I. P. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THESE two criminal miscellaneous applications nos. 943 of 1981 and 2783 of 1981 have been filed by Abdul Aziz applicant under section 482 Cr. P. C. against (1) the State of V.- P. (2)Moinuddin (3) Faiyaz Ahmad and (4) Abu Salim, opposite parties, with this difference that in the latter application no. Z7. 83 of 1981 Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Azamgarh, has also been arrayed asopposite party no. 5. ( 2 ) BOTH these applications have arisen out of the same proceedings under section 145 and 146 Cr. P. C. Application No. 943 of 1981 was presented on 17. 2. 1981. Till then orders dated 9. 12. 1980 and 9. 2. 1981 had been passed by the learned magistrate. In this application prayer was made to quash the said two orders. Of course, added prayer was to meanwhile stay further proceedings in case no. 26/11 of 1980 pending in the court of Magistrate, Sadar. Azamgarh, under section 145 Cr. P. C. and also to stay the operation of the said two impugned orders dated 9. 12. 1980 and 9. 2. 1981. ( 3 ) APPLICATION No. 2783 of 1981 was presented on 12. 6. 1981 by which date the learned magistrate had come to pass further orders dated 24. 2. 1981, 26. 2. 1981, 27. 2. 1981 and 13. 4. 1981. The prayers made in this application were similar to those made in the earlier application No. 943 of 1981 with the difference that the four subsequent order dated 24. 2. 1981,26. 2. 1981,27. 2. 1981 and 13. 4. 1981 were added to the earlier two orders dated 9. 12. 1980 and 9. 2. 1981. The operation of the said six orders were sought to be stayed during the pendency of the application in this court along with the stay of further proceedings in the above-mentioned case before S. D. M Sadar, Azamgarh. Here it may also be noted that although in the earlier application No. 943 of 1981 there was no prayer to quash the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. Yet in the second application No. 2783 of 198] this prayer was also added. ( 4 ) SINCE the matter for decision in both these applications is basically the same so both these applications are being disposed of by this common order. P. C. Yet in the second application No. 2783 of 198] this prayer was also added. ( 4 ) SINCE the matter for decision in both these applications is basically the same so both these applications are being disposed of by this common order. Reference to annexure would pertain to those filed in application No. 2783 of 1981 unless specifically mentioned from the other application No. 943 of 1981. ( 5 ) THE brief facts appearing from the applications, the accompanying affidavits, the counter affidavits and supplementary affidavits are as follows: the subject- matter of dispute between the parties is agricultural land situated in two villages, namely, Maharani Sarai Pohi within Tehsil Sadar, district A7amgarh. Plot nos. 20, 23, 27 and 29 are situated in village Maharani while plot no. 186 in village Sarai Pohi. The litigation over these plots came down from the ancestors of the parties. The matter was pending before the Board of Revenue per reference dated 24. 5. 1980 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Gorakhpur. ( 6 ) IN between, Moinuddin, opposite party no. 2 moved application (Annexure C-i) to S. D. M. Sadar Azamgarh, to the effect that there was a dispute between the parties over the plots detailed therein (they are more or less the same plots as mentioned above) and likely to cause breach of the peace. It was prayed that the police be directed to reach the spot and take necessary action. On this application the learned magistrate on 13. 3. 1980 directed S. O. Nizamabad that as the situation was serious so he should proceed to the spot and take necessary action to maintain the peace. Another application (Annexure C-2 ). was moved by Moinuddin, opposite party no. 2 to S. P. Azamgarh mentioning same facts and praying that the Police help be made available to him on the spot at the time of harvesting the crop of the said plots. On this application the S. P. on 27. 3. 1980 directed the S. O. Nizamabad, to report facts to him and in the meanwhile to act on the order of the S. D. M. received by him. ( 7 ) IT appears that in pursuance of the S. D. Ms order dated 13. 3. On this application the S. P. on 27. 3. 1980 directed the S. O. Nizamabad, to report facts to him and in the meanwhile to act on the order of the S. D. M. received by him. ( 7 ) IT appears that in pursuance of the S. D. Ms order dated 13. 3. 1980 S. O. Nizamabad through constables (vide annexure II) got the disputed wheat crop standing in the, disputed plot of village Sarai Pohi only harvested and entrusted to supurdars-Raznai Chaukidar and Ram Nath ex Pradhan. ( 8 ) ON 23. 4. 1980 S. O. Nizamabad, submitted a report (Annexure III) to the S. D. M. Azamgarh detailing facts and ,circumstances depicting the existence of a dispute between the parties likely to cause breach of the peace concerning plot no. 186 of village Sarai Pohi and plot nos. 20-Ka, 20- Kha. 23-Ka, 23-Kha, 25, 27, 27-Ka and 27-Kha of village Maharani and recommending action under Cr. P. C. so as to attach the said property in a much as there was apprehension of riot and murder taking place. ( 9 ) IT appears that in pursuance of the S. P. s order dated 27. 3. 1980 S. O. Nizamabad submitted some report to him. On that report the S. P. called further report from the S. O. vide his order dated 8. 5. 1980 (Annexure 4 ). It further appears that some file was sent to the S. D. M. Azamgarh by the S. O. which was returned by the S. D. M. with a forwarding letter dated 13. 6. 1 980 (Annexure V) pointing out that the file was received in his court without compliance report of S. P. s order dated 8. 5. 1980. Subsequently, the S. O. submitted his report dated 22. 9. 80 (Annexure VI or Annexure XVIII) to the S. D. M. Azamgarh to the effect that there was dispute between the parties over plots of two villages mentioned in the said report (which are same as already mentioned above) likely to cause breach of peace and recommending action under section 145 Cr. P. C. ( 10 ) IN pursuance of and on perusal of the two reports of the S. 0. concerned dated 23. 4. 1980 (Annexure III) and 22. 9. 1980 (Annexure VI) the S. D. M. passed preliminary order dated 4. 11. P. C. ( 10 ) IN pursuance of and on perusal of the two reports of the S. 0. concerned dated 23. 4. 1980 (Annexure III) and 22. 9. 1980 (Annexure VI) the S. D. M. passed preliminary order dated 4. 11. 1980 (Annexure C-3 or Annexure 7) under section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. ( 11 ) ON an application dated 28. 11. 1980 moved by Moinuddin, opposite party no. 2. supported by his affidavit and after hearing him and considering the report of S. 0. dated 22. 9. 1980 and the documentary evidence produced by Moinuddin the learned S. D. M. by his order dated 9. 12. 1980 (Annexure VIII) came to his subjective satisfaction that it was a case of emergency so he under section 146 Cr. P. C. ordered attachment of the disputed property and the S. O. Nizamabad was directed to effect the attachment (impugned order ). ( 12 ) THE attachment was effected on 11. 12. 1980 vide Annexure C-4. The attached plots and crop were given in the Supurdgi of Ram Samujh Pradhan and Jagannath. Aggrieved, against this order dated 9. 12. 80 passed under section 146 Cr. P. C. Abdul Aziz applicant filed a criminal revision No. 180 of 1980 in the court of Sessions Judge, Azamgarh, which was dismissed on 9. 2. 81 (Annexure IX) (Impugned order ). In the said order while dismissing the revision the learned Sessions Judge had directed the learned magistrate to look into the question that it was not for the Station Officer to appoint any Supurdar. The said two Supurdars moved undated application (Annexure X) before the S. O. for permission to harvest the sugarcane crop to prevent its waste. On this application the S. O. on 21. 2. 1981 submitted a report (Annexure XII) to the s. D. M. that the Supurdars were desirous of harvesting the said crop and after crushing the same to deposit the sale price so necessary orders be passed. ( 13 ) ACCORDINGLY the learned S. D. M. passed order dated 24. 2. 1981 (Annexure XII) (impugned order ). It was mentioned that per the directions of the Sessions Judge dated 9. 2. 1981 in Criminal Revision No. 180 of 1980 it was necessary that the Supurdars of the attached property including the crop standing thereon be appointed by the magistrate himself. 2. 1981 (Annexure XII) (impugned order ). It was mentioned that per the directions of the Sessions Judge dated 9. 2. 1981 in Criminal Revision No. 180 of 1980 it was necessary that the Supurdars of the attached property including the crop standing thereon be appointed by the magistrate himself. He observed that Ram Subhag, who was already acting as Supurdar, was the Pradhan of village Sarai Pohi and in his opinion was a fit person to be appointed as Supurdar. It was also observed that he was willing to act as Supurdar. He was accordingly appointed Supurdar of the attached plots and crops standing thereon. He was directed to get the sugarcane crop harvested and its sale price deposited in the court. He was also directed to look after the other crops of Arhar, Gram, and wheat standing in the plot. ( 14 ) ON 25. 2. 1981 Abdul Aziz applicant moved application (Annexure XIII) in the court that in the preliminary order dated 4. 11. 1980 the boundaries of the plots were not given. So the said preliminary order was vague and, as such, the court had no jurisdiction in the matter. It was further mentioned that the plots in question were in joint possession of the Khatedars so the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. were barred. It was contended that the Supurdar for Sehna appointed by the court was illegal and invalid. It was prayed that proceedings under sections 145/146 Cr. P. C. be dropped. The learned magistrate vide his order dated 25. 2. 1981 (Annexure XIV) stayed the order appointing Selma for the time being and the matter was directed to be placed before him on-27. 2. 1981. ( 15 ) HOWEVER, on 26. 2. 1981 Moinuddin and others, opposite parties, moved application (Annexure XV) to the effect that since by order dated 25. 2. 1981 of court appointment of Sehna (Supurdar) was stayed for the time being, so Abdul Aziz applicant was making preparations to cut the crops and a critical situation had arisen. It was prayed that in pursuance of the earlier order dated 9. 12. 1980 (order of attachment under section 146 Cr. P. C.) the police be directed to protect the crop from being cut by any party. On that application the learned S. D. M. by his order dated 26. 2. It was prayed that in pursuance of the earlier order dated 9. 12. 1980 (order of attachment under section 146 Cr. P. C.) the police be directed to protect the crop from being cut by any party. On that application the learned S. D. M. by his order dated 26. 2. 1981 (Annexure XVI) (impugned order) directed S. O. Nizamabad to protect the attached crop and prevent the parties from cutting the same. ( 16 ) THE matters raised by applications dated 25. 2. 81 of Abdul Aziz applicant (Annexure XIII) and of Moinuddin etc. dated 26. 2. 1981 (Annexure XV) were taken up before both the parties and order dated 27. 2. 1981 (impugned order) staying the appointment of Supurdar (Sehna) (vide order dated 24. 2. 1981) was withdrawn. The said order dated 24. 2. 1981 was again put into operation and the S. 0. was informed to implement the same and return the papers after compliance. ( 17 ) ON 2. 3. 1981 Abdul Aziz applicant moved application (Annexure XIX) before the Collector (District Magistrate) Azamgarh, praying for transfer of the case pending before S. D. M. , Sadar, azamgarh, to some other magistrate. He also moved another application dated 10. 4. 1981 (Annexure XX) before S. D. M. Sadar, Azamgarh, pointing out that the matter regarding jurisdiction of the said court was under decision and that the said decision has not so far been given, that he had apprehensions that he would not get justice, so no order should be passed specially when he had already moved an application for transfer of the case from that court. ( 18 ) ANNEXURE XXI is the copy of the order dated 13. 4. 1981 (impugned order) passed by the S. D. M. Sadar, Azamgarh rejecting the objections of Abdul Aziz applicant contained in his application dated 11. 3. 1981 that (1) as the property in question was joint bhumidhari plots of the parties meaning thereby that proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. could not be initiated and, as such preliminary order dated 4. 11. 80 was invalid; (2) there was no apprehension of breach of peace on the spot; (3) in the absence of any report (of police) regarding the necessity or emergency the order dated 9. 12. 80 of attachment under section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. could not be initiated and, as such preliminary order dated 4. 11. 80 was invalid; (2) there was no apprehension of breach of peace on the spot; (3) in the absence of any report (of police) regarding the necessity or emergency the order dated 9. 12. 80 of attachment under section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. was invalid and (4) matters regarding Supurdars concerning accounts of the crops cut by them and the estimation of the price of the cut crops. ( 19 ) THUS in these two applications in all 6 impugned orders are challenged. ( 20 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant has, to begin with, referred to first two points covered by the fast i. e. , 6th impugned order dated 13. 4. 1981 and pointed out that the property in question is joint bhumidhari plots of the parties and as such beyond the purview of Section 145 Cr. P. C. I do not agree with this contention. The joint ness of tenure would be immaterial if the co-tenure holders are having a dispute regarding possession over that property to the exclusion of another giving rise to an apprehension of breach of peace. The content of affidavit of Abu Salim O. P. No. 4 (filed on behalf of himself and opposite parties nos. 2 and 3) clearly asserts in Para 5 that during consolidation operations in both villages Sarai Pohi and Maharani separate and exclusive chacks were allotted to the parties and one party had no concern with the chacks of others. In this way separate possession to the excision of others was asserted. In para 6 of the counter affidavit it was vouched that the applicant wanted to take forcible possession over the chacks in dispute. Thus when dispute over exclusive possession over the disputed property is there and attempt to take forcible possession on the part of the other side is alleged so as to give rise to an apprehension of breach of peace then certainly section 145 Cr. P. C. is attracted. Accordingly the learned S. D. M. had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings after passing the preliminary order which he did on 4. 12. 1980 (Annexure C-3 or 7 ). The said order therefore cannot be said to be invalid on that ground. P. C. is attracted. Accordingly the learned S. D. M. had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings after passing the preliminary order which he did on 4. 12. 1980 (Annexure C-3 or 7 ). The said order therefore cannot be said to be invalid on that ground. Besides, the said order was passed after taking into consideration two reports of the S. O. concerned dated 23. 4. 1980 (Annexure III) and dated 22. 9. 80 (Annexure VI or Annexure XVIII ). In them it was clearly reported that there existed a dispute between the parties over agricultural plots detailed therein likely to cause breach of peace. In the report dated 23. 4. 80 it was even mentioned that there was apprehension of riot and murder taking place. In the report dated 22. 9. 80 recommendation was made to take action under section 145 Cr. P. C. The preliminary order dated 4. 11. 1980 (Annexure C-3 or 7) opens with the words I feel satisfied from the reports of S. O. Nizamabad, Azamgarh, dated 23. 4. 1980 and 22. 9. 1980 which afford sufficient grounds for taking action under section 145 Cr. P. C. . ( 21 ) TO my mind, it is the sole discretion of the Magistrate to decide on the basis of material before him, whether any such apprehension as envisaged by section 145 Cr. P. C. exists or not. It is the subjective satisfaction of Magistrate which gives his jurisdiction in the matter and that subjective satisfaction, provided there is some material for forming that clinches the issue. Superior courts would not revalue that material and would not go into the question of sufficiency of that material or would not impose their own satisfaction on the magistrate. This is so because under law duty of prevention of breach of peace and maintenance of law and order squarely rests on his shoulders and wider interests require that the Magistrate should act in the matter on the basis of his subjective satisfaction. I am fortified in this view by the following Supreme Court observations in R. A. Bhutani v. Miss Mani: the language of the sub-section is clear and unambiguous that tie can arrive at his satisfaction both from the police report or from other information which must include an application by the party dispossessed. I am fortified in this view by the following Supreme Court observations in R. A. Bhutani v. Miss Mani: the language of the sub-section is clear and unambiguous that tie can arrive at his satisfaction both from the police report or from other information which must include an application by the party dispossessed. The High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate. The same view was followed by this Court in the case of Nathi Lal v. Suni Kumar Singh and another. The above point, therefore, has no force. It is next pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicant that the preliminary order must record reasons for subjective satisfaction of the S. D. M. and as it does not record any reasons so it stands vitiated and with it the entire proceedings fall through. For this view reliance is placed on the case of Sardari Lal and another v. The State of Punjab and Others in which the following quota appearing in the case of Faquir Chand v. Bhana Ram was extracted that the Magistrate is required by section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to state the grounds of his satisfaction, as to the existence of likelihood of a breach of the peace; he must permit to be produced the material on the basis of which he has to express his satisfaction. The law while giving to the magistrate ample latitude, insists that in his preliminary order, he must set out the grounds which are the basis of his satisfaction. The reasons on the basis of which he declines to pass the initiatory order must also be stated. ( 22 ) THERE is no dispute over the principle laid down above. However, the opening words of section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. give a clue to the material from which he can form his subjective satisfaction. They are Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute ( 23 ) THAT material, therefore, has to be either a police report or any other information. Naturally the Executive Magistrate has to base his reasons from the facts and apprehensions appearing from that material. In the present case the learned S. D. M. in the impugned preliminary order dated 4. 11. Naturally the Executive Magistrate has to base his reasons from the facts and apprehensions appearing from that material. In the present case the learned S. D. M. in the impugned preliminary order dated 4. 11. 1980 mentions that from the reports of S. O. Nizamabad, Azamgarh, dated 23. 4. 1980 and 22. 9. 1980 he feels satisfied that there does exist a dispute between the parties over possession of the property detailed in the said order and that the said dispute has created tension between the parties and that the dispute is likely to cause a breach of peace. To my mind, the above order in substance records reasons for the subjective satisfaction of the learned S. D. M. A similar situation had arisen in the case of Nathuni Rai and others v. State of U. P. and others wherein it was observed: the Magistrate then concluded the matter by observing that after the perusal of the report dated May 14,1982, of the Station Officer Gahmar, Copy of the F. I. R. and Photostat copy of the injury report he is satisfied that the apprehension of breach of peace continues and the situation is grave and to prevent the breach of peace it is necessary to attach the property and the Magistrate then passed the impugned order. It was further held it is always the subjective satisfaction of the magistrate and matter open to be considered is whether such satisfaction has been based on some relevant materials or not. So far as that aspect goes, before coming to a conclusion the Magistrate has fully discussed all the materials before him. ( 24 ) I, therefore, am of the opinion that the impugned order dated 4. 11. 1980 is quite valid. ( 25 ) THE next point referred to by the learned counsel for the applicant relates to the 3rd point covered by the 7th impugned order dated 13. 4. 1981 as well as by first impugned order dated 9. 12. 1980 which concerns attachment of property in dispute under section 146 (I) Cr. P. C. on the ground of emergency. The argument of the learned counsel for the applicant is that there was no report of Police regarding the necessity or emergency. So the above impugned orders were invalid. It is pointed out that on the basis of police reports dated 23. 4. 1980 and 22. 9. P. C. on the ground of emergency. The argument of the learned counsel for the applicant is that there was no report of Police regarding the necessity or emergency. So the above impugned orders were invalid. It is pointed out that on the basis of police reports dated 23. 4. 1980 and 22. 9. 80 preliminary order dated 4. 11. 1980 was passed. On that date the material placed before the learned S. D. M. and considered by him was not regarded sufficient to make out a case of emergency within the meaning of section 146 (I) Cr. P. C. because no such order was passed on that date under that section. However, the same reports were considered sufficient on 9. 12. 1980 for the purpose. In this background the said orders are said to be illegal. ( 26 ) BUT I am not impressed with this approach. Impugned order dated 9. 12. 1980 (Annexure VIII) records satisfaction of the learned S. D. M. on the basis of consideration of the application dated 28. 11. 1980 of Moinuddin, Opposite party no. 2 and his affidavit of that date as well as the documentary evidence filed by him and the said police report dated 22. 9. 80. Thus the learned S. D. M. had material before him to form his subjective satisfaction to hold that there was a case of an emergency calling for an immediate action by way of an attachment of the disputed property. The fact that as to whether there is a case of emergency or not again lies within the scope of subjective satisfaction of the magistrate concerned. The same view was taken in the case of G. D. Mukerji v. Shyam Lal Tiwari and others by Hon. P. N. Bakshi, J. where it was observed: ( 27 ) VIEW to the same effect, as already quoted above, is also expressed in Nathuni Rais case (supra ). However, the argument is that the police reports dated 23. 2. 1980 and 22. 9. 1980 had already been considered by the learned S. D. M. while passing the preliminary order dated 4. 11. 1980. At that stage the learned S. D. M. did not regard the said reports to be making out a case for emergency. It is argued that subsequently the same reports could not be relied upon for holding that there was a case of emergency. 11. 1980. At that stage the learned S. D. M. did not regard the said reports to be making out a case for emergency. It is argued that subsequently the same reports could not be relied upon for holding that there was a case of emergency. But I am not impressed with this contention. Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. make it clear that action under that section can be taken by the magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of Section 145 Cr. P. C. Thus it is not necessary that action under section 146 (l) Cr. P. C. be taken simultaneously with the passing of the preliminary order under section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. If order under section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. could legally be passed at any subsequent stage no objection can be raised as to why it was not passed simultaneously with the passing of the preliminary order, even though the material remains the same. It might as well be that the same material would justify passing of the preliminary order as well as an order of attachment under section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. taking it as a case of emergency. But somehow the learned magistrate failed to direct himself touching the point of emergency. The mere fact that the magistrate omits to pass an order of attachment under section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. treating it as a case of emergency simultaneously with the passing of preliminary order under section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. on the same facts and materials, would not tie down his hands to pass the attachment order on the same facts and materials if his attention is pointedly drawn towards it stressing that there is a case of emergency. The magistrate retains that jurisdiction and it ran be exercised at any time after passing the preliminary order under section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. However, in the present case the attention of the learned 7. A. I. R. 1963 All 256. As I have mentioned above, the City Magistrate considered the case as one of emergency. This was purely his satisfaction with which I am not concerned. S. D. M. was pointedly drawn by Moinuddin, opposite party no. 2, by his application dated 28. 11. A. I. R. 1963 All 256. As I have mentioned above, the City Magistrate considered the case as one of emergency. This was purely his satisfaction with which I am not concerned. S. D. M. was pointedly drawn by Moinuddin, opposite party no. 2, by his application dated 28. 11. 80 supported by his affidavit of the same date and it was then that the learned S. D. M. after again considering the report of Police dated 22. 9. 1980 and the other documentary evidence produced ,by opposite party no. 2 that he passed the impugned order dated 9. 12. 1980 holding that it was a case of emergency and accordingly the property in disputebe attached. ( 28 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant has raised objection that the said affidavit was inadmissible in evidence in as much as it was not verified or attested before the learned S. D. M. himself but was verified before the Oath Commissioner. In support of this contention reliance is placed by him on (1) Wahid And another v. State in which it was held: under the provisions of Section 145, a party to the proceeding can adduce evidence of such persons as the party relies upon in support of his claim by putting in affidavits of those persons. An affidavit under section 145 cannot be sworn or affirmed before the Commissioner or Oath officer appointed by the High Court. The Magistrate before whom the proceedings are pending has authority to receive evidence in the proceedings. He is, therefore, a person authorised to administer oath either by himself or by an official empowered by him in this behalf. The affidavits that are to be filed in the proceedings can, therefore, be sworn by the magistrate before whom the proceedings are pending decision. It is not necessary that the magistrate should write in so many words affidavit sworn in my presence. Mere attestation by the magistrate is sufficient to signify that the affidavit was sworn before him. But it has to be remembered that this relates to affidavits under section 145 (4) Cr. P. C. (Old) which were to be filed in support of parties respective claims of their possession over the property in dispute. (2) Govind v. State and others in which it was held to the effect that evidence on affidavit in proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. (Old) which were to be filed in support of parties respective claims of their possession over the property in dispute. (2) Govind v. State and others in which it was held to the effect that evidence on affidavit in proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. (old) could be admissible if evidence was to be of formal character. If, however, the evidence was not of formal character, then the affidavit was to be verified by the magistrate himself. ( 29 ) IT was held that a finding of fact so recorded by relying upon inadmissible evidence could be interfered with by the High Court. ( 30 ) IT is, however, obvious that the affidavits referred to in above-mentioned decisions were those affidavits which. were required to be filed under section 145 (4) Cr. P. C. (old) by the parties in support of their respective claims regarding possession because such claims under the law then prevailing under the old Code was to be decided on affidavits and for that matter those affidavits before they could be admissible in evidence had to be sworn before the competent authority which in the circumstances was held to be only the magistrate who was holding the inquiry. But in my view the same principle would not apply to an affidavit which a party chooses to file for the purposes of passing a preliminary order under section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. (new) or of Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. (New ). This is so because for the purposes of these two provisions it is not necessary that the material should be such which must be admissible in evidence for the purposes of deciding the parties claims when the law permitted the use of such affidavits, for deciding the respective claims of the parties to their possession. Any affidavit which was not sworn before the magistrate holding inquiry would at ,any rate for purposes of sections 145 (1) Cr. P. C. and 146 (1) Cr. P. C. , be nothing but a material for the consideration of the learned magistrate. Such a material could serve as other information referred to in Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. (new ). In my view the magistrate has the widest possible latitude in interpreting the; words other information. No particular way of receiving information is necessary. P. C. , be nothing but a material for the consideration of the learned magistrate. Such a material could serve as other information referred to in Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. (new ). In my view the magistrate has the widest possible latitude in interpreting the; words other information. No particular way of receiving information is necessary. There may be a general information or application by a party. The words other information are wide enough to include the knowledge derived from any source whatsoever. The, source of information is immaterial. It may be a police report or an affidavit filed by a party or even be an application moved by a party. In this view of the matter the subsequent application dated 28. 11. 1980 moved by Moinuddin, opposite party no. 2, supported by his affidavit of the same date, even though verified before the Oath Commissioner, would provide a relevant material and a source of information to the learned S. D. M. to form his opinion in the matter. Accordingly the learned S. D. M. was within his jurisdiction to take the said application and affidavit into consideration said reassess and judge the earlier report of the Police dated 22. 9. 1980 and come to subjective satisfaction that it was a case of emergency under section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. which called for an order of attachment of the disputed property. . It has already been discussed above that so long as there is some relevant material it is always open to the magistrate to form his subjective satisfaction to act in the required manner as provided either under section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. in the matter of passing the preliminary order or under section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. in the matter of holding a case of emergency and passing an order of attachment of the disputed property. For the above reasons I do not see any force in the above contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant. For this reason the impugned order dated 9. 12. 1980 is quite valid. It follows that the order dated 9. 2. 1981 passed by the Sessions Judge, Azamgarh, dismissing Criminal Revision No. 180 of 1980 against the said, order dated 9. 12. 1980 also suffers from no illegality. For this reason the impugned order dated 9. 12. 1980 is quite valid. It follows that the order dated 9. 2. 1981 passed by the Sessions Judge, Azamgarh, dismissing Criminal Revision No. 180 of 1980 against the said, order dated 9. 12. 1980 also suffers from no illegality. This would also dispose of the connected matter, regarding emergency dealt with in 6th impugned order dated 13. 4. 1981. That too does not call for any interference by this Court. Both the orders do not call for any interference in the present applications under section 482 Cr. P. C. ( 31 ) COMING to the other three impugned orders dated 24. 2. 1981, 26. 2. 1981 and 27. 2. 1981 touching supurdars of the disputed property or the Crops staliding thereon the full circumstances under which those orders were passed have been detailed in the narration of facts in the earlier part of this judgment. They speak for themselves that the impugned order dated 24. 2. 1981 was passed in compliance with the directions given by the Sessions Judge in Criminal Revision No. 180 of 1980. The learned S. D. M. had by that order come to appoint only Ramsubhag the Pradhan of village Sarai Pohi as the only Supurdar as in the opinion of the learned S. D. M. he was a fit person to be so appointed. He was also willing to act as Supurdar. He was directed to get the sugar cane harvested and its sale price deposited in court. He was also directed to look after other crops of Gram, Arhar and Wheat standing thereon. I see no illegality or infirmity in the said impugned order dated 24. 2. 1981. ( 32 ) THE impugned order dated 26. 2. 1981 was nothing but interlocutory order which directed S. O. Nizamabad to protect the attached crop preventing the parties from cutting the same (of course till further order of the S. D. M. concerned), That does not call for any interference by this Court in the present applications. ( 33 ) THE impugned order dated 27. 2. 1981 simply disposed of applications dated 25. 2. 1981 of the present applicant and dated 26. 2. 1981 of Moinuddin opposite party no. 2 and had the effect of putting the above impugned order dated 24. 2. 1981 in. ( 33 ) THE impugned order dated 27. 2. 1981 simply disposed of applications dated 25. 2. 1981 of the present applicant and dated 26. 2. 1981 of Moinuddin opposite party no. 2 and had the effect of putting the above impugned order dated 24. 2. 1981 in. operation which in between was ordered to be stayed by order dated 25. 2. 1981. ( 34 ) THERE is nothing illegal in all these impugned borders to justify interference under section 482 Cr. P. C. Both these applications are, therefore, Dismissed. This order will govern the other application also. .