JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :- Roy, J.: This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 5th July, 1968, made by A. K. Sinha, J. in Civil Rule No. 468 (W) of 1964. Along with this appeal, F.M.A. No. 424 of 1969, made by the same learned Judge on the same day in Civil Rule No. 224 (W) of 1944 was heard as the concerned Rules were heard together and the appeals, according to the learned Advocates for the respective parties, involve the same question of law. Mr. Arun Probsh Sirkar appeared for the Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 in the other appeal, and the appearances on behalf of the parties other than those as mentioned above, were the same. 2. The predecessors of the Respondent Nos. 1(a) (e) 5, were the owners of C. S. Plot Nos. 354 and 355 (hereinafter referred to as the said lands), situate within the Asansol Municipality (hereinafter referred to as the said Municipality). The original petitioner a obtained the concerned Rules claiming that one Shri S. S. Atwal, who was impleaded as Respondent No.4, was a member of the Parliament and was very influential person in and around the said Municipality. The said Shri Atwal is dead and it would also appear that the service of notices of these appeals were dispensed with on him in terms of the order dated 23rd June, 1968. In these appeals the said Shri Atwal was impleaded as Respondent No.8. It was also alleged that the said Shri Atwal has his residential house at Young Road, which is just opposite the said lands and he, while alive wanted the petitioners in the Rules to sell the said lands to him and that apart, one Shri G. S. Atwal, a brother of the deceased Respondent No. 8 (S. S. Atwal), tried to occupy forcibly, one of the plots as involved in this case, and on such a complaint under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code was filed, being Misc. Case No. 2 of 1948, wherein the petitioners in the Rules were held and found to be persons entitled and authorised to retain possession of the lands in question and thus to retain possession of them. 3. Case No. 2 of 1948, wherein the petitioners in the Rules were held and found to be persons entitled and authorised to retain possession of the lands in question and thus to retain possession of them. 3. It bas been alleged that having failed in their attempts to secure the said lands from the petitioners, the said Shri S. S. Atwal, while alive, persuaded the Administrator (Respondent No.2.) of the said Municipality, to acquire the said lands for his benefit and at his own expense under the pretence of a land acquisition proceedings on the pretext of creating or constructing a Park. It has been stated that in fact the said S. S. Atwal, while alive, had paid Rs. 39,000/ to the said Municipality, on account of compensation, if any, to be paid for such acquisition. There is no dispute and in fact it cannot be doubted that the said lands are outside the jurisdiction of the said Municipality or at least at the outskirt of the Asansol town and the concerned Budha village, where the Park in question was proposed to be constructed, is inhabited mainly by farmers. The petitioners have stated and to which we cannot agree that these inhabitants of the concerned village do not require or have any necessity for a Park. It was also the ease of the petitioners that apart from the said lands, vast tracts of land, which are thinly populated, are lying vacant. In fact, this was also one of the justifications of the petitioners that there was no need for a Park. 4. There was a notification dated 14th January, 1960 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the said first notification), whereby, lands measuring 1.70 acres, comprising in the plots as mentioned hereinbefore, were sought to be acquired, for the public purpose of constructing a Park at the junction of Young Road, in terms of the requirements of the said Municipality. It was also mentioned that such acquisition was not for the purposes of the Union and such acquisition was at the expenses of the said Municipality. The notification further stated that the concerned plan was lying ready for inspection in the Office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Burdwan as well as also in the office of the said Municipality. It was also mentioned that such acquisition was not for the purposes of the Union and such acquisition was at the expenses of the said Municipality. The notification further stated that the concerned plan was lying ready for inspection in the Office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Burdwan as well as also in the office of the said Municipality. The notification further required, that objections if any, may be filed in writing within the stipulated days before the Collector of Burdwan. 5. Against the said first notification, exception were taken under section 5A of the said Act before the land Acquisition Collector by Sri Biswamitra Shukla and Ram Kripal Shukla by their representations as in Annexures "B" and "B(1)" to the petition. By these objections it was claimed that the proposed acquisition would neither benefit the public nor serve any public purpose. It was claimed that the said lands were not really needed for any public purpose and in the locality in question there was no need to construct a Park, as there were plenty of vacant lands available. It was also contended that the petitioners and their co-sharers would require the said lands for constructing their residential houses and in case the acquisition proceedings were allowed to be continued, then, they would suffer great loss and prejudice. It was also claimed that the proposed acquisition was being attempted to be done in such a way as to leave lands belonging to the petitioners on both sides of the said lands which would be acquired, would be wasted. As stated earlier, the petitioners restated further that the proposed constructions of a Park was not a public purpose in the facts and circumstances of the case. It was also contented by the petitioners that there were and are many localities in and around or within the said Municipality which are very congested and these portion do really need proper roads and drains, but nothing has been done by the said Municipality. But on the other hand they have taken the task of requiring the said lands and that too for the purpose of suiting the convenience of the said Shri S. S. Atwal, since deceased. It was also claimed that some of the petitioners being away at their native place at Balia, have not received the notice for the proposed acquisition. 6. It was also claimed that some of the petitioners being away at their native place at Balia, have not received the notice for the proposed acquisition. 6. It was claimed by the other objector Shri Ram Kripal Shukla that the notice of the proposed acquisition was not served on him. That apart, he has reiterated the stand as taken by the other objector viz. Shri Biswamitra Shukla. Similar such objections were also filed before the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector by Sukdeo Shukla and apart from that, several citizens of the said Municipality filed an objection to the Secretary of the Ministry of Local Self Govt. of the State of West Bengal, practically on the same line as indicated hereinbefore. 7. Apart from the above, the said Biswamitra Shukla made another representation dated 11th December, 1963 to the Collector of Burdwan restating the objection as indicated hereinbefore and further prayed for an impartial enquiry in the facts and circumstances of the case and also to determine whether the concerned Park at the proposed site, would be required or can be considered as essential necessities to the public and also to withdraw the acquisition proceedings thereafter. 8. It should also be noted that it appeared before the learned Judge of the Court below that there was, a subsequent notification under section 4 dated 12th September, 1963 and by such notification the area of the said lands as proposed to be acquired was increased from 1.70 acres to 1.85 acres and the learned Judge has also observed that the declaration under section 6 for 1.85 acres of the said 18nds was made simultaneously and on the same day i.e. 12th September, 1963. On 22nd May, 1968 the learned Judge directed the State of West Bengal to supply typed copies of the errata notification and declaration under section 6 to the petitioners as well as to the other Respondents within 10 days and the case was directed to be heard on 12th June, 1968. By that order, the learned Judge also gave the Administrator of the said Municipality at that time, an opportunity to file a supplementary affidavit within 10 days and reply thereto, if any, was directed to be filed within a week thereafter. By that order, the learned Judge also gave the Administrator of the said Municipality at that time, an opportunity to file a supplementary affidavit within 10 days and reply thereto, if any, was directed to be filed within a week thereafter. The learned Advocates appearing for the parties before us could not enlighten us as to whether the supplementary affidavit and the affidavit-in-reply as mentioned hereinbefore, were filed, They were also not in a position to say whether the errata notification under section 4 and the declaration under section 6 or the said Act were also produced. But, from a reference to the judgment it would appear that the learned Judge has recorded about the amendments incorporated to the said first notification by the second notification under section 4 of the said Act (hereinafter referred to as the said errata notification) and whereby, the area of the said lands lis sought to be acquired, were enhanced. That apart the learned Judge has recorded that the declaration under section 6 (hereinafter referred to as the said declaration) was issued on the same day on which the said errata notification was issued. 9. It would also appear that thereafter, the acquisition proceedings was completed and a notice under section 12(2)of the said Act, informing the petitioners that on 28th March, 1964 an award has been made, was served, and on such Shri Sukdeo Shukla and Biswamitra Shukla, as claimants, requested the Land Acquisition Collector, Burdwan, not to proceed or take any further steps in pursuance to the concerned award for a period of 4 weeks, to enable them to take necessary steps in the matter. They also stated that against the concerned acquisition proceedings they obtained Civil Rule No. 225 (W) of 1964 which at that time was pending and it was also stated by them that without prejudice to any of their rights in such proceedings, they had preferred a claim of compensation. 10. The affidavit-in-opposition in the instant case (which would hereafter be referred to as the said first affidavit) was dated 25th June, 1954 and filed by Shri Satyandra Kumar Mitra, the Land Acquisition Collector, Burdwan. The ownership of the said lands of the petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest has been admitted by the deponent and he has stated that the said lands should be deemed to be weste lands, as they are tankfilled lands. The ownership of the said lands of the petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest has been admitted by the deponent and he has stated that the said lands should be deemed to be weste lands, as they are tankfilled lands. He denied that the said first notification or the stops as taken for acquiring the said lands and which were started at the request of the Administrator of the said Municipality were illegal, irregular and maiafide as claimed. It was his specific case that Asansol is a big Industrial Municipal town within the Burdwan District and there has been en0fmous increase of the permanent residence of the town and many structures have come up, so, for providing amenities for old infirm and children and specially for providing safe playground for children due to abnormal increase of vehicular traffic, the need for constructing the concerned Park was fait by the rate prayers and in order to cater such need, the said Municipality, in the interest of the general public, requested the authorities concerned, to acquire the said lands. He has also stated that the said first notification was duly published in the appropriate issues of the Calcutta Gazette, but, he has denied the other allegations including all allegations of malafide and machination of or by the said Shri S.S. Atwal since deceased, in the matter of having the acquisition proceedings initiated and completed. The deponent has further stated that the public notice or the substance of the said first notification was duly published at all convenient places of the locality and they were also served on the persons known or believed to be interested, inviting objections against the proposed acquisition. It was also his case that notices meant for Sarbashree Madon Mohan Shukla and Ananda Mohan Shukla were duly issued, but as they did not reside at the addresses as available from the records, they could not be served locally, but the notices addressed to them in Balia District in Uttar Pradesh, were duly served through post on 26th February, 1960. Such being the position, he denied that those persons had no opportunity for filing objections to the proposed acquisition. In fact he has categorically claimed that those persons, who were Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the Rule, were duly served. Such being the position, he denied that those persons had no opportunity for filing objections to the proposed acquisition. In fact he has categorically claimed that those persons, who were Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the Rule, were duly served. It has also been claimed that notices meant for the concerned acquisition, were also duly served on petitioner Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 and he had received three objections, some particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore, under section 5-A of the said Act. It his also been stated that those objections were heard and considered by the deponent, in the presence of Sarbashree Biswamitra Shukla and Sukdeo Shukla and they were disposed of in accordance with law. 11. it was also the case of the deponent that general notices under section 9(1) of the said Act, were duly published in conspicuous places in the locality, and special notices under section 9(3) of the said Act, inviting claims for compensation were also served on some of the petitioners locally and by registered post on others at their native district in Balia District. 12. Thereafter, the deponent has stated that the said declaration was duly issued and published in the issues of the Calcutta Gazette in accordance with law. It was also his case that the proposed acquisition was for public purpose viz. for the purpose of making provisions for a public Municipal Park and the object behind the same, as mentioned hereinbefore, according to the deponent was due and bonafide. It was also his case that the petitioner Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were appropriately served with notices under sections 4 and 6 of the said Act and the other petitioners were also served with those notices at their native place as mentioned hereinbefore. The deponent has further admitted that notices to Ram Kripal Shukla was not issued, us his name did not appear in the record-of-rights in respect of the said lands. He has also stated that no claim was preferred by the said Ram Kripal Shukla till 9th March, 1964 to which the enquiry under section 11 of the said Act, was adjourned and on that day Sukhdeo Shukla one of the petitioners submitted a written petition stating that the said Ram Kripal Shukla was aha a co-sharer and as such a person interested in the said lands. The deponent has stated that on the basis of the registered partition deed as produced at the time of the hearing, the said Ram Kripal Shukla was accepted and deemed to be a co-sharer in respect of the said lands and such decision had to be taken after the enquiry under section 11 of the said Act, was heard and disposed of. 13. Section 98 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, deals with acquisition of land and is to the following effect :- (1) When any land, whether within or without the limits of a municipality, is required (a) for the purposes of this Act, or (b) for the recoupment of the cost or any portion of the cost of carrying out any such purpose, the State Government may, at the request of the Commissioners at a meeting, proceed to acquire it under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894). (2) Before requesting the State Government to acqire land for the purpose referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) the Commissioners shall obtain previous sanction of the State Government and give due notice of their intention and an opportunity to any objector, who appears within such period as they may fix, to be heard in this connection. (3) On payment by the Commissioners of the compensation awarded under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and of any other charges incurred in acquiring the land including costs, if any, incurred by the State Government in proceedings subsequent to acquisition concerning enhancement of the award for the land, the land shall vest in the Commissioners. (4) The Commissioners shall be bound to pay to the State Government the cost, including all charged and costs referred to in sub-section (3) of any land acquired for the Commissioners on their application under the provisions of sub-section (1). On a reference to those provisions the said deponent has claimed that it was quite lawful for the authorities of the said Municipality, to request the Land Acquisition authorities to initiate proceedings to acquire the said lands for the concerned public purpose. On a reference to those provisions the said deponent has claimed that it was quite lawful for the authorities of the said Municipality, to request the Land Acquisition authorities to initiate proceedings to acquire the said lands for the concerned public purpose. He bas also stated that the statutory provisions and procedure for acquisition of lands as laid down under the said Act were duly followed in this case and every endeavour was made to give the persons known or believed to be interested in the said lands, adequate notices and opportunities to file their objections and claims against the concerned acquisition. The deponent has also stated that the objections as filed in the proceedings were duly considered and reported and findings as arrived at by him, were forwarded to the Commissioner, Burdwan Division. It was also his case that after due consideration of the objections to the proposed acquisition and the Collector's report, State Government were satisfied that the said lands were needed for a public purpose and accordingly, the said declaration was issued. The deponent has further stated that all and every evidences as has produced and tendered in the proceedings and at every steps, have been legally and appropriately considered. 14. It was also the case of the deponent that he made a joint award of compensation relating to the said lands and such joint award was made interms of the entries in the settlement records. The said lands were not recorded on the basis of any partition deed, which was of course sought to be referred to and relied on by the petitioners in the concerned proceedings. The deponent has stated that even in the registered partition deed, which was produced before him, there was no mop or any plan showing the respective allotments of the parties nor was it possible for him to ascertain from such evidence as tendered, which portion of the said lands belonged to whom. The deponent has also stated that he himself held the enquiry under section 11 of the said Act on due notices to the parties but no one excepting the petitioner Sukdeo Shukla was present on behalf all the petitioners, when he visited the said lands. The deponent has also stated that he himself held the enquiry under section 11 of the said Act on due notices to the parties but no one excepting the petitioner Sukdeo Shukla was present on behalf all the petitioners, when he visited the said lands. It was also his case that even at that time, the said Shri Sukdeo Shukla failed to point out the particulars of apportionment or those of separate allotments as claimed by the petitioners. Under such circumstances the said deponent has stated that he had no other alternative but to make the concerned joint award in favour of all the interested persons, so that in the event of failure on the part of the award is to agree to receive payment of the compensation-jointly the matter may be referred to Court under the provisions of section 30 of the said Act. It has further bf en stated by the deponent that in making the concerned award or completing the concerned proceedings, there was no arbitriness or there has been any violation of principles of natural justice. 15. There was another affidavit (which would hereinafter be referred to as the said second affidavit) affirmed on 5th September 1964 by Shri Chandrashekher Bhattacharjee, the then Administrator of the said Municipality. He bas stated that in or about July 1959, the said Shri S. S. Atwal since deceased proposed to construct a drain on both sides of Budha village at his own cost. It was his case that the said village was and is within the said Municipality and was and is inhabited by people not only of that village but also others who are workers of the neighbouring factories. It has also been stated by him that during the course of discussions regarding the construction of the said drain, the said Shri Atwal proposed to finance the construction of a Park, for the use of the residents within the said Municipality, which the said Municipality welcomed, as the same would not require them to incur any cost. It has also been stated by him that during the course of discussions regarding the construction of the said drain, the said Shri Atwal proposed to finance the construction of a Park, for the use of the residents within the said Municipality, which the said Municipality welcomed, as the same would not require them to incur any cost. The deponent has of course arrived that the said Shri Atwal since deceased approached the Administrator of the said Municipality, with a request to punish the petitioners, by acquiring the said lands and by converting the acquired lands into a Park, which would enhance the beauty and advantages enjoyed by the said Shri Atwal since deceased, in respect of his own residential house. The deponent has stated that such proposal of said Shri Atwal as given for the construction of the Park at his costs, was a bonafide one and there was no malafide intention behind the same. It has also been asserted that at the time such proposal was made the said Shri Atwal was not a member of the Parliament. 16. It was the categorical assertion of this deponent that the concerned acquisition was for public purpose, as the members of the public would be immensely benefited incase such construction of the Park was completed. He has also stated that the limits of the said Municipality have developed and are developing very first and to keep pace with such growth and development, the Park as proposed, was necessary and that too for the reasons as mentioned in the other affidavit. It was his case that the development of the said Municipality would be hampered and affected, if the proposed Park is not allowed to be constructed and if such construction is withheld. It was also his case that not only the surroundings but also the other environment and character as involved, would make the said lands fit and proper for the purpose of constructing the proposed Park and in case such construction is allowed, the interest of the public of the locality would certainly be served well. He has further stated that the said Shri Atwal while arriving had paid a sum of Rs. 35,080/- and not a sum of Rs. 39,000/-as alleged, for the concerned construction of the Park and if such Park is allowed to be constructed, the general public would be immensely benefited. He has further stated that the said Shri Atwal while arriving had paid a sum of Rs. 35,080/- and not a sum of Rs. 39,000/-as alleged, for the concerned construction of the Park and if such Park is allowed to be constructed, the general public would be immensely benefited. It was his further case, that the lands outside the proposed acquisition are in the process of being included within the limits of the said Municipality or in other words, the limits of the said Municipality or the area thereof are being extended to meet the demand of the last developing town of Asansol. The deponent has further denied catagorically, the allegations of malafide or machination as imputed against the Municipal Authorities and the said Shri S.S. Atwal. In any event, he has denied that the then Administrator of the said Municipality, had acted malafide, in proposing to acquire the said lands for the construction of the Park in question and be has stated further that there has been no illegality or excessive use of power by the said Municipality, in the matter or he has known any zeal to help and assist the said Shri S.S. Atwal, while alive, in the matter of keeping the said lands vacant in front of his house so that he gets undue advantage. 17. The deponent has further stated that the petitioners having filed claims for compensation under section 9 of the said Act, have no locus standi to maintain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that apart, they were not entitled to challenge the concerned proceedings in this Court for their conduct. In fact the deponent has pleaded that the petitioners were estopped for their conduct, in challenging the acquisition proceedings in this Court. It was also the case of the deponent that the petitioners had no right and authority, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to challenge the valuation as made by the Collector, in respect of the said land and he has categorically stated that the award as made, was due, proper and appropriate. 18. By his respective replies to the above affidavit-in-oppositions Shri Sukdeo Shukla has denied categorically the material allegations and he has in fact restated the case as was sought to be made out in the main petition. 19. 18. By his respective replies to the above affidavit-in-oppositions Shri Sukdeo Shukla has denied categorically the material allegations and he has in fact restated the case as was sought to be made out in the main petition. 19. On such pleadings as above, the learned trial Judge, in consideration of the arguments as advanced has recorded that at the bearing, the petitioners before him, raised the following points :(1) The acquisition of the parts of the disputed plots without clear specification of such parts in the impugned notification and declaration is entirely bad in law. (ii) Simultaneous publication of the amended notification under section 4 along with the declaration under section 6 of the Act is entirely illegal and ultra vires. (iii) The entire acquisition proceeding is malafide as the lands are being acquired for the benefit of Atwal the Respondent No. 4 and not for alleged public purpose. (iv) A joint awards given by the Collector cannot be sustained as valid award under the Law and on consideration of the respective arguments on those points, be has concluded that the said first notification, the said errata notification and the said declaration cannot be sustained or can be held to be valid. So far the allegations of malafide were concerned, the learned Judge has not really decided the point although he bas recorded the incidence of malafide as alleged, for the views which be has taken with regard to the defective notification and the declaration as indicated hereinbefore. In fact, while on the question of malafide the learned Judge has not expressed any opinion on them. Then, on the question of the validity of the joint award the learned Judge has followed the determinations in the case of (1) Rabindra Kumar Basu v. S. K. Banerjee & Ors., 63 CWN 851, wherein it has been amongst others that an award given by the Collector, jointly in the name of the interested persons without apportionment, is invalid. The relevant findings of the learned Judge on other points would be indicated hereafter. 20. It should be noted that the said Municipality was impleaded as a party Respondent in the Rules, through the Administrator, as at that time, there was an Administrator for the same and the present appeals were not filed by such Administrator, but they have been filed by the said Municipality, on filing fresh powers. Mr. 20. It should be noted that the said Municipality was impleaded as a party Respondent in the Rules, through the Administrator, as at that time, there was an Administrator for the same and the present appeals were not filed by such Administrator, but they have been filed by the said Municipality, on filing fresh powers. Mr. Dasgupta, appearing in support of the appeals, in answer to the question of maintainability of the appeals by the said Municipality and not by the Administrator of the same, which was urged by Mr. Mitra as a preliminary point, stated, perhaps at the time of obtaining the Rules, there was the Administrator of the said Municipality and by the time the appeals were preferred, the said Administrator was removed and as such, the appeals were duly filed by the said Municipality. It was claimed by Mr. Dasgupta that on the basis of the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act at the relevant time, the Commissioners of the said Municipality had the power to appoint subordinate Officers in terms of section 66, and not withstanding contained in the said section 66, the State Government, on requisition by them, had the right to appoint all or any of the Officers like (a) an Executive Officer, (b) a Secretary, (c) an Engineer, (d) a Health Officer and one or more Sanitary Inspectors, subject to the stipulations and restrictions as indicated in section 67. Mr. Dasgupta also mentioned section 67 A, while on the question of the appointment of Executive Officer by the State Govt. It should be noted that sections 67 and 67 A have since been omitted from the Bengal Municipal Act by Act LI of 1980. It should also be noted in those days, in may cases, State Government used to appoint Administrators for the Municipalities and the method of recruitment and qualifications for direct recruitment to the Gazetted posts of Special Officers, Grade-I and II in West Bengal General Services for appointment by Government as Administrators and Executive Officers, the Rule published with N.F. No. 1221, M. 2A-35/60 date 21-2-1962 as issued in the issues of Calcutta Gazette Part-1 (page 576) of 1st March, 1962 as issued by the Department of Local Self Government etc. was followed. 21. Mr. was followed. 21. Mr. Dasgupta stated that both the Executive Officer and the Administrator in those days or anyone of them as appointed, had the same powers and when such an officer was appointed, he used to exercise such powers of the Chairman or the Commissioners of the concerned Municipality, whether at a meeting or otherwise as may be conferred on him by notification by the State Government and on such notification, such powers used to be ceased to be exercised by the Chairman or by the Commissioners. Mr. Dasgupta, also on a reference to section 68, reiterated the concerned powers of the Executive Officer, which states that (1) The Executive Officer shall be the principal executive officer of the Commissioners and all officers and the employees of the Commissioners shall be subordinate to him. He may be required to be present at a meeting of the Commissioners or of any standing or special committee by the Chairman or the President of the meeting, as the case may be, to make a statement or explanation of facts, but he shad not vote upon, or make, any proposition at such meeting. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 51 Executive Officer of the Chairman through whom he shall be responsible to the Commissioners. As such, and on a reference to the provisions as indicated hereinbefore, Mr. Dasgupta claimed and contended that so long the Administrator, Respondent No.2 in the Rules was there, all the powers and duties of the Commissioners devolved on him or they were kept in suspended animation and on removal of the Administrator, the Commissioners have again come to power and as such, they have duly presented the appeal, on filing first powers. Mr. Dasgupta also contended that such being the position, when the appeals were presented. there were also no exceptions taken or noted by the Stamp Reporter and the appeals as preferred, were found and observed to have been in form and filed in time. Mr. Dasgupta also stated that the carriage of proceedings in the Rules being with Respondent Nos. Mr. Dasgupta also contended that such being the position, when the appeals were presented. there were also no exceptions taken or noted by the Stamp Reporter and the appeals as preferred, were found and observed to have been in form and filed in time. Mr. Dasgupta also stated that the carriage of proceedings in the Rules being with Respondent Nos. 1 (a) 10 5 in these appeals or their predecessor-in-interest, they should have taken steps to bring the Commissioners of the said Municipality, as soon as the Administrator, as appointed, was removed and whereupon the Commissioners, who were so long denuded of their powers, received back the powers and authority to continue with the administration of the said Municipality, on record. 22. It was then contended by Mr. Dasgupta that even if the appeals are found to be not maintainable at the instance of the said Municipality, they would of course be maintainable at the instance of Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 and those Respondents, on transposition to the category of the appellants, since they have the same interest in the appeals like the said Municipality, can continue with the appeals. Those submissions in the case of (2) The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel & Ors., 1971 (3) SCC 821 was made as Mr. Moitra as indicated earlier, submitted that the appeals at the instance of the said Municipality would not be maintainable. That determination is a very short one and we think, for appreciating the submissions of Mr. Moitra, the fact of the same and the findings on them should be stated here. In that case, certain lands belonging to the first Respondent were notified for acquisition under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act by the Government of Bombay by a notification, dated February 19, 1959. The area in which the land is situate having thereafter been allotted to the State of Gujarat on the bifurcation of the State of Bombay under the State Reorganisations Act, 1960 a Divisional Commissioner of the State of Gujarat issued a notification under section 6 on May 2, 1961. Both the notification mentioned the purpose for acquisition as "for School and neighbourhood work". The notifications were challenged by the first Respondent in a petition filed by him in the High Court of Gujarat on various grounds which it is not necessary to set out. Both the notification mentioned the purpose for acquisition as "for School and neighbourhood work". The notifications were challenged by the first Respondent in a petition filed by him in the High Court of Gujarat on various grounds which it is not necessary to set out. The petition was granted the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad which was the fourth Respondent in the petition having appealed to the Court. A preliminary objection was raised against the maintainability of the appeal filed by the Corporation. It was urged that the Corporation was not aggrieved by the order and the Supreme Court found the contentions to be justified and upheld them. The other relevant f1cts and observations that emerge from that judgment ale that the Municipal Corporation was impleaded as the fourth Respondent before the High Court but no relief was deemed against the Municipal Corporation. The property, it is true, was notified for Acquisition by the State Government for the use of the Municipal Corporation after it was acquired by the Government, but that, did not confer any interest in the Municipal Corporation so as to enable it to file an appeal against the order of the High Court allowing the petition. Substantially the grounds on which the petition was filed were that the notifications were invalid on account of diverse reasons. Some of these reasons have been upheld and some have not been upheld but all those grounds related to the validity of the Notifications issued by the Government of Bombay and the Government of Gujarat. Not even an order of costs has been passed against the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad. We fail to see what interest the Municipal Corporation has which would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the first Respondent. On the basis of the above determination, Mr. Moitra wanted to establish that the appeal by that the instance of the said Municipality was not maintainable, the more so when, no right has accrued in their favour and they have not got possession. He contended further that if anyone was aggrieved in the matter that was the State of West Bengal. Mr. Moitra wanted to establish that the appeal by that the instance of the said Municipality was not maintainable, the more so when, no right has accrued in their favour and they have not got possession. He contended further that if anyone was aggrieved in the matter that was the State of West Bengal. Mr. Moitra also pointed out that the said Municipality would not also be interested in any event or prejudiced by the concerned proceedings, as they have not parted with the money, which was received from the said S. S. Atwal. He also claimed and contented that the appeals as filed by the said Municipality would not also be maintainable as there was no legal evidence available establishing the fact when the Administrator was removed and the said Municipality or the Commissioners received the power to continue with the administration of the same. 23. Mr. Dasgupta sought to distinguish the case of The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shemaldas Patel & Ors. (Supra) from this case, as in that case there was no relief claimed against the Municipality and in fact no order was passed against the Municipality. He also stated that in that case, only notifications under section 4 and declarations under section 6 were challenged and there was no allegations of malafide. It was also contended by him, on a reference to the averments in the petition that in this case acquisition proceedings was initiated and the said lands were sought to be acquired at the requisition of the said Municipality and the Collector has notified that the acquisition would be at the cost of the said Municipality. That apart, on a reference to the prayers, Mr. Dasgupta contended that the writ or writs as asked for in this case, have also been directed against the said Municipality amongst other respondents. It was also stated by Mr. Dasgupta that the notice under section 12(2) of the said Act in this case, would show and establish that the Award has been made in favour of the Respondent Nos. 1 (a) to 5 or their predecessors-in-interest and the payments under the same have been directed to be made through the said Municipality. Mr. It was also stated by Mr. Dasgupta that the notice under section 12(2) of the said Act in this case, would show and establish that the Award has been made in favour of the Respondent Nos. 1 (a) to 5 or their predecessors-in-interest and the payments under the same have been directed to be made through the said Municipality. Mr. Dasgupta further pointed out that the said second notification, not being available on record, the learned Judge was wrong in taking the same into consideration and further erred, in making his determinations on the basis of the same. That apart, he pointed out again that the requisition in this case was by or at the instance of the said Municipality and the petitioners in the Rules had claimed compensation on the basis of such proceedings as initiated. 24. Apart from the above, reference was made by Mr. Dasgupta to section 98 of the Bengal Municipal Act as quoted hereinbefore and also to section 221(a) of that Act, which invests the Commissioners with power to make, improve and close public streets, squares and gardens and also authorises them, in pursuance of a decision arrived at a meeting amongst others, to (a) layout and make new streets, square and gardens in support of his contentions that under those provisions, the Commissioners of the said Municipality in this case had and still have a statutory duty not only to maintain but also to open, create and construct Parks, as that would come within the meaning of squares. Such being the position, it was also contended and claimed by Mr. Dasgupta that the requisition as made by the said Municipality for acquisition of the said lands, for the construction of the Park, could be made and such requisition was due, legal and boncfide. 25. Then, Mr. Dasgupta claimed that the said Municipality should be deemed in the facts and circumstances of the case "a person aggrieved". To establish, who should be deemed to be considered as a person aggrieved”, reference was made by Mr. Dasgupta to the case of (3) Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 2602 , which was a determination under U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 and wherein, amongst others, the question and effect of vesting under section 4 of that Act and that of further vesting under section 117(1), was considered. Dasgupta to the case of (3) Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 2602 , which was a determination under U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 and wherein, amongst others, the question and effect of vesting under section 4 of that Act and that of further vesting under section 117(1), was considered. It has been observed in that case that the States first vest in the State under section 4. The fulfilment of the purpose of the Act, the setting in which the cornerstone for the statutory edifice is laid and the categorical language used, especially "tree from all encumbrances", leave no doubt that this initial vesting is absolute and inaugurates the scheme of abolition. In section 117(1) of the Act the expression 'vested in the State carries a plenary connotation, while shall vest in the Gaon Sdbha imports a qualified disposition confined to the right to full possession and enjoyment so long as it lasts. The State has title to sustain the action in ejectment of the quondam Zamindar of the estate even in absence of Gaon Sabha. Aside from this, it can be said that the State is a person aggrieved and has the competence to carry on appeal against the dismissal of the suit even in absence of Gaon Sabha. Where a wrong against community interest is done, ‘no locus standi’ will not always be a plea to non-suit an interested public body chasing the wrongdoer in Court. Right of resumption of the Government from the Gaon Sabha, tenant to be exercised in public interest, will be seriously jeoparfised if the estate slips into the hands of a trespasser. The estate belonged to the State, is vested in the Gaon Sabha for community benefit, is controlled by the State through directions to the Land Management Committee and is liable to be divested without add any time. Therefore, the State was entitled to appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Testing the facts of this case on the basis of such determination. Mr. Therefore, the State was entitled to appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Testing the facts of this case on the basis of such determination. Mr. Dasgupta claimed that here, the said Municipality was really prejudiced and as such, it was also claimed that, being the position and the said Municipality being really and prejudicially affected and that too is terms of the determination in the case of (4) Srinath Das v. Probodh Chunder Das & Ors., 11 Cal LJ 580, there would be no other way out, but to hold that the appeals at the instance of the said Municipality were maintainable and the determinations in the case of The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel & Ors. (supra), would not be available and applicable in this case. In Srinath Das’s case (supra) it has been observed that ordinarily only such persons should be added as defendants in a partition suit as are owners of the interest to be partitioned. But if it cannot be ascertained with precision whether some of the owners are alive, then both the unascertained owners and their legal representatives should be added as defendants, and service of notice effected on the unascertained owners in the manner prescribed by section 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (1882), and the only presumption enacted by section 107 of the Indian Evidence Act is that the party is dead at the time of Suit, but there is no presumption as to the precise time of his death, apart from observing that the Court has inherent power to regulate its procedure in such a manner as may shorten litigation and result in substantial justice to the litigant parties, and the requisites of a valid appeal are, first, that no one can appeal from a judgment or decree unless he was a party to the action or was treated as such or is the legal representative of a party or has privity of estate, title of interest, apparent on the face of the record secondly, that the appellant bas an interest in the subject-matter of the suit, and thirdly, that the appellant is prejudicially "needed by the decree complained of. 26. The above submissions of Mr. Dasgupta on the preliminary point regarding the maintainability of the appeals were adopted by Mr. Banerjee, appearing for Respondent Nos. 6 and 7. 27. 26. The above submissions of Mr. Dasgupta on the preliminary point regarding the maintainability of the appeals were adopted by Mr. Banerjee, appearing for Respondent Nos. 6 and 7. 27. In answer to those submissions, in reply, Mr. Moitra claimed that in the facts of the case, the said Municipality was not, firstly an aggrieved party and secondly, the same was not an interested party also. To establish those submissions, Mr. Moitra referred to section 3(b) of the said Act, which days down that the expression "person interested" includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under the Act; and a person shall be "deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land; and on such reference, he also claimed that transposition of the said Municipality to the position of the- Respondent and Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 to the category of appellants and then to continue with the appeals, would not be permissible. It was also contended by Mr. Moitra that since the requisition for acquisition, if any, must be by a resolution and there bas admittedly been in this case, no such resolution by the sad Municipality, to have the said lands acquired, they cannot also be deemed to be or treated as "persons aggrieved or interested" and as such the appeals at the instance of the said Municipality must also be deemed and found to be not maintainable. Mr. Moitra also reiterated that as the Municipal Commissioners were not made party Respondents, these appeals, at the instance of the said Municipality were also incompetent. Such and above being the position, it was Mr. Moitra's further submissions that provisions of Order 1, Rules 10 and 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, would not be applicable in this case. He also claimed that in view of the explanation to section 141 of the Code also, those provisions would not be available in these appeals which arose out of writ proceedings. To establish the above submissions Mr. He also claimed that in view of the explanation to section 141 of the Code also, those provisions would not be available in these appeals which arose out of writ proceedings. To establish the above submissions Mr. Moitra referred to and relied on the case of (5) Sailendra Nath Mallick v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 1981 (2) Cal LJ 99, where I had the occasion to observe that considering the effect of the "Explanation" as incorporated in section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1976, the said section has no application to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The jurisdiction which the High Court exercises under Article 226 is a special and not a limited one and the same is neither revisional nor appellate. That being the position, the submission made on behalf of the petitioner on the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and in that view of the matter, the provisions of Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code, is not sustainable. In that case of course, it was not observed, whether the explanation as added to section 141, should be prospective or retrospective. Thereafter, in the unreported decision dated 24th August, 1984, made in (6) State of West Bengal & Ors. v. M/s. Hind Tea Company (P) Ltd. & Ors., F.M.A No. 362 of 1978 this Bench had the occasion to hold that the explanation as added to section 141 of the Code, by the Amendment of 1976 would not be retrospective but prospective. That being the position and since the proceedings involved in this case and so also the order made in the writ petitions as involved in these appeals were much prior to the incorporation of the explanation to section 141, the submissions of Mr. Moitra, about the non availability of the provisions of Order 1, Rules 10 and 11 of the Code, would not be of much substance. 28. While on the question whether the said Municipality was aggrieved party and in support of his submissions that they were not Mr. Moitra stated further that the said Municipality had no interest in the acquisition proceedings or they were not in any event interested, as the said lands belonged to his clients viz. 28. While on the question whether the said Municipality was aggrieved party and in support of his submissions that they were not Mr. Moitra stated further that the said Municipality had no interest in the acquisition proceedings or they were not in any event interested, as the said lands belonged to his clients viz. the writ petitioners, it was the said Shri S.S. Atwal, while alive, wanted to purchase them for the purpose of securing better facilities of enjoyments so far his residential house was concerned, the writ petitioners succeeded in the• Criminal Proceedings against the Atwals, those Atwals acted in a malafide manner and approached the said Municipality, to have the said lands acquired and in fact, the Atwals deposited the amount required to be spent on account of such acquisition and the money which was given to the said Municipality did not merge with the Municipal fund, which is created under or in terms of section 105 of the Bengal Municipal Act. 29. In the case of (7) The Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University Rajendranago, v. Mahmoodunnisa Begum & Anr., AIR 1976 AP 134 , a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court while dealing with He meaning of the Word "Person interested" as used in section 3(b) of the said Act has observed that under clause (b) of section 3 only those persons who claim an interest in compensation are brought under the need ‘person interested’. The word ‘claiming’ is very significant. Only a person, who is entitled to compensation, can claim an interest in compensation and not a person who is liable to pay it. Therefore, only those who have an interest in the land that is acquired and could thus claim and interest in compensation are 'persons interested' within the meaning of section 3(b). Neither the Government nor the person for whom the land has been acquired is a person interested, apart from holding that the person for whose benefit the land has been acquired cannot be said to be a person claiming under the Government who has been a party, to the acquisition proceeding before the lower court. Such persons right's arise only when the question has been completed. So, in the land acquisition proceedings he cannot be said to be claiming under the Government. Section 146 does not, therefore, help such person in seeking leave of the court to file an appeal. Mr. Such persons right's arise only when the question has been completed. So, in the land acquisition proceedings he cannot be said to be claiming under the Government. Section 146 does not, therefore, help such person in seeking leave of the court to file an appeal. Mr. Moitra also referred to those observations and claimed that on the basis of the tests as laid down in that case, the said Municipality cannot be held to have any interest in the concerned acquisition proceedings and thus, would not come within the definition in section 3(b) of the said Article such Act. Such being the position, Mr. Moitra further contended that if the appeals go, there would also be no application or any question of applying the provisions of order 1, Rules 10 and 11 of the Code. 30. We have already indicated our views in respect of the applicability of the Code or the explanation to section 141 of the same in the facts of this case. We also feel that even if the provisions of Order 1, Rules 10 and 11 of the Code are applicable in this case, we are not required to determine the character of the Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 as appellants in this Case or the case of their substitution as appellants, as according to us, in view of the determination in Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (Supra) and those made in Srinath Das v. Probodh Chandra Das & Ors. (Supra), the said Municipality would be interested in the proceedings and they would come within the purview of the terms "person interested" and the observations in the case of The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel & Ors. (Supra), would not apply in the facts of this case. Apart from the above, on the basis of the pleadings and the prayers in the writ petition, so also the allegations of malafide, is must also be held that the said Municipality would come within the terms "persons interested" as mentioned above and as such they would be prejudicially affected, if they are not allowed to continue with the appeals. Apart from the above, on the basis of the pleadings and the prayers in the writ petition, so also the allegations of malafide, is must also be held that the said Municipality would come within the terms "persons interested" as mentioned above and as such they would be prejudicially affected, if they are not allowed to continue with the appeals. We further held that the appeals by the said Municipality, after the removal of the Administrator, Would also be in form and maintainable in view of the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act and since the carriage of proceedings the writ proceedings were with the Respondent Nos. 1(a) to 5 herein as petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest, steps should have been taken by them, to have the name of the Administrator, Respondent No. 2 in the Rules, if he was really removed during the Pendency of the Rules and if the said Administrator was really removed after the disposal of the Rules and before the presentation of the appeals within time, they were appropriately filed by the said Municipality. We are also of the view that the determinations in the case of Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University, Rajendranagar v. Mahmoodunnisa Begum & Anr. (Supra), are distinguishable and not applicable in the facts of this case. Thus, the preliminary points as raised and urged by Mr. Moitra should fail and the appeals are held and determined to be maintainable at the instance of the said Municipality. 31. The submissions on merits as were put forward before the learned Trial Judge have been indicated hereinbefore. It should also be noted that grounds were also taken in the petitions about the non-service of notices on some of the owners of the said lands or on some of them, who had interest in the said lands, apart from claiming vagueness of the notices and the proceedings. From the statements and averments in the petitions, it appeared clear that petitioner Nos. 1, 4 and 5 viz., Sarbashree Biswamitra Shukla, Ram Kripal Shukla and Sukhdeo Shukla were served with the said first notification and such fact of service would also be patent, as these persons had duly filed their objections under section 5-A of the said Act and they were heard and considered. That apart, it also appeared from the pleadings in the proceedings that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 viz. That apart, it also appeared from the pleadings in the proceedings that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 viz. Sarbashree Madan Mohan Shukla and Ananda Mohan Shukla, were sought to be served at their addresses at Balia District, Bihar, as they, at the relevant time, were staying there and at their native place. Such being the position, it cannot be held that the petitioners were not either duly served or they had no opportunity to contest the proceedings and as such, the submissions on vagueness and non-service of the notice of the proceedings or receiving opportunities by the petitioners, to contest the concerned proceedings, should fail. We further hold that the said first notification was not vague. 32. The particulars of the two notifications under section 4 of the said Act have been indicated hereinbefore and Mr. Dasgupta, on a reference to them contended, that by the variation as made to the said first notification by the said second notification and that too in respect of the increased quantum of land in this case, the concerned Respondents in these appeals were not at all adversely affected and prejudiced, and to support hi, contentions as above, Mr. Dasgupta relied on the case of (8) Indrajit C. Parekh & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.. AIR 1975 SC 1182 . In that case, amongst others the Supreme Court had considered the effect of difference of the area as sought to be acquired in the notification under section 4 and the declaration under section 6 of the said Act, and it has been observed that where the notification under section 4 in which the area of the land to be acquired was stated as "part of Survey No. 56A measuring about 3,000 sq.yds." was withdrawn and a fresh notification under section 4 was published wherein the area was described as "5,600 sq.yds. from the north-west corner of Survey No. 56A" and in the declaration under section 6 the area was stated as "5,632 sq. yds. from the north-west corner of Survey No. 56A", it should be held that from the fact that area was differently stated together with the fact that the State's contribution was only one rupee it could not be said that the Government did not really apply its mind to the proposal for acquisition and that the acquisition was a colourable exercise of power. On the contrary, the difference in the area as stated in the notifications under section 4 and in the declaration under section 6 indicated that the State Government was careful about the exact' area that was likely to be needed for the purpose for which it was being acquired. No law other than the proviso to section 6(1) was pointed out and it was not necessary for the purposes of the appeal to enter on a discussion as to what such other law could he. The initial notification under section 4 of the said Act in that case was withdrawn and then the second notification under section 4 was made and published, but that was not the position in our case and as such, Mr. Moitra claimed, that case or the determination as made therein, to be inapplicable in this case. It must be recorded that by the said first notification in the area of the lands as sought to be acquired was 1.70 acres and by the said second notification, such area was enhanced to 1.85 acres and such enhanced area also tallied with the said declaration, which was made simultaneously. As indicated earlier, Mr. Moitra specifically contended that the determinations as indicated above do not really apply in this case, to which we agree. 33. Then Mr. Dasgupta contended that the writ petitioners having applied or asked for acceptance of the compensation as a warded, even though under protest, were estopped from moving this Court. It was also contended that the learned Trial Judge while dealing with the jointness of the Award failed to appreciate the determinations in the case of (9) Kanailal Mondal & Ors. v. Slate of West Bengal & Ors., 73 CWN 422. Where it has been observed that the principle upon which relief is given in case of a part acquisition proper description is that unless such description is given, the persons effected might not be appraised of the particular portion of which they are to deliver possession and also to claim compensation under the law. In the instant case quite a good number of joint petitioners fought out the matter at the compensation proceedings. So that they had no doubts as to what portion was going to be acquired. In the instant case quite a good number of joint petitioners fought out the matter at the compensation proceedings. So that they had no doubts as to what portion was going to be acquired. Once an award has been made in the presence of a person aggrieved by the proceeding under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, his further remedy would be against the award under section 18 of the said Act and the like. He cannot thereafter, turn found to and claim to re-open the entire land acquisition proceedings on the ground of defects which might have been available if the award had not been made. In the instant case as many section 31 petitioners pursued the matter of compensation proceedings resulting in an award. The claim of the petitioners being joint, the Court cannot make any apportionment if one fails because of his conduct and no relief can be granted to the rest. 34. It was further contended by Mr. Dasgupta that in the facts of the case, the acquisition proceedings as initiated on the requisition of she said Municipality should be deemed to be a valid and bonafide one and according to him, the money as received from the said Shri S.S. Atwal, while alive, became the fund of the said Municipality and as such compensation was really required to be said out of their fund and no contrary view should be taken. It should also be mentioned that on the basis of the determination in the case of lnderjit C. Parekh & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (Supra), Mr. Dasgupta contended that the fact that there was the said second notification and then the said declaration, even though they were issued simultaneously, would establish that then was real application of mind by the authorities and that too on the tests as laid down and indicated in the case as mentioned. We have already observed that the said determination is distinguishable on the facts and would not strictly apply in this case. The facts of that cast and those in this case are not in pari materia or similar to each other. 35. Before the learned Trial Judge, it was argued that since it appeared from the said first notification and the said declaration that part plots were sought to be acquired, the acquisition proceedings itself was bad. The facts of that cast and those in this case are not in pari materia or similar to each other. 35. Before the learned Trial Judge, it was argued that since it appeared from the said first notification and the said declaration that part plots were sought to be acquired, the acquisition proceedings itself was bad. It was also contended that as the specification of the said lands were not duly given, the petitioners in the Rules felt the difficulty in filing their objections under section 5-A of the said Act and in other words, they had not had the due and real opportunities to make effective representations against the proposed acquisition. It was also contended that the mentioning of due particulars was a condition precedent for a valid notification and for want of such particulars, the said first notification became void, inoperative and invalid and the consequential result of such invalidity also made the Hid declaration void, irregular and illegal. Before the learned Trial Judge, it was also claimed that the right to make representation against a notification under section 4 of the said Act is a substantial right under section 5-A and such right in this case was taken away or was made totally ineffective because of the vagueness of the said first notification or the character of the same as indicated herein before. Such submissions were sought to be supported on a reference to the case of (10) Ganesh Chandra Banerjee & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 70 CWN 387. That was a case where the effect of acquisition of unspecified portions of a plot or whether sufficient particulars of "portions" should he given in a notification under section 6(2) of the West Bengal Lands Development 2nd Planning Act, 1948, was considered, and on the facts of that case, it has been observed that in view of the fact that several plots which are intended to be acquired and which are set out in the declaration under section 6 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, belonged to different persons, and that an unspecified part of a plot belonging to the appellants is made the subject-matter of acquisition, the mere mention of the total area of all the plots under acquisition is not a sufficient compliance with the requirements of sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Act. This sub-section requires that whenever a particular plot is sought to be acquired under the provisions of the Act, the approximate area in respect of such a plot is to be stated in the declaration and if there are different plots which belong to different owners and only a part of a plot belonging to a particular owner is sought to be acquired some more definite statement or indication with regard to the area of the unspecified part of the plot should appear in the declaration. Otherwise, the person whose land is sought to be acquired would be totally in the dark as to which particular part of his land is intended to be acquired and this will also prevent him from putting forward all his objections that he would like to advance in respect of steps taken for the proposed acquisition subsequent to the publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act. We have observed earlier that the said first notification and so also the said second notification were not vague. In fact, they were not so indefinite as was sought to be urged before the learned Trial Judge, so that they could not serve the purposes of the said Act. It should also be noted that from their objections under section 5A of the said Act and as disclosed in this proceedings or some particulars whereof have been indicated hereinbefore, it would not appear that the petitioners in the Rule had felt any difficulty in filing their objections. The fact, that such exceptions under section 5A of the said Act were filed without disclosing the difficulties as experienced of felt, in our view, would be enough to held that the petitioners in the Rule should not have been allowed to raise such pleas, by the learned Trial Judge, in our view was wrong in holding that the rule of estoppel, as was pleaded by the Respondent before him and on the facts as indicated above, was not available. If such rule of estoppel, or waiver by conduct or acquiescence is not adopted or adhered to in a Land Acquisition Proceedings, then there would be no finality of a proceeding after the concerned notification under section 4 and filing of an objection under section 5A. Each case, of course will have to be judged by the fact of that case. Each case, of course will have to be judged by the fact of that case. On the facts of this case, we find that the learned Judge should have held on the available facts and pleadings that the petitioners in the Rules were hit by the principles as indicated hereinbefore and they were precluded from challenging the said first notification. The basis of the determination in Ganesh Chandra Banerjee & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (Supra) was that the particulars of the lands as sought to be acquired should motioned in such a way, so that reading the concerned notification under section 4, the person, whose land, is going to be acquired may know or get a definite idea of the exact lands which are going to be acquired. In this case, on such difficulty could be spelt out from the objections under section 5A as filed, against the said first notification. In the case of (11) Khub Chand & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1074 , which was one under the provisions of Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, it has been observed that the provisions of statute conferring power on Government to acquire lands shall be strictly construed. The learned Trial Judge has observed that in that case section 4 notification was cancelled because there was no substance of notification published and as regards declaration under section 6, the learned Advocate for the Respondent, at the time of the disposed of the Rule made a clarification as to the actual area and extent of the parts of the plots that was intended to be acquired and on such clarification, the Rule was discharged, but that it was not upheld in appeal. It was really on the basis of the determinations amongst others in the abovementioned case. it was observed by the learned Trial Judge that the said first notification and the said declaration could not be sustained. The determination as made in the case indicated above in our view, would not apply in the facts of this case, and Mr. Banerjee, appearing for the Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 was also justified in his submissions to the above effect. That determination was really an authority for the mandatory characters of section 4. The determination as made in the case indicated above in our view, would not apply in the facts of this case, and Mr. Banerjee, appearing for the Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 was also justified in his submissions to the above effect. That determination was really an authority for the mandatory characters of section 4. He also chimed that the observations in the case of Ganesh Chandra Banerjee v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (Supra), would not apply in this case as in the said first notification due and relevant particulars have been specified. 36. It must also be noted that Mr. Banerjee claimed the said second notification, to be an alleged one and he stated that toe objection under section 5-A was really filed against the said first notification and not against the said second notification and he also pointed out that there was really no exception taken against the said second notification in these proceedings. It was further stated by him that after taking of steps under section 4(2), note can be prepared and report made under the provisions of the said Act and since these provisions were complied with and the requirement' fulfilled and report was made on due consideration of the objections under section 5A and then the said declaration was made, the learned Trial Judge should not have made any interference. It was also the submissions of Mr. Banerjee, while on the scope of objection under section 5A, that the same would be related to public purpose only not with regard to the area. According to him the area has only to be mentioned in the notification and that may be changed. For the views as expressed by us earlier regarding the requirements for mentioning the area sought to be acquired and the purposes for the same we do not think that we can agree with the above submissions of Mr. Banerjee. We are also of the view that apart from contending that there is no public purpose involved in a concerned acquisition, acceptations with regard to area can also be taken and raised in appropriate cases, under section 5A of the said Act. 37. As indicated earlier and for the circumstances as mentioned, Mr. Banerjee claimed the said second notification as an alleged one. 37. As indicated earlier and for the circumstances as mentioned, Mr. Banerjee claimed the said second notification as an alleged one. It was his specific submissions, that since no point on that notification was taken, there was no opportunity for the answering Respondents to meet any allegations or statements on that behalf. It was also contended that the learned Trial Judge did not also ask the Respondents to substantiate any case on the said second notification and as such, the Respondents had no opportunity in the matter. It would appear from the records, that the learned Government Pleader, appearing for the Respondents concerned in the Rules at that time did not ask. for any opportunity in the matter and from the records, unless contrary is shown, it cannot be doubted that submissions advanced on the said second notification and there was a direction on the said learned Government Pleader, that he should make available to the other parties, the said second notification and so also the said declaration. It must also be held and observed that since there has been no contrary evidence of non-production of the available records in view of the specific findings by the learned Trial Judge and the determinations made by him on the simultaneous publication of the slid second notification and the said declaration, which were on 12th September, 1963, the presumption should be in favour of production of those records and the more so when, there has neither been any cross-objection filed or any appeal taken by the Respondents concerned against such findings. In fact, the learned Trial Judge, while on the point has observed that the simultaneous publication of the amended notification under section 4 and the declaration under section 6 was bad. He has also recorded that by the said second notification, the area of the said lands as sought to be acquired was increased from 1.70 acres to 1.85 acres. It has also been observed, because of the said second notification and the said declaration the petitioners really had not the opportunity to file objections under section 5A on the basis of the said second notification and as such there was violation of the mandatory provisions under section 5A of the said Act and the petitioners Were deprived of a very substantial and valuable right to object under the said section. The learned Trial Judge has also, in our view rightly observed that in case of urgency, the usual procedure of filing objection under section 5A can given a go by or may be dispensed with. While arriving at his conclusions in the manner as indicated hereinbefore and also for his conclusion that the said declaration should be deemed to be vitiated with serious irregularities as there was no time lag between the said second notification and the said declaration the learned Trial Judge referred on and relied on the determinations in the case of (12) Smt. Somawanti & Ors. v. The State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 151 . Mr. Banerjee of course contended that the said determination has no due application in this case and it was also submitted by him that in fact there has been no determination by the learned Trial Judge as to how the actions as involved have prejudiced the petitioners in the Rules. 38. Mr. Moitra contended also that such simultaneous publication of the said second notification and the said declaration had really taken away a substantial and valid right of the petitioners in the Rules, under section 5A of the said Act. According to Mr. Moitra, the language of section 6 of the said Act also contemplates or suggests an interregnum after a notification under section 4 and the rule of construction being that when a statute makes some provisions, here in this case objection under section 5A after the notification under section 4 and before the declaration under section 6, steps must be taken in that way and not in any other way, the concerned acquisition should be set aside by holding the illegalities as mentioned hereinbefore in respect of the said second notification and the said declaration. It was also submitted by Mr. Moitra that when the said first notification mentioned specifically the area of the said lands viz. 1.70 acres to be required for acquisition and also to suit the concerned purpose, by a subsequent erratum notification under section 4 again viz. by the said second notification, larger area of the said lands could not be sought to be acquired for the same purpose, unless the earlier notification was withdrawn. It was stated by Mr. Moitra, that the said first notification was not withdrawn. 39. by the said second notification, larger area of the said lands could not be sought to be acquired for the same purpose, unless the earlier notification was withdrawn. It was stated by Mr. Moitra, that the said first notification was not withdrawn. 39. The West Bengal Land Acquisition Manual, which contains executive instructions by the Government of West Bengal and were brought in for the purposes of those instructions, the administrative department of Government is the department which sanctions 1he project necessitating the acquisition, or in the case of an acquisition on behalf of a local authority or a company is the department which controls or is concerned with the functions of the local authority or company. In the case of acquisition by a railway, the Works and Buildings Department is the administrative department. Rule 24 of that Manual lays down the necessary particulars, which should contain in a declaration and further prescribes that the law does not require that the declaration under section 6 shall specify the specify the precise boundaries or area of the land to be taken. This, however, is advisable, though the declaration should be so generally worded that no impediment may afterwards arise from its terms to prevent the appropriation of all the land that can possibly be required. In areas which have been cadastrally surveyed the serial numbers of the settlement fields will ordinarily be a sufficient description of the land required. In the case of land required for a road, canal, distributory, railway etc., unless there is any reason to the contrary, it will be sufficient to give in the declaration the approximate area in acres and decimals, length, breadth, and the general direction of the land for the line or channel, with the names of the districts, thanas and villages through which it will pass. 40. Collectors should be careful to prevent discrepancies between plans and schedules and draft declarations with regard to boundaries, areas and names and limits of villages; and when they consider that the plans and schedules of land to be acquired for a department or company require any modification in respect of any discrepancy, they should communicate with the Executive Engineer or other officer of the department or company concerned and have the discrepancies reconciled before submitting the draft declaration, estimate, etc., to the Commissioner. On the basis of such provisions, it was contended by Mr. On the basis of such provisions, it was contended by Mr. Moitra that the proceedings in this case, were void and irregular, as the said declaration did not comply with such requirements as are mentioned in that Rule. Mr. Moitra further claimed that the said Act being an exproprietory legislation or has that character, the petitioners were certainly prejudiced for not receiving the necessary opportunities to object under section 5A of the said Act after the said second notification, which opportunity to file objection, according to him was a must. He further contended that the acquisition in this case was per se, ultra vires. section 5A, the more so when and as restated by Mr. Moitra that when the procedure as prescribed by the statute was required to be followed in the way as mentioned in the said Act and not in any other way and more particular when, according to him, the statutory procedure of receiving and considering objections under section 5A was not followed after the said second notification. Those submissions were sought to be supplemented by Mr. Moitra, on a reference to the determinations in the case of (13) Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Governor of Delhi & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 1868 , which specifically lays down amongst others that the Collector concerned is required to enquire into the objection as raised. 41. Admittedly, in case of urgency under section 17 of the said Act, which deals with the special powers of the Collector in Cases of urgency, and that the Local Government has the discretion to suspend the operation of section 5A by a declaration under section 7(4) and the provisions of the section will not have any application. The provisions of section 5-A will also have no application. When temporary occupation of land is directed under sections 35, 36 and 37 of said Act. The case before us, win not bring the same under any of the exceptions as indicated above and as such, it can be held that the right to file objection under section 5A, which was a fundamental and substantial right of the petitioners in this case, as the said lands were neither waste nor arable was lost since there was no time lag for filing the objection under section 5A. after the said second notification and the said declaration, as they were admittedly issued simultaneously and actually on the same day. The noncompliance with the provisions under section 5A, except in the circumstances as indicated above and the other stipulations as in the said Act, would be fatal. Such being the position and as in this case there has been no extraordinary circumstances for dispensing with the requirements of section 5A, we are of the view that the learned Trial Judge was justified in his holdings that the notification and the said declarations were improper and that for such shortfalls as indicated hereinbefore, be held the acquisition proceedings to be void, inoperative, irregular, illegal and bad. 42. Mr. Moitra, then contended on a reference to the said first notification that the mentioning therein that the written objection was to be field to the Collector of Burdwan and not before the Land Acquisition Collector concerned as required under section 4 of the said Act, made the said notification bad and thus all subsequent proceedings irregular and void. Such point was not also taken at any time either before the proceedings before the authorities or before this Court. Such being the position, we uphold the contentions of Mr. Dasgupta and Mr. Banerjee that such point cannot be allowed to be agitated now. 43. Then comes the question of malafide. It was contended before the learned trial Judge that the acquisition in question of the said lands, were made at the instance and for the benefit of the Atwals and such fact would be apparent from the fact the Atwals have paid Rs. 39,000/- to the said Municipality, for the purpose of the acquisition. It was of course contended before the learned trial Judge by the Respondents in the said Rules, that a sum of Rs. 35,000/- and not Rs. 39,000/- was gifted to the said Municipality by the Atwals and the contentions, that amount which was so received by the said Municipality, could not form part of the fund of the said Municipality, since such payment was made for a specific purpose viz. for the purpose of acquisition and as such the said Municipality had no absolute control over the amount, had no basis whatsoever. for the purpose of acquisition and as such the said Municipality had no absolute control over the amount, had no basis whatsoever. It was also contended before the learned trial Judge that for the reasons as above, the acquisition in question, was not for any public purpose but the same was a malafide one and intended to benefit the Atwals. For the other views as taken by him, the learned trial Judge has not entered into the question - of malafide and has not also expressed any opinion on the same. In these appeals also, Mr. Moitra, to substantiate the fact of malafide or to establish the same behind the acquisition, contended that since payment was initially made for the construction of a drain at the cost of Atwals was changed to the purpose and proposal of construction of a Park, really with money as was given by the Atwals for the earlier purpose and such money was sought to be utilised by the said Municipality for the purpose of the acquisition of the said lands at their cost and in fact no cost was sought to be paid or to come out of the funds of the said Municipality, the entire action was malafide. Mr. Moitra also contended that acquisition in this case was for a non existence public purpose and as such also, the same was malafide. He also submitted that the statements in the said first affidavit would show establish, there was no due satisfaction in this case and that fact would further establish malafide. To substantiate his submissions on malafide of to establish the tests necessary to determine malafide, reference was made by Mr. Moitra to the case of (14) The State of Punjab & Anr. v. Gundial Singh & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 319 , where it has been observed that bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power-sometimes called colourable exercise or fraud on power and often times overlaps motives, passions and satisfaction is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. If the use of the power is for the fulfillment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal. If the use of the power is for the fulfillment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous consideration, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested the Court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. Thus, where acquisition is sought for establishing a grain market, it is no doubt for public purpose. However, when acquisition of a particular land was earlier declared by the Court to be vitiated by malafides and the Government again seeks to acquire it after some years under emergency powers and it is found that the real intention is to take away land of particular persons to vent the brutality of a local politician and ex-Minister, the acquisition must be held to be malafide. We agree with the submissions of Mr. Banerjee that since no determinations has been made on the submissions of malafide we are not also required to answer the same. We also feel it difficult to determine on the question of malafide as it appears that service of the notice of appeals on the Atwal, Respondent No. 8 were dispensed with and as such there is no representation before us by the Atwals. We of course keep it on record that if the Atwals were before us, then on the given facts there would have been no difficulty in answering the question of malafide against the Respondents in the Rule. But we are not making such determination for the circumstances as indicated hereinbefore. It should further be recorded that Mr. Banerjee contended that the allegation of malafide will loose all their force and would be of no assistance or would be irrelevant in view of section 6(3) of the said Act, which is a conclusive evidence of the existence of a public purpose and as there is a presumption of reaching the satisfaction before issuing a declaration under section 6, attached, no contrary view should be taken in this case to the said declaration, as that would go against such presumption as attached. 44. It was further contended by Mr. 44. It was further contended by Mr. Moitra that even If the purpose in this case was a public one, strict compliance with the provisions of section 98 of the Bengal Municipal Act, as quoted hereinbefore, was necessary and in fact, in this case, there was no such compliance, as according to him, there is no legal evidence available that the Commissioners of the said Municipality, at a meeting resolved to construct the Park. On a reference to the observations in the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the case of (15) K. Yadaih & Ors. v. Government of A. P. etc, AIR 1984 NOC 5, Mr. Moitra further stated that strict compliance with the said Act and other statutes as involved, was a must in this case, but there were failures in such respect by the authorities concerned. In that case, amongst others, it has been held and observed that the Courts must insist on strict observance of procedure under the Act. It was also claimed and contended by Mr. Moitra that such illegality as committed in this case were incurable and in support of these submissions, reference was made by him to the determinations in the case of (16) Sri K. Ramdas Shenoy v. The Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi & Ors., 1974 (2) SCC 506 . In that case a resolution of the concerned Municipality, whereby sanction was accorded to construct a Cinema building in contravention of Town Planning Scheme, was impeached and on such, it has been observed that where the Municipality acts in excess of the powers conferred by the Act or above those powers then in those cases it is not exercising its jurisdiction irregularly or wrongly but it is usurping powers which it does not posses. The right to build on his own land is a right incidental to the ownership of that land. Within the Municipality the exercise of that right has been regulated in the interest of the community residing within the limits of the Municipal Committee. If sanction is given to build by contravening a bye-law the jurisdiction of the Courts will be involved on the ground that the approval by an authority of building plans which contravene the bye-laws made by that authority is illegal and inoperative. If sanction is given to build by contravening a bye-law the jurisdiction of the Courts will be involved on the ground that the approval by an authority of building plans which contravene the bye-laws made by that authority is illegal and inoperative. An illegal construction of a cinema building materially affects the right to or enjoyment of the property by persons residing in the residential area the municipal authorities owe a duty and obligation under the statute to see that the residential area is not spoilt by unauthorised construction. The scheme is for the benefit of the residents of the locality. The rights of the residents in the area are invaded by an illegal constructions of a cinema building. If the scheme is nullified by arbitrary acts in excess and in delegation of the powers of the Municipality the Courts will quash such orders, apart from holding that an excess of statutory power cannot be validated by acquiescence in or by the operation of an estoppel. The Court declines to interfere for the assistance of persons who seek its aid to relieve them against express statutory provisions. 45. In view of our findings and determinations as above the submissions as to the maintainability of the appeals at the instance or by the said Municipality, should fail and the appeals are thus found to be maintainable as duly filed. We have not also made any determinations on the questions of malafide. In fact, we have not also made any determination on that point even though we had a mind to do so, as the service of the notice of appeals against the person responsible or who had made the authorities concerned to act in a malafide manner, were dispensed with and the Atwals did not appear before us. In fact, we have not also made any determination on that point even though we had a mind to do so, as the service of the notice of appeals against the person responsible or who had made the authorities concerned to act in a malafide manner, were dispensed with and the Atwals did not appear before us. But, we find that the simultaneous issue of the said second notification and the said declaration were not proper and for such simultaneous issue of the concerned notification and the necessary declaration, the writ petitioners held really missed the necessary opportunities to prefer their objections under section 5A, the more so when by the said notification, admittedly the area of the said lands as sought to be acquired was enhanced from the area as indicated in the said first notification and the acquisition certainly did not come within the exceptions as indicated hereinbefore, for which the compliance with the requirements of section 5A could have been waived. 46. The last point which remains to be decided is the validity of the Award, as made. Such point is really involved in the other appeal being F. M. A. No. 424 of 1969. As indicated earlier, Mr. A. P. Sarker appear for the State Respondents in that appeal. The Award as made was challenged before the learned Trial Judge, to be void, irregular and invalid, as according to that writ petitioner the joint Award as made, was improper and invalid. While dealing with the validity of the concerned joint Award, the learned Trial Judge bas observed the same to be void, inoperative and bad, as while making the same, the Collector had not made any apportionment of the compensation money, which again according to him, was contra to section 31 of the said Act and furthermore, by following the determinations in the case of Rabindra Kumar Basil v. S. K. Banerjee & Ors. (Supra), such joint Award as made was found to be invalid. Such findings of the learned Trial Judge, we are of the view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, require no interference. We also feel that because of the character of the notification and the declaration as indicated hereinbefore the A ward could not have been passed as no award would possibly be made unless the earlier proceedings were valid. 47. We also feel that because of the character of the notification and the declaration as indicated hereinbefore the A ward could not have been passed as no award would possibly be made unless the earlier proceedings were valid. 47. For the views as expressed by us, we shall have to consider, what ultimate order we should propose. We think, for the views as expressed by us, the said declaration and the A ward as made should be set aside and quashed and not the said second notification. That being the position, the writ petitioners must have opportunities to file their exceptions, if any to the said second notification. On the basis of such objections as filed, the authorities should deal with and dispose of the said matter before any declaration under section 6 of the said Act is made. 48. It should be noted that today Mr. Banerjee produced the order sheet of Case No. 23-IV of 1959-60 and from the entry dated 23rd September, 1983 it appeared that "Erratum No. 14190 L.A./4 M-11/63 dated 23.8.63 to Notification No. 23690 L.A. dated 30.12.59 has been published at page 1894, Part-I of the Calcutta Gazette dated 12.9.63 in the following manner :- 'Read the figure and word "1.85 acre" for the figure and word" 1.70 acres" in line 12. Sri M. L Roy, Surveyor will verify the Gazette publication and report if there is any discrepancy. Declaration under section 6 bearing No. 14192 L. A./4 M-11/63 dated 23.8.63 has been published at page 1899, Part-I of the Calcutta Gazette dated 12.9.63. Start a separate case in Register V. No action in this case is necessary after verification of Gazette publications to erratum to notification by the Surveyor concerned." 49. The above fact do really establish that there was simultaneous publications as indicated hereinbefore. It must also be recorded that save as above, neither the erratum notification under section 4 nor the declaration under section 6 were produced. 50. It should also be noted that today Mr. Nandy produced his records for establishing the fact that by notification dated 30th March, 1962 the powers, duties and functions of the said Municipality were vested with Shri Chandra Shekhar Bhattacharya, Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector as administrator during the supersession of the same. 50. It should also be noted that today Mr. Nandy produced his records for establishing the fact that by notification dated 30th March, 1962 the powers, duties and functions of the said Municipality were vested with Shri Chandra Shekhar Bhattacharya, Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector as administrator during the supersession of the same. It further appeared from the records as produced that the term of the said Administrator had expired during the continuance of the Rule. It has also been noted by us earlier that although the carriage of proceeding was with Respondent Nos. 1 (a) to 5 before us, they had not taken any steps to bring the said Municipality or its authorities on record. 51. We must also keep it on record that Mr. Shih Lal Basu stated that we should expunge the determinations as made by us on the question of malafide as the concerned Respondent was not appearing before us and for such dispensation of services of the notice of the Rule on the Respondent concerned, his clients had no hand. Since we feel that allegations on malafide as made cannot and should not be determined in the absence of the persons against whom they have been levelled, we have not made any determination on such question. 52. The appeal are thus disposed of and the determinations of the learned trial Judge are modified to the above extent. We direct that the objection under section 5-A be filed by two rules after the long vacation. There will be no order as to costs. Sengupta, J. : I agree.