JUDGMENT : J. P. Desai, J. The plaintiffs-petitioners, trustees of a public charitable trust are owners of the suit property situated at Surat. The property bears room No. 15 of Shri Dulheramji Maharaj, Old Ramdwara Temple Chawl. The defendant Ambalal Naik is a tenant in the suit premises. The premises were let to him on a monthly rent of Rs. 7/-, according to the plaintiffs. He was in arrears of rent from 1-3-1968 and hence notices were given to him and ultimately a notice sent in December 1968 by registered post was received back with an endorsement “unclaimed” and then a notice was sent under certificate of posting which was not returned back to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then filed Regular Civil Suit No. 179 of 1969 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division at Surat for recovery of arrears of rent and possession on the ground of non-payment of rent and on several other grounds. The said suit, in due course, was transferred to the Court of Small Causes at Surat on the establishment of that Court at Surat in the year 1975 and it was then numbered as Small Cause Suit No. 621 of 1975. It was earlier contended before the Civil Court that the defendant was insane and was not in a position to defend himself in the suit but that contention was negatived by the learned Civil Judge and it seems that a revision application filed in this Court against that decision was also dismissed by this Court. After the suit was transferred to the Court of Small Causes, issues were framed at Exhibit 32 on 28-12-1976. Thereafter, the defendant filed the Written Statement, Exhibit 34 on 7-1-1977 signed by the defendant and verified by the defendant and his son both. A dispute about the standard rent was raised in that suit. It was also denied that the defendant was in arrears from 1-3-1968 and it was contended that the defendant was not in arrears of rent but if any arrears were found due, he was prepared to pay up the same. A contention was also raised bout the legality and validity of the notice without, of course, mentioning whether the notice was received by the defendant or not. A contention was also raised bout the legality and validity of the notice without, of course, mentioning whether the notice was received by the defendant or not. The plaintiff examined Ratilal Chunilal at Exhibit 36, who is serving as Mehtaji-cum-Secretary with the temple, while on behalf of the defendant, his son Narendra gave evidence at Exhibit 53. 2. On appreciating the evidence recorded before him, the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court at Surat reached the conclusion that though the rent was payable by month and the arrear was more than six months and the dispute about standard rent was raised for the first time while filing the Written Statement in the year 1977, it appeared from the evidence on record that the defendant was liable to pay taxes which, on the face of it, would not be payable by the month and the suit would be governed by Section 12 (3) (b) and not Section 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act. The learned Judge found that the arrears were deposited in the Court and, therefore, the tenant was entitled to protection under Section 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act. So far as other allegations made by the plaintiffs are concerned, they were not accepted by the learned trial Judge. The learned trial Judge accordingly dismissed the suit so far as possession is concerned, but passed a decree for Rs. 79/-. The plaintiffs carried the matter in appeal. It was their contention before the District Court in appeal, being Regular Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1977 that the learned trial Judge had erred in reaching the conclusion that the defendant was liable to pay taxes when the plaintiffs had demanded only Rs. 7/- as rent and had not demanded any taxes or permitted increases from the defendant. It was contended that in view of this, the suit was governed by Section 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act and the dispute about the standard rent having been raised only at the time of filing the Written Statement and that too many years after the filing of the suit, the defendant was not entitled to seek any protection from being evicted. The learned District Judge who heard the appeal did not agree with the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that the suit was governed by Section 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act. The learned District Judge who heard the appeal did not agree with the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that the suit was governed by Section 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act. He did not agree with the learned trial Judge that taxes were payable by the defendant-tenant. The learned District Judge, however, on the material on record, reached the conclusion that the rent was Rs. 4/- per month in the year 1963 A.D. and there was nothing on record to show as to how the rent was raised to Rs. 7/- per month and, therefore, Rs. 4/- per month would be the standard rent of the suit premises, fie held that the plaintiffs had demanded more than Rs. 4/- per month as rent and, therefore, the notice was illegal because the plaintiffs were bound to demand only the standard rent and permitted increases and nothing more by the notice. The learned District Judge also held that the notice was also not legal and valid because it was not sent by registered post as required by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. On these two grounds, the learned District Judge held that the notice was not legal and valid and hence the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover possession. The learned District Judge held that though he was inclined to fix the standard rent at Rs. 4/- per month, he was not in a position to vary the decree of the trial Court so far as arrears are concerned, because the defendant had neither filed any appeal nor any cross-objections. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the District Court dismissing the appeal, the present Revision Application has been filed by the original plaintiffs. 3. The learned advocate Mr. K. K. Chokhawala who appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs-petitioners urged that the learned District Judge had erred in taking the view that the notice was not legal and valid because something more than standard rent was demanded by that notice. He also submitted that the learned District Judge committed an error in holding that the notice was not legal and valid because it was not sent by registered post. He also submitted that the learned District Judge committed an error in holding that the notice was not legal and valid because it was not sent by registered post. He also submitted that the learned District Judge committed an error in going into the question of standard rent, when no issue was framed by the trial Court and the trial Court had not fixed the standard rent and the defendant had not filed any appeal or cross-objections with regard to the issue of standard rent. 4. It seems that the defendant, vide Written Statement, Exhibit 34, specifically raised a contention that the rent earlier was Rs. 4/- per month and hence standard rent may be fixed. The defendant thus specifically prayed for fixation of standard rent. In spite of this, no issue in this regard was framed by the learned trial Judge. Ir seems that this is because the issues were framed at Exhibit 32 on 28-12-1976 while the Written Statement was filed thereafter on 7-1-1977. The learned trial Judge should have amended the issues and framed a specific issue as to what was the standard rent of the suit premises when that dispute was raised by the defendant vide Written Statement, Exhibit 34. The learned trial Judge, however, framed issue No. 4 as follows : “Whether the defendant is ready and willing to pay the standard rent?” This issue involves fixation of standard rent because unless the standard rent which was disputed is fixed, the Court cannot come to the conclusion whether the defendant was ready and willing to pay the standard rent. Looking to the evidence on record, it cannot be said that the question of standard rent was not present in the mind of the parties or their advocates. In fact, a question was put to Ratilal, Exhibit 36 that the rent earlier was Rs 4/- per month and he admitted that fact. He also told that he cannot say why the rent was increased. He admitted that they were issuing receipts and they had counter-foils in their possession and he was prepared to produce them, but he did not produce any such counterfoils at all. The defendant even produced at Exhibit 55 a receipt dated 20-3-1955 showing that the rent of the suit premises was Rs. 4/- per month. It is true that it was produced after the evidence of the defendant was recorded. The defendant even produced at Exhibit 55 a receipt dated 20-3-1955 showing that the rent of the suit premises was Rs. 4/- per month. It is true that it was produced after the evidence of the defendant was recorded. That was with list, Exhibit 53 with an application, Exhibit 52. The application was granted by the learned trial Judge and the documents were allowed to be produced. Exhibit 55 purports to bear the signature of Ratilal Chunilal. A notice dated 3-12-1963 purporting to have been issued on behalf of the plaintiffs by Nagindas Nathubhai was also produced by the defendant. These two documents show that the rent was Rs. 4/- per month. Exhibit 56 also shows that flush latrines were constructed and drainage connection was taken and about Rs. 5,000/- were spent for the same and there was increase in municipal taxes. Narendra, Exhibit 54, who is the son of the defendant admitted that flush latrines were, constructed and drainage connection was taken in the suit premises. But except the bare statement in the notice, Ex. 56, there is no other evidence on record to show as to what were the expenses incurred and what was the amount of tax payable on account of the same. The plaintiff’s Munim Ratilal, Ex. 36, did not throw any light so far as this aspect is concerned. This shows that the dispute about standard rent was very much present in the mind of the parties though a specific issue was not raised by the learned trial judge in the above circumstances, though, of course, an issue was framed at serial No. 4 which would necessarily involve the issue about fixation of standard rent. It is rather unfortunate that the learned trial Judge did not decide the question of standard rent while deciding issue No. 4. But any way the fact remains that the learned trial Judge did not fix standard rent. The learned trial Judge, without fixing the standard rent, passed a decree for arrears of rent at Rs. 7/- per month. This was, on the face of it, neither legal nor proper on the part of the learned trial Judge. The defendant, as I stated earlier, neither filed any appeal nor any cross-objections before the District Court. That would show that the defendant probably did not want to agitate the question of standard rent. 7/- per month. This was, on the face of it, neither legal nor proper on the part of the learned trial Judge. The defendant, as I stated earlier, neither filed any appeal nor any cross-objections before the District Court. That would show that the defendant probably did not want to agitate the question of standard rent. It seems that he was satisfied with the dismissal of the suit, so far as possession is concerned. In view of this, the question is whether the learned District Judge was justified in going into the question of standard rent and fixing the same as he did. Order 41, Rule 33 C.P.C. empowers the appellate Court to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection. It cannot be disputed that when the dispute about the standard rent, was specifically raised by the defendant in the Written Statement, though filed belatedly, which was allowed to be produced, the learned trial Judge was bound to raise that issue and decide the same. If he had decided the same and the defendant had not filed any appeal or cross-objections, then one can certainly say that the appellate Court could not enter into that question. But when the trial Court failed in its duty to decide this issue which it was bound to decide, it cannot be said that the District Court committed any error in going into the question of standard rent. I may also mention here that this is a matter under the Rent Act and Section 7 of the Bombay Rent Act says that any recover)' in excess of standard rent is illegal. In view of this and in view of the fact that the tenant is entitled to protection if he is ready and willing to pay the standard rent, it becomes the duty of the Court to fix the standard rent when that dispute is raised. In view of this and in view of the fact that the tenant is entitled to protection if he is ready and willing to pay the standard rent, it becomes the duty of the Court to fix the standard rent when that dispute is raised. It is true that the dispute was raised in the Written Statement and not within one month from the date of the receipt of the notice. But that may deprive the tenant of the protection under Section 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act because if other conditions satisfied, the case would be governed by Section 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act. But even then the standard rent is required to be fixed by the Court. The Court cannot pass a decree in excess of standard rent even if the suit is governed by Section 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act. When the trial Court failed in its duty in raising this specific issue about standard rent and in not deciding that question even though it was involved in issue No. 4, I do not think that the learned District Judge committed any error in going into this question. I may also mention here even at the cost of repetition that the dispute was present in the minds of both the sides and material documents have been produced in the Court by the parties. Questions have also been put in oral evidence of the parties in this regard. In view of this, it cannot be said that the parties were in any way misled on account of non-framing of specific issue about standard rent by the learned trial Judge. When the parties led evidence on this question, it cannot be said that the learned District Judge committed any error in considering the same and deciding the question. 5. The next question is whether the learned District Judge committed any error in fixing the standard rent at Rs. 4/- per month. Exhibit 55, as I said earlier, clearly shows that the rent was Rs. 4/- per month. Even the plaintiffs’ Munim Ratilal, Exhibit 36 had admitted in no uncertain terms at the end of his cross-examination that the previous rent of the suit premises was Rs. 4/- per month. He has also admitted that he cannot say as to why the rent was increased to Rs. 7/- per month. 4/- per month. Even the plaintiffs’ Munim Ratilal, Exhibit 36 had admitted in no uncertain terms at the end of his cross-examination that the previous rent of the suit premises was Rs. 4/- per month. He has also admitted that he cannot say as to why the rent was increased to Rs. 7/- per month. A mere statement in the notice, Exhibit 56, that expenses were incurred and taxes were raised coupled with the admission of the defendant’s son that flush latrines were constructed and drainage connection was taken does not throw any light on the question as to how the rent was increased. It cannot be said that the plaintiffs were entitled to claim any increase on account of the construction of flush latrines and for taking drainage connection. They may be entitled under Section 10 of the Rent Act to claim increase in taxes, if there was any. The plaintiffs have not led any evidence whatsoever to show that there was increase in taxes on account of the construction of flush latrines and drainage connection and if so, what was the increase. When the receipt, Exhibit 55, read with the admission of Ratilal shows that the previous rent of the premises was Rs. 4/-, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to have shown as to how they were demanding the rent at Rs. 7/- per month. It was for them to justify the increase by placing necessary material. Even the rent-note has not been produced under an excuse that it could not be traced. Ratilal stated that he would produce the counter-foil receipts but he did not produce the same. The plaintiffs’ Munim Ratilal was not even in a position to tell the Court as to what are the terms of the tenancy. When on this material the learned District Judge reached the conclusion that the standard rent of the suit premises would be Rs. 4/- per month, it is difficult to say that the learned District Judge committed any error of law. Hence I am fully in agreement with the conclusion reached by the learned District Judge that the standard rent of the suit premises would be Rs. 4/- per month. 6. We now come to the question about legality and validity of the notice. The standard rent of the suit premises is Rs. 4/- per month, while the plaintiffs demanded rent at Rs. 4/- per month. 6. We now come to the question about legality and validity of the notice. The standard rent of the suit premises is Rs. 4/- per month, while the plaintiffs demanded rent at Rs. 7/- per month. On this ground, the learned District Judge has held that the notice was not legal and valid. It is difficult to agree with this conclusion reached by the learned District Judge. It is true that Section 12 (2) requires that demand should be of the standard rent, but simply because a demand of more than standard rent is made, the notice does not necessarily become illegal or invalid. In the case of Labhabhai Vithaldas v. Laxmidas Vithaldas, 4 GLR 567, a learned single Judge of this Court has held that when a notice under Section 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Control Act is given for the payment of arrears of rent at the rate of contractual rent but at a rate higher than standard rent, the notice itself does not become invalid so as to take away the right of the landlord to institute the suit one month after the notice. The same view has been taken by this Court in Modi Mohanlal Bhagwandas v. Shah Keshavlal Jethalal, 8 GLR 814. Hence I am not inclined to agree with the conclusion reached by the learned District Judge that the notice is illegal and invalid because more than standard rent was demanded by the said notice. 7. The question, however, which requires serious consideration is whether the notice sent under certificate of posting and presumed to have reached the defendant can be said to be a legal and valid notice as required by Section 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. 7. The question, however, which requires serious consideration is whether the notice sent under certificate of posting and presumed to have reached the defendant can be said to be a legal and valid notice as required by Section 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. Section 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act reads as follows: “No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882).” The Legislature has thus provided that the notice is to be served upon the tenant in the manner provided in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 106 (second part) of the Transfer of Property Act with which we are concerned reads as follows: “Every notice under this Section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family members or servants, at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.” One of the modes of sending a notice as per this part of Section 106 is to send by post. There are other modes also indicated in this part of Section 106 but we shall come to the same a little later. There are other modes also indicated in this part of Section 106 but we shall come to the same a little later. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as follows : “Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression “serve” or either of the expressions “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.” The above provisions of Section 27 thus clearly show that where any Central Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, it has to be sent by registered post unless a different intention appears. The Transfer of Property Act was enacted in 1882, i.e. before the General Clauses Act was enacted. But the words “either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party” have been substituted by the Amending Act of 1929 for the words “tendered or delivered personally to the party who is intended to be bound by it”. The learned District Judge has held that looking to the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 27 of the General clauses Act, when the other modes of service of notice provided by the said Section 106 are not adhered to and when the service of notice is sought to be effected by post, it must be done by putting the document in the envelope duly addressed, prepaid and posted and sent by registered post. The learned District Judge has taken the view that the notice was sent by registered post but it was returned back to the sender with an endorsement “not claimed”. The words “not claimed or unclaimed” do not indicate that it was refused by the addressee. The learned advocate Mr. The learned District Judge has taken the view that the notice was sent by registered post but it was returned back to the sender with an endorsement “not claimed”. The words “not claimed or unclaimed” do not indicate that it was refused by the addressee. The learned advocate Mr. Chokhawala handed over to me an extract from the Post and Telegraphs Manual, Volume VI wherein it is laid down that if sufficient information regarding the addressee cannot be obtained, the article should be returned to the postmaster as unclaimed. In view of this, it is difficult to say that the endorsement “unclaimed” indicated that the addressee refused to accept the same. In Special Civil Application No. 1454 of 1970 decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 12-2-1971, it appears that a notice sent by registered post was returned back to the landlord with an endorsement “unclaimed” and it was contended that was tantamount to refusal of notice by the tenant. The learned single Judge negatived that contention. The learned Single Judge refused to presume from the endorsement “unclaimed” that the tenant had refused to accept the notice. The learned single Judge observed that the word “unclaimed” may indicate that it was not claimed by the addressee, but that is not tantamount to refusal. In view of this, it is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Chokhawala that the tenant must be deemed to have refused to accept the notice. He, of course, drew my attention to a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Kamalabala Devi v. Durgacharan Dutta, 1974 All India Rent Control Journal 373 wherein it is laid down that where the defendant was residing and was available at the address to which the notice was sent, the expression “not claimed” must be read as amounting to refusal and in that view it would be good service on the defendant. I am not inclined, with due respect to the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court, to agree with this view taken by him, particularly looking to the Post and Telegraph Manual, Vol. 6, Part III and the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court which is referred to by me just above. I am not inclined, with due respect to the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court, to agree with this view taken by him, particularly looking to the Post and Telegraph Manual, Vol. 6, Part III and the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court which is referred to by me just above. In view of this, it follows that the attempt on the part of the landlord to serve the notice by registered post did not materialise and did not have the effect of a valid service on the defendant-tenant. 8. The learned advocate Mr. Chokhawala, however, urged that the notice was sent under certificate of posting and it is not received back by the landlord as deposed to by Ratilal and, therefore, a presumption should be raised u/s 114 of the Evidence Act that the notice must have reached the defendant. Now, there cannot be any difficulty in raising a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act as contended by Mr. Chokhawala. In fact, in Special Civil Application No. 1454 of 1970 referred to above, it was held that a rebuttable presumption could be raised that a letter sent under certificate of posting has reached the addressee. The question in the present case is not whether the notice reached the addressee. The question is whether sending the notice under certificate of posting will be a valid notice as contemplated by Section 12 (2) of the Rent Act. The learned advocate Mr. Chokhawala relied upon this decision of this Court in support of his contention that a notice sent under certificate of posting will be a valid notice. Now, it appears from the facts of the case before this Court in that Special Civil Application that it was a matter under the Tenancy Act and only an intimation was required to be sent to the tenant. Now, it appears from the facts of the case before this Court in that Special Civil Application that it was a matter under the Tenancy Act and only an intimation was required to be sent to the tenant. The provisions of the Tenancy Act do not require that a notice should be sent in the manner laid down by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, this decision of a learned single Judge of this Court cannot be of any assistance in deciding the question whether a notice sent under certificate of posting can be said to be a valid notice as required by Section 12(2) of the Rent Act read with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. The learned advocate Mr. Chokhawala drew my attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in Babulal Talakchand Shah v. Purshottamdas, 65 Bombay Law Reporter 434 in support of his contention that the notice must be deemed to be a valid notice. It appears from the facts of that case decided by the Bombay High Court that a notice was sent by registered post to the tenant by the landlord and it was returned with an endorsement “refused”. This was sufficient compliance of Section 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act because when the notice was sent by registered post and returned with the endorsement “refused” it should be deemed to have been refused by the tenant and would be a valid service. It appears that as a matter of precaution, the landlord again sent copies of notice under certificate of posting, one at the residential address of the tenant and the other at the address where he was carrying on business. The learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court who decided this case, with respect, rightly held that the letter sent under certificate of posting must be deemed to have been received by the tenant unless it was shown by positive evidence that he had not received the same. It also appears from the facts of that case that the landlord even affixed a copy of the notice on the premises occupied by the tenant over and above sending two copies under certificate of posting. It also appears from the facts of that case that the landlord even affixed a copy of the notice on the premises occupied by the tenant over and above sending two copies under certificate of posting. It was sought to be contended before the learned single Judge that the tenant could not be deemed to have knowledge of the contents of the notice because the registered packet was refused. This contention was repelled by the learned single Judge observing that though the tenant could avoid the knowledge of the contents of the notice by refusing the registered packet, he must be deemed to have had the knowledge of the contents of the notice, both from the copy affixed to his premises and also through the copies sent to him under certificate of posting. The question whether a notice sent under a Certificate of posting would be a legal and valid service as contemplated by Section 12(2) of the Bombay Rent Act did not arise for consideration before the Bombay High Court and hence it cannot be said that this is a decision supporting the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioners in this case. The learned advocate for the petitioners drew my attention to a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Sukumar Guha v. Naresh Chandra Ghosh and another, A.I.R. 1968 Calcutta 49. The Calcutta High Court has held in that case that although presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act can only arise when the notice is sent by registered post, there may arise a presumption under Section 114, Evidence Act when notice is sent by post as contemplated by Section 106, T.P. Act irrespective of whether it is sent by ordinary post or under Certificate of Posting, There cannot be any dispute with this proposition of law. The question is whether when a notice is sent by ordinary post or under certificate of posting it will be valid notice when the provisions of law require that the notice should be sent by registered post. It seems that the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court was inclined to take the view that when a notice is sent either by ordinary post ox-under certificate of posting, it was by one of the other modes indicated by Part 2 of Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act, viz. It seems that the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court was inclined to take the view that when a notice is sent either by ordinary post ox-under certificate of posting, it was by one of the other modes indicated by Part 2 of Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act, viz. tendering or delivering personally to the party at his residence. It seems that the learned single Judge took the view that when notice was sent through post, the Post Office becomes an agent and that is a service by personal tender or vicarious tender. The view taken by the Calcutta High Court seems to be this that it is by one of the other modes than by post as contemplated by Section 106 of the transfer of Property Act read with Section 27 the General Clauses Act. It appears that the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has relied upon a decision of the Privy Council reported in Harihar Banerji and Others v. Ramshashi Roy, A.I.R., 1918 P.C. 102. It must be remembered that it was a case prior to the amendment of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by the Act of 1929 by which amendment the words “sent by post were added This shows that before the amendment of 1929, Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act provided that the notice may be tendered or delivered personally to the party who is intended to be bound by it. The question which arose for consideration before the Privy Council was whether, when Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act did not provide for sending a notice by post, registered or otherwise, sending a notice by post can be said to be a valid service. The Privy Council held that such service will be a valid service because the mode which was provided by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act did not at that time exclude sending a notice by post. I may mention here that the relevant facts with regard to the notice which are found at column 1 of page 111 show that the notices were sent by registered post. The notices were, in fact, delivered and receipts bearing their signatures of the addressees were produced. I may mention here that the relevant facts with regard to the notice which are found at column 1 of page 111 show that the notices were sent by registered post. The notices were, in fact, delivered and receipts bearing their signatures of the addressees were produced. It was in these facts and circumstances that the Privy Council held that the notices sent by registered post was a valid one even though that specific mode was not provided by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. This shows that sending by post, registered or otherwise, was permissible even in absence of a specific provision in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act because it was included in the mode which was already provided in Section 106 before the amendment of 1929. It was not necessary for the Legislature to add any such phrase as per the amendment Act of 1929 if the Legislature did not intend that if the mode of service by post was adopted, then it must be by registered post and not otherwise. Even without adding the phrase “either be sent by post”, service of notice by post was permissible under the other mode which was already existing, as discussed above. In view of this, the legislature would not have used this phrase “either be sent by post” if it intended that service by ordinary post or under certificate of posting could be effected and could be claimed to be a valid service under the other mode, viz. “delivering personally to the party.” The Legislature, while enacting Section 12(2) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, very well knew as to what was the phraseoelogy used in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as regards the mode of service. In view of this, we have to say that when the Legislature provided that notice should be sent by registered post, the Legislature intended that if that course was to be adopted, then it must be by registered post and not otherwise. It cannot be said that there could be any other intention on the part of the Legislature either while amending Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act or while enacting Section 12(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. It cannot be said that there could be any other intention on the part of the Legislature either while amending Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act or while enacting Section 12(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. In short, the Legislature by amending Section 106 provided that the notice may be sent either by registered post or by delivering the same personally to such party. These are two different and distinct modes provided by the Amending Act of 1929 and, therefore, the party has to choose whether it wants to adopt the first course and if the party adopts the first course, then it must be necessarily by registered post and not by ordinary post or under certificate of posting. If it adopts the second course, then it should be otherwise than by sending by post. That second mode will not include sending by post. 9. The discussion made above will go to show that the notice sent under certificate of posting, though presumed to have reached the defendant-tenant, cannot be said to be a legal and valid service as contemplated by Section 12 (2) of the Rent Act read with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. The learned District Judge rightly reached the conclusion that the notice was not a legal and valid one on this ground. When the notice as contemplated by Section 12 (2) is not found to be a legal and valid notice, then it is obvious that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of the suit property on the strength of such a notice. There cannot be any dispute with this proposition of law because unless a legal and valid notice as required by Section 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act is served either in fact or by presumption, the plaintiffs could not have filed the suit for possession on the ground of non-payment of rent. 10. Now, the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal so far as the claim for possession is concerned. The learned District Judge observed that because the defendant-tenant had not filed any appeal or cross-objections, it was not possible for him to modify the decree of the trial Court so far as the arrears of rent are concerned. 10. Now, the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal so far as the claim for possession is concerned. The learned District Judge observed that because the defendant-tenant had not filed any appeal or cross-objections, it was not possible for him to modify the decree of the trial Court so far as the arrears of rent are concerned. In my opinion, the learned District Judge could have even varied the decree of the trial Court even so far as the arrears of rent are concerned taking the standard rent at Rs. 4/- per month in exercise of the powers conferred by Order 41, Rule 33 C.P.C. If he could not vary the decree, he could not have even fixed the standard rent. But any way, when the learned District Judge has not thought it fit to vary the decree for arrears, I am not inclined to do so while hearing this Revision Application. But when the learned District Judge has reached the conclusion that the standard rent was Rs. 4/- per month, the learned District Judge should have indicated in the final order that the appeal was dismissed but the standard rent was fixed at Rs. 4/- per month and to that extent, the decree of the trial Court stood modified. The learned District Judge having not done so, I am inclined to give such a direction while disposing of this petition. 11. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that there is no merit in this Revision Application and it deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed, with, no order as to costs. But at the same time, the decree passed by the learned trial Judge and confirmed by the learned District Judge in appeal is hereby modified by giving a declaration that the standard rent of the suit premises is Rs. 4/- per month. Rule discharged.