M. WAHAJUDDIN, J. ( 1 ) THE applicant has come forward with a prayer that the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate be quashed. It is also prayed that the entire proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, be quashed. ( 2 ) PROCEEDINGS under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, were initiated much earlier. The Magistrate derivest his jurisdiction from the preliminary order. He has to record his satisfaction concerning the apprehension of breach of peace centering round the dispute over possession of immovable property and once he bas recorded any suck satisfaction, his jurisdiction comes into play. Nothing is pointed out to canvass that the preliminary order as such was bad. What is being urged is that the attachment order is bad. Apart from that, it is crystal clear that there is a hot dispute between the parties 1969 concerning possession. The matter has been litigated upon in the revenue courts into the appellate and revisional level and even now a writ petition is pending. In the circumstances, such dispute exist. It is the subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate concerning apprehension of bleach of peace and I may not make more observations, because the question whether such apprehension continues will have to be later gone into by the Magistrate himself, and if make any observation concerning continued apprehension of breach of peace that may prejudice the applicant. It is a settled law that once the Magistrate has passed a preliminary order under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, he has to continue with the proceedings to its logical end. This was the view taken in the case of R A Bhutani v. Mismani1 and a similar view was also taken in Rajput v. Bachcha2. What has been held in the various Supreme Court pronouncements is that after passing a preliminary order the Magistrate must decide the matter of possession one way or the other under Section 145 (4) Criminal Procedure Code, unless from the evidence before it the Magistrate comes to a Magistrate can drop proceedings under clear fiading on evidence that apprehension of 145 Cr. P. C. only when he proceeds under breach of peace has ceased to exist. P. C. only when he proceeds under breach of peace has ceased to exist. It is Section 145 sub-section (4) and if at that stage thus obvious that the whole matter it to be he is satisfied of to that no apprehention (If looked into at the stage of Section 145 (4), breach of peace exists he need not go into the Criminal Procedure Code. Obviously, it will question of possession be an abuse of the process if findings are given piecemeal. At the stage of Section 145 (4) Criminal Procedure Code the Magistrate can well before entering into discussion concerning Possession on the material date, first consider in that Judgment whether apprehension of breach of peace continues, and If on evidence on record he then comes to a conclusion that such apprehension of breach of peace has ceased to exist, he will naturally conclude the proceedings without further entering into the question of possession and granting a declaration as contemplated under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. This is the only proper procedure. ( 3 ) IT was urged that the applicant moved an application before the Magistrate supported by an affidavit that apprehension of breach of peace does not exist, so proceedings may be dropped, and it should have been considered then and there. I do not agree with such submissions. If this type of procedure is adapted, actually the provisions of Section 145 (4), Criminal Procedure Code would be defeated. The scheme -of Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is that first a preliminary order is passed inviting written statements and evidence and then the matter is proceeded with under Section 145 (4) Criminal Procedure Code, and, of course, if an the evidence at that stage the Magistrate comes to a conclusion that apprehension of breach of peace has ceased to exist, he can well drop the proceedings and not earlier. That stage has not reached. The stage will came whether the Magistrate takes the entire evidence under Section 145 (4), Criminal Procedure Code regarding possession as well and be will then in that judgment record a -finding an this aspect also. ( 4 ) IT was next urged that the attachment order, which is impugned, is bad, and in any case the Magistrate should have entered into an- enquiry when the applicant was challenging the matter regarding the apprehension of breach of peace. ( 4 ) IT was next urged that the attachment order, which is impugned, is bad, and in any case the Magistrate should have entered into an- enquiry when the applicant was challenging the matter regarding the apprehension of breach of peace. This aspect again stands resolved by the pranouncement in the case of Inder Deo v. Bhagwati. It was held that no. enquiry etc. is required, nor any party is to be given any notice far making attachment under Section 146, Criminal Procedure Code. It is always the satisfaction of the Magistrate an materials existing an record to satisfy the Magistrate concerning the emergency. So, he was well within his right to pass any attachment order, as contemplated under Section 146, Criminal Procedure Code. ( 5 ) IT was urged that the attachment has been made as late as in August 1981. This is not the correct position. Actually the attachment order was passed an 19. 4-1980 an attachment was formerly effected an 21-4-80, but an the application of the applicant the Magistrate passed a release order also an 21. 4-1980 and the property stood released. The Magistrate passed such orders when it was brought to the Magistrates notice that this Court in a writ petition bas passed orders that the applicant shall not be disposed until further orders. The Magistrate even went to drop the proceedings. This view of the Magistrate was definitely erroneaus and the matter went in revision. The revisional court vide its judgment dated 21-7-1980 (Annexure B) Held that there was no occasion far dropping the proceedings or making any release. He directed the Magistrate to placed with the proceedings. That order is final between the parties so. far as the proceedings under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code is concerned. Apart from that, the order passed by the revisional court is the any order which could have been passed. If any emergency attachment is made under Section 146, Criminal Procedure Code, the proceeding as such under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code is not to be dropped. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate on the criminal side and any superior courts an the civil, revenue or such other jurisdiction is totally independent of each other: Kalapdin v. State, Jalar Husain v. State, Mst. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate on the criminal side and any superior courts an the civil, revenue or such other jurisdiction is totally independent of each other: Kalapdin v. State, Jalar Husain v. State, Mst. Hosanki v. State and Tikendra v. State7 are authorities an the paint and the correct Jaw is that not with standing any civil suit instituted or temporary injunction granted, the Magistrate has independent jurisdiction to proceed under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, as that jurisdiction is primarily concerned to prevent breach of peace and to maintain law and order. Such decrees or judgments may be simply relevant for consideration of the case an merits. I may also observe that so far as the revenue litigation is concerned, the opposite party succeeded all through. As regards the order in writ petition, the writ petition is still pending and only an interim order was passed that there should be no dispossession of the present applicant. The question of dispossession will arise if applicant is in possession. That matter again, will be determined under Section 145 (4) Criminal Procedure Code as to give a finding which party is in possession on the date of the preliminary order or within two months from such order. Of course if Magistrate records and finding that the apprehension of breach of peace does not continue while proceeding under Section 145 (4) Criminal Procedure Code, he can well at that stage even drop the proceedings. But at the present stage neither there is any bar to the proceedings, nor any bar to the exercise of powers under Section 146, Criminal Procedure Code. I may also observe that actually by passing the fresh order of attachment the Magistrate has given effect to the order of the revisional court, which became final. So far as earlier attachment is concerned it was made before the order of the Honble High Court in writ petition was filed before the Magistrate. The case of Mccl Rai v. Murt DEals with the implications and effectiveness of the stay order or injunction order and the date from which it will be effective and. the matter of knowledge is material. Besides, an injunction order is directed against a party. At this stage it cannot be said that the apprehension of breach of peace has come to an end when parties are litigating so forth so on. the matter of knowledge is material. Besides, an injunction order is directed against a party. At this stage it cannot be said that the apprehension of breach of peace has come to an end when parties are litigating so forth so on. Of course, when the evidence is lead the Magistrate will be in a position to decide whether there is evidence to prove that existence of breach of peace no more exist. The Magistrate has simply in a sense revived the attachment after the decision of the first revision to give effect to the order of the revisional court by making a fresh attachment as earlier the property was released. This is the real position. ( 6 ) I do not find any force in this application under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, but I may observe that as at this stage the Magistrate will not be in a position to say whether the applicant is in possession or not. and that stage win come under Section 145 (4) Criminal Procedure Code, the best way to reconcile the situation is that the Magistrate should keep that property under attachment so that it is in custodia, legis, but at the same time let the applicant be a Supurdar of such property on behalf of the court on such terms as the Magistrate imposes, so that any physical actual dispossession may not take place. I may further observe that this will be possible, if the applicant abides by the terms and conditions which the Magistrate may impose and agrees to be a Supurdar of the properties on such terms and conditions and not unconditional. The property in such case will be in a custodia legis and will ultimately be governed by the final order that is passed in the case under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, including the declaration of possession, restoration of possession to that party so forth so on. ( 7 ) WITH the aforesaid observation the applicant under Section -482, Criminal Procedure Code, is dismissed. The proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, be unless for a very unavoidable reason, disposed of within three months. Application dismissed.