MAHAMED JAMALBHAI v. STATE — 1984 DIGILAW 312 (GUJ)

M. B. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) ON the night of 16/08/1984 P. S. T. Vinchhiya Police Station had received an information that some persons were to transport livestock to the slaughter-house illegally without any pass or permit by minor trucks. He had therefore kept a close watch and at about 12-35 a. m. i. e. during night time he intercepted and seized two trucks carrying livestock. The driver of one motor truck bearing No. G. T. G. 3049 was Mahmad Jamalbhai. The driver of the other truck was one Habib Jusab. Both these persons were prosecuted for the offences punishable under sec. 279 of the Indian Penal Code and under secs. 116 and 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act and also under sec. 11 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1960 In both the cases the accused pleaded guilty and the Judicial Magistrate First Class Jasdan by his judgment and order dated 16/08/1984 convicted both the persons for the offences punishable under sec. 1279 of the Indian Penal Code and Sec. 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act and imposed a fine of Rs. 40. 00and under sec. 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act and imposed a fine of Rs. 35. 00. At the time of passing the order convicting the accused he passed a further order that seized muddamal livestock to be handed over to the drivers or to its owners. It seems that before pronouncing the said order the owners of the said livestock had filed an application praying that they are the owners of the livestock and therefore muddamal should be handed over to them. ( 2 ) IT seems that after seizing the livestock the P. S. I. had handed over its possession to Vinchhiya Mahajan Panjrapole. This seems to have taken place at about 1. 35 a. m. on 16/08/1984 The Police Inspector submitted a charge-sheet on the same day i. e. on 16/08/1984 In the charge-sheet itself it was mentioned that livestock was seized and it was handed over to Panjrapole. . Ex. 3 on record shows that the accused of the case were produced before the Magistrate at about 4. 45 P. M. on 16/08/1984. . Ex. 3 on record shows that the accused of the case were produced before the Magistrate at about 4. 45 P. M. on 16/08/1984. On the same day statements of the accused were recorded and a charge against them was explained to them where it was pointed out that they were taking the livestock to slaughter house without pass or permit and also that the trucks were driven by both the accused of different cases rashly and negligently. In both the cases the accused admitted their guilt on the same day. The accused also submitted a purshis stating that they plead guilty to the charge. So after recording the plea in both the cases the learned Magistrate has passed the aforesaid order of conviction and simultaneously he has ordered that the livestock should be handed over to the accused as it was their first offences or lit should be returned to its owners. ( 3 ) AGAINST the said judgment and order the Trustees of Vinchhiya Mahajan Panjrapole filed two Criminal Appeals bearing Criminal Appeal No. 13/84 and Criminal Appeal No. 13a/84 before the Sessions Judge Rajkot District Rajkot. At the time of hearing of the said appeals it was contended on behalf of the accused and the owners of the livestock that Trustees have no locus standi to file an appeal because they were not interested on the livestock and they cannot be said to be aggrieved parties within the meaning of sec. 454 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Sessions Judge negatived the said contention by holding that the Trustees of Vinchhiya Mahajan Panjrapole Trust were interested in the welfare and maintenance of the healthy sick and disabled animals. It was also contended on behalf of the Trustees that as the livestock was being transported to the slaughter house without obtaining necessary pass or permit and as the drivers of the truck have pleaded guilty to the charges. Panjrapole Trust was vitally interested and therefore they have locus standi to file an appeal under sec. 454 of the Code. The learned Sessions Judge thereafter held that the learned Magistrate was required to follow the provisions of secs. 29 (1) and 29 (2) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1960 before disposing of the livestock. Panjrapole Trust was vitally interested and therefore they have locus standi to file an appeal under sec. 454 of the Code. The learned Sessions Judge thereafter held that the learned Magistrate was required to follow the provisions of secs. 29 (1) and 29 (2) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1960 before disposing of the livestock. He therefore remanded the matter to the trial Court for determining it after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties including the State and after considering the provisions of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1960 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the said judgment and order passed by the Sessions Judge Rajkot District Rajkot on 11-9-84 ink Criminal Appeals Nos. 13/84 and 13a/84 the petitioners have filed these two revision applications. ( 4 ) AT the time of hearing to these petitions the learned advocate Shri D. D. Vyas submitted that under sec. 454 of the Criminal Procedure Code any person aggrieved by an order made by the Court under sec. 452 or 453 is entitled to file an. appeal. according to his submission the person who is party to the proceeding would be an aggrieved person and not the third person. He submitted that in any case Vinchhiya Mahajan Panjrapole Trust cannot be said to be the person aggrieved within the meaning of sec. 454 of the Code. Sec. 454 empowers any person aggrieved by an order made by a Court under sec. 452 or 453 to file an appeal against it. It nowhere provides that only a person who is party to the proceedings is entitled to file an appeal. A person may not b party to the proceedings yet if he is aggrieved by the order passed by the Court under sec. 452 or 453 of the Criminal Procedure Code he is entitled to file an appeal. Under the old Criminal Procedure Code there was no such specific provision for filing an appeal against the orders which are passed at the. conclusion of trial. Some Courts interpreted that there is no independent right of appeal under the old Criminal Procedure Code and some Courts interpreted that there was right to file an appeal against the said order. Under the old Criminal Procedure Code there was no such specific provision for filing an appeal against the orders which are passed at the. conclusion of trial. Some Courts interpreted that there is no independent right of appeal under the old Criminal Procedure Code and some Courts interpreted that there was right to file an appeal against the said order. To avoid this conflict it is observed by the Law Commission in its first Report while proposing alteration in the section as under:-"43 17 If there was no intention to confer an independent right of appeal on an aggrieved party there would have been no necessity to make an express provision in sec. 520. every appellate court has the power to pass consequential and incidental orders by virtue of clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 423. Similarly a court of revision by virtue of sec. 439 (1) has the same powers as an appellate court; and hence where the main judgment of the trial court was challenged by way of revision that court also may pass consequential and incidental orders for disposal or the property even though such orders may involve modifying or altering the order of the trial court passed under sec. 517. Apart from these considerations we think that. an independent right of appeal must be given because the party aggrieved by an order under sec. 517 418 or 519 may not be the same as the party aggrieved by the main judgment. Thus if in a prosecution under 411 of the Indian Penal Code the case ends in acquittal and the trial court directs the alleged stolen property to be returned to the accused the state may not care to prefer an appeal against the order of acquittal. But the informant may desire to challenge the order. for disposal of property on the ground that it was his property and wrongfully taken away from his possession. Unless an independent right of appeal under sec 517 is conferred on him he will be without any direct remedy. Then again there may be instances where apart from the informant or complainant and the accused there may be a third party who may be entitled to possession of the property or to compensation as provided in sec. 519 He may be aggrieved by the order passed by the trial court under any of the three proceeding sections. Then again there may be instances where apart from the informant or complainant and the accused there may be a third party who may be entitled to possession of the property or to compensation as provided in sec. 519 He may be aggrieved by the order passed by the trial court under any of the three proceeding sections. and he will be without any remedy unless an express right of appeal is conferred. (2) Clause 463 confers an independent right to appeal against orders regarding disposal of property. The party aggrieved by an order of disposal of property may not be the same as the party aggrieved by the main judgment and. so it is considered necessary to give this independent right of appeal". So the object and reasons of adding sec. 454 are clear. It clearly provides that any person aggrieved even though he may not be a party to the proceedings is entitled to file an appeal against the orders regarding disposal of property. He may not be the same person as the party aggrieved by the main judgment i. e. either convicting the accused or acquitting the accused. ( 5 ) THE learned advocate for the petitioners however relied upon decision of the Karnatak High Court in the case of S. P. Ravi v. M. R. A. Tribunal A. I. R. 1974 Karnatak 56 wherein the Court has held that the words person aggrieved in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act would mean a person against whom a decision must have been pronounced and this can happen only when he is party to a proceeding where the order with which he is aggrieved has been passed. In my view this decision would be of no assistance to the present petitioners because the Karnatak High Court has considered the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and not sec. 454 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The meaning of the words person aggrieved may vary according to the context of the Statute. In the context of sec. 454 of the Criminal Procedure Code it cannot be said that restricted meaning should be given to the said words meaning thereby only a person who was party to the proceedings is entitled to file an appeal against the order disposing of property. In the context of sec. 454 of the Criminal Procedure Code it cannot be said that restricted meaning should be given to the said words meaning thereby only a person who was party to the proceedings is entitled to file an appeal against the order disposing of property. The Legislature has conferred a right of appeal to any person meaning thereby he may not be a party to the proceedings and there is no reason why the wider language used by the Legislature should be given a restricted meaning. ( 6 ) ). Learned advocates for the respondents rightly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar A. I. R. 1975 Supreme Court 2092. In the said case the Court interpreted the phrase a person aggrieved used in sec. 38 of the Advocates Act 1961 and held that the words person aggrieved are found in several statutes. The meaning of the. words person aggrieved will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. Sometimes it is said that the words person aggrieved correspond to the requirements of locus standi which arises in relation to judicial remedies. The meaning of he words a person aggrieved may vary accordding to the context of the statute. One of meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one a person aggrieved. Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The Court further observed as under :-"the meaning of the words a person aggrieved is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The rule of the Bar Council under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words persons aggrieved in secs. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The rule of the Bar Council under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words persons aggrieved in secs. 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests". The test is whether the words person aggrieved include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests. Considering the object and reasons of adding sec. 454 and considering the fact that the right is given to any persons aggrieved to file an appeal there is no reason to give a restricted meaning to the said words of holding that the person must be a party to the proceedings. The word any is also of wide import. In this view of the matter if any person is aggrieved by the order disposing of the muddamal property and even though he is not a party to the proceedings he is entitled to file an appeal against the order disposing of the muddamal property. So a person from whose possession stolen articles were seized he can also file an appeal if the property is disposed of by the Magistrate. It cannot be said that as he was not either accused or complainant he cannot file an appeal against the order disposing of the muddamal property. In my view therefore the submission of the learned advocates is of no substance. ( 7 ) THEN the next question which requires determination is whether the Trustees of the Vinchhiya Mahajan Panjrapole Trust were entitled to file an appeal against the impugned orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate handing over livestock to the opponents Nos. 2 and 3. It is an admitted fact that after the truck was seized immediately the concerned P. S. I. handed over the possession of livestock to Vinchhiya Mahajan Panjrapole for safe custody. The reason for handing over possession of the livestock to Vinchhiya Mahajan Panjrapole is also obvious that it would be practically impossible for the concerned P. S. I. to keep the livestock at the police station. The offence alleged against the accused was also under sec. The reason for handing over possession of the livestock to Vinchhiya Mahajan Panjrapole is also obvious that it would be practically impossible for the concerned P. S. I. to keep the livestock at the police station. The offence alleged against the accused was also under sec. 11 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. The allegations were that the accused were taking the livestock to slaughter house without any pass or permit. The accused are admittedly convicted for the offences alleged against them. Sec. 29 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act provides that if the owner of any animal is found guilty of any offence under the Acts the Court upon his conviction thereafter may if it thinks fit in addition to any other punishment make an order that the animal with respect to which the offence was committed shall be forfeited to Government and make such order as to the disposal of anyone as it thinks fit under the circumstances. Therefore after the conviction order was passed the learned Magistrate was required to hold the necessary enquiry under sec. 29 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. He was required to consider whether there was any previous conviction or not. For that also evidence was necessary. It seems that in the hot haste the learned Magistrate as soon as the charge-sheet was submitted on the same day recorded the plea of the accused. Admittedly as per Ex. 3 the accused were produced before him at about 4. 45 P. M. As soon as they were produced before him he recorded their plea and as they pleaded guilty he immediately passed an order convicting them without verifying whether there was any evidence. Now as the possession of the livestock was handed over to Vinchhiya Mahajan Panjrapole Trust atleast the learned Magistrate was required to ascertain from the said Trust with regard to the expenses made by the Trust for keeping them in safe custody. Without holding any such enquiry the learned Magistrate has passed the order that the livestock should be handed over to the opponents Nos. 2 and 3. ( 8 ) IT is the further contention of the Vinchhiya Mahajan Panjrapole Trust that one of the main functions of the Trust is to see that there may not be any cruelty to animals and livestock. 2 and 3. ( 8 ) IT is the further contention of the Vinchhiya Mahajan Panjrapole Trust that one of the main functions of the Trust is to see that there may not be any cruelty to animals and livestock. The other function is also of upbringing and maintenance of animals and livestock. As the possession of the livestock was handed over to the said Trust in my view the learned Magistrate ought not to have passed an order without hearing the said Trust granting the livestock to opponents Nos. 2 and 3 and as the learned Magistrate has not heard them it can be said that within the meaning of sec. 454 of the Criminal Procedure Code they were aggrieved persons entitled to file an appeal against the order passed by the learned Magistrate. In this view of the matter the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge cannot be said to be in any way illegal which calls. for interference by this Court in these revision applications. The learned Sessions Judge has directed that the learned Magistrate would pass an order within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of R and P. 9 In the result both the revision applications are rejected. Rule discharged. Interim relief in both the matters shall stand vacated. Application dismissed. .