ORDER : This application had been taken out under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Ganges Printing Ink Employees Industrial Co. operative Society Ltd and another for issuance of a rule of Mandamus commanding the respondent no. 1, the 7th Industrial Tribunal to act in accordance with law; recall and/or cancel the impugned orders dated 7th November, 1983, 30th November, 1983, 2nd December, 1983 and all proceedings relating thereto and also for a declaration that S. 15 sub P. (2) of the amended Industrial Disputes Act was ultra vires and/or in the alternative for a declaration that the time period prescribed under S. 15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was mandatory and no interim relief could be granted if an application was made beyond the period as prescribed under the Act including an order of injunction retraining the respondents from giving effect or further effect to the said impugned ardors. 2. The petitioner no. 1 is a co-operative society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, M/s. Ganges Printing Ink Factory Ltd. had four factories at Bombay, Madras, Delhi and West Bengal Due to bad management the production of the company declined and suffered huge financial losses. The Bengal unit as a result was completely closed down. Upon an application fur winding up this Court appointed the Official Liquidator to take charge of the entire asset of the Company in West Bengal The employees of the Calcutta factory formed a Co-operative Society and made an application before this Court for necessary reliefs to run the said factory in Calcutta and by order dated 18th September, 1978 this Court granted the necessary leave and licence to the said Society for running the Calcutta unit for a period of one year which was renewable subject to sanction of Court, which leave and licence had been renewed from time to time and at present the said members of the Co-operative Society are running the factory at Calcutta. The respondent no. 3 Sushil Kumar Giri was a former employee of the company and he was appointed in the service of the Society for a total pay of Rs. 1038/-. and he was designated as an in charge of Raw Materials Stores by letter dated 30th of November, 1978. The respondent no. 3 Sushil Kumar Giri was a former employee of the company and he was appointed in the service of the Society for a total pay of Rs. 1038/-. and he was designated as an in charge of Raw Materials Stores by letter dated 30th of November, 1978. In the said appointment letter it was made clear that such appointment was on a temporary basis for a maximum period of 12 months and at the end of the 12 months such appointment could be terminated by giving one month's notice by either side. Due to difficult financial position and in view of the fact that the retention of the post which was given to the respondent no. 3 was no longer necessary in the interest of the Society in as much as the duties assigned to the said post could be effectively discharged by the Assistant Manager of the Society, hence the service of the said respondent no. 3 was dispensed with. In view of that the Society by letter dated 3rd of October, 1981 discharged the respondent no. 3 from service. The respondent was directed to collect his admissible legal dues which he failed to comply with. It was the case of the petitioner that in as much as the post was abolished hence it was necessary to terminate the service of the respondent no. 3. No new incumbent had been engaged in the said post but the work assigned to the said post is now being carried out by a former director of the Society. In spite of that the respondent raised an industrial dispute questioning the validity of such discharge. By an order dated 6th September, 1982 the respondent no. 2 Govt. of West Bengal referred to an industrial dispute to the respondent no. 1 the 7th Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of the issue "whether the termination of service of Sri Sushil Kumar Giri was justified and to what relief if any the respondent no. 3 was entitled to". The written statements wore filed by both the parties. In the written statement of the employee according to the petitioner baseless, irrelevant allegations have been made contending that the termination was illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice and he prayed for reinstatement with arrears of wages. 3 was entitled to". The written statements wore filed by both the parties. In the written statement of the employee according to the petitioner baseless, irrelevant allegations have been made contending that the termination was illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice and he prayed for reinstatement with arrears of wages. The petitioners in their written statement not only emphatically denied such allegations but also stated that the said Sushil K. Giri was not a workman but he was employed in the managerial and administrative capacity drawing a salary of Rs. 1000/- per month. They contended that such reference was not maintainable in as much as the termination was due to the abolition of the post to which the incumbent had no right. Hence it was not penal in nature. The respondent no. 3 was not a workman. Hence the industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction over the matter. A preliminary issue was raised but the respondent no. 1 held that the preliminary issue would be tried along with the hearing of the main issue on merits. Thereafter the documents were filed by both the parties and depositions on behalf of the petitioner commenced. At that juncture the respondent no. 3 made, according to the petitioner a belated application dated 16th of June, 1983 for production of certain documents The petitioner opposed such application on the ground that those documents were immaterial and irrelevant documents, more so the application by the respondent no. 3 had not been made in accordance with the rules, but by order dated 29th July, 1983 an order was passed allowing the petition filed by the respondent no. 3 thereby directing the petitioner moved under the writ jurisdiction of this Court and obtained an order from Mr. Justice @ P.C. Borooah on 27th of September, 1983 where under the said impugned order dated 29th July, 1983 was set aside and the learned Judge directed the tribunal to hear both the parties after passing a speaking order. Thereafter, the respondent no. 3 moved an application under S. 15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the tribunal for necessary orders on 7th September, 1983. The petitioner contended that such application was not maintainable in as much as the tribunal according to the petitioner could give such interim relief within sixty days of the reference and since the respondent no. 3 moved an application under S. 15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the tribunal for necessary orders on 7th September, 1983. The petitioner contended that such application was not maintainable in as much as the tribunal according to the petitioner could give such interim relief within sixty days of the reference and since the respondent no. 3's application was filed after a period of one year the application should be rejected in limine. The petitioner further apprehended that in the event the proceedings terminated in favour of the petitioner then it would not be possible for the petitioners to recover the money from the respondent no. 3. In spite of that the tribunal allowed the application filed by the respondent no. 3 directed the company to pay 50% per cent of the salary that is Rs. 519/- per month with effect from the date of the application with a further stipulation that the employee should give the undertaking supported by an affidavit that the amount so received by way of Interim relief should be returned to the employer in the event the proceedings being decided against the employee. The tribunal further held that the time limit of sixty days imposed by the statute in the amended S. 15 sub.s. (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was directory in nature and not mandatory as a result the application could be filed after a period of 60 days and such application was maintainable. The employee was dissatisfied with such order in as much as the tribunal did not allow the interim relief retrospectively from the date of the termination and in as much as the tribunal directed the employee to affirm an affidavit giving the undertaking as indicated earlier Therefore, the petitioner contended that the tribunal has no power to review its own order except the ground of some clerical error or some mistake apparent on the face of the record. The said application was dismissed by the tribunal by an order dated 30th of November, 1983 and thereby maintained its earlier order dated 7th November, 1983 which directed the petitioner to pay 50% per cent of the salary month by month with effect from 7th September, 1983 subject to the condition of affirming an affidavit by the employee concerned. The said application was dismissed by the tribunal by an order dated 30th of November, 1983 and thereby maintained its earlier order dated 7th November, 1983 which directed the petitioner to pay 50% per cent of the salary month by month with effect from 7th September, 1983 subject to the condition of affirming an affidavit by the employee concerned. The validity of the entire Industrial Disputes Act, 1980 including the amended section of S. 15 sub-s. (2) of the Act has been challenged before the High Court at Calcutta in the matter No. 1378 of 1983. The said matter had not yet been heard and finally decided. It was the case of the petitioners that S. 15 sub-s (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act did not give any guideline as to how and in what case such interim relief would be granted as such conferred discretionary and un canalised power to the tribunal as a result it was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner further contended that the amended section of S. 15 sub.s. (2) directing payment of interim relief to the workmen without considering the facts of the case, the financial position of the employer and without securing the said money paid by the employee tantamounts to putting unreasonable restrictions on the employers right to carryon the trade and business. Hence such unreasonable restriction was violative of the Constitutional guarantee given under Article 19. 3. Section 15 sub-s. (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act provides as follows : "Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Labour Court, or Tribunal it shall – (a) after filing of statement and taking of evidence, give day to day hearing and give its award, other determination or decision in the manner specified in S. 17B without any delay; (b) Upon hearing the parties to the dispute, determine, within period of sixty days, from the date of reference under Sub-s. (1) of S. 10 or within such period as specified in the order of reference under sub-s. (1) of S 10, the quantum of interim relief admissible, if any; Provided that the quantum of interim relief relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of services of workmen shall be equivalent to subsistence allowance as may be admissible under the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969". 4. 4. The said new section, S. 15 Sub-s. (2) empowers the tribunal to determine the quantum of interim relief within sixty days, if any, and in the case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service such relief should be equal to the amount as prescribed by the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969 Sub-section (2) of S. 15 provides that it shall be the duty of the tribunal to determine within a period of sixty days from the date of the reference to the quantum of interim relief admissible if any. No penal provision had been made in the said section that no such application shall be entertained if made beyond the period of sixty days although the expression 'shall' had been used but in view of not providing any penal consequence for failure to take out an application within a period of sixty days from the date of reference, appear to be directory and not mandatory. The object of Introducing the said section in the Act itself indicate that the legislature was desirous of disposing of labour dispute without any delay. As provided under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act reference was made on the 6th September, 1982 but the application for interim relief was made in September, 1983. The petitioner offered a sum of Rs. 5000/- as terminal benefits, to the respondent no. 3 who for reasons best known to him refused to accept the same. Hence the petitioner contended that even without accepting the terminal benefits if the workman could have survived since his discharge in October, 1981 there was no justifiable reason for granting a relief on his belated application He was not in genuine financial hardship. 3 who for reasons best known to him refused to accept the same. Hence the petitioner contended that even without accepting the terminal benefits if the workman could have survived since his discharge in October, 1981 there was no justifiable reason for granting a relief on his belated application He was not in genuine financial hardship. The section provided that sixty days to be counted from the date of the reference and not from the date of the receipt of the notice hence to hold that the section was mandatory would defeat applications in genuine cases for subsistence allowance by way of interim relief for example in oases where such notices reached beyond the period of 60 days or in such extreme cases where the order of reference also did not reach the tribunal in time but belatedly which would curtail the period as provided in S. 15 Sub-s (2) without any fault on the part of the employee to hold that the tribunal being the creature of statute and its power being circumscribed by the statute it cou1d not exercise any discretion, not vested in it by letter by entertaining the application after the period of sixty days would defeat that whole purpose for which such section was inserted. A prayer for interim relief can be granted only after considering the financial position of the employer and the employee, the nature of the case, the prospect of the success of the workmen the delay of the adjudication proceedings and so many other factors before tribunal could pass such an order for an interim relief not that as a matter of right every workman is entitled to such relief even beyond the period of sixty days as provided in the said section but considering the facts and circumstances of the case would the tribunal be debarred from allowing an application filed beyond 60 days if in the background of the facts and circumstances of the case it justified not only its entertainment by the tribunal but also passing an order in favour of the workmen? It is true that S. 15 Sub-s. (2) did not lay any guideline as to how and when such interim relief had to be granted but even prior to the enactment of the said section the tribunal had power in a proper befiting case to grant such interim reliefs. It is true that S. 15 Sub-s. (2) did not lay any guideline as to how and when such interim relief had to be granted but even prior to the enactment of the said section the tribunal had power in a proper befiting case to grant such interim reliefs. In the instant case apart from the affidavit giving an undertaking to reimburse the employer in the event the proceedings terminated in favour of the employer, the employer held money on behalf of the respondent no. 3 by way of provident fund, gratuity and other benefits. The tribunal under the section had been given jurisdiction to consider the application and the prayer for interim relief and after hearing the parties to the dispute and considering the submissions on behalf of the parties had been given power to allow or to refuse such prayer for interim relief. A deserving person in a proper case should receive the benefit of the provision. To give such a strict construction to the section would defeat the purpose for which it was enacted. 5. This Court at this stage is not going into the merits and/or deciding whether the respondent no 3 is a workman and as to whether ho is entitled to got any benefit under S. 15 sub-s. (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act but the question for determination before this Court at this stage is whether the tribunal had power to entertain such an application for interim relief beyond the period of sixty days from the date of the reference. In its order the learned Judge observed that from the experience by presiding over the tribunal the learned Judge was of the view that in very many cases the period of sixty days expired long before the service of the notice upon the parties. Apart from that on a genuine case like sudden illness, accident or for reasons beyond the control of the workmen the workmen may be delayed in presenting their petition within a period of sixty days. The tribunal has ample descretion to exercise such a relief in a proper case. Apart from that on a genuine case like sudden illness, accident or for reasons beyond the control of the workmen the workmen may be delayed in presenting their petition within a period of sixty days. The tribunal has ample descretion to exercise such a relief in a proper case. Similarly the tribunal has been given discretion to act judiciously and t he parties to refuse such a prayer in a proper case if such application was filed beyond the period of sixty days Such exercise of power which amounts to perverse order which could not be supported by any reasonable man would naturally be interfered with and sot aside. But to hold that the tribunal would not have any power at all to entertain an application beyond the period of sixty days from the date of the reference would defeat the whole purpose for which such section has been enacted. 6. Section 12(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act provides that a report under that section shall be submitted after the completion of the conciliation proceedings within sixty days from the commencement of the conciliation proceedings or within such a shorter period as may be fixed by the appropriate government. Provided that subject to the approval of the Conciliation Officer the time for submission of the report may be extended not exceeding six months as may be agreed upon in writing by all the parties to the dispute not exceeding six months had been inserted by the amended Industrial Disputes Act, 1980. In West Bengal, the report of the Conciliation Officer has to be submitted to the appropriate Government within sixty days which period may be extended as agreed in writing by the parties but not exceeding six months. In the case reported in AIR 1949 SC 841 Andheri Marol Kurla Bus Service & Anr v. The State of Bombay it was held : "The conciliation proceedings therefore do not end when the report under S. 12(6) is made by the conciliation Officer but when that report is received by the appropriate Government. The contention that the conciliation proceedings should be held to terminate when the Conciliation Officer is required under S. 12(6) of the Act to submit has report is not supported by the provisions of the Act. The contention that the conciliation proceedings should be held to terminate when the Conciliation Officer is required under S. 12(6) of the Act to submit has report is not supported by the provisions of the Act. No doubt, S. 12 contemplates that the report should be made and the proceedings closed within a fortnight and if proceedings are not closed but are carried on, or if the Conciliation Officer does not make his report within 14 days he may be guilty of a breach of duty but in law the proceedings do not automatically come to end after 14 days but only terminate as provided in S. 20(2)(b) of the Act". 7. In consideration whether such provision under S. 15 Sub-s. (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was mandatory or directory reference was made to the case reported in AIR 1957 SC p. 912 State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava where it was held : "The use of the word "shall" in a statute, though generally taken in a mandatory sense, does not necessarily mean that in every case it shall have that effect that is to say, that unless the words of the statute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid. On the other hand, It is not' always correct to say that where the word "may" has been used, the statute is only permissible or directory in the sense that non-compliance with those provisions will not render the proceeding invalid". 8. Where the validity of a particular provision in an Act would render it invalid would depend largely on the construction of the statutory provision itself considering the intention for which such provision was enacted. The Industrial Disputes Act being a social legislation particular provision in an Act shou1d not be given such a strict construction which would totally defeat the interest of a bona fide claimant. The preamble of the Act provides : "The Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is primarily an Act to make provisions for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. The legislation is calculated to ensure social justice to both employers and employees and advance the progress of industry by bringing about the existence of harmony and cordial relationship between the two parts of industry". 9. In the preamble the social objective for investigation and settlement of industrial dispute is provided. The legislation is calculated to ensure social justice to both employers and employees and advance the progress of industry by bringing about the existence of harmony and cordial relationship between the two parts of industry". 9. In the preamble the social objective for investigation and settlement of industrial dispute is provided. The social justice cannot be an one way traffic but must be impartial and balanced. To give such a balanced interpretation to the particular provision in the Act the tribunal's hands should not be fettered by construing such provision as mandatory. 10. In the case reported in AIR 1955 SC p. 170 Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v. Sufi Mills Mazdoor Union, Kanpur it was held : "We my before concluding refer to an argument which was addressed to us by Mr. Isaacs, the learned Counsel for the respondent that this Court under Article 136 should not interfere with the decisions of the tribunals set up by the Industria1 Disputes Act, 1947 This contention can be shortly answered by referring to our decision in the 'Bharat Bank Ltd. Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd, AIR 1950 SC 188 , where we held that the Industrial Tribunal were tribunals within the meaning of Article 136 and further that Article 136 has vested in this Court exceptional and overriding power to interfere where it reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a Court or Tribunal within the territory of India has not given a fair deal to a litigant" 11. In the case reported in AIR 1973 SC p. 273 The Works Manager Bihar State Superpbosphate Factory, Sindhri v. Sri C.P. Singh & ors. It was held : "Pending adjudication of the complaints filed under S. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 an interim award was made by the tribunal on the applications by the workmen concerned directing the employer to pay them half wages. In a special leave appeal to Supreme Court the employer claimed that the interim award was made without giving him an opportunity to place his objections The employer also disputed the endorsements contained in the order-sheet of the tribunal stating that the employer was represented by his agent on the concerned dates. In a special leave appeal to Supreme Court the employer claimed that the interim award was made without giving him an opportunity to place his objections The employer also disputed the endorsements contained in the order-sheet of the tribunal stating that the employer was represented by his agent on the concerned dates. In view of the delay that might be caused for a detailed investigation by calling for a report from the tribunal and considering the fact that complaint filed under S. 33-A was still pending the Supreme Court modified the directions given in the interim awards by directing that the amounts ordered to be paid to the workmen could be drawn by them only on their furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Tribunal concerned". It was further hold by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court that normally the court would proceed on the basis that the records made by the Court or tribunal record what happened before. It represented the correct facts unless there was any strong circumstances established which would indicate to the contrary. 12. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended that when a power had been given to the tribunal to be exercised in a certain way it must be exercised in that manner or not at all in as much as all other modes of purpose were necessarily forbidden. The power had been given in a drastic nature under the circumstances it should be exercised in the mode provided otherwise it will be violative of the principles of natural justice. In that respect the learned lawyer appearing on behalf of the petitioner relied upon the case reported in AIR 1976 SC p 789. In the case reported in AIR 1976 SC p. 789 Hukum Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India & Ors. it was held : "Section 5(1) if properly construed, does not confer unguided and unbridled power on the Central Government/State Government/Specially Authorised Officer to take possession of any telegraph. Firstly, the occurrence of a public emergency is the sine qua non for the exorcise of power under this section. As a preliminary step to the exercise of further jurisdiction under this section the Government or the authority concerned must record its satisfaction as to the existence of such an emergency. Firstly, the occurrence of a public emergency is the sine qua non for the exorcise of power under this section. As a preliminary step to the exercise of further jurisdiction under this section the Government or the authority concerned must record its satisfaction as to the existence of such an emergency. Further, the existence of the emergency which is a pre-requisite for the exercise of power under this section must be a 'public emergency' and not any other kind of emergency. It is well settled that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. It is all the more necessary to observe this rule where power is of a drastic nature and its exercise in a mode other than the one provided, will be violative of the fundamental principles of natural justice. Now in the present case, if the telephone of the appellants were to be disconnected on the ground of misuse, then they had to give, in consonance with the principles of natural justice, opportunity to the appellants to explain their conduct before taking action under Rule 427 read with Rules 416 and 421. Resort to the wrong and more drastic course provided in Rule 422, on a ground which was not germane to an action under that Rule, vitiates the impugned order, particularly when it is manifest that in making the impugned order, the General Manager was influehced more by this ground and less, if at all, by the existence of "public emergency" certified by the Delhi Administration". 13. There the learned Judges were concerned with the Telegraph Act and for determination of the powers and the conditions to exercise of such power under public emergency. In that aspect of the matter such observation has been made by the learned Judges in paragraph - 18. The provision of S. 15 Sub. s (2) does not provide that the tribunal will have to exercise such power within the period or not at all. 14. The contention of the petitioner was that once having relied to make out an application for interim relief within the period of 60 days the respondent no. The provision of S. 15 Sub. s (2) does not provide that the tribunal will have to exercise such power within the period or not at all. 14. The contention of the petitioner was that once having relied to make out an application for interim relief within the period of 60 days the respondent no. 3 was debarred for all time to come to make such application for subsistence allowance, or to hold that the tribunal would have no jurisdiction at all under no circumstances to entertain an application on proper facts which would justify the tribunal from considering such application, would amount to nullifying the rights of the employees to get subsistence allowance during the course of the proceedings. In the case reported in AIR 1959 SC p. 135. The Manager of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi & Ors. v. Hotel Workers' Union it was stated : "The ordinary law of master and servant as to suspension can be and should be held to have been modified in view of the fundamental change introduced by S. 33 in that law and a term should be implied by Industrial Tribunals in the contract of employment that if the master has held a proper enquiry and come to the conclusion that the servant should be dismissed and in consequence suspends him pending the permission required under S. 33 he has the power to order such suspension, thus suspending the contract of employment temporarily, so that there is no obligation on him to pay wages and no obligation on the servant to work. The undisputed common law right of the master to dismiss his servant for proper cause has been subjected by S. 33 to a ban; and that in fairness must mean that, pending the removal of the said statutory ban, the master can after holding a proper enquiry temporarily terminate the relationship of master and servant by suspending him employee pending proceedings under S. 33. It follows therefore that if the tribunal grants permission, the suspended contract would come to an end and there will be no further obligation to pay any wages after the date of suspension. If, on the other hand the permission is refused, the suspension would be wrong and the workman would be entitled to all his wages from the date of suspension". If, on the other hand the permission is refused, the suspension would be wrong and the workman would be entitled to all his wages from the date of suspension". "Under S. 10(4) Industrial Disputes Act the Industrial Tribunal has power to grant interim relief, where it is admissible, as a matter incidental to the main question referred to the tribunal without itself being referred in express term. There can be no doubt that, for example, question of reinstatement and/or compensation is referred to a tribunal for adjudication, the question of granting interim relief till the decision of the tribunal with respect to the same matter would be a matter incidental thereto under S. 10(4) and need not be specifically referred in terms of the tribunal". In paragraph 21 it was stated: "After a dispute is referred to the tribunal under S. 10 of the Act, it is enjoined on it by S. 15 to hold its proceeding expeditiously and on the conclusion thereof submit its award to the appropriate government. An "award" is defined in S. 2(b) of the Act as meaning "an interim or final determination by an Industrial Tribunal of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto". Where an order referring an industrial dispute has been made specifying the points of dispute for adjudication, the tribunal has to confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto; (S. 10(4). It is urged on behalf of the appellants that the tribunals in these cases had to confine itself to adjudicating on the points referred and that as the question of interim relief was not referred to it, it could not adjudicate upon that. We are of opinion that there is no force in this argument, in view of the words "incidental thereto" appearing in S. 10(4) There can be no doubt that if, for example, question of reinstatement and/or compensation is referred to a tribunal for adjudication The question of granting interim relief till the decision of the tribunal with respect to the same matter would be a matter incidental thereto under S. 10(4) and need no the specifically referred in terms to the tribunal Thus interim relief where it is admissible can be granted as a matter incidental to the main question referred to the tribunal without being itself referred in express terms". 15. 15. In the case reported in AIR 1984 SC p. 153 D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration & Ors. where it was held : "Tribunals entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in disputes at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workman in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary question must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences". "Where the Labour Court while deciding the preliminary issue in a labour dispute had considered the entire evidence on record and recorded a positive finding that the delinquent employee, whose services were terminated, was discharging the duties of a clerical nature and Was a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of I D. Act 1947, its finding being not merely an inference from the mere circumstance that the delinquent was not discharging supervisory duties, the High Court could not interfere with such finding In a petition under Article 226. It was just the other day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial dispute on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial piece, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile We have now before us a case where a dispute originating in 1969 and referred to adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary objections. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where the delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 may by allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Art. 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are required to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold partadjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Art. 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues." 16. The entire amendment Act had been challenged in some other proceedings pending before this Court. The parties in the instant case only made their submissions with regard to the construction of S. 15 sub-s (2). Under the circumstances, this Court only decides that point in this proceedings, by bolding that the Tribunal has power after considering the facts and circumstances of a particular case justifying the entertainment of an application under S. 15 sub-s. (2) beyond the period of sixty days, in as much as this Court is of the view that such provision is not mandatory but directory in nature. Hence the application is disposed of accordingly. 17. This Court is of the view that S. 15(2) is not ultra vires. This Court does not think fit to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal. There will be a stay of operation of this order for seven days from date. Application rejected.