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1984 DIGILAW 310 (CAL)

Sukumar Das v. State

1984-08-28

AMITABHA DUTTA

body1984
ORDER This revisional application under S. 401 read with S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is for quashing the proceeding, being Singur P.S. Case No. 21 dated 30.12.1976 under S. 13(1) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 initiated against the petitioner on a report of the Sub-Inspector of Police District Enforcement Branch, Hooghly dated 18.12.1979 before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Chandernagore, alleging that the petitioner carried on a business of rice milling operation as owner of a daddy husking mill without licence in contravention of s. 8 of the said Act. 2. Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid proceeding against the petitioner on the two fold grounds. Firstly, it is contended that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the alleged offence under S. 13(1) of the Act as no report in writing of the facts constituting such offence was made by the Licencing Officer or any person duly authorized by the Central Government or the Licensing Officer in this behalf as required under S. 15 of the Act. In this connection he bas relied on the decision of Orissa High Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Bisram Patel, AIR 1965 Orissa 159 in which a learned Single Judge of the said High Court has expressed the view that S. 15 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) specifically requires that the person making the report must be so authorised in respect of a particular offence in view of the phrase "in this behalf" in the section which is not without significance. Relying on the said decision, Mr. Banerjee contends that in the present case, the Sub-Inspector of Police who bas made the report not having been authorised under S. 15 of the Act to do so in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner, the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate is bad in law and not warranted by S. 15 of the Act. Upon consideration of the submissions made on this point on behalf of the petitioner and the State, I find that there is no substance in the point of law raised on behalf of the petitioner. Upon consideration of the submissions made on this point on behalf of the petitioner and the State, I find that there is no substance in the point of law raised on behalf of the petitioner. In the aforesaid decision of the Orissa High Court the learned Judge has based his finding on a decision of the Orissa High Court reported in AIR 1963 Orissa 158 on an interpretation of S. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 which is in pari materia with S. 15 of the Act as it has been held in the said case of K.G. Anganawalu v. Chairmar, Puri Municipality, AIR 1963 Orissa 158 that a Criminal case filed against accused by a person who was not duly authorised in the manner required by S. 20(1) of the said Act was not maintainable in the absence of specific authorisation for a specific offence. In this connection reference may be made to the provisions of S. 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (as amended by Act 34 of 1976) which runs as follows:- "Cognizance and trial of offences – (1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under S. 14 of S. 14A shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or any person authorised in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government." 3. The expression “in this behalf” in S. 20(2) of the aforesaid Act has been considered in several decisions of different High Court and it has been held that a general authorisation of all Food Inspectors is valid. In this connection reference may be made to the decision reported in AIR 1966 Madras 194, AIR 1963 Mysore 157 and AIR 1969 Delhi 198. The view taken in AIR 1963 Orissa 158 has been dissented from. It follows from those decisions that the word “authorised in this behalf” appearing in the section part, mean authorised to instituted or to give consent to any prosecution for an offence under the Act, and that the words “in this behalf” do not mean that the authority must be given for each and every complaint. The general authority for taking action is sufficient. Authority can be conferred long before a particular offence takes place (See AIR 1970 SC 318 ). The general authority for taking action is sufficient. Authority can be conferred long before a particular offence takes place (See AIR 1970 SC 318 ). Similar interpretation should be given to the expression “in this behalf” in S. 15 of the Act. With all deference to the view expressed by the learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court in the decision relied on by the learned Advocate for the petitioner I disagree and hold that the expression “in this behalf” in section 15 of the Act does not require that there must be specific authorisation for each and every complaint or report under the said section. So, the first ground taken on behalf of the petitioner for assailing the impugned proceeding fails. 4. The second ground on which the proceeding is challenged on behalf of the petitioner is that after the omission of S. 6A of the Act, requiring licence for running a husking mill by the West Bengal Act XXV of 1977, it was not required the petitioner to obtain a licence for carrying in rice milling operation as owner of a husking mill and so, no offence has been committed by the petitioner for carrying on such operation without a licence under S. 8 of the Act, the husking mill not being a rice mill as defined in S. 3(i) of the Act. But in my view, there is no substance in this contention as it has been held by the Supreme Court in Chandra Kant Saha v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 314 that on a true interpretation of S. 3, clause (d)(i),(ii) and (gg) of the Act there can be absolutely no doubt that they include operation carried by the rice hullers. In view of this interpretation, it was not necessary for the legislature to add S. 3A and this was done in order to put the matter beyond doubt or controversy Section 3A of the Act shows that the Act applies to rice huller, or paddy husking mills. 5. As both the grounds taken on behalf of the petitioner fail, the present revisional application cannot succeed. It is therefore dismissed and the Rule is discharged. 6. Let the records be sent down to the court below expeditiously. Rule discharged.