RAJINDAR SACHAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition and others were heard together and these should be disposed of by a common order as the point raised is the same. ( 2 ) THIS petition is directed against the order of Deputy Director (Allotment), Delhi Administration, informing the petitioner that his request of allotment of an alternative plot under the scheme of a large scale acquisition, development and disposal of land in Delhi, 1961 cannot be acceded to. The facts are that one Damomal was the owner of agricultural land measuring 62 bighas two biswas. The said land was the subject matter of a notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, Dt. 23rd Jan. , 1965. Section 6 notification was issued on 13-1-1969. The petitioner purchased 1/8th share in the 62 bighas 2 biswas from the Vendor Damomal by means of a registered sale deed dt. 21st May, 1973. Award with respect to the land was made on 31st Jan. 1983 and the possession of the same was taken on 4th Mar. 1983. The petitioner received compensation of his l/16th share in April, 1983. ( 3 ) THE Delhi Administration has issued a Scheme of allotment of alternative plot under the Scheme of Large Scale Acquisition and Development and Disposal of land in Delhi in 1961. The relevant features of the Scheme which calls for discussion is to be found in para 8 reproduced below ; "8 As a general policy disposal of developed land should be made by auction and the premium should be determined by the highest bid, except in the following cases where land may be allotted at pre-determined rates namely, the cost of acquisition and development plus the additional charges mentioned in sub-paragraph (7) above. (i) to individuals whose land has been acquired as a result of the Chief Commissioner s notification dt. the 7th Mar. 1957, the 3rd Sept. 1957, the 13th Nov. 1959, and the 10th Nov. 1960 or other such subsequent notifications provided that this concession will not be available in the case of individuals affected by the notification dt. 7th Mar. 1957 and the 3rd Sept. , 1957, if the acquisition proceedings have been completed and payment made or deposited in the Court by the 1st Jan. , 1961. In these cases. . . . . 7th Mar. 1957 and the 3rd Sept. , 1957, if the acquisition proceedings have been completed and payment made or deposited in the Court by the 1st Jan. , 1961. In these cases. . . . . "the petitioner s request for alternative allotment has been rejected on the ground that he had purchased the land which was already notified under S. 4 issued on 21st Jan. 1968. This is the grievance which has brought the petitioner to this Court. The petitioner s counsel s main reliance is on the two judgments given by Division Bench of this Court in Udai Raj Giri v. Union of India, Civil Writ Petn. No. 591/82 decided on 22nd April, 1983 which was followed in "vinod Kumar Khanna v. Union of India" Civil Writ Petn. No. 175/84 decided on 7th August, 1984. The view expressed in the said Division Bench judgment is that para 8 gives a right to the individuals whose lands have been acquired as a result of the notification and there is no bar that if any person buys land subsequent to the date of notification under S. 4 but prior to the acquisition as a result of the said notification he would not be eligible. We have gone through the judgment. With very great respect we find ourselves unable to subscribe to the view subscribed therein. There is no discussion in the said judgments as to how an individual who. was not an owner on the date of the notification under S. 4 is held to be eligible. A reference to para 8 will show that eligibility is given to individuals whose land has been acquired as a result of the notification issued under S. 4. No doubt, eligibility cannot arise till the land is acquired. That means that even if after Ss. 4 and 6 notifications the Government was to give up acquisition by issue of a notification u/s. 48 of the Act the individual owner will not be entitled to alternative land. But the notification is clear that it is only an individual whose land has been acquired as a result of notification that can ask for an alternative accommodation. Admittedly, the petitioner was not a owner of the land when notification was issued in 1961 or even in 1965. But the notification is clear that it is only an individual whose land has been acquired as a result of notification that can ask for an alternative accommodation. Admittedly, the petitioner was not a owner of the land when notification was issued in 1961 or even in 1965. It is true that he had purported to buy the land earlier than the date of the award and in that sense it may be said that he had become an owner before the acquisition proceedings had been finalised. But this interpretation ignores completely the purpose and the object behind the issue of notifications issued in 1961. Large scale acquisitions were to be made of the land. In the normal course when the land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act the only requirement is to provide compensation, providing any alternative land is not a part of the requirement of the statute. As, however, very large areas of land were being acquired the Government evidently considered that it would be rather harsh if having deprived large number of people of their land which was apparently being acquired for planned development of Delhi no alternative accommodation was given to them which would inevitably mean their large scale displacement with necessary serious problems. The purpose of the scheme obviously was that those who are going to be displaced by large scale acquisition should apart from the compensation be given a special benefit by giving an alternative accommodation at concessional rates. It was obviously not the object of the scheme that theindividuals whose lands were the subject matter of notification u/s. 4 should be permitted an additional benefit of being able to sell their lands at a profit and still pass on this right of alternative accommodation to their vendees who had nothing to do with the land at the time of issue of S. 4 notification. The reason is that an individual whose land was being acquired is entitled to get compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. An additional benefit of alternative accommodation was being given to him by para 8 of the scheme. The reason is that an individual whose land was being acquired is entitled to get compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. An additional benefit of alternative accommodation was being given to him by para 8 of the scheme. But if such an individual is allowed to sell his land at profit and even assuming that there was no bar to such a sale, he obviously would not be entitled to alternative accommodation because he would not be the owner at the time of acquisition of the land though he may have been an owner at the time of earlier notification of S. 4. But if the ratio of the Udai Giri s case is accepted it would be open to such a person to have taken the profit of the sale and also pass on the benefit of alternative accommodation to the purchaser. The Vendor thus would be enjoying double benefit which was not the object of the scheme. The scheme is meant to rahabilitate and provide alternative accommodation for those who are being displaced. The vendee does not fall in that category. According to us the correct interpretation of para 8 is that an individual will be entitled to alternative accommodation only if he was the owner at the time of issue of notification under S. 4 of the Act and was also an owner when the acquisition proceedings are finalised and the land is acquired. If in between this period an owner whose land is being acquired sells away his land he ceases to have any rights to lay a claim to alternative accommodation and as he himself could not lay a claim to such an alternative accommodation it stands to reason that he cannot pass on a better title than himself to his vendee. Of course, this position would not arise in the case of a person succeeding by inheritance or by a bona fide gift without consideration which apparently stands on a different footing from transfer by sale or otherwise. ( 4 ) APART from the above reasons we feel that the present case is also distinguishable on facts from the decision given in Udai Giri s case. From that judgment it is not clear whether the land which was purchased was the total land of the original owner. In the present case the facts are different. ( 4 ) APART from the above reasons we feel that the present case is also distinguishable on facts from the decision given in Udai Giri s case. From that judgment it is not clear whether the land which was purchased was the total land of the original owner. In the present case the facts are different. Here Damomal the original Vendor was the owner of 62 bighas of land. In terms of the scheme if he had continued to be the owner till the land was acquired he would have been entitled to alternative land to the extent of anything between 200 to 800 sq. yds. of land. Now the petitioner and a number of others have purchased part of the share i. e. 1/8th share each from the said Damomal. Each one of these vendess is now claiming the right to an alternative accommodation which at the minimum would total to anything between 2000 to 4000 sq. yds. To take another illustration Damomal was the owner of 62 bighas which means about 62,000 sq. yds. he could have sold 1000 yds. pieces of land to 62 persons. In such a case if the argument of the petitioner was to be accepted it would be that there would be 62 claimants entitled for alternative accommodation. The result would be that whereas if Damomal had continued to remain the owner till the land was acquired he would have been entitled at a maximum of 800 sq. yds. of land but by the device of the land having been sold prior to the final acquisition the authorities will have now to give land to each of the 62 claimants which even at a minimum of 200 sq. yds. each would work out over 12,000 sq. yds. i. e. at least fifteen times more than what would have been the entitlement of the original owner Damomal. Surely such an absurd result could never have been contemplated by the framers of the scheme. If this interpretation was to be given the whole of the land would be exhausted amongst the few such land owners thus destroying the very object of the scheme and making a mockery of it. This is another reason why we feel that the ratio of the Udai Raj Giri s case is not applicable to the facts of the case. This is another reason why we feel that the ratio of the Udai Raj Giri s case is not applicable to the facts of the case. ( 5 ) THERE is another aspect for which that (sic) the facts of the present case are distinguishable from those of Udai Raj Giri s case. Parliament his passed Delhi Lands (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972, (hereinafter to be called 1972 Act) being an Act to impose certain restrictions on transfer of lands which have been acquired by the Central Government or in respect of which acquisition proceedings have been initiated by that Government. Section 4 of that Act provides that no person shall except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority transfer by sale any land or part of the land in the UnionTerritory of Delhi which is proposed to be acquired and in relation to which a declaration u/s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act has been made. Section 8 further prohibits the Registering Officer from registering any document by transfer by sale of any land referred to in S. 4 unless the transferor produces a permission in writing of the competent authority for such transfer. Thus after the passing of this 1972 Act no transfer of sale can take place without the permission of the competent authority. Evidently, therefore, where no permission is given there can be no question of any ownership of the Vendee being accepted. The provisions of 1972 Act were not brought to the notice of the Division Bench which decided Udai Raj Giri s case and they did not, therefore, have any occasion to comment on it. It will be clear that if land is sold without permission ownership of the Vendee will not be recognised and to that extent, therefore, claim by the vendee to claim alternative land on the basis of such purchase would have to be negatived. This is because S. 4 having prohibited a transfer of land any transfer in violation of the mandatory provisions would be a void transaction and will not confer any right on the vendee. This is because S. 4 having prohibited a transfer of land any transfer in violation of the mandatory provisions would be a void transaction and will not confer any right on the vendee. The broad argument of the petitioner s counsel that all the vendees prior to the taking of possession of the land would have a right to get alternative land has to be negatived even on the short ground that at least after the passing of the 1972 Act there is a restriction on the right to sell land and any sale which is made without permission would confer no right on vendee and hence no right to claim alternative accommodation. The only effect of permission under 1972 Act is that the sale may be recognised as valid so as to confer I right to receive compensation but it can have no effect or has no relevance so far as eligibility for alternative land under para 8 of the scheme is concerned because the object of the scheme is rehabilitation of displaced persons rather than giving additional benefit to a new vendee. Its only relevance is that the sale which takes place may be treated as a valid sale permitting the vendee to claim compensation or other benefits arising therefrom which in the absence of permission would have been deemed to be a void sale, thus conferring no right at all. As a result, as the petitioner is not an individual who was an owner at the time when S. 4 notification was issued he would not be eligible to lay any claim for alternative land. The respondent, therefore, rightly refused to allot any land to him. The petitioner being the individual who has come on the scene in between after the issue of notification under S. 4 of Land Acquisition Act even though before the pronouncement of the Award are not entitled to any alternative land. The denial to the petitioners claim, therefore, is justified. The result is that the petition is dismissed but with no order as to costs.