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1984 DIGILAW 344 (KER)

PRABHAKARA MENON v. MANAGING DIRECTOR, K. S. R. T. C

1984-12-12

K.K.NARENDRAN, PARIPOORNAN

body1984
Judgment :- 1. This is a petition filed under S.23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with R.165 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971. The petitioner was an employee of the State Transport Department later transferred to the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation. The respondent is the Managing Director of the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation. The petitioner entered service on 7-5-1123 (M.E.) and retired in 1978. The scale of pay of the employees of the Corporation were revised with effect from 1-1-1966 and 14-1-1971 on the basis of the Awards of Justice Shri Kumara Pillai and Shri Kunjukrishna Pillai. The petitioner was entitled to one increment more, under the pay revisions. It was not favourably considered by, the Corporation. He filed O.P. No. 2829 of 1977. This court allowed the O.P. on 25-10-1979. The Corporation was directed to pass fresh orders in accordance with law. Again by order dated 10-7-1980 the Corporation rejected the claim of the petitioner. Thereupon, the petitioner filed O. P. No. 4161 of 1980. Our learned brother Kochu Thommen, J, by judgment dated 10th June, 1983 allowed the said O. P. The Corporation was directed to reconsider the matter and pass appropriate orders within six months from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment dated 10-6-1983. According to the petitioner, the respondent-Corporation received the judgment in August, 1983. It did not move in the matter. By Ext. P2 petition dated 2-2-1984 the petitioner requested the Corporation to pass appropriate orders in the matter in conformity with the decision of the High Court rendered in O.P No 4161 of 1980 (Ext P1). Even then, no orders were passed. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present O. P. (Contempt) on 17th September, 1984. The petitioner alleged that the facts and circumstances detailed above will show that the respondent has committed Contempt of Court as defined in S.2 (a) and 2 (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by not implementing the directions of this court contained in the judgment rendered in O. P. No. 4161 of 1980 dated 10-6-1983 (Ext. P1). The petitioner prayed that this Court may be pleased to take necessary action against the respondent for Contempt of Court. Notice was ordered in this OP. on 18-9-1984. The matter stood posted on a number of occasions. P1). The petitioner prayed that this Court may be pleased to take necessary action against the respondent for Contempt of Court. Notice was ordered in this OP. on 18-9-1984. The matter stood posted on a number of occasions. The respondent, Managing Director, filed an affidavit dated 24-10-1984 praying for exemption from personal appearance and also brought to the notice of this court Ext. RI. dated 24-10-1984 passed in compliance with the judgment of this court in OP. No. 4161 of 1980. A counter-affidavit dated 27-10-1984 has been filed by the Managing Director, wherein he sincerely apologised for the delay in complying with Ext. PI judgment. It is stated therein that the Corporation received the judgment of this court in OP. No. 4161 of 1980 on 18-11-1983. It is stated that the matter was pending with the "personnel" section and "legal section" for along time and final orders could not be passed in view of the fact that the service book of the petitioner was not returned by the Corporation's counsel after the disposal of OP No. 4161 of 1980 The service book could be traced out only on 24-10-1984. The Managing Director came to know of the directions in Ext. P1 judgment only on 22-10-1984 when the Standing Counsel informed him about these proceedings. The delay occurred due to exigencies in administration and was not due to any wilful default. The Managing Director submitted that this Court may accept his unconditional apology in the matter. An additional counter-affidavit dated 14th November, 1984 has been filed by the Law Officer of the KS R.T. Corporation. Finally, the Managing Director has filed an additional counter-affidavit dated 25-11-1984 stating that an enquiry is being conducted for the delay caused in the office of the Corporation in not implementing Ext. P1 judgment within time, resulting in inordinate delay in the matter. It seems, a final order dated 22-11-1984 has also been passed by the Corporation in modification of its earlier order dated 24-10-1984. This is evident from C. M. P. No. 31352 of 1984. When the matter was finally heard, counsel for the respondent, Shri Sankarasubban, submitted that the directions contained in the judgment of this court (Ext. P1) has been complied with and the matter may not be proceeded with. Earlier on 19-11-1984 notice was issued to the Advocate General. We heard counsel for the petitioner. Mr. When the matter was finally heard, counsel for the respondent, Shri Sankarasubban, submitted that the directions contained in the judgment of this court (Ext. P1) has been complied with and the matter may not be proceeded with. Earlier on 19-11-1984 notice was issued to the Advocate General. We heard counsel for the petitioner. Mr. K. R. B. Kaimal, counsel for the respondent, Mr. S. Sankarasubban and the learned Advocate General. 2. Learned Advocate General brought to our notice the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in H. P. Singh v. Thakur Prasad Tewari (AIR. 1953 SC. 436) and Shanti Sarup Gupta v. Anjuman Isnai Ashria (AIR. 1982 SC. 1461), and submitted that the non-compliance with the directions of this court contained in Ext. P1 judgment is a civil contempt, and since by the time, the petition came up for final orders, the respondent has complied with the directions of this court, no further proceeding need be taken in that behalf. We should state that the fact that by the time the contempt petition came up for final orders, the respondent has complied with the directions of this court and the petitioner is also satisfied with the same, may not by themselves afford any defence or sufficient reasons for absolving the respondent from the default or for discharging him. However, having gone through (the affidavits filed by the respondent and after bearing counsel for the respondent and the learned Advocate General, we are inclined to drop the proceedings in this case and close the matter. 3. Be that as it may, we wish to point out that in the recent times, it has come to the notice of this court, in many cases, that the public authorities or other persons concerned, who have been directed to do or not to do a particular thing within a time, have been taking things in a light-hearted fashion. Such an attitude on the part of the public authorities should be deprecated. In view of long delay in implementing the orders of this court, very often the public are put to great injury or hardship and they are compelled to resort this court, and initiate proceedings by way of contempt. We should state that it is not a satisfactory state of affairs. In view of long delay in implementing the orders of this court, very often the public are put to great injury or hardship and they are compelled to resort this court, and initiate proceedings by way of contempt. We should state that it is not a satisfactory state of affairs. We are afraid that the scope and effect of the orders passed by courts, their importance in a country which is governed by the rule of law and the basis for initiating proceedings in contempt, to see that the orders passed by courts are complied with, have not been properly understood There is some misconception regarding the proceedings in contempt. Advertence to a few leading decisions may throw light on this aspect. 4. The relevant Sections of the Contempt of Courts Act are S.2(a), 2(b) and 12(1). They are as follows:-"2(a) "Contempt of court" means civil contempt or criminal contempt; (b) "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court: xx xx xx 12. Punishment for contempt of court:-(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both: Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court. Explanation: An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bonafide." 5. "Contempt of Court" means an act or omission calculated to interfere in the due administration of justice. Lord Cross, observed in A-G v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1973 (3) All. E. R.54 at page 83): "It is unfortunate that the offence should continue to be known by a name which suggests to the modern mind that its essence is a supposed affront to the dignity of the court." Quoting the observations of Lord President Clyde in Johnson v. Grant (1923 AC. 789 at p. 790), Lord Edmund Davies in A-G v. Leveller Magazine Ltd. (1979 (1) All. 789 at p. 790), Lord Edmund Davies in A-G v. Leveller Magazine Ltd. (1979 (1) All. E. R.745 at page 757) observed: "The phrase "contempt of court" does not in the least describe the true nature of the class of offence with which we are concerned. The offence consists in interfering with the administration of law; in impeding and perverting the course of justice It is not the dignity of the court which is offended a petty and misleading view of the issues involved it is the fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged" (Emphasis supplied) Lord Morris in A-G v. Times Newspapers Ltd (1973 (3) All. E.R. 54) at page 66 observed: "In an ordered community courts are established Tor the pacific settlement of disputes and for the maintenance of law and order. In the general interests of the community it is imperative that the authority of the courts should not be imperilled and that recourse to them should not be subject to unjustifiable interference. When such unjustifiable interference is suppressed, it is not because those charged with the responsibilities of administering justice are concerned for their own dignity: it is because the very structure of ordered life is at risk if the recognised courts of the land are so flouted that their authority wanes and is supplanted" (Emphasis supplied) Again at page 78 of the same reports, Lord Simon of Claisdale said: "It is the means by which the law vindicates the public interest in due administration of justice that is, in the resolution of disputes, not by force or by private or public influence, but by independent adjudication in courts of law according to an objective code". (Emphasis supplied) 5. What is the position of the court, in a case of 'civil centempt' as the one in this case? Quoting from Halsbury's Laws of England, Cross, J, in Phonographic etc. v. Amusement Caterers (1963(3) All. (Emphasis supplied) 5. What is the position of the court, in a case of 'civil centempt' as the one in this case? Quoting from Halsbury's Laws of England, Cross, J, in Phonographic etc. v. Amusement Caterers (1963(3) All. E.R. 493 at page 496) observed: "Where there has been wilful disobedience to an order of the court and a measure of contumacy on the part of the defendants, then civil contempt, what is called contempt in procedure, "bears a two-fold character, implying as between the parties to the proceedings merely a right to exercise and a liability to submit to a form of civil execution, but as between the party in default and the state, a penal of disciplinary jurisdiction to be exercised by the court in the public interest." (Emphasis supplied) The learned judge continued: "I think, therefore, that although the order has now been complied with, I must consider whether it can be said in this case that the directors of the company were deliberately setting the court at defiance and were really treating the order of the court as not worthy of notice. If that is the true view, then, notwithstanding that the order has now been complied with, it may well be that a punishment ought to be inflicted on them" (Emphasis supplied) The above passage has been quoted with approval by Edrnond Davies Q. in Jennison v. Baker (1972 (1) All E R.997 at page 1009 (CA)). 6. The above decisions amply bring out the 'rationale' behind the "contempt" proceedings and their importance. As stated already, we drop the present proceedings and close the matter.