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1984 DIGILAW 326 (MAD)

His Holiness Sriman Sadagopa Sri Vedantha Desika Yathindra Mahadesikan, 44th Jeer or Sri Ahobila Math, Hereditary Trustee of Vedantha Desikar Sannadhi within the precincts of Sri Ranganathaswami Temple, rep. by Attorney agent, Srinivasachariar v. The Commr, H. R. & C. E. , (Admn. ) Dept. Madras and others

1984-08-03

P.VENUGOPAL

body1984
Judgment :- Plaintiff is the appellant. Defendants 1 to 6, 8 to 10, 12 to 17, 19, 22 and 24 to 26 are the respondents. 21st respondent has been impleaded in the appeal. 2. According to the plaintiff there is an established usage to bring Sri Vedantha Desikar to Adhyayana Mandapam of Lord Ranganatha on the days of Yugathi, Deepavali, Kanu, etc and on Tirunakshathram day into the sanctum sanctorum of Lord Ranganatha with Vadakalai mark and with all paraphernalia like Vadakalai Namam, Pathram, Vazhithirunamam, etc. In order that the established usage is followed in the temple, the plaintiff made an application to the trustees of Sri Ranganatha Swami Devas-thanam to take Sri Vedantha Desikar idol to worship Lord Ranganatha on the occasions mentioned above with the Vadakalai mark on his fore-head. The trustees imposed a condition that the idol should bear only the Thenkalai mark on His fore-head. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Department, to permit and follow the established usage while taking the idol of Sri Vedantha Desigar with all Vadakalai paraphernalia for Mangalasasanam on the Thirunakshatram day into the sanctum sanctorum of Lord Ranganathar. The Deputy Commissioner passed an order that the established usage was to take Sri Vedantha Desikar to the sanctum sanctorum of Lord Ranganathar only with the Thenkalai mark. The appeal to the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, having proved futile, the plaintiff filed the suit under section 70 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, Act 22 of 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for cancelling the order of the Commissioner. 3. On a preliminary objection that the suit is not maintainable without a notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, the trial court held that the suit is to set aside the order made by a public officer, namely, the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Department, in respect of an act done in discharge of his official duty and such a suit without the issue of notice under section 80, Civil procedure Code, is not maintainable and on this finding, the suit was dismissed with costs of defendants 1 and 2. Against this-decree and judgment of the trial Court, the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal. 4. Against this-decree and judgment of the trial Court, the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the 2nd defendant contended that a notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, is necessary before a suit can be filed against the 2nd defendant. Learned. counsel for the plaintiff pointed out that the 2nd defendant has been impleaded as representing Sri Kanganatha-swamy Devasthanam and not in his individual capacity. Now that the Executive Officer has been impleaded as representing the Devasthanam, no notice is necessary. 5. Relying on the Bench decision of this Court in Lakshmana Shah v. Commissioner, H.R. & G.E., (1971) 2 M.L.J. 495 : 84 L.W. 828: A.I.R. 1972Mad. 319 and Santhana-gopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar, (1974) 1 M.L.J. 215 and also a decision of a decision of a Single Judge in Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. v. E.V. Kacheri-chamy (1981) 2 M.L.J. 375) the learned counsel for the appellant contended that no notice under section 80, Civil procedure Code, is necessary for a statutory suit filed under section 70 of the Act. On the other hand, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in S.D.G. Pandarasannidhi v. State of Madras, (1965) 2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 167: (1965) 2 An. W.R.(S.C) 167: (1965) 2 S.C.J. 711: (1965) 3 S.C.R. 17 : A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1578 and a decision of this Court in Province of Madras v. Vikrama Deo, (1943) M.W.N. 56: (1943) 1 M.L.J. 53 : 56 L.W. 50: A.I.R. 1943 Mad 284 as well as a decision of the Bombay High Court in Ebrahimbhai v. State, A.I.R. 1975 Bom. 13 contended that the Commissioner, while functioning under the Act, functions only as a Public Officer or Government and that therefore, section 80, Civil Procedure Code, is attracted when a suit is filed against a Public officer in respect of any act purported to be done by such public Officer in his official capacity and the order passed is also an act purported to be done by the publicofficer in his official capacity and the suit without notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, notice, is not maintainable. The learned counsel also relied on a decision of a single Judge of this Court in Santhanagopal 2 Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar (1968) 2 M.L.J. 41 and contended that the Commissioner while functioning under the Act functions only as a Public Officer and the provisions contained in section 80, Civil Procedure Code, will apply to him. 6. The decision of the single Judge of this Court in Santhanagopla Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar (1968) 2 M.L.J. 41 came up on appeal before a Bench of this Court and the decision of the Bench is reported in Santhanagopla Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar, (1974) 1 M.L.J. 215 . The question that arose therein was whether the temple is a denominational temple and the Court held that such a question is not coming under section 53 of the Act and so, the jurisdiction of the civil court is not ousted. Construing that the suit is one for declaration, that the temple is a denominational one, it was pointed out that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide that issue is not ousted. The implication of this judgment is that if it is a matter falling under section 63 of the Act, against which a statutory suit is provided under section 70 of the Act, no notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, is necessary before the filing of the suit. This aspect has come up for consideration before another Division Bench of this Court in another case and it is in Lakshmana Shah v. Commr., H.R. & C.E. (1971)2 M.L.J. 495 : 84 L.W. 828. In that case there was an application under section 57 (ft) of the Madras Act 16 of 1951 before the Deputy Commissioner to hold that the office of the trustee of the suit temple was hereditary and the appellants are not hereditary trustees. The Deputy Commissioner had held that the office of trustee was hereditary and it was confirmed by the Commissioner. On a suit filed for cancelling the order of the Commissioner, it was held that ‘no notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, is required in respect of a statutory suit to set aside or cancel the order of the Commissioner under the provisions of the Act. On a suit filed for cancelling the order of the Commissioner, it was held that ‘no notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, is required in respect of a statutory suit to set aside or cancel the order of the Commissioner under the provisions of the Act. This Bench decision has been uniformly followed in a number of cases as seen from Commr., H.R. & C.E. v. E.V. Kacharichamy, (1981) 2 M.L.J. 375 and it has been held that for filing a statutory suit, no notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, is necessary. 7. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent in Province of Madras v. Vikroma Deo, (1943) 1 M.L.J. 53 :1943 M.W. N. 56 was a suit under section 14 of the Survey and Boundaries Act and the suit was filed only against the Government. The scope and scheme of the Survey and Boundaries Act are certainly not in pari materia with the scope and scheme of Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959. The other decision relied on by him in Ebrahimbhai v. State, A.I.R. 1975 Bom. 13 was again a suit against the Government filed under rule 13 (2), Schedule II of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code and being a suit against the Government, it was held therein that section 80, Civil Procedure Code, notice is necessary. In the absence of the State Act, viz., Madhya Pradeeh Land Revenue Code, it is difficult to state whether the scope and scheme under that Act is analogous to the Madras Act 15 of 1949. Learned counsel for the respondent is unable to point out any decision arising under Tamil Nadu Act 15 of 1949 holding that even in respect of a statutory suit under section 70 of the Act, notice under section 80. Civil Procedure Code, is necessary for the maintainability of the suit. 8. Section 110 of Act 22 of 1959 provides that where a Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner makes an enquiry or hears an appeal under Chapter V or Chapter VI the enquiry shall be made and the appeal shall be heard in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of suits or the hearing of the appeals. The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and the Indian Oaths Act fare also applicable to such enquires or appeals. The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and the Indian Oaths Act fare also applicable to such enquires or appeals. The order passed by the Deputy Commissioner under section 53 is a quasi-judicial order passed by him in exercise of his quasi-judicial functions. The appellate order passed by the Commissioner is also a quasi-judicial order passed by his in exercise of his quasi-judicial function. In respect of enforcing the statutory remedy under auction 70 of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner or the Commissioner have passed quasi-judicial orders in exercise of their qasi-judicial functions and in that view’ they cannot be termed to be public officers supporting to act in their official capacity within the meaning of section 80, Civil Procedure Code. It therefore follows that for enforcing the statutory right conferred under section 70 of the Act, notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, is unnecessary. Even without that notice, the suit is maintainable. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the finding of the trial Court on the preliminary issue is set aside and the suit is remitted back to the trial Court for trial on the other issues on merits. The parties are directed to bear their own costs in this appeal. Appeal allowed.