JUDGMENT : K.P. Mohapatra, J. - This revision is directed against the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Sambalpur rejecting the Plaintiffs petition u/s 35-B of the CPC (for short the 'Code'). 2. The Petitioner (Plaintiff) instituted Title Suit No. 38 of 1976 in the trial court for declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of the suit land. The suit became ready for healing on 4-11-1980 and was adjourned from time to time to different dates. On 17-12-1980, on the opposite parties (Defendants) petition for adjournment, the trial court levied cost of Rs. 10/- against them. On 18-12-1980 cost was not paid, but P.W. 1 was examined by the Petitioner and cross-examined by the opposite parties. On 27-1-1981, the opposite parties applied for adjournment and a cost of Rs. 15/- was imposed to be payable to the Petitioner. On 29-4-1981 and 30-4-1981 regular hearing of the suit commenced and the Petitioner was examined as P.W. 2 and cross-examined by the opposite parties. On 18-9-1981, when hearing of the suit was resumed, the opp parties applied for adjournment. The suit was adjourned and cost of Rs. 75/- was levied by 18-11-1981 the opposite parties had not paid the costs to the Petitioner. On that day the Petitioner made a petition u/s 35-B of the Code, stating therein that the opposite parties failed to pay the costs as directed by the trial court to him. The provisions of Section 35-B of the Code being mandatory the opposite parties should be debarred from further participation in the trial of the suit. This petition was rejected by the impugned order, mainly on the ground that the Advocate for the opposite parties offered the costs to the Advocate for the Petitioner, who refused to accept the same and so the opposite parties were directed to deposit the costs in the Nizarat. Further despite non-payment of costs the opposite parties participated in the trial without any objection being raised by the Petitioner and so there was waiver of his right, if any, with regard to participation of the opposite parties in the trial of the suit. This order of the trial court has been challenged in this Court. 3. Mr. Ashok Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, urged that the provision of Section 35-B of the Code is mandatory in nature. This order of the trial court has been challenged in this Court. 3. Mr. Ashok Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, urged that the provision of Section 35-B of the Code is mandatory in nature. As the opposite parties did not comply with the trial court's order and did not make payment of the costs awarded in favour of the Petitioner, they have forfeited their right to participate in the trial of the suit. Mr. S.K. Dey, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite parties, on the other hand, contended that Section 35-B is not mandatory but directory in character. The Petitioner having not raised his objection before participation of the opposite parties in the trial of the suit must be deemed to have waived a right acquired by operation of Section 35-B of the Code. He also pointed out that costs were offered to the Petitioner's Advocate who refused to accept the same and an endorsement to that effect was made by the Advocate for the opposite parties on the petition u/s 35B of the Code. According to the trial court's direction, the costs having been deposited in the Nizarat of the trial court, there has been compliance with the provision of Section 35-B of the Code and, so there is no further impediment for the participation of the opposite parties in the trial of the suit. In view of the contentions, raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the principal question that falls for determination is whether the provision of Section 35-B of the Code is mandatory or directory in character. 4. Section 35-B was inserted by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976 to give to the court a discretion to impose compensatory cost on parties who are responsible for delay at any stage of the litigation. Imposition of such cost is irrespective of the ultimate outcome of the litigation. The legislative intention in introducing the new provision is to avoid delay in disposal of suits, payment of compensatory cost for causing delay being condition precedent to the further prosecution of the suit or the defence, by the Plaintiff or the Defendant concerned. A plain reading of the section makes the mandate amply clear that if the Plaintiff is required to pay cost he must have to pay the same to the Defendant before prosecuting his suit any further. A plain reading of the section makes the mandate amply clear that if the Plaintiff is required to pay cost he must have to pay the same to the Defendant before prosecuting his suit any further. If the Defendant has to pay cost to the Plaintiff, he must have to pay the same before prosecuting his defence. Payment of cost either by the Plaintiff or by the Defendant as directed by the court becomes condition precedent for further prosecution of the Plaintiff's case or the defence case. If, therefore, the cost is paid, the embargo put by Section 35-B is removed and the party who was required to pay the cost can prosecute his case. 5. The petition u/s 35-B of the Code was made placing reliance on the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Anand Parkash Vs. Bharat Bhushan Rai and Another in which the majority view was that the provision of Section 35-B of the Code is mandatory. In taking that view the earlier Single Bench decisions of the said High Court reported in Hakmi and Others Vs. Pitamber and Another Manak Chand v. Suresh Chand Jain AIR 1979 P&H. 229 , Nikka Singh v. Puran Singh 1979 P.L.J. 535 as well as, a division Bench decision of the said High Court reported in Manjit Singh v. State Bank of India, were overruled. The minority view in the said case was that the provision of Section 35-B is directory in nature. The ratio of the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Anand Parkash (supra) came up for consideration by a Single Bench of this Court in the case reported in Sri Kasi Biswanath Dev Vs. Paramananda Routrai and Others in which it was held that the cause of justice is paramount and a procedural law cannot be raised to the pedestal of being such a mandatory provision as would take away the Court's right in a given case to exercise its discretion in the interests of justice. The language in which Section 35-B of the Code has been expressed is to be considered as directory. Taking into consideration the facts of the case, it was held that the Defendants participated in the proceeding and all the witnesses examined on their side were brought to the court on several dates after the default had occurred. The language in which Section 35-B of the Code has been expressed is to be considered as directory. Taking into consideration the facts of the case, it was held that the Defendants participated in the proceeding and all the witnesses examined on their side were brought to the court on several dates after the default had occurred. The Plaintiff cross-examined the witnesses and the suit had reached the stage of argument. It was only at that stage the Defendants put in an application for dismissal of the suit. In view of the Defendants' conduct it was clearly a case of estoppel as provided in Section 115 of the Evidence Act under which he could not raise the plea at such a belated stage. While lying down the aforesaid principle, the majority view of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Anand Parkash, (supra) was dissented horn and the minority view was approved. A Single Bench of the Allahabad High Court considered the question and it appears from the decision reported in Prakash Narain Vs. Additional District Judge and Others that the provision of Section 35-B is directory. It was held that the party liable to pay cost cannot further prosecute his case unless the cost was paid. The provision does not debar the party from prosecuting his case for ever as his case is not struck off but is merely suspended. The ratio of the decision is that after cost is paid the party can prosecute his case. In the case reported in Thambuswamy v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore AIR 1983 Karn 203, a Single Bench took a similar view. In a later Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Prem Sagar and Ors. v. Phul Chand and Ors. AIR 1980 P&H. 385 (F.B.), a different note was struck. It was held on interpretation of the plain language of Section 35-B that further prosecution of the suit or of the defence is made a condition precedent on the payment of costs ordered and in the event of default the same would be barred. The emphasis inevitably must be on the word "further" and it should not be denuded of all meaning. The emphasis inevitably must be on the word "further" and it should not be denuded of all meaning. The legislature in its wisdom does not use the words in a statute which may be wholly redundant and, therefore, any construction which renders a phrase or a word otiose is not to be easily acceded to. Therefore, the word "further" in Section 35-B would enjoin that on the date next following the date of the order of the Court to pay costs, the defaulting party thereto would not be allowed to take any further step or produce evidence in the prosecution of its case whether as a Plaintiff or as a Defendant; This, however, would not mean that whatever is already on the record before that date would also be wiped off as either non est or non-existent. It was further held that if on the date next following the date of the order of payment of costs, the issue is not raised by either of the parties or taken notice of by the Court, it cannot be said that thereafter on all or any subsequent date the same can be resusciated or that Section 35-B would continue to apply with all its rigour thereafter as well. Indeed it seems inevitable that if on the crucial date fixed for the payment of costs the question is not raised at all, then impliedly a waiver of the right arising in favour of the party entitled to costs would necessarily follow. Therefore on subsequent dates it would not be open to the parties to reopen the issue at their will and seek the barring of the further prosecution of the suit or the defence u/s 35-B afresh. It is axiomatic that the law is for the vigilant and not for those who blissfully sleep over their rights obviously the Full Bench while making reference to the decision of this Court in the case of Sri Kasi Biswanath Dev Vs. Paramananda Routrai and Others applied the doctrine of estoppel contained in Section 115 of the Evidence Act. In a very recent decision reported in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Ram Niwas a Single Bench held that the provision of Section 35-B is directory, because, what is forbidden is further prosecution of the suit or the defence for non-payment of cost. Paramananda Routrai and Others applied the doctrine of estoppel contained in Section 115 of the Evidence Act. In a very recent decision reported in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Ram Niwas a Single Bench held that the provision of Section 35-B is directory, because, what is forbidden is further prosecution of the suit or the defence for non-payment of cost. If, ultimately cost is paid, which has been imposed on earlier dates, then the further prosecution of the suit or the defence by the Defendant could be possible. On a conspectus of the decisions cited at the Bar and referred to above, I find no reason to accede to the contention of Mr. Mukherjee, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, to take a view different from that taken by a Single Bench of this Court in the case of Sri Kasi Biswanath Dev Vs. Paramananda Routrai and Others. On the other hand, with respect I reiterate the same view that the provision of Section 35-B is directory and not mandatory. It should not be forgotten that in introducing Section 35-B to the Code, the legislature intended to discourage parties to seek unnecessary adjournments and delay trial of suits. Injustice shall be caused to the party who, either due to ignorance, poverty or for some other sufficient cause, cannot pay the cost imposed on him. If he subsequently pays the cost and there is nothing more left to be done, it would be unjust that he should be debarred from prosecuting his case so as to enable the rival party to have an easy march and victory. 6. In the present case cost of Rs. 10/- was levied on 17-12-1980, Cost of Rs. 15/- was levied on 18-12-1980 and cost of Rs. 75/- was levied on 18-9-1981. The costs were not paid by the opposite parties by 18-11-1981. Even then the Petitioner without raising any objection allowed the opposite parties to prosecute their defence and cross-examine P.W. 1 and himself as P.W. 2 and then made an application on 18-11-1981 u/s 35-B of the Code. It further appears from the record of the trial Court that on the aforesaid petition itself an endorsement was made by the Advocate for the Defendants that he offered the costs, but the Plaintiff did not receive them. It further appears from the record of the trial Court that on the aforesaid petition itself an endorsement was made by the Advocate for the Defendants that he offered the costs, but the Plaintiff did not receive them. The impugned order also shows that the trial court directed the Defendants to deposit the costs in the Nizarat of the court and according to the information given at the Bar the costs were so deposited. In view of the aforesaid facts, the conclusion is inescapable that the Petitioner having allowed the opposite parties to prosecute their defence and participate in the trial of the suit even after non-payment of cost and having not raised objection at the earliest possible stage, he must be deemed to have been estopped by conduct from raising objection at a later stage. The above apart, the costs having been deposited in the court which the Petitioner is no doubt entitled to withdraw, there is no further legal impediment for the opposite parties participation in the trial of the suit. Whatever embargo, by operation of the provision of Section 35-B of the Code was there, does not exist any more. I am, therefore, of the firm view that Section 35-B of the Code is no longer a bar for further trial of the suit with opposite parties full participation in it. 7. Before parting with the case, I consider it appropriate to highlight some disquieting aspects apparent on the face of the record of T.S. No. 38 of 1976 of the court of the Subordinate Judge, Sambalpur. The plaint in the suit was presented on 17-6-1976 and the written statement was filed on 12-9-1977. Issues were settled on 19-1-1978. Liberal adjournments were allowed for filing of the written statement and for settlement of issues. Adjournments were even allowed for filing additional written statement. The trial of the suit continued piecemeal In granting liberal adjournments and trying the civil suit piecemeal, the trial court clearly violated the instructions contained in Chapter III, Part I of the General Rules and Circular Orders (Civil) Volume I and General Letter 5 of 1960 (Civil) The Presiding Officers who dealt with the suit from time to time seem to have lacked control over the proceedings thereof and ignored the instructions. It is unnecessary to repeat that delay defeats justice and so suits should be disposed of with due despatch, for which purpose, it is expected that the Presiding Officers should exercise effective control over the proceedings thereof. They should strictly adhere to the instructions contained in the Rules referred to above. Parficularly, a civil suit should not be tried piecemeal and the trial when once commended, shall, except for good and sufficient cause to be noted in the order-sheet, proceed throughout the day on which it has been opened, and from day to day, throughout each day following, until it is completed as envisaged in Rule 5, Chapter III, Part-I of the General Rules and Circular Orders (Civil) Volume 1. It is now necessary that the old suit be disposed of latest by 31st March, 1985 under intimation to the Court. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, the revision is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed