JUDGMENT 1. - These two contempt petitions involve identical questions and they were heard together. It will be convenient to dispose them of by a common order. 2. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the preliminary objection that under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short the Act) no proceedings for contempt can be initiated against the non-petitioners as more than one year his elapsed from the commission of the alleged contempt, has force. I propose to deal it first. 3. The facts in both the cases are substantially the same and I will notice the facts in S. B. Civil Misc. Contempt petition No. 190 of 1980. I will only state those facts which are necessary for the purpose of deciding the aforesaid preliminary objection. 4. Non-petitioner No. 1 M/s. Agrawal Textiles Industries, Pali filed S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1375 of 1980 alongwith S. B. Civil Misc. Stay Petition No. 1337 of 1980. In S.B. Civil Misc. Stay Petition No. 1337 of 1980, the following order (Annexure-1) was passed on July 26, 1980 : "Hon'ble Shri Kudal, J.Shri H. M. Parekh for the petitioner.Shri C. K. Garg for the respondent No. 3.Learned counsel for the parties have been heard on the stay petition. The writ petition has been listed for final disposal on August 20, 1980. In the meantime, show cause notices have been issued to the respondents. The stay petition shall be disposed of along with the main writ petition. In the meantime, the petitioner shall comply with the directions contained in the consent order dated 13-4-1977." This order was passed by Kudal, J. (as he then was). Thereafter, on November 27, 1980, the contempt petition was filed praying that non-petitioner No. 1 M/s. Agrawal Textiles Industries, Pali and non-petitioners No. 2 to 4 who are its partners have not complied with the order and have disobeyed it and, therefore, they should be punished for the contempt of the court Specific provision of the Act has not been mentioned in the contempt petition but it purports to be under Section 12 of the Act. This petition was listed before M.C. Jain, J. on December 15, 1980. The learned Judge passed the following order : "Hon'ble Mr. M. C. Jain, J.Mr. This petition was listed before M.C. Jain, J. on December 15, 1980. The learned Judge passed the following order : "Hon'ble Mr. M. C. Jain, J.Mr. C. K. Garg for the respondent.Issue notice to (?) the application to the non-applicants returnable on 19-1-1981."When the contempt petition was listed before the then Chief Justice, it was submitted on March 25, 1981 by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this contempt petition has been filed against the willful disobedience of the order of the Hon'ble Justice P. D. Kudal, which was passed in S. B. Civil Misc. Stay Application No. 1337 of 1980 and so the contempt petition may be listed before him for orders. It was ordered that the contempt petition be listed before Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kudal on that very day. On that day, the case was, however, adjourned. When this petition came up before the then Acting Chief Justice, he passed the order on December 21, 1981 that as Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. D. Kudal is not sitting at Jodhpur the case will be listed before the normal single bench hearing writ cases. However, on May 6, 1982, this contempt petition was listed in Chambers before Hon'ble Kudal, J. He passed the order that as he is not sitting at Jodhpur during these days, the contempt petition may be listed before the regular bench hearing civil writ petitions. When the matter was listed before Hon'ble D. L. Mehta, J. on August 24, 1983, an objection was raised on behalf of the non-petitioners that Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. C. Jain had no jurisdiction to pass the order. It was submitted that the proceedings have not been initiated so far by this Court and in support of that, the case of State of Rajasthan v. Manohar Ghodhad, 1978 RLW 186 was cited. Thereafter, the matter came up before me from time to time. 5. In reply to the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners, Mr. C. K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioners concluded the opening parts of the arguments on February 15, 1984. Today, I have heard Mr. P. Saran. learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. H. M. Parekh, learned counsel for the non-petitioners. 6. 5. In reply to the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners, Mr. C. K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioners concluded the opening parts of the arguments on February 15, 1984. Today, I have heard Mr. P. Saran. learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. H. M. Parekh, learned counsel for the non-petitioners. 6. The only point that I am called upon to decide at this stage is whether any order can be made under Section 20 of the Act against the non-petitioners, even if there has been wilful disobedience of the order dated July 26, 1980 though Hon'ble Mr. M. C. Jain, J. has passed the order on December 15, 1980 regarding issuance of notice of the application to the non-petitioners. 7. It will be relevant here to refer the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, which is as follows : "20. Limitation for actions for contempt-No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 46 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 read with Article 225 of the Constitution of India and all other enabling powers in that behalf. Rules of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952 (for short 'the Rules') were framed. In Chapter XVII of the Rules, R. 324 has been incorporated. It reads as under : "324 Contempt of Court. (1) Where an application for the taking of proceedings in contempt of Court is presented before a Judge other than the Chief Justice, he shall direct that it be laid before the Chief Justice for orders. And the Registrar shall, on receipt of a report against any person of contempt of court, lay the papers before the Chief Justice for orders. (2) The provisions of sub-rule (1) shall not be applicable in cases where the contempt consists in disobedience of a judicial order of' the High Court, a date shall be fixed for hearing and notice thereof in the prescribed form given to the person concerned as also to the Government Advocate. (2) The provisions of sub-rule (1) shall not be applicable in cases where the contempt consists in disobedience of a judicial order of' the High Court, a date shall be fixed for hearing and notice thereof in the prescribed form given to the person concerned as also to the Government Advocate. The notice shall contain a substance of the allegations made against such person and require him to appear unless otherwise ordered in person before the Court at the time and on the date specified therein to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of Court. Before a Division Bench of this Court to which I was a party in State of Rajasthan v. M/s Jamna Das Ganga Das & Co. 1983 RLR 774 , Sections 12 and 20 of the Act and Article 215 of the Constitution came up for consideration. In that case, Sardakanta v. Misra, C. J. H. C. AIR 1974 SC 2255 , was noticed, wherein it was observed in pars 7 as follows : "The motion or reference is only for the purpose of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt alleged to have became committed and it is for the Court on a consideration of such motion or reference to decide in exercise of its discretion whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. The court may decline to take cognizance and to initiate a proceeding for contempt either because in its opinion no contempt prima facie appears to have been committed or because, even if there is prima facie contempt, it is not a fit case in which action should be taken against the alleged contemnor. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemners, the Court, though moved by motion or reference may in its discretion. decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt. whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt. whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court." (Emphasis supplied)State of Rajasthan's case was subsequently noticed by the learned single Judge of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Gulam Abbas Kamruddin & anr., ( 1984 RLR 136 ) wherein, the learned Judge has stated that the observations of the Court contained in Paras 5 and 7 in State of Rajasthan's case clearly goes to show that the period of limitation will have to be counted from the date of issuing notice for initiating the proceedings. The learned Judge has observed as under : "It is pertinent to notice here that the notice to be given is for showing cause why the non-petitioners should not be punished for contempt of court. This notice is to contain the allegations made against the person and further the notice to show cause, is for punishment for contempt. In State of Rajasthan's case one of the orders under consideration which was subject-matter of Petition No. 37 of 1982 was regarding issuance of notice to the non-petitioners to show cause as to why the contempt proceeding be not initiated against them. The learned Judge while considering the aforesaid order opined that the only inference which can be drawn from the Above order is that the Court wanted to apply its mind in respect of the initiation of the proceedings after hearing the non-petitioners, In other words, after hearing the non-petitioners, an order could be passed that proceedings be initiated and he (the alleged contemner) must show cause why he should not be punished or equally an order could be passed that it is not proper and fit for initiation of contempt proceedings. In view of this, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that it is not possible to draw the inference that even though the order dated April 13, 1982 in terms restricted notice for showing cause as to why the contempt proceedings should not be initiated, yet it should be assumed that the Court as against its order, initiated proceedings. To quote the learned Judge: I am not prepared to interpret the order against the express words used in it. If the words why the contempt proceedings be not taken would have been there, there would have been some ground or reason for interpreting or in drawing an inference as to what was the intention of the learned Judge whether he wanted to issue notice for final hearing or showing cause before initiation. In that situation, probably there could be either of the two directions, then the inference may have been possible. 8. Learned counsel for the non-petitioners in support of his preliminary objection has placed three propositions before me in this connection, when the contempt petition relating to wilful disobedience of order comes up before the Court ; 1. That the Court may order issuance of notice of the contempt petition to the non-petitioners (alleged contemnors) : 2. That the Court may issue notice to show cause as to why contempt proceedings be not initiated against the non-petitioners ( alleged contemnors); 3. That the Court may issue notice to show cause as to why the non- petitioners (alleged contemners) be not punished for contempt of the Court; and 4. That the Court may reject the petition. 9. For the purpose of the two contempt petitions before me, learned counsel for the non-petitioners did not address me as to the difference between issuing notice to show cause why contempt proceedings be not initiated and to show cause as to why the non-petitioners (alleged contemners) be not punished for contempt. That the Court may reject the petition. 9. For the purpose of the two contempt petitions before me, learned counsel for the non-petitioners did not address me as to the difference between issuing notice to show cause why contempt proceedings be not initiated and to show cause as to why the non-petitioners (alleged contemners) be not punished for contempt. In my opinion, the order dated December 15, 1980 viz., issuance of notice of the contempt petition to the non-petitioners in any case does not amount to initiation of proceedings under Section 20 of the Act and for that matter, as more than one year has elapsed since the order dated July 26, 1980 was passed regarding which wilful disobedience has been alleged or that it has not been complied with, no order under Section 20 of the Act regarding initiation of proceedings can be passed. In this connection, my attention, was invited to Rs. 324 (2) and (3) of the Rules and also to G. N. Verma v. Hargovind Dayal, AIR 1975 All. 52 and Gulab Singh v. Sri Ram Das, AIR 1975 All. 366 . So far as G. N. Verma's case is concerned, it was noticed in State of Rajasthan v. M. R. Mitruka 1978 RLW 224 . In Gulab Singh's case, the petitioner brought the action for contempt to the High Court within one month. The High Court did not initiate proceedings within one year. While overruling the contention that the petitioner ought not to suffer on account of the mistake of the court, it was observed that the petitioner not having any right as such and none of his rights having been prejudiced, if the respondent is not punished for contempt. he cannot be heard to say that he should not be allowed to suffer for the mistake of the Court. In the case of a civil contempt, when the contempt petition is presented under Section 12 of the Act, it comes before the Bench concerned and it has to pass appropriate orders on it. According to Mr. Parekh. he cannot be heard to say that he should not be allowed to suffer for the mistake of the Court. In the case of a civil contempt, when the contempt petition is presented under Section 12 of the Act, it comes before the Bench concerned and it has to pass appropriate orders on it. According to Mr. Parekh. learned counsel for the non- petitioners, appropriate orders contemplated by r. 324 (2) are: (i) rejection of the petition in limine: (ii) issue of notice of the petition; (iii) issue of notice to show cause as to why contempt proceedings be not initiated; (i) issue of notice to show cause as to why the non-petitioners (alleged contemners) may not be punished for contempt of the Court. He submits that on December 15, 1980, the learned Judge passed the order regarding issue of notice of the contempt petition only and that according to Mr. Parekh, this cannot be said to be an order under Section 20 of the Act. According to him, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 20 of the Act, what is contemplated is a notice to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of the court and for that a provision has been made in R. 324 (3) of the Rules. I agree with Mr. Parekh. learned counsel for the non-petitioners that when the learned Judge on Dec. 15, 1980 ordered for issuance of notice of the application, he did not intend to initiate the proceedings for contempt against the non-petitioners as envisaged by Section 20 of the Act. 10. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, it is clear that when the Court after application of its mind decides that the action is to be taken against the alleged contemners and to initiate proceedings for the contempt of the Court then it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt and commences the initiation of proceedings. It is well settled that terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 of the Act is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. Issuance of mere notice of the contempt petition in view of Sardakanta's case and State of Rajasthan's case (Supra), in my considered opinion does not amount to initiation of the proceedings under Section 20 of the Act. Issuance of mere notice of the contempt petition in view of Sardakanta's case and State of Rajasthan's case (Supra), in my considered opinion does not amount to initiation of the proceedings under Section 20 of the Act. Here it may be mentioned that I am expressing no opinion with regard to the observations made by the learned Judge in para 20 of the State of Rajasthan's case, for, in the cases on hand, it is not at all necessary for me to do so. 11. The upshot of the above discussion is that though the petition for contempt of the court was filed within one year from the date of the order dated July 26, 1980 regarding its disobedience and further notice of the application was also ordered to be issued on December 15, 1980, still at this stage, no order under Section 20 of the Act can be passed by this Court for more than one year has elapsed since the date of the order. 12. The result is that I uphold the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners. The contempt petitions are dismissed. Notices are discharged and the contempt proceedings are dropped.Petition dismissed. *******