N. H. BHATT, R. A. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) BESIDES the above contentions which we have dealt with extensively in our judgment in Spl. Criminal Application No. 427/84 and others the learned counsel for the petitioners in these petitions has raised several other grounds which we shall now take up for consideration. It was contended that the detenus were deprived of the information about the delay and the correspondence with the State Government and that these materials were highly relevant and necessary and were required to be supplied to the detenus. In this connection reference was made to the case of Mohd. Shakil Wahid Ahmed v. State of Maharashtra A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 541. In that case co-detenus were released by the Advisory Board and while passing the order of detention in respect of that detenu the detaining authority had not taken into consideration the fact that the other persons were released and the order of the Advisory Board was not taken into consideration. Here the facts are entirely different. The question before us is not of that character. On the question of delay the Supreme Court in the case of Hemlata v. State of Maharashtra A. I. R. 1982 S. C. 8 held that the detaining authority is under no liability to tell or satisfy the detenu as to the causes of delay. It is under an obligation to satisfy the court as to the causes of delay and in that case the Supreme Court held that the delay was satisfactorily explained by the detaining authority in its affidavit. In the present case also the delay has been satisfactorily explained to the court and it was not necessary that the detenu should have been supplied with such information and explanation. ( 2 ) WITH respect to the declaration under sec. 9 COFEPOSA Act it was contended that this declaration was not placed before the Central Government when it considered the representation of the detenu and the detenus representations came to be rejected by the Central Government without it being made aware that declaration under section 9 was made. Section 9 declaration is a mere declaration regarding the detenus prejudicial activity in an area highly vulnerable to smuggling and such declaration has nothing to do with the original detention against which the representation was made. Section 9 declaration is a mere declaration regarding the detenus prejudicial activity in an area highly vulnerable to smuggling and such declaration has nothing to do with the original detention against which the representation was made. Such declaration has statutory consequence by operation of law and it has no independent existence and if the detention is otherwise bad or is revoked by the Central Government the declaration would automatically become ineffective. Therefore on this ground the consideration of the representation by the Central Government cannot be said to be vitiated. ( 3 ) IT was contended that the detaining authority the Additional Secretary to the Central Government has not sent the order of detention grounds and all the facts and circumstances to the Central Government under sec. 3 (2) of the COFEPOSA Act. This contention is misconceived because under that provision the report is required to be made to the Central Government only when the detention order is made by the State Government or an officer empowered by the State Government and not when the order is made by an officer empowered by the Central Government. ( 4 ) IT is also contended that the detenus had made representations both to the detaining authority as well as the Central Government and it is nut shown as to who had considered the representation on behalf of the Central Government. In the affidavit in reply it has been pointed out that the representation made to the detaining authority was rejected by the detaining authority and the representation made to the Central Government was decided by the Minister of Revenue and Expenditure Government of India who is empowered to decide the same under the Rules of Business. Therefore this contention must fail. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the detenus has further submitted that earlier detention dt. 9/06/1983 for an earlier incident of 2/02/1983 was operative when the present proposal was made in July 1983 and therefore there was no cause for detaining them when they were already under detention in respect of the smuggled goods worth two crores and forty five lakhs. In respect of that detention the two brothers detenus had preferred Special Criminal Applications Nos. 868 and 869 of 1983 and both these petitions were allowed by a judgment dt. In respect of that detention the two brothers detenus had preferred Special Criminal Applications Nos. 868 and 869 of 1983 and both these petitions were allowed by a judgment dt. 6/09/1983 and the detention orders were quashed on the ground that these detenus were not given the permission to get themselves represented by their advocate before the Advisory Board. Thus these detenus were released by the judgment dt. 6/09/1983. But the sponsoring authority pursued the present proposal for detention in respect of the present smuggling transaction of March 1983 and the detaining authority on consideration of the material in respect of the incident of March 1983 on being satisfied has passed the present Order of detention. it cannot be said that the detention is vitiated because of the non-consideration of the earlier incident or release from the earlier detention. When the detaining authority considered the present detention it has not taken into consideration and the sponsoring authority has not supplied any material regarding the earlier incident. The detenus cannot make any grievance of the same because the facts of the earlier incident have not been taken into account. When the detaining authority passed the order of detention in the present case the detenus were neither in detention nor in custody and therefore if the detaining authority was satisfied about the need of detention at the time of passing the order of detention it cannot be said that there was no case for such detention. Merely because during the three months of the detention under the previous order there was no possibility of smuggling it cannot be said that there was no cause for detention because of the second incident because at the time of passing the present order of detention they were not under detention or in custody. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel has also argued that the detenus were released on bail and there was no fresh incident. There was no attempt to get the bail cancelled and there was no prosecution for 15 months and these facts have not been considered by the detaining authority. It is not correct to say that these facts have not been taken into consideration by the detaining authority. In fact because these persons are not in custody that the need to detain them arises. It is not correct to say that these facts have not been taken into consideration by the detaining authority. In fact because these persons are not in custody that the need to detain them arises. The detaining authority is aware that the prosecution was not yet launched because in the detention order it has been stated that the prosecution is likely to be initiated. The bail applications and the orders thereon have also been taken into consideration and the time between the date of incident and the order of detention has also been taken into consideration. This aspect we have considered in the judgment in the connected matters and the contention has been rejected. It has been further argued in this connection that the fact that these detenus were granted bail shows that there was no valid reason to detain them. In this connection reliance was placed in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Narayan Singh v. State of Bihar A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 1334. At para 32 at page 1345 it has been observed that the preventive detention is not intended for the purpose of keeping the man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of order of bail unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirement of legal provision authorising such detention and when a person is enlarged on bail by competent court great caution should be exercised in considering the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same challenge which has to be tried by the court. Thus the Supreme Court has not laid down that a person who is released on bail in respect of the same charge cannot be preventively detained. The emphasis is that greater caution should be exercised in such case. In the present case the facts as found by the detaining authority are eloquent. There is large scale organised smuggling operation. The purpose of bail pending trial is to see that the presence is secured at the trial whereas the purpose of preventive detention is to see that the person with a tendency to indulge in the prejudicial activity is effectively prevented from continuing such activity. Therefore merely because the person is released on bail is no ground for contending that he cannot be detained at all. Therefore merely because the person is released on bail is no ground for contending that he cannot be detained at all. In the affidavit in reply the detaining authority has effectively dealt with the contention in the following words:-"i say that the position that the material placed before me did not disclose that any untoward incident had taken place after the anticipatory bail orders had been passed by the Sessions Judge Jamnagar was present in my mind when I passed the detention order. I deny that reasonable nexus was not established and harm and danger rule did not come into play as alleged. I submit that the petitioner is not right in contending that a single solitary incident cannot be the basis of detention of the detenu. I submit that the material on the basis of which I have passed the detention order was sufficient to disclose the propensity of the detenu. I may point out that the magnitude of smuggling activity disclosed in relation to the occurrence in question and the nature of the activity disclosed therefrom shows that the petitioners detention on this score is not correct". ( 7 ) THE further contention was that important particulars and documents have not been supplied. It has been contended that reference is made to one Tayab in the ground of detention and to him active role is attributed. However no particulars in respect of that person have been given. Reference to Tayab is to be found in the grounds of detention as revealed from the statements of various persons. That Tayab has not been traced and the only particulars which the authorities have are those contained in the statements and all of them have been given to the detenus. It is not the case of the detenus that the authorities had anything more with them and not supplied. therefore this contention is with out any substance. Regarding the ambassador car it is contended that the date and time are not specified. Sufficient details are found in the grounds of detention as well as in the documents. Here again it is not the case that any information which the authorities had with them is not supplied. It is also submitted that the statement of one Bhagwanji is supplied. In that statement there is reference that though Bhagwanji had earlier refused to reveal anything as he was under threat. Here again it is not the case that any information which the authorities had with them is not supplied. It is also submitted that the statement of one Bhagwanji is supplied. In that statement there is reference that though Bhagwanji had earlier refused to reveal anything as he was under threat. This earlier refusal and non co-operation is taken by the present detenus as a previous statement and then it is contended that such previous statement is not supplied to them. It is not their case that such previous statement was recorded and was not supplied. In the statement of Bhagwanji his previous oral statement is referred to but it was not recorded and therefore there was no question of supplying the same. It was also contended that in the grounds of detention there is a reference to the information received by the Revenue Intelligence on the basis of which watch was kept and the contraband goods came to be detected and seized and ultimately above orders came to be passed. However that information has not been supplied to the detenus. The gist of the information has been supplied to the detenus in the grounds of detention itself containing all the material particulars of that information. However it is not on the basis of the information that the detention order came to be passed. The detention order came to be passed as a result of the investigation and the detection of the smuggling activities. Moreover the detaining authority has pointed out in the affidavit in reply that the detaining authority had considered it to be against public interest to disclose the information and relied on the provisions of Art. 22 (6) of the Constitution. This is quite legitimate and the material facts and the gist of the information has been supplied to the detenu. Therefore this contention also fails. ( 8 ) IT has been further contended that the photographs of the detenus supplied along with the documents are very faint and therefore it is not possible to identify the persons from such faint photographs. We have been shown that compilation by the learned counsel for the petitioners. We have ourselves seen the xerox copies at pages 47 68 102 and 1107 and we find that they are reason ably clear and it is possible to identify the person. We have been shown that compilation by the learned counsel for the petitioners. We have ourselves seen the xerox copies at pages 47 68 102 and 1107 and we find that they are reason ably clear and it is possible to identify the person. ( 9 ) IT is also contended that the statements of various persons alleged to be involved in the activities are involuntary as contended in ground no. 5 in the petition and it is further contended that there is no reply to this ground and therefore the averment of the petitioners should be accepted. The averment is a vague and general statement that the statements are involuntary. No reply is called for to such general averments. More specific averments have been made in grounds 15 16 and 25 and 27 of the petition and they have been replied and denied. ( 10 ) IT has been further contended that after the amendment and substitution of section 9 and consequential amendment in section 8 of the COFEPOSA Act the Advisory Board can go into the questions of validity of continued detention and therefore it was contended that the validity of the original detention can not be gone into by the Advisory Board and on that ground it was contended that the petitioners were deprived of their right to represent before the Advisory Board against the original detention. This is clearly misconceived. The jurisdiction of the Advisory Board to go into the validity of the original detention is not taken away and the jurisdiction to go into the question of continued detention necessarily includes the question of original detention also. Therefore this contention also fails. ( 11 ) IT is contended that the detenus are required to be ordinarily kept at a place as near as possible to the town of their residence. In this connection it would be open to the detenus to apply to the authorities and the authorities are bound to consider the same in accordance with law and having regard to the facts and circumstances of each detenu and the administrative and other exigency of the situation. However no interference is called for by this court at this stage. In this connection it would be open to the detenus to apply to the authorities and the authorities are bound to consider the same in accordance with law and having regard to the facts and circumstances of each detenu and the administrative and other exigency of the situation. However no interference is called for by this court at this stage. ( 12 ) IN the facts of Special Criminal Application No. 455/84 Ibrahim Umar Bhaya is the tindel of the fishing boat Al Jena in which the contraband goods were transhipped from the Pakistani launch to the shore and his remuneration for that single night was Rs. 5 0 He had knowingly participated in the smuggling activity and had abetted the smuggling of the goods. On facts it cannot be single that the subjective satisfaction of the authority is without materials and therefore no interference is called for. ( 13 ) IN the facts of Special Criminal Application No. 456/84 the detenu; is Elias Haji Ismail. He is the brother of Haji Haji Ismail the detenu in Spl. Criminal Application No. 457/84 Elias Haji Ismail is the person who arranged for the fishing boat and accompanied Ibrahim Umar Bhaya in the fishing boat to the Pakistani launch wherefrom the contraband goods were transhipped. He had supervised the transhipment and loading of the packages in the trucks and he was maintaining contact over the walkie-talkie with his brother Haji Haji Ismail. His role in abetting Haji Haji Ismail is therefore crucial and material. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority can not be said to be vitiated in any manner. ( 14 ) IN Special Criminal Application No. 457/84 the detenu is Haji Haji Ismail who is the mastermind and who planned and organised the present smuggling transaction worth about Rs. 60 lakhs. There is no reason to interfere with his determination. ( 15 ) IN the result all the three petitions fail and rule is discharged in each one of them with no order as to `costs. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners has made an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. ( 15 ) IN the result all the three petitions fail and rule is discharged in each one of them with no order as to `costs. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners has made an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. These petitions do involve important questions of law in the context of substituted section 9 of the COFEPOSA Act and there was difference of opinion between us and having regard to the importance of the question the question was required to be decided by the Full Bench and the Full Bench has decided that question. The question in respect of section 9 satisfaction is a substantial question of law of general public importance and therefore we certify that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. (PAP) petition dismissed. .