JUDGMENT - BHARUCHA S.P., J.: - The petitioners are the International Airports Authority of India (now called “the Authority”). Respondent 1 is the State of Maharashtra and respondents 2 to 7 are its various officers. Respondent 8 is the Union of India. The Authority and the Union are arranged on the one side and the State and its Officers on the other side. 2. There is a provision (section 12(3) in the International Airports Authority Act, 1971 (now called 'the Act') which provides that if any dispute or doubt arises as to which of the properties of the Central Government have been transferred to the Authority, such dispute or doubt shall be decided by the Central Government in consultation with the Authority and the decision of the Central Government thereon shall be final. The Central Government has decided that the land occupied by the airport at Bombay (now called 'the said land') continues to be its property and the ownership thereof is not transferred to the Authority. Despite the binding nature of this decision, which was communicated to the State Government, the Authority has been constrained to file this writ petition and, indeed, the State has contested it. 3. On 10th September, 1979 seven notices were served upon the Authority by the State's Additional District Deputy Collector. They stated that the said land was used for non-agricultural, i.e., for commercial purposes, in contravention of the provisions of section 44 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. Prior to the coming into force of the Act the said Land was held by the Civil Aviation Department of the Government of India. From 1st February, 1972, the date upon which the Act had come into force, the said land stood vested in the Authority, which was a corporate body having its separate fund and administration and so it was liable to pay non-agriculture assessment on the said land held and used by it for an aerodrome. The Authority was called upon to show cause why action should not be taken. A further such notice was issued on 27th September, 1979. On 21st September, 1979 several assessment orders were passed making the Authority liable for payment of non-agricultural assessment from 1st February, 1972. Another such assessment order was passed on 19th October, 1979. On 12th November, 1979 demand notices were issued to the Authority for an aggregate sum of approximately Rs. 60 lacs. On 21st September, 1979 several assessment orders were passed making the Authority liable for payment of non-agricultural assessment from 1st February, 1972. Another such assessment order was passed on 19th October, 1979. On 12th November, 1979 demand notices were issued to the Authority for an aggregate sum of approximately Rs. 60 lacs. On 22nd/23rd November, 1979 the Authority wrote to the Additional District Deputy Collector that the airport ha not ceased to be a Government aerodrome and that it was, therefore, not liable to assessment on 7th and 13th December, 1979 and 11th January, 1980 the Authority was threatened with coercive action. In February, 1980 three additional demand notices were issued to the Authority for an aggregate sum of approximately Rs. 1.63 crores. On 27th February, 1980 the Authority wrote to the Additional District Collector to say that the Bombay airport had not ceased to be a Government airport even after the transfer to its management to the Authority with effect from 1st April, 1972. On 28th February, 1980 the Additional Collector informed the Authority that action was being taken pursuant to the audit remarks of the State's Accountant General. In May, 1980 further demand notices were issued to the authority in the sum of Rs. 39 lacs. On 3rd May, 1980 the Additional Collector wrote to the State, with copies of the Authority and to the Government of India, setting out the rival contentions and asked for instructions. On 30th August, 1980 the Additional Collector informed the Authority that the State Government had concluded that from 1st April, 1972 the Central Government had transferred all properties and other assets vested in it for the purpose of the airport at Bombay and administered by the Director-General of Civil Aviation immediately before such day and, as such, they were vested in the Authority. Not only that, it was the duty of the Authority to provide the airport with all facilities and services and it could also, inter alia, plan, develop, construct and maintain runways, etc. Therefore, from 1st April, 1972 the airport at Bombay had vested in the Authority for all purposes and, as such, it had ceased to be the property of the Central Government and was not immune from taxation by virtue of Article 285 of the Constitution. In November and December 1980 demand notices were served upon the Authority. 4. Therefore, from 1st April, 1972 the airport at Bombay had vested in the Authority for all purposes and, as such, it had ceased to be the property of the Central Government and was not immune from taxation by virtue of Article 285 of the Constitution. In November and December 1980 demand notices were served upon the Authority. 4. On 2nd January, 1981 the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India wrote to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra on the subject of no-agricultural assessment of the said land and the payment of Municipal tax by the Authority. He stated that the Authority had informed the Central Government that the Additional Collector, Bombay Suburban District, and the Bombay Municipal Corporation were levying non-agricultural assessment and municipal taxes on the said land. The Central Government had received a letter dated 3rd May, 1980 from the Additional Collector, Bombay Suburban District, stating that the Authority was subject to non-agricultural assessment for the said land. The matter had been referred to the Union Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs for legal opinion. A copy of the opinion was enclosed. From the opinion it would be seen that the property vested with the Authority continued to be the property of the Government of India and was exempt from State taxation. In view of this it was requested that suitable instructions be issued to the Additional District Collector, Bombay Suburban District, and the Commissioner, Bombay Municipal Corporation, not to levy any State tax on the said land. 5. The Authority has also filed a writ petition in this Court (being O.O.C.J. Writ Petition 473 of 1982) against the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay in regard to the latter's demand for municipal taxes upon the said land. In that writ petition an affidavit has been made on behalf of the Union Government in which it is expressly stated that the said letter dated 2nd January, 1981 “was a decision of the Union of India, under section 12(3) of the IAA Act and the same is binding inter alia on the Bombay Municipal Corporation since a dispute is raised by the Bombay Municipal Corporation contending that the said properties belong to the petitioners and not to the Union of India”. 6. On 31st January, 1981 the Authority was served with a demand for Rs. 2.29 crores. 7. 6. On 31st January, 1981 the Authority was served with a demand for Rs. 2.29 crores. 7. This petition impugns the various assessment orders and demand notices. 8. It was contended by Mr. Chinoy, learned Counsel for the Authority, that the word 'vest' was of variable meaning and did not only mean the vesting of ownership rights. The vesting that had taken place in the Authority was only to serve the purpose of the Act. There had been no divesting of the Union Government's proprietary rights in the aid land. Hence, the said land continued to enjoy the immunity from State tax provided by Article 285. It was urged that it was not permissible for the State to contend to the contrary in view of the Union Government's decision dated 2nd January, 1981 issued under the provisions of section 12(3) of the Act. Alternately, Mr. Chinoy submitted that the Authority was a statutory agent of the Central Government and acted for it and its property was, therefore, the property of the Central Government. Other submissions were that the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code in regard to the procedure to be followed upon change of ownership had not been observed and that there was no justification for the retrospective levy from 1st February, 1972. 9. It was submitted by Mr. Chaugule, learned Counsel for the State and its officers, that the petition involved disputed questions of fact and that it should, therefore, be rejected. He also submitted that, inasmuch as the Authority had not availed of the alternate remedies under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, the petition was not maintainable. Upon the merits, Mr. Chaugule contended that the ownership of the said land had been transferred to the Authority and that, therefore, it had lost the protection of Article 285 and was liable to land revenue. In so far as section 12(3) was concerned, Mr. Chaugule submitted that the decision of the Union Government of 2nd January, 1981 was not binding upon the State Government and was a nullity because it had been rendered “behind the back” of the State Government and it had not been heard. If it had been heard the State Government would have pointed out that the Authority had treated itself as the owner of the said land and had granted leases of parts thereof. 10. If it had been heard the State Government would have pointed out that the Authority had treated itself as the owner of the said land and had granted leases of parts thereof. 10. The question that I have to decide is whether the said land, which, prior to the Act, belonged to the Union Government, now, by virtue of the provisions of the Act, belongs to the Authority. If the said land does not belong to the Authority and continues to belong to the Union Government, Article 285 applies and gives it immunity from State Tax. Article 285 states that the property of the Union shall, save in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, be exempt from all taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within a State. 11. Reference must first be made to the Judgement of the Supreme Court in (The Fruit Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust)1, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 344, for that judgment has considered the shades of meaning the word 'vest' can bear. The Supreme Court noted that the argument before it assumed that the word 'vest' necessarily signified that the title to the property resided in the respondents before it. But the word 'vest' had several meanings with reference to the context in which it was used. It was a word of variable import as shown by the provisions of various Indian statutes and the authorities of English Courts. The word 'vest' had not a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property was owned by the person or the authority in whom it vested. It might vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it might have been used in a particular piece of legislation. 12. It is now necessary to refer to the provisions of the Act to see the context in which the word “vest” is used in it. The preamble recites that the Act is intended “to provide for the Constitution of an authority for the management of certain aerodrome where at international air transport services are operated or are intended to be operated and for matters connected therewith”. Chapter II of the Act provides for the constitution of the Authority. The preamble recites that the Act is intended “to provide for the Constitution of an authority for the management of certain aerodrome where at international air transport services are operated or are intended to be operated and for matters connected therewith”. Chapter II of the Act provides for the constitution of the Authority. Under the provisions of section 3(2) it is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and has power, subject to the provisions of the Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property, both moveable and immoveable, and to contract and it can sue and be sued. Section 12 under Chapter III, dealing with property and contracts, provides in sub-section (1)(a) that all properties and other assets vested in the Central Government for the purposes of the airport and administered by the Director-General of Civil Aviation immediately before the day appointed by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette in relation to any airport shall vest in the Authority. A similar provision is made under sub-section (2)(a) in regard to equipment and appliances relating to air navigation services and buildings used exclusively for such services. The distinction is necessary in view of the fact that the proviso to section 16(2) makes it clear that the function of providing air navigation services at airports would continue to be discharged by the Central Government until such date as it determined. Sub-section (3) of section 12 need to be quoted in extenso: - “(3) If any dispute or doubt arises as to which of the properties, rights or liabilities of the Central Government have been transferred to the Authority or as to which of the employees serving under the Central Government are to be treated as on deputation with the Authority under this section, such dispute or doubt shall be decided by the Central Government in consultation with the Authority and the decision of the Central Government thereon shall be final.” Section 15 deals with the mode of executing contracts on behalf of the Authority. The 2nd proviso to sub-section (1) thereof states that no contract for the acquisition or sale of immoveable property or for the lease of any such property for a term exceeding thirty years shall be made unless it has been previously approved by the Central Government. The 2nd proviso to sub-section (1) thereof states that no contract for the acquisition or sale of immoveable property or for the lease of any such property for a term exceeding thirty years shall be made unless it has been previously approved by the Central Government. Section 16 requires the Authority, subject to the rules, if any, made by the Central Government in this behalf, to manage the airports efficiently and to provide threat such services and facilities as are necessary or desirable for the efficient operation of air transport services. Section 17 under the chapter dealing with finance, accounts and audit (Chapter V), empowers the Authority, with the previous approval of the Central Government, to charge fees or rent for the landing, housing or parking of aircraft or for any other service or facility offered in connection with aircraft operations. There is an explanation which excludes aircraft belonging to the Indian Defence Services. Section 20 provides for the allocation of surplus funds and sub-section (2) thereof requires the Authority to pay the balance of its annual net profits, after making provision for a reserve fund for bad and doubtful debts, depreciation and the like, to the Central Government. Under section 21 the authority is required to prepare a programme of its activities for the next financial year and a financial estimate thereof and submit them for approval to the Central Government. Under section 23 the Authority has borrowing powers. Section 3; provides that, for the purposes of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, or any other enactment for the time being in force relating to income tax or any other tax on income, profit or gains, the authority shall be deemed to be a company within the meaning of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and shall be liable to tax accordingly on its income, profits and gains. Section 33 confers upon the Central Government the power to temporarily divest the Authority of the management of any airport. It provides that if at any time the Central Government is of opinion that in the public interest it is necessarily expedient so to do, it may direct the Authority to entrust the management of the airport to such person as it may specify and the Authority is bound to comply with such direction. It provides that if at any time the Central Government is of opinion that in the public interest it is necessarily expedient so to do, it may direct the Authority to entrust the management of the airport to such person as it may specify and the Authority is bound to comply with such direction. Thereupon the Authority shall cease to exercise and discharge all its powers and functions under the Act in relation to such airport and such powers and functions shall be exercised and discharged by the authorised person. Section 34 empowers the Central Government to supersede the Authority if at any time it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do in the public interest. Upon the publication of a notification of supersession all property owned or controlled by the Authority shall, until the Authority is re-constituted, vest in the Central Government. Section 35 binds the Authority to follow the directions of the Central Government on questions of policy. Section 38 gives the Authority the power to make regulations but no regulations made by the Authority can take effect until approved by the Central Government. 13. A Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court considered the question that is before me in Civil Rule No. 3918 (w) of 1980, (I.T.D.C Ltd. v. The Municipal Commissioner of Dum Dum Municipality)2. The judgment and order of Dipak Kumar Sen, J., is dated 30th September, 1983. Very shortly stated, the Dum Dum Municipality was seeking to levy tax upon the land of the Dum Dum Airport at Calcutta. The I.T.D.C. was putting up a hotel upon part of the land and contended that the land could not taxes, being protected by Article 285 of the Constitution. The Central Government had also decided under section 12(3) of the Act that the land belonging to it. The learned Judge considered the provisions of the Act. He referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union's case (to which I have adverted) and the judgment of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in (State of Gujarat v. Port of Kandla)3, 20 Guj.L.R. 732. He said that it appeared from the Preamble that the object of the Act was to provide for the management of aerodromes providing international air transport services. He said that it appeared from the Preamble that the object of the Act was to provide for the management of aerodromes providing international air transport services. It was not the object of the Act to transfer properties in the airports from the Central Government to the authority. Under the provisions of the Act the Central Government retained full control over the Authority. The appointments of the members of the Authority and the termination of their office were also under the control of the Central Government. The Central Government retained almost total control over the fund available to the Authority. The balance of the annual net profits of the Authority was to be made over to the Central Government. The Central Government retained the power to take away the management of airports from the Authority and entrust the same to any other person. It was significant that the Act did not provide for any particular procedure for divesting of the properties vested with the Authority. Another significant provisions was that the Central Government retained the power to decide in case of any dispute or doubt in respect of any decision of the Central Government in this respect was final. Upon an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appeared to the learned Judge that the scheme of the Act was that the vesting of the properties of the Central Government in the Authority was for the limited purpose of administration and management. The title or the proprietorial interest of the Central Government in such properties was not intended to be transferred. Applying the principles of construction laid down in the Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union's case in construing the Act, the learned Judge found that the vesting of the properties of the Central Government with the Authority was for the limited purpose of administration and management and complete title thereto was not transferred. 14. The question whether the Major Port Trusts Act vested absolute property right in the Boards of Trustees of various major ports arose before the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat v. The Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla, (supra). The provisions of the Major Port Trusts Act are broadly akin to those of the Act before me. 14. The question whether the Major Port Trusts Act vested absolute property right in the Boards of Trustees of various major ports arose before the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat v. The Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla, (supra). The provisions of the Major Port Trusts Act are broadly akin to those of the Act before me. Upon a consideration thereof, a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court concluded that the vesting of ownership in the land under section 29(2)(a) of the Major Port Trusts Act was not absolute but was for the limited purpose of administration, control and management. The lands and buildings falling within the area of the major ports continued to belong to the Central Government and enjoyed the immunity provided by Article 285. 15. The question that I must consider is squarely this: does the said land vest absolutely in the authority under the provisions of section 12(1)(a) of the Act? Since the word 'vest' is capable of variable meanings, the provisions of section 12(1)(a) do not assist and one must turn to other provisions of the Act. 16. The Authority is constituted, as the Preamble states, for the management of certain aerodromes. The vesting of all properties therefore vested in the Central Government would, ordinarily, only be to serve that object. The Authority is not empowered freely to deal with immovable property vested in it. By virtue of the provision of section 15(1) no contract for the sale of immovable property can be made unless previously approved by the Central Government. The Authority may not even lease, if the lease be for more than 30 years, without the Central Government's previous approval. The Central Government is empowered by section 33 of the Act to take away the management of any airport from the Authority and to entrust it to anybody else and the Authority is bound to comply with such direction. The Central Government may, under section 34, supersede the authority and then “all property owned or controlled by the Authority shall, until the Authority is reconstituted ... .... ., vest in the Central Government”. The provisions of sections 33 and 34 would not have been as they are if absolute vesting of immovable property in the Authority was the consequence of section 12(1)(a). .... ., vest in the Central Government”. The provisions of sections 33 and 34 would not have been as they are if absolute vesting of immovable property in the Authority was the consequence of section 12(1)(a). The provisions of sections 33 and 34 suggest that the only vesting effected by section 12(1)(a) was that necessary for the management of the airports. 17. In my view, therefore, upon a construction of the relevant provisions of the Act, the rights of ownership of the Union Government in the said land are not transferred to the Authority. Hence, the Union Government remains its owner. It is entitled to the immunity conferred by Article 285 and the State cannot impose any tax upon it. 18. I have already referred to the letter dated 2nd January, 1981 addressed by the Union Government to the State. It states that “the property vested with IAAI continues to be the property of the Government of India and is exempt from State taxation”. Tough the letter does not explicitly so state, it is clear from its terms that it is a decision of the Central Government given under the provisions of section 12(3) of the Act. Mr. Chaugule, learned Counsel for the State, submitted that the State was not bound by this decision because it was given “behind the back” of the State and that if the State had been afforded a hearing it could have pointed out that the Authority had leased out some part of the said land. Firstly, the decision contained in the letter of 2nd January, 1981 was not given “behind the back” of the State. It was given after considering, as the letter dated 2nd January, 1981 states, a letter of the State dated 3rd May, 1980 in which the State's case was set out. That the State contended that the said land was liable to assessment and that the Authority contested this position was, as the letter dated 2nd January, 1981 makes clear, known to the Central Government. There was, therefore, a doubt or dispute as to whether the said land had been transferred to the Authority. The Central Government, acting under section 12(3), decided that the said land continued to be its property and was exempt from State taxation. Secondly, the Act contemplates a lease by the Authority of immovable property. There was, therefore, a doubt or dispute as to whether the said land had been transferred to the Authority. The Central Government, acting under section 12(3), decided that the said land continued to be its property and was exempt from State taxation. Secondly, the Act contemplates a lease by the Authority of immovable property. That it had leased part of the said land cannot make any difference to the position that the said land has not vested absolutely in the Authority. The Central Government's decision under section 12(3) given in its letter dated 2nd January, 1981 binds the State. 19. It is now necessary to go into the alternative contentions raised on behalf of the Authority. 20. I must answer the two preliminary objections of Mr. Chaugule. He submitted that disputed questions of fact were involved in the petition and that the petitioners had not availed of the alternate remedy provided by the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. He asked that, therefore, the petition should be dismissed. As is apparent, no disputed question of fact arises in the petition. Considering that the State had gone against the binding decision of the Central Government, the Authority could hardly have hoped for relief by availing of the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. Neither of the preliminary objections has merit. 21. It is declared that the land of the Bombay Airport belongs to the Union of India and is entitled to the immunity given by Article 285 of the Constitution. The assessment orders and demand notices issued by the State upon the Authority in regard to the aid land are quashed and set aside. The State shall pay to the Authority and to the Union of India the costs of the petition in different sets. 22. Rule accordingly. Order accordingly. -----