole, the court comes to the conclusion that a trust is intended." In other words the rule we have to observe is simply this: "In considering whether a 'precatory trust' is attached to any legacy, the court will be always guided by the intention of the testator apparent in the Will and not by any particular words in which the wishes of the testator, are expressed." 10. Another way of understanding the terms of the document Ext.A-1 is to treat the document as one by which the property has been bequeathed upon certain conditions, namely the donee is obliged to perform certain religious ceremonies for the departed souls of forefathers of the family and for the soul of the testator after his death. This is also often a most difficult question. As in the case of precatory words, however it is entirely a question of interpretation of the terms of the Will. If from the terms of the Will it is clear that the property was beneficially given to the donee subject to a particular condition, it is only a conditional gift. If on the other hand the true interpretation of the terms of the Will is that the testator intended that the donee should hold the property not for his benefit but only for the benefit of other or for the benefit of himself and other or for certain charitable purposes, then it will be a case of Trust. We should add that words which on their face appear to impose a condition may be construed as merely precatory. and explanatory of the testator's motive in making the gift. We should add that words which on their face appear to impose a condition may be construed as merely precatory. and explanatory of the testator's motive in making the gift. In Cunningham v. Foot (1878) (3) Appeal Cases 974-the operative words of the document "the property was devised to A on condition of his well and truly paying legacies", were found in sufficient to create a trust. 11. Yet another look which is possible in interpreting the Will Ext. A-1 is to consider the words in Clause.4 of the Will expressing the desire of the donor that the donee should perform certain religious acts for the departed souls of the forefathers of the family are only words of "expectation or explanatory of motive". The words which are explanatory of the donors' motive or words of expectation never impose a trust on the donee. In the case Re Brace 1954(2) All England Report 354 a legacy was given to a father with the words "better to enable him to bring up his children", was found not to create a trust for such words are only explanatory of the donors' motive. 12. We are bound to see that beneficiaries are not made trustees unless intended to be made so by their testator. We have to take the will which we have to construe and see what it means and if we come to the conclusion that no trust is intended we say so, although some judges have said the contrary on some Wills more or less similar to the one which we have to construe. 13. We have gone through the document Ext. A-1 very carefully. We cannot find an intention on the part of the testator to create a trust in respect of the plaint property. The words added to the words of vesting in Clause.4 are in the nature of "explanatory of motive" if not precatory words or words of expectation. The trial court found that Ext. A-1 does not create a trust. We also hold that Ext. A-1 does not create a trust in respect of the suit properties. The primary case of the plaintiff fails. The plaintiff cannot succeed in the suit. The suit is only to be dismissed. This meant that the secondary defence of limitation becomes of less importance, but nevertheless we must deal with it as shortly as we can. A-1 does not create a trust in respect of the suit properties. The primary case of the plaintiff fails. The plaintiff cannot succeed in the suit. The suit is only to be dismissed. This meant that the secondary defence of limitation becomes of less importance, but nevertheless we must deal with it as shortly as we can. The trial court found that the suit is barred by limitation. The defendants raised the contention that the suit is barred under Art.122 of the Travancore Limitation Act. Admittedly the property is in Travancore Area. Ext. Al as well as the sale deed was executed when the Travancore Limitation Act was in force. The Article that is applicable under the Travancore Limitation Act of 1100 is Art.122. It read thus: 14. The defendants contended that even if Ext. Al creates a trust in respect of the suit properties since the property was transferred on 27-5-1100, the right to institute a suit for recovery of the property is extinguished after the lapse of 12 years, that is, on 27-5-1112. The Indian Limitation Act was made applicable to Travancore Area long after 27-5-1112. The case of the defendants is that the plaintiff lost his cause of action in respect of the suit property when the Indian Limitation Act came into force in Travancore Area. 15. Art.122 of the Travancore Limitation Act has to be read along with S.29 of the Travancore Limitation Act. S.29 of the Travancore Limitation Act provides for extinguishment of right to property. "29. At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished". The corresponding section in the Indian Limitation Act is S.27. The fundamental policy delitescent, these Sections is that in matters of suit for possession of property where a statute provides a period therefor, such a right will stand extinguished on the expiry of such period. The plaintiff is bound to bring the suit before his title to the property is extinguished. Where the plaintiff skips to sue for possession within the period fixed under the Limitation Act his right to sue gets extinguished, with the result the person in possession acquires thereby absolute title. The plaintiff is bound to bring the suit before his title to the property is extinguished. Where the plaintiff skips to sue for possession within the period fixed under the Limitation Act his right to sue gets extinguished, with the result the person in possession acquires thereby absolute title. The law of Limitation declares that as between parties contesting as to title one that fails to seek that remedy within 12 years has the remedy not only barred but also extinguished. Once there is a statutory extinguishments of a right there cannot be a revival of the right to recover the property. It has to be remembered that the ordinary rule is that the statute of Limitation bars the remedy and does not extinguish the right itself. But the Section is an exception to this rule. 16. The principle of extinguishments of the right was recognised by the Privy Council; based on public policy and expediency, even when there was no statutory provision like S.27 of the Limitation Act. The observations of the Privy Council in Gunga Gobind Mandul v. The Collector of 24 Parganas (11 Moores Indian Appeal 345) PC. are illuminating "The title to sue for possession of the land belongs to the owner whose property is encroached upon; and if he suffers his right to be barred by the law of limitation, the practical effect is the extinction of his title in favour of the party in possession. As between private owners contesting interse the title to the lands, the law has established a limitation of 12 years; after that time it declares not simply that the remedy is barred but that the title is extinct in favour of the possessor". 17. We also hold that the suit for recovery of the plaint schedule property is barred by limitation. In the result the appeal is dismissed. No costs.