DWARIKA PRASAD v. STATE OF UTTARPRADESH, — 1984 DIGILAW 320 (ALL)

V. K. KHANNA, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petition the petitioner (in jail) has challenged the order dated 15-12- 1983 passed by the District Magistrate, Allahabad under section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Black- marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, t 980 (hereinafter referred to as 1the Act ). ( 2 ) THE brief facts for the purposes of deciding the present petition are that on 9-12-1983 the District Supply Officer, Allahabad lodged a first information report against the petitioner for committing an offence for the contravention of the provisions of U. P. Cement Control Order (as amended from time to time ). According to the first information report, on receiving information that the petitioner had illegally stored cement and was, selling the same in black-market, the District Supply officer along with other officers of that Department reached at the shop of the petitioner where it was alleged that he had stored cement. The petitioner was said to be present at his shop and is said to have admitted on enquiry that he used to sell cement. At the time of inspection the shop was found locked and the petitioner was asked to open the locks. On his refusal to open the locks, the locks were broken and 684 bags of cement and one open bag of cement containing about 10 kilograms of cement and loose cement about 5 kilograms was found in two tins. It was said in the first information report that the petitioner neither produced any paper in connection with storage of cement nor gave any other information. It was alleged that in front of the shop no notice was exhibited regarding stocking of the cement and in this way the petitioner has illegally stored the cement for the purposes of illegally selling in black market and has thus contravened the provisions of U. P. Cement Control Order, 1973 (as amended from time to time) which is an offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act. A case was registered against the petitioner under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act and the petitioner was arrested on the same day i. e. 9-12-1983 and lodged in jail. A case was registered against the petitioner under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act and the petitioner was arrested on the same day i. e. 9-12-1983 and lodged in jail. It appears that the District Supply Officer had taken statement of some persons of the locality on 9-12-1983 Enquiry was again made by the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Soraon on the direction of the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) Allahabad and in the aforesaid enquiry statements of several persons were taken on the basis of which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Soaron submitted a report on 14-12-1983 that the petitioner was illegally carrying on the business of selling cement. It appears that the District Supply officer on 12-12-1983 had sent a letter to the District Magistrate Allahabad detailing all the facts which in his opinion, required detention of the petitioner. On 15-12-1983 the District Magistrate, Allahabad passed the impugned order of detention against the petitioner under section 3 (1) of the Act. As the petitioner was in jail since 9-12-1983 in pursuance of a case registered, against him under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate was served on the petitioner in jail. ( 3 ) THE petitioner after the service of the impugned detention order made representation On 2-1- 1984, which was addressed to the Food Secretary Uttar Pradesh Shasan, Vidhan Bhawan, the District Magistrate, Allahabad, the Chief Secretary to Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, the Home Minister, Government of India, New Delhi, the Prime Minister of India, New Delhi, the President of India, Rashtrapati Bhawan, New Delhi. The District Magistrate, Allahabad forwarded the copy of the representation to the State Government on 3-1-1984 which reached the state Government on 4-1-1984 and on the same date i. e. 4-1-1984 it was sent to the Registrar of the Advisory Board, who received it on the same day. On 24-1-1984 the representation was forwarded by the State Government to the Central Government. The Central Government decided the aforesaid representation on 7th February 1984. As far as the State Government is concerned, the representation made to the Food Minister was disposed on 11-1-1984 and intimation of the rejection was communicated to the detenue by radiogram message on 13-1-1984 through Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad. ( 4 ) WE have heard learned counsel for the petitioner at some length in this case. As far as the State Government is concerned, the representation made to the Food Minister was disposed on 11-1-1984 and intimation of the rejection was communicated to the detenue by radiogram message on 13-1-1984 through Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad. ( 4 ) WE have heard learned counsel for the petitioner at some length in this case. The first point which had been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this case was regarding the competence of the Food Minister of State of Uttar Pradesh to deal with the representations made by the Petitioner. It was contended that according to the Rules of Business of the State Government, the matter with regard to the preventive detention fell within the jurisdiction and purview of the Chief Minister and admittedly the representation made by the petitioner has been disposed of by the Food Minister, who is not competent to dispose of the representation under the Rules of the Business and thus the representation has not been dealt with by a competent authority rendering the continued detention of the petitioner invalid. It may be stated here that in another Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1747 of 1984 similar question was receiving our attention and we permitted Sri Amar Saran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in this petition to address arguments on this question, while we heard this question in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1647 of 1984. On 3-4-1984 we decided Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1647 of 1984. We repelled this argument and held that under the provisions of clause (2) (ii) (b) of the Business of Uttar Pradesh (Allocation) Rules, 1975 the Food Minister is an appropriate authority. For the same reasons in this case also, as cement Control Order is an order issued under the Essential Commodities Act, and since, the maintenance of supply of cement, which is an essential commodity and business with regard to the matter concerning preventive detention relating to the breach of Cement Control Order has to be transacted in the Department of the Secretarial in which the business relating to Cement Control Order is transacted. Admittedly it is the Department of Food and Civil Supplies which deals with the business relating to the cement control order and thus the Food Minister is competent by dispose of the representation. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has thus no force. Admittedly it is the Department of Food and Civil Supplies which deals with the business relating to the cement control order and thus the Food Minister is competent by dispose of the representation. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has thus no force. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has then urged that under section 10 of the Act, the State Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person, shall place before the Advisory Board the grounds on which the order had been passed and also the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order. It has been argued that three weeks expired in the instant case on 4th January 1984 but by that date the representation of the petitioner had only been sent to the Registrar of the Advisory Board and had not been placed before the Advisory Board. We are not impressed by the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, inasmuch as, in our opinion the State Government has complied with the provisions of section 10 by sending the representation made by the petitioner to the Registrar of the Advisory Beard, Receiving of the representation by the Registrar of the Advisory Board, in our opinion, would amount to receiving the representation for the Advisory Board. On the facts of this case it is thus clear that there has been no violation of provisions of Section 16 of the Act. ( 6 ) IT has then been urged that a bare perusal of the detention order would show that the District Magistrate had Dot at all applied his mind while passing the impugned order. It has been argued that the last portion of the detention order mentions that the petitioner should be arrested and should be detained in the Naini Central Jail, Allahabad. From the aforesaid recital in the detention order, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that it becomes clear that the District Magistrate before passing the order was not even aware of the fact that the petitioner was already detained in jail in pursuance of the case lodged against him under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act and thus the order has been passed on a totally wrong premise. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents, has, however, argued that the District Magistrate was aware of the fact at the time of the passing of the detention order that toe petitioner was in jail and had passed the detention order because he was of the opinion that the petitioner was likely to be released on bail. On this precise question the District Magistrate, Allahabad filed a supplementary affidavit in this petition and has also produced his original record. We have perused the original record. The order sheet indicates that on 12-12-1983 the District Supply officer, Allahabad had sent a letter to the District Magistrate, Allahabad detailing all the facts which required the detention of the petitioner, under the Act. On 13-12-1983 we find from the order sheet the following noting: As per your verbal orders I enquired from Jail about the presence of accused Dwarika Prasad. This accused is in jail at present. In his bail application 16. 12. 1983 is fixed for hearing before the District Sessions Judge. Sd. S. P. O. 13. 12. 1983 TI It appears that the District Magistrate before 13. 12. 1983 had even ordered the S. P. O. to enquire as to whether the petitioner was in jail and on 13-12-1983 that information had been given by the S. P. O. that the petitioner was in jail and his bail application was going to be considered by the Court on 16. 12. 1983. From the order sheet we find that before taking the decision there is a nothing on the order-sheet dated 15-12-1983 which says that the accused was still in jail. It is after this nothing that the District Magistrate had passed the detention order. The detention order had been passed in the own handwriting of the District Magistrate and is dated 15. 12. 1983. The actual order passed by the District Magistrate runs as follows: AAIelr Iacf/kr Ikexzh dk voyksdu o mijksdr Vhksa ns[kus ij esjk Iek/kku gks x;k gs fd mijksdr Jh }kjdk izlkn dks fo:} djuk vksfpr;iw. kz gs A ok:v ,io ,io iho dks tsy esa rkehy djus dks fn;k x;k This fact is also corroborated by the letter dated December 15, 1983 written by the District Magistrate, Allahabad to the Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies. Uttar Pradesh. In the aforesaid letter it has been specifically stated that the accused is in jail. kz gs A ok:v ,io ,io iho dks tsy esa rkehy djus dks fn;k x;k This fact is also corroborated by the letter dated December 15, 1983 written by the District Magistrate, Allahabad to the Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies. Uttar Pradesh. In the aforesaid letter it has been specifically stated that the accused is in jail. There is another letter on the original record dated 15. 12. 1983 addressed by the District Magistrate. Allababad to the Senior Superintendent of Poilce, Allababad. In the aforesaid letter it is clearly written that the accused was in Naini Jail and the detention order should be served on him today. From the aforesaid it is thus clear that the District Magistrate knew that the petitioner was in jail at the time of the passing of the impugned detention order. This argument, therefore, fails. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner in this connection has also urged that tile District Magistrate could not come to the conclusion in a case under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act that the petitioner will be granted bail as a matter of course as the provisions applicable for granting of bail did not permit granting of bail automatically by the court below. The District Magistrate in para 3 of his affidavit has stated that the papers before him clearly indicated that the petitioner had applied for bail by means of an application dated 12. 12. 1983 and the said application was fixed for disposal on 16-12-1993. It has been also stated by the District Magistrate that the deponent had knowledge that the petitioners are normally granted bail by the courts in matters relating to section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. The deponent examined the activities of the petitioner and since the deponent was clearly of the view that on account of the activities of the petitioner mentioned in the grounds there was every likelihood of the petitioner repeating similar activities again after his release from jail the deponent passed the order of detention against the petitioner. The deponent examined the activities of the petitioner and since the deponent was clearly of the view that on account of the activities of the petitioner mentioned in the grounds there was every likelihood of the petitioner repeating similar activities again after his release from jail the deponent passed the order of detention against the petitioner. The learned, counsel for the petitioner bas not disputed this position that even if a person has been detained in jail in connection with a crime the District Magistrate can pass detention order in case he is satisfied that the accused person is likely to be released on bail If that be so, the District Magistrate bona-fide thought that the accused might be released on bail as his case was fixed on 16. 12. 1983 and thus proceeded to pass the impugned order on 15. 12. 1983 in order to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the supply of the commodity essential to the community in case be was released on bail. ( 9 ) FROM the aforesaid observation it is clear that the District Magistrate was in know of the fact that the petitioner was in jail at the time of the passing of the detention order and that he passed the detention order as he felt that the petitioner was likely to be released on bail on 16. 12. 1983. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has then urged that as the petitioner was not a dealer within the meaning of U. P. Cement Control Order (as amended from time to time), he could not be said to have contravened any provisions of U. P. Cement Control Order, 1973. Clause 3 of the U. P. Cement Control Order, 1973 prescribes that no person, except a dealer, shall sell cement by retail. Clause 4 of the aforesaid order provides that no person except a cement company shall sell cement by wholesale. From the aforesaid provisions it is thus clear that cement can be sold in the state of Uttar Pradesh either by a dealer or by a cement company. Clause 4 of the aforesaid order provides that no person except a cement company shall sell cement by wholesale. From the aforesaid provisions it is thus clear that cement can be sold in the state of Uttar Pradesh either by a dealer or by a cement company. Under the provisions of U. P. Cement Control Order, 1978 (as amended from time to time), it has been specifically provided in clause 3 that no person shall sell or offer for sale or store for sale or carryon business in retail or loose sale of cement in Uttar Pradesh except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence granted under, this order or by any general or special permit granted by the Licensing Authority provided that no licence shall be necessary for a person who stores upto 5 bags of cement at a time for loose sale. Clause 4 of the aforesaid First Amendment Order, 1978 puts restrictions on wholesale dealer also in the sense that it can only sell in pursuance of a valid licence issued under the Order. In case it is true that the petitioner had no licence under the U. P. Cement Control Orders (As amended from time to time) and that he was found storing 684 bags of cement for the purposes of sale, the petitioner would definitely be contravening the provisions of the U. P. Cement Control Orders (as amended from time to time ). U. P. Cement Control Orders have been issued under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act and thus contravention of any provision of the cement control order would amount to an offence punishable under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has, therefore, no force. ( 11 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has then urged that the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate is bad as it has not specified as to under which part of section 3 (1) of the Act he was passing the order of detention. Reliance has been placed on a decision reported in Smt. Leharibai v. State of Karnataka and others1. In our opinion, this argument has no force. Reliance has been placed on a decision reported in Smt. Leharibai v. State of Karnataka and others1. In our opinion, this argument has no force. If one reads the grounds supplied to the detenue carefully, it is clear that the order has been passed under the first part of section 3 (1) of the Act. The grounds make it clear that the petitioner was detained. as he had committed an offence under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act and that there was a likelihood of repeating such offence in future. ( 12 ) THE last argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there has been unnecessary delay by the Central Government in disposing of the representation of the petitioner which renders the continued detention of the petitioner invalid. ( 13 ) IT is not disputed that the petitioner handed over representation to Superintendent Central Jail Allahabad on 2. 1. 1984, which were addressed to various authorities including the President of India, Prime Minister of India, Home Minister of India. In paragraph 8 of the petition the petitioner has averred that it appears that representations made by the petitioner have not been dealt at all and in any event the representations have not been expeditiously dealt with. ( 14 ) IN the counter-affidavit, which has been filed on behalf of the State Government by Syed Israr Husain it has been stated that the petitioner did not make several representations but made only single representation which bear the date under his signature to be 2. 1. 1984 to the Food Secretary of the State Government. At the foot of the representation it was mentioned that the copy of the representation was being forwarded to 5 other authorities including the President of India, Prime Minister of India and Home Minister of India but the necessary copies for forwarding the representation to the aforesaid authorities were not made available. In para 3 of the aforesaid counter-affidavit it has been stated that the detenue appears to have supplied necessary copies later and made a request to the District Magistrate, Allahabad to send the representation to the Central Government and on 18. 1. 1984 the District Magistrate, Allahabad sent a letter to the Secretary Department of Food and Civil Supplies, enclosing a copy of the representation with a request that the same may be sent to the Central Government. 1. 1984 the District Magistrate, Allahabad sent a letter to the Secretary Department of Food and Civil Supplies, enclosing a copy of the representation with a request that the same may be sent to the Central Government. The aforesaid averments made by the State Government have been controverted by the petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit and it has been stated that along with the original representation handed over to the Superintendent, Naini Central Jail, Allahabad on 2 1. 1984 the petitioner had also supplied the requisite copies meant for various other authorities of the Central Government. The District Magistrate, Allahabad has also filed a counter affidavit in this case and in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit, the District Magistrate has stated that on 3. 1. 1984 the representation together with other copies of the representation and the comments were sent to the Government. From the original record of the District Magistrate it is clear that on 3. 1. 1984 the District Magistrate had sent the representation in original along with three extra attested copies to the State Government. In view of the aforesaid facts it is clear that the state Government received original representation and three attested copies. ( 15 ) THE Central Government has also filed a counter affidavit in this case and in para 4 of the aforesaid counter-affidavit it has been stated that on 27. 1. 1984 a copy of the representation was received in the Dept. of the Civil Supplies. In paragraph 5 it has been stated that the aforesaid representation was considered and examined as expeditiously as possible by the Union of India and was rejected on 7. 2. 1984. The fact that the Central Government received the representation from the State Government on 27. 1. 1984 is also corroborated by the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government in which it has been stated that the representation was forwarded to the Central Government on 24th January 1984 and 26th January 1984 being a holiday it was received by the Central Government on 27. 1. 1984. From the aforesaid facts it is thus established that: (i) That the petitioner submitted the representation along with copies to the Superintendent of Central Jail, Naini at Allahabad on 2. 1. 1984. (ii) The State Government sent the aforesaid representation to the Central Government and it was received by the Central Government on 27. 1. 1984. 1. 1984. From the aforesaid facts it is thus established that: (i) That the petitioner submitted the representation along with copies to the Superintendent of Central Jail, Naini at Allahabad on 2. 1. 1984. (ii) The State Government sent the aforesaid representation to the Central Government and it was received by the Central Government on 27. 1. 1984. (iii) The representation was rejected by the Union of India on 7. 2. 1984. The learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis of the aforesaid facts has urged that there has been inordinate delay in dealing with the representation by the Central Government rendering the continued detention of the petitioner invalid. It has been argued that no valid explanation has been given either by the State Government or the Central Government as to why the representation made by the petitioner on 2. 1. 1984 could not be disposed of at an early date. ( 16 ) BEFORE we deal with this point, it would be necessary to decide an application which has been moved along with a supplementary counter affidavit by the Central Government on 3rd April, 1984, after we had-reserved the judgment but before the judgment was pronounced. In the aforesaid application it has been stated that when the counter affidavit had been filed, the Union of India had been advised that since the representation itself had been disposed of within 11 days, the disposal in the eyes of lawt would be deemed to be expeditious and, therefore, no details were given and the Union of India was not advised to give the progress in the matter of disposal of the representation in detail in the previous counter affidavit filed by it. The supplementary counter- affidavit filed gave the details regarding the manner in which the representation was disposed of by the Central Government i. e. The details of the various authorities which had dealt with the representation after its receipt on 27th January 1984 till its disposal on 7th February 1984 by the Union Food Minister. ( 17 ) THE counsel for the petitioner has vehemently opposed the admission of the supplementary counter - affidavit on the ground that the judgment had already been reserved in this case and the counter affidavit was sought to be filed after the conclusion of the arguments. ( 17 ) THE counsel for the petitioner has vehemently opposed the admission of the supplementary counter - affidavit on the ground that the judgment had already been reserved in this case and the counter affidavit was sought to be filed after the conclusion of the arguments. It has been urged that it would among to permitting filling in the lacuna in the respondents case after the arguments had concluded. It was also urged that wrong legal advice cannot be a valid ground for taking on the record the counter affidavit which has been filed after such a long time. ( 18 ) BEFORE we proceed to decide the question as to whether the application moved on 3rd April, 1984 should be allowed or not, it would be necessary to mention certain facts which may have bearing on the question of passing orders on this application. In the present case when the arguments started the learned counsel for the petitioner at the very outset raised the question regarding the competence of the Food Minister of the State Government to deal with the representation made to the State Government. Similar point had been raised in another Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1647 of 1984. Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. Superintendent, District Jail, Agra and others and the hearing in this petition on the aforesaid question was started first treating it to be the leading case on that point. Counsel for the petitioner in the present petition, Sri Amar Saran, was allowed to argue the aforesaid question in writ petition No. 1647 of 1984 and was, in fact, heard in that writ petition. Judgment was reserved in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1647 of 1984 on 22nd March 1984 and, thereafter further arguments on other points were heard in the present petition on 24th March 1984 and 26th March, 1984. On 26th March 1984 judgment was reserved and it was made clear it judgment in this petition will be given after the judgment in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1647 of 1984 bas been pronounced, the reason being that the question raised in this petition about competence of Food Minister was to be governed by the decision given in the leading petition no. 1647 of 1984. On 3. 4. 1984 the judgment was delivered in writ petition no. 1647 of 1984. On 3. 4. 1984 the judgment was delivered in writ petition no. 1647 of 1984 in which it was held that the Food Minister of the State was competent to adjudicate on the representation made by the petitioner under the. Rules of Business applicable to the State. On 3. 4. 1984 itself the Central Government moved the application along with the supplementary counter affidavit with a prayer that the supplementary counter affidavit be taken on the record of the case and the same may be decided after giving both the parties further opportunity to make such submissions as may be deemed fit and proper on the facts and circumstances of the case. On 3rd April, 1984 as the judgment in the present writ petition had not been delivered, we ordered the case to be put up for orders with record on 6. 4. 1984. On 6th April, 1984 arguments were heard and we specifically asked the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as to whether be would like to file any affidavit in reply to the application and the supplementary counter affidavit filed by the respondent Central Government. Counsel for the petitioner, however, contended before us that be strongly opposes the admission of the supplementary counter affidavit at this stage and, in fact, addressed us at some length. He submitted that as the facts contained in the supplementary counter affidavit are based on the record of the Central Government, the petitioner does not propose to file any affidavit in reply. The learned counsel argued that an insufficient return which does not explain the delay in considering a representation with sufficient particularity mentioning the precise steps taken is legally unacceptable. It was also urged that as the application fails to disclose any good reason for not having filed a counter affidavit for such a long time, the same should not be accepted. It was also submitted that the supplementary counter affidavit of the Central Government is being sought to be filed after 2-1/2 months after the case was admitted and even after the judgment was reserved. It has also been argued that even if the supplementary counter affidavit is taken into account, it cannot be said that the Central Government had acted with promptitude. It has also been argued that even if the supplementary counter affidavit is taken into account, it cannot be said that the Central Government had acted with promptitude. The first question which has to be decided in this connection is as to whether the application moved by the Central Government on 3rd Airil, 1984 should be allowed or not. The cause which bas been disclosed in the application has been given in paragraph 1 as the advice which the Central Government received on the aforesaid question. The real reason which has been disclosed in paragraph 1 is that as the representation had been disposed of within 11 days of its receipt in the Ministry concerned, it was presumed that the disposal of the representation in the eyes of law would be deemed to be expeditious. The precise question which falls for consideration in this case is as to whether the Central Government could be said to have acted in a bona-fide manner after receiving such an advice. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied on a case of Supreme Court reported in Suresh Bhojraj Chelani v. State of Maharashtra2, in which six days delay in dealing with the representation was accepted as not un-reasonable. Looking to the working and the manner in which the representation is dealt with in the offices of the Central Government and the State Government it can be presumed that many a times despite the best efforts by the authorities concerned it may take upto a week or sometimes more for disposing of such matters. The representation after being received normally goes to the concerned section and the concerned section is expected to put up a note on it and thereafter it goes to the Secretary concerned and after the Secretary concerned makes a note, it is generally found that the file reaches the Minister who is the final authority for the disposal of the representation. In this case, if one looks from the point of the petitioner, one can not escape the conclusion that the representation of the petitioner by the Central Government bas been disposed of after about one months five days. On the other hand, if one looks the matter from the side of the Central Government, one finds that the Central Government had received the representation On 27th January 1984 and had disposed it of Oil the 7th February 1984. On the other hand, if one looks the matter from the side of the Central Government, one finds that the Central Government had received the representation On 27th January 1984 and had disposed it of Oil the 7th February 1984. The explanation of the delay from 2. 1. 1984 till 27th January 1984 could not be offered by the Central Government as the State Government bad only sent the representation to the Central Government on 27th January 1984. The Central Government had filed a counter affidavit. In the counter affidavit only this much has been said that they disposed of the representation received on 27th January 1984 expeditiously on 7th February, 1984. According to the Supreme Court case, which has been cited before us, it can be taken that a delay of 6 days in disposal of the representation was not treated to be unreasonable. We, therefore, can not say that the disposal of representation within 11 days by the Central Government will amount to inordinate delay. From the Central Governments point of view, they had not to explain the entire one month five days delay and thus one could labour under the impression that as far as the Central Government is concerned, the representation has been disposed of within 11 days which may be treated to be expeditious disposal. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited certain case on the question that ignorance of law is no excuse and also on the question that anon sufficient return which does not explain the delay in considering a representation with sufficient particularity mentioning the precise steps taken is legally unacceptable. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Mumtaz Husain v. Superintendent, District Muradabad Jail, and others3 where this court refused to take the counter affidavit on record at a late stage. In this case, however, as has been stated by us above, we ourselves feel that looking to the entire facts and circumstances of the case it would be in the interest of justice that the supplementary counter affidavit filed by the Central Government be accepted. As far as the case of Mumtaz Hussain (supra) is concerned, the counter affidavit proposed to be filed at a late stage was not accepted because no good reason bad been disclosed for not filing a counter affidavit for such a long time. As far as the case of Mumtaz Hussain (supra) is concerned, the counter affidavit proposed to be filed at a late stage was not accepted because no good reason bad been disclosed for not filing a counter affidavit for such a long time. In this case, however, we accept the explanation given by the Central Government in not disclosing the facts mentioned in the supplementary counter affidavit at the time of the filing the counter affidavit, The application dated 3rd April, 1983 is accordingly allowed and the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by the Central Government is taken on the record for the purposes of deciding this petition. The next question. which arises for consideration is as to whether after taking into account the supplementary counter affidavit filed by the Central Government, it can be said that the Central Government had disposed of the representation expeditiously. ( 19 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner bas urged that the petitioner bas submitted the representation no 2. 1. 1984 and it has been disposed of after one month five days by the Central Government and thus there has been inordinate unexplained delay in disposing of the representation rendering the petitioners continued detention invalid. The counsel for the petitioner has mainly relied on the case of Rattan Singh and another v. State of Punjab and others4 and tried to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Sat Pal v. State of Punjab and others5. The learned counsel for the respondents have relied mainly on the case of Sat Pal (supra) and has urged that the decision in the aforesaid case squarely covers the controversy and on the basis of the afore said decision it can not be held that there was any inordinate delay by the Central Government in disposing of the representation. At the very outset while considering this argument it may be noticed that though the case of Sat Pal (supra) has been reported in A. I. R. 1981 S. C. 2230 and the case of Rattan Singh has been reported in A. I. R. 1982 S. C. page 1, it is Rattan Singhs case which was decided earlier and has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Sat Pal (supra ). ( 20 ) IN the case of Sat Pal (supra) the detenue was apprehended on June 28 and was served with the grounds of detention on the same day. On July 4,1981 a representation was sent by his counsel by registered letter to the Superintendent, Central Jail Amritsar, enclosing there with two representations drafted on behalf of the detenue, one of which was addressed to the joint secretary of the State Government and the other endorsed to the Central Government through the Secretary Ministry of Finance for revocation of the order of detention passed under section 11 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. The Superintendent of Jail Received these two representations on July 6, 1981. However, the representation meant for the Central Government was forwarded by the State Government to the Central Government on 23rd September, 1981 i. e. after about 2h/2 months from the date of the receipt of the representation by the Superintendent, Central Jail, Amritsar. On behalf of the respondents it was urged before the Supreme Court that there was no duty cast on the State Government to forward to the Central Government the representation and that the power of revocation of an order of detention by the Central Government under section 11 of the Act was exercisable only after the representation has been rejected by the State Government and the Advisory Board and the order of detention is confirmed by the State Government. Both these arguments were repelled by the Supreme Court and it was held that the detenue was entitled to make a representation to the Central Government and the State Government was duty bound to forward it to the Central Government for necessary action. It may, however, be mentioned that in this case the representation, as mentioned above, was forwarded to the Central Government on September 23, 1981 and the said representation was considered by the Central Government and rejected on September, 28, 1981. The Supreme Court held: In the present case, there was, therefore, no denial of the right of making a representation to the Central Government for revocation of the order of detention under section 11 of the Act unlike in Rattan Singhs case (supra ). There is nothing, but the unexplained delay on the part of the State Government and that by itself is not sufficient to invalidate the order of detention. There is nothing, but the unexplained delay on the part of the State Government and that by itself is not sufficient to invalidate the order of detention. The detenue was not deprived of the right of making a representation to the State Government i. e. the detaining authority, as well as of the right of making a representation to the Central Government for revocation of the order of detention under section 11 of the Act. The representations that he made were duly-considered by the State Government and the Central Government. The contention that the unexplained delay on the part of the State Government is sufficient to invalidate the order of detention can hardly be accepted. The Court must look at the substance of the matter and not act, on mere technicality. ( 21 ) FROM the aforesaid decision in the case of Sat Pat (supra) it would thus be clear that the unexplained delay on the part of the State Government by itself will not be sufficient to invalidate the order of detention. We have thus to see whether the Central Government disposed of the representation within a reasonable time. A hare perusal of the supplementary counter affidavit filed would show that the Union of India in the Department of Food and Civil Supplies received on 27. 1. 1984 the representation which was examined in detail in the department of Civil Supplies and it was considered necessary to seek on 1. 2. 1984 the advice of the Ministry of Law, justice and Company affairs (Department of Legal Affairs ). The files was received back in the Department of Civil Supplies on 3. 2. 1984 and the same day the file was submitted to the Minister of Food and Civil Supplies, who under the rules of business was competent to dispose of the representation of Sri Dwarika Prasad. Orders dated 6. 2. 1984 of the Minister rejecting the representation was received on 7. 2. 1984 and conveyed by telegram to the detenu through the Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad on 8. 2. 1984. It is thus clear that the representation which had been received on 27th January 1984 was disposed of by the Minister on 6th February 1984. It may be noted that in between 29th January and 5th February 1984 were Sundays. 2. 1984 and conveyed by telegram to the detenu through the Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad on 8. 2. 1984. It is thus clear that the representation which had been received on 27th January 1984 was disposed of by the Minister on 6th February 1984. It may be noted that in between 29th January and 5th February 1984 were Sundays. The details now given in the supplementary counter affidavit, in our opinion, clearly show that the Central Government showed no insensitivity to the representation made by the petitioner. On the other hand, the details clearly give an idea that the representation was being dealt with expeditiously and it can not be said that there was any inordinate delay in disposing of the representation made by the petitioner. In our opinion, the decision given by the Supreme Court in the case of Sat Pal (supra) clearly applies to this case and the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has got no force. ( 22 ) NO other argument bas been raised before us. ( 23 ) FOR the reasons stated above the present petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. .