JUDGMENT K. Sukumaran, J. 1. On 27th January 1983 a mini lorry having registration No. KLN 4633 loaded with six logs of timber, without any hammer marks and unaccompanied by any permit, was intercepted by the forest officials, who were patroling Vaniyappara Thodimaram Kolli road. The lorry with the timber was seized after the preparation of a mahazar. A case was registered. Proceedings under sections 52(1) and 61A of the Kerala Forest Act were initiated. The driver on being questioned in the course of the enquiry conducted by the Range Officer stated that the timber was loaded on the basis of the instruction of one Kunhachan, who was also seen in the lorry when it was seized. Kunhachan corroborated the version so given by the driver. He also admitted that the timber was collected from Valanthodu area. As it was revealed that the timber was illicitly collected from the vested forests, it was felt that the offence under sections 52(1) and 61A had been committed. 2. While making further enquiry regarding the ownership of the lorry, it was known that its registration stood in the name P. I. Baby, the petitioner herein. A show cause notice was issued proposing confiscation, to the registered owner P. I. Baby, the driver Pavithran and Kunhachan, who claimed the ownership of the timber and the lorry at the time of the seizure. The reply was to be submitted on or before 20th July 1983, and the hearing was fixed on 27th July 1983. Despite the receipt of the notices, the driver did not submit any reply. The registered owner P. I. Baby requested the proceedings be kept in abeyance till the disposal of the writ perition (O.P. 5650/83) filed by him. To that effect was the reply of Kunhachan also. It was noted that there were no interim orders in O.P. 5650 of 1983. In that view, further proceedings were pursued by the authorities. 3. There was the admission of the driver and the aforesaid Kunhachan that the logs were loaded at Valanthodu. The worker T. V. John stated that the logs had been cut and collected from the vested forests land in Valanthodu. Concededly the timber was not covered by any transport permit. The investigation of the Range Officer, Kuthuparamba also revealed that the timber had been collected from the vested forest. The worker T. V. John stated that the logs had been cut and collected from the vested forests land in Valanthodu. Concededly the timber was not covered by any transport permit. The investigation of the Range Officer, Kuthuparamba also revealed that the timber had been collected from the vested forest. It was accordingly concluded that the timber was the property of the Government. An offence under the Forest Act was found to be established under section 27, inasmuch as there was illicit possession and removal of timber without passes. On a consideration of various other matters, the lorry and the timber were directed to be confiscated. Ext. P-1 order was passed on 19th August 1983, directing, confiscation of the lorry and the timber. 4. The matter was taken in appeal before the District Court, Tellicherry. By Ext. P-2 Judgment, dated 7th January 1984, the appeal was dismissed. 5 The appellate court noted that the appellant registered owner of the vehicle had not availed of the opportunity afforded to him to put forward his contentions before Ext.P-1 order was passed. On merits also, the contentions were rejected. One such contention was that Kunhachan was entrusted with the lorry under an agreement and that the timber was loaded by the lorry driver at the instance of Kunhachan. Though such agreement was referred to by the appellant, no such agreement had been produced. The appellate authority noted that if the lorry had been handed over to Kunhachan and thereafter to the driver, they would be the agents of the appellant. In that event, it was for the appellant to prove that the illicit transport was without his knowledge and consent. No such attempt was made by him. The reliance placed on the decision in Sasidharan v. State of Kerala1980 K.L.T. 671 was found to be misplaced due to the difference in the factual situation. The appellate Judge concluded: "It is taking very serious view of the illicit on-slaught on the forest wealth of the country, illicit felling and destruction and of full-time thieving.. that the legislature has provided such stringent measures as confiscation. Confiscation is one mode of checking this national offence," The appellate court therefore felt that in cases of that nature, extreme steps like confiscation are necessarily to be taken. that the legislature has provided such stringent measures as confiscation. Confiscation is one mode of checking this national offence," The appellate court therefore felt that in cases of that nature, extreme steps like confiscation are necessarily to be taken. Before concluding the judgment the court also observed: "I may point out it has not been argued at all that no timber was seen in the lorry or that the timber seen were not those illicitly cut from vested forest." The appeal was accordingly dismissed. 6. The orders of the authorities are challenged in this writ petition. There is no substance in the contention (elaborated in ground A) that the seizure was illegal. The facts noted above would clearly establish that any authority could have reason to believe about the offence having been committed by the lorry carrying the illicit timber, in the circumstances referred to above. The further contention urged in ground B would also fail, when the earlier contention about the alleged illegality of the seizure is repelled. The petitioner cannot complain about lack of opportunity to put forward his contentions or about the infraction of the principles of natural justice. As noted correctly by the authorities below, opportunity was afforded but was not properly availed of. 7. One argument advanced with considerable emphasis was that the confiscation was not justified, particularly having regard to the price of the lorry and that of the timber carried in it. The averments about the price of the lorry and of the timber are contradicted in the counter-affidavit. The timber carried is not a meagre quantity. There were six logs of timber in the lorry, two mullan, three kadamba and one punna. Some of which are valuable timber trees. It could not be said that the timber carried is not of a negligible value at all. Even the scheduled rate of timber would worth to Rs. 1,556 according to the counter-affidavit. It is well-known that the actual value of the timber in the market would be many times the schedule rate. The lorry is a Mini lorry. The petitioner has not given the details such as the original price of the lorry, the date of its purchase, and the condition in which it was at the time of seizure. Even according to the petitioner, the outstanding amount towards the loan taken from the Bank was only Rs. 42,000. The lorry is a Mini lorry. The petitioner has not given the details such as the original price of the lorry, the date of its purchase, and the condition in which it was at the time of seizure. Even according to the petitioner, the outstanding amount towards the loan taken from the Bank was only Rs. 42,000. This is indicative of the long use of the vehicles. Its depreciated value would be considerably less than the original value. The observations in Pushpan v. State of Kerala 1984 K.L.T. 1021 would not therefore be applicable to the facts of the present case. It must also be noted that in the aforesaid decision the Division Bench found as a fact that the registered owner, hirer, and the driver had all taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against the use of the van for committing the forest offence. The Court observed: "This alone is sufficient for setting aside Ext. P-1 proceedings of confiscation" The general observations contained in para 2 of the judgment will have to be understood in the above background as well. 8. The statutory scheme of the Act also would not support the contention of the writ petitioner. Special provisions had been made into the Forest Act, by an amendatory process, to effectively contain the loot of the forest. Important provisions were introduced under the Amendatory Act of 1975, (Act 28 of 1975). Section 69 provides for a statutory presumption that the forest produce belongs to the Government and casts the burden on the person proceeded against to establish the contrary. In the present case, a confiscation can be avoided if the owner of the vehicle satisfies the officer that the timber belonged to him. Under section 61B(2), to avert confiscation, he has to satisfy the authorities that the transport of the illicit timber was without the knowledge or connivance of the owner, his agent of the person in charge of the vehicle. In that attempt, the petitioner had signally failed. The confiscation cannot therefore be characterised as in any way unjustified or even unduly harsh. 9. The objective behind a particular legislation, has necessarily to be taken note of while construing its provisions, and in adjudicating the honest action of the officials in the course of the implementation of such well meant social legislation. The confiscation cannot therefore be characterised as in any way unjustified or even unduly harsh. 9. The objective behind a particular legislation, has necessarily to be taken note of while construing its provisions, and in adjudicating the honest action of the officials in the course of the implementation of such well meant social legislation. A statute with such stringent provision may be enacted to save the national economy: such as the Customs Act or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The legislative measure may again be conceived in the larger public interest such as the Essential Commodities Act intended to ensure equitable distribution of commodities essential for the sustenance of the community at large. The background in which legislation regarding forest had been made, and had been improved from time to time, both by the Parliament and by the State Legislatures, has to be viewed in the larger background. When the legislature has taken note of the colosal depredation of the forest wealth, and when it is scientifically established that such wanton waste of forest-cover would take the country perilously near desertification and a total disturbance of the ecology and environment, the Court should be slow to give a narrow interpretation to such well-meant statutory provisions. It is useful in that background to bear in mind the importance assigned by the Constitution for the protection of the forest, by incorporating a positive duty on the State in that behalf under Directive Principles of State policy (Article 48A), and also casting a Fundamental Duty on the citizen (Article 51 A) for such protection and preservation of the forest. 10. The recognition of the importance of the forest by the Parliament by a constitutional amendment, in a sense, is the result of a world-wide movement for the protection of the environment. As for this part of the country, such a concern for the protection of forest had been evinced even by administrators of an alien regime. The custom of persons in possession of adjacent lands keeping guard over the forests as a means of preventing their destruction had been recognised as far back as 1858. As for this part of the country, such a concern for the protection of forest had been evinced even by administrators of an alien regime. The custom of persons in possession of adjacent lands keeping guard over the forests as a means of preventing their destruction had been recognised as far back as 1858. In a proclamation of August, 1854, where the rights of a Government to the forest and hills had been reiterated, an obligation in relation to the protection of forests was provided in the following terms: ''Therefore in future each should guard the forest in the neighbourhood of his lands as ordered above, only the leaves, grass, dry leaves and fuel necessary for the aid of cultivation of his lands should be used and other people should not enter that forest. If any one cuts trees and forests contrary to the order given above, the same shall be attached and those that cut the same shall be punished according to law." The details of such measures and the history of the law relating to forest have been sketched in a classic judgment of the Madras High Court, The Secretary of State for India v. M. Krishnayya I.L.R. 28 Madras 257, 11. Protection of forest has therefore been a felt necessity of the State from very early times. Not without reason. Scientific studies of later years have only confirmed the far sightedness and the wisdom of the ancients in the protection of the forest wealth. Viewed in that background, those engaged in organised activities aimed at pilfering the forest wealth do not deserve any sympathy or special consideration from the courts of law. A 'soft' feeling or a misplaced sympathy in such circumstances, would only help the organised sections who indulge in systematic on-slaughts on the forest wealth of the country. That would be only encouraging the anti-social elements, by fleecing the Nation. I am therefore in full agreement with the views expressed by the appellate Judge about the necessity to take deterrent action, when circumstances justify the same. The facts of the present case eminently, justified the confiscation of the lorry and the illicit timber. 12. A complaint was raised that no case had been registered so far. It was even suggested that the delay was motivated. Counsel even suggested that the officials had been virtually bargaining for an unholy 'settlement'. The facts of the present case eminently, justified the confiscation of the lorry and the illicit timber. 12. A complaint was raised that no case had been registered so far. It was even suggested that the delay was motivated. Counsel even suggested that the officials had been virtually bargaining for an unholy 'settlement'. It is not necessary to express any finding on such a submission, which is not fully relevant for the purpose of the writ petition, having regard to the contentions urged before the appellate judge and seriously projected in the writ petition. However, it is desirable that the officials do not give room for any such complaint. On behalf of the State, an assurance was given that necessary action would be pursued for registration of the offence against those involved in the matter. I record that submission. 13. An argument about the competence of the officer to initiate confiscation proceedings was urged at the fag end of the hearing. Such a contention had not been urged at any time earlier. The conduct of the petitioner is not having raised such a contention disentitles him to put forward the same in the discretionary jurisdiction of a writ petition. I have therefore declined to consider such a contention. 14. In the result, the writ petition fails, it is accordingly dismissed with costs, Advocate Fee Rs. 500.