JUDGMENT K. P. Singh, J. 1. By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the judgment of the appellate authority dated 27-4-1974 contained in Annexure 2' as well as that of the revisional authority dated 28-5-1975 contained in Annexure 3' attached with the writ petition. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the contesting respondents had claimed co-tenancy right in the disputed land. The petitioners had contested the claim of the contesting respondents on the allegation that the disputed land was acquisition of their ancestors, Bahadur and Sahadur, and the contesting respondents had no share in the disputed land. The Consolidation Officer gave, judgment against the contesting respondents in the present writ petition as is evident from the judgment dated 10-3-1973. In appeal, the claim of the contesting respondents has been accepted as is evident from the judgment of the appellate authority dated 27th April, 1974. The petitioners have failed in revision-petition as is evident from the impugned judgment dated 28-5-1975. Now, the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that the petitioners and their ancestors were recorded over the disputed land from 1334 F. onwards, hence their claim was rightly accepted by the Consolidation Officer, the appellate authority and the revisional authority have patently erred in accepting the claim of the contesting respondents. It has been emphasized that the entry of 1334 F., being of settlement year, should have been accepted by the higher consolidation authorities. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the name of the objector was not shown over the disputed land for a pretty long time and they did not get their claim agitated and decided within the period of limitation hence the petitioner's claim stood established. The third contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that a summon has been filed to demonstrate that the interest of the ancestors of the respondents in the present writ petition had extinguised but the same has not been adhered to by the higher consolidation authorities. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting respondents has submitted in reply that the disputed land was originally shown in the names of the ancestros of the parties; hence their claim has been rightly accepted by the higher consolidation authorities. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting respondents has submitted in reply that the disputed land was originally shown in the names of the ancestros of the parties; hence their claim has been rightly accepted by the higher consolidation authorities. The second submission made on behalf of the contesting respondents is that the summon relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners does not conclusively prove that the interest of the ancestors of the contesting respondents became extinct in the disputed land. The third submission of the learned counsel for the contesting respondent is that on the materials on record, it has not been demonstrated that the claim of the contesting respondents became extinct due to ouster and hostile possession of the petitioners or their ancestors over the disputed land ; hence in the circumstances of the present case, it is difficult to say that the impugned judgments suffer from any error of law much less patent error. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have gone through the judgments attached with the writ petition and I have also examined the documents relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners attached with the supplementary-affidavit. In my opinion, the impugned judgments do not suffer from any patent error of law. 5. As regards the petitioner's claim that the interest of the contesting respondents became extinct in the disputed land due to ouster and adverse possession of the petitioners for more than statutory period, I think that the petitioners have utterly failed to prove essential ingredients of adverse possession of ouster between the co-sharers. The disputed land stood in the names of the ancestors of the parties originally as is evident from the revenue extracts and the pedigrees of the parties given in the impugned judgment of the revisional authority. Even in the year 1334 F. the ancestors of both the parties were recorded over the disputed land and the names of the petitioner's ancestors Sahadur and Bahadur, were shown as qabiz in the tenants column ; hence the entry was not accepted by the higher consolidation authorities. 6. Even in the year 1334 F. the ancestors of both the parties were recorded over the disputed land and the names of the petitioner's ancestors Sahadur and Bahadur, were shown as qabiz in the tenants column ; hence the entry was not accepted by the higher consolidation authorities. 6. Paragraph 73 of the Land Records Manual, 1927 reads as below ; "Patwaris are prohibited from introducing into column 5 the names of any persons in addition to those who were previously recordea and still hold as tenants, unless the landholder has expressly consented to their admission to a share in the holding. When any person other than the rightful tenant is in actual cultivating possession of a field the " name and particulars of the rightful tenant only will be entered in column 5. The entry will be marked with an asterisk in red ink and a note made in the column of remarks "Ghair Qabiz Ba Qabza, so and so. " In the Khatauni and statement of holding and (sic) the field will be treated as part of the holding of the rightful tenant. The actual cultivator will not be shown as a sub-tenant. Such entries should be reported to the tahsildar through the Superivisor Kanungo for orders immediately on the expiry of two years. A rightful tenant should not be entered as Ghair Qabiz if he is himself in legal or constructive possession as when he has put some one else in possession on his behalf, or the land is lying waste. A familiar instance would be where a sepoy has left his land in his brother's possession while he is with his regiment. In such a case the sepoy should be entered as in possession of the land through (Marfat) his brother in column 5. Another instance would be where a tenant allowed his brother, nephew, or other relation to cultivate the land. In such a case the tenant-in-chief should be entered as in possession of the land through (Marfat) his brother, nephew or other relation as the case may be. An entry of Ghair Qabiz should not be made unless some person other than the rightful tenant is in adverse possession. Where the word "Ghair Qabiz " is entered under this paragraph the year in which the rightful tenant ceased to cultivate the plot will be written after it in brackets thus "Ghair Qabiz" (1134 Fasli). An entry of Ghair Qabiz should not be made unless some person other than the rightful tenant is in adverse possession. Where the word "Ghair Qabiz " is entered under this paragraph the year in which the rightful tenant ceased to cultivate the plot will be written after it in brackets thus "Ghair Qabiz" (1134 Fasli). The same year will continue to be entered as long as the tenant is shown as Ghair Qabiz. From the above provision, it is clear that the entry of 1334 F. in favour of the petitioner's ancestors, Bahadur and Sahadur, was not in accordance with law ; hence the petitioner's claim over the disputed land, being their ancestors sole acquisition, was rightly negatived by the higher consolidation authorities. In the circumstances of the present case, it has not, at all, been established how the right or the interest of the contesting respondents' ancestors became extinct in the disputed land. My attention has been drawn to Sheo Tahal Ram v. Binack Shukul, AIR 1931 Alld. 689, Khazam Singh v. Abhey Ram, 1966 AWR 254 and Mohd. Safi v. Hashmat, 1976 RD 305 but those cases do not help the petitioners in proving their exclusive right to the disputed land. I think that the petitioners have utterly failed to prove their exclusive right over the disputed land in view of the dictum of law laid down in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 . 7. As regards the petitioner's contention that the summons against Sheo Prasad, attached with the supplementary-affidavit, is a proof that the interest of the ancestors of the contesting respondents became extinct in the disputed land, it is sufficient to observe that the aforesaid document does not lead to any conclusive inference suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Moreover, in the year 1334 F. the anestors of the contesting respondents were also recorded over the disputed land; hence the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the petitioners about the extinction of the interest of the contesting respondents stands disproved. 8. Moreover, in the year 1334 F. the anestors of the contesting respondents were also recorded over the disputed land; hence the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the petitioners about the extinction of the interest of the contesting respondents stands disproved. 8. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on Kaulesher v. Sukhai, 1958 RD page 12, Bahuilat v. Ram Koran, 1977 RD 362 and Ram Prasad Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1984 ACJ 38 and he has contended that as the respondent have failed to prove their possession and payment of rent etc., hence their claim was wrongly recognised by the higher consolidation authorities. In my opinion, when the contesting respondents have succeeded in showing that the disputed land was shown in the names of their ancestors also originally, a heavy burden lay upon the petitioners to establish how the interest of the contesting respondents became extinct in the disputed land. The rulings referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners are distinguishable to the facts and circumstances of the present case and it is well known that if a co-sharer does not pay rent or fails to prove his possession over the joint property, his claim would not be extinguished in the joint property unless the other co-sharer succeeds to extinguish the claim of co-sharer by ouster, hostile and adverse possession. The learned counsel for the petitioners also suggested that the theory of representation provided in Article 29 of Hindu Law is inapplicable to the case of tenancy land. There is no quibble that the notion of personal law is inapplicable to the tenancy land, out in the present case it has been demonstrated that the disputed land originally belonged to the ancestors of the parties; hence a presumption would arise that the property would be joint property unless persons claiming exclusive right succeed in establishing their claim by ouster, hostile and adverse possession. 9. I have already indicated above that the petitioners have utterly failed to prove their exclusive right on the basis of ouster, hostile and adverse possession. 10. In the result, the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners fail and the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is, hereby, dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.