JUDGMENT S. Ray, J.- Defendant no. 1 is the appellant. The plaintiff-respondent no. 1 filed the suet for declaration that the sale deed executed by defendant no.2-respondent no. 2 in favour of the appellant on 27.8.1976 with regard to the subject matter of the suit did not in any way affect her title. The relief has been granted by both the courts below. 2. Admittedly, the property belonged to Suleman who by a registered instrument transferred the property to his wife, respondent no. 1 on 6.8.1969. The document has been marked as exhibit 4. Thus respondent no. 1 became owner of the property. Defendant no. 2 respondent no. 2 is the son of respondent no. 1 and defendant no. 3 respondent no. 3 is her grand son being the son of respondent no. 2 On 19.3.1975, respondent no. 1 executed a registered deed of gift with regard to the suit property in favour of her grand son-respondent no. 3. Execution of the document was admitted by respondent no. 1 in the plaint. She, however, contended that the gift was neither accepted on behalf of respondent no. 3, who was less than 15 years old at that time, nor possession of the property was taken on his behalf. Deed of gift; exhibit 6 never became operative. Respondent no. 2 by registered instrument, exhibit A, transferred the suit property on behalf of the minor to the appellant. On the assertion that exhibit 6 never became effective, it was stated in the plaint that she never lost title over the suit property. 3. Three written statements were filed, one by defendant no.2-appellant, another by defendant no.2-respondent no. 2 and the 3rd by defendant no.3-respondent no. 3 through his mother. Respondent no. supported respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 2 supported the appellant. Except filing the witten statements, neither respondent no. 2 nor respondent no. 3 contested the written suit. The suit was contested by the appellant. 4. In the written statement, inter alia, it was contended that the gift was accepted on behalf of the minor by his father, respondent no. 2 and possession of the same was also taken by him. 5. 2 nor respondent no. 3 contested the written suit. The suit was contested by the appellant. 4. In the written statement, inter alia, it was contended that the gift was accepted on behalf of the minor by his father, respondent no. 2 and possession of the same was also taken by him. 5. Although to decide whether exhibit 6 became effective, i.e. whether the gift became complete, it was necessary for the trial court to frame an issue as to whether the gift was accepted and possession was given as required under the Mahomedan Law, no issue was framed. However, parties led evidence on this question. The trial court held that the gift was not accepted on behalf of the minor and possession of the property was also not given. Both these findings were affirmed by the lower appellate court. Both the courts below, therefore, held that the transfer, i. e. gift, was not complete and exhibit 6 did not in any way effect the title of respondent no. 1 with regard to the suit property. 6. On 10.1.1984 at the time of admission of this appeal the following substantial question of law was formulated: (i). Whether the courts below have drawn correct inference in law on the basis of the evidence led on behalf of the appellant that the gift was not duly accepted on behalf of the done who was then a minor and the delivery of possession was effected in his favour. In view of the submissions made on behalf of the parties the other substantial question of law is : (ii) Whether the suit was hit by section 34 of the Specific Reliefs Act, as no prayer for recovery of possession of the suit property or cancellation of the deed of gift, exhibit 6 was made. 7. Three essentials for validity of a gift under the Mahomedan Law are (i) there should be declaration of intention to make a gift by the donor, (ii) an acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or on behalf of the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee. If these three conditions are complete, then the gift is complete. Under the Mahomedan Law it in not necessary that the gift must be made by a written instrument. If these three conditions are complete, then the gift is complete. Under the Mahomedan Law it in not necessary that the gift must be made by a written instrument. If any of the three essentials is absent, the gift cannot be held to be complete. 8. In view of exhibit 6, in this case, it must be held that the first requirement, i.e. declaration of intention to make a gift by the donor, is present. But the dispute between the parties is with regard to the other two requirements. Before I consider the findings of the courts below with regard to other two essentials, it is necessary to notice one submission of Mr. Debi Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant. He contended that in view of the pleadings of the parties, it was necessary for the trial court to frame an issue as to whether the gift was accepted and whether delivery of possession was effected. In other words, whether the deed of gift was complete. Mr. Debi Prasad is correct in his submission. From perusal of the record, it appeared that both the parties knew the issues involved in the suit and they led evidence on that point. Completeness or otherwise of exhibit 6 was one of the issues, although not framed. Mr. Debi Prasad submitted that as no issue was framed on that point, the appellant was prejudiced. There is no substance in that submission in view of the facts noticed above. 9. For the reasons, aforesaid, I am of the opinion that because no issue was framed in the terms indicated above, the finding of the courts below cannot be interfered with. 10. In a given case, whether there has been acceptance by and on behalf of the donee and delivery of possession has been effected or not will depend on the facts of each case. But certain legal position must be kept in mind before finding can be recorded on those two questions. If the gift is to a donee who is major, he can himself accept it, or it can be accepted on his behalf by some body authorised to accept it on his behalf. But when the donee is minor, in law he is incapable to accept the gift. The gift, therefore, must be accepted by some body on his behalf. There is nothing in the Mahomedan Law, according to Mr. But when the donee is minor, in law he is incapable to accept the gift. The gift, therefore, must be accepted by some body on his behalf. There is nothing in the Mahomedan Law, according to Mr. Debi Prasad, which prevents a minor from accepting the gift or taking delivery of possession of the property. Mr. Debi Prasad further submitted that in Mahomedan Law it is not necessary that minor's guardian only can accept the gift or take delivery of possession of the property. Reliance was placed by Mr. Debi Prasad in Mt. Fatma v. Mt. Autun A. I. R. 1944 Sind 195 which was followed in Munni Bai v. Abdul Gani A. I. R. 1959 Madhya Pradesh 225. To show that defendant no. 3 respondent no. 3 had accepted the gift and taken delivery of possession of the property, Mr. Debi Prasad referred to the recitals in this regard in exhibit 6. He submitted that the court below was bound to accept the recitals in exhibit 6. In support of his contention, reliance was placed by him in Ismail and ors. v. Idris and ors, A. I. R. 1974 patna 54. On behalf of respondent no. 1, Mr. N. K. Prasad, learned counsel, submitted that a minor Mahomedan boy who has not attended the age of discretion, i.e. 15 years is not competent to accept the gift and it must be accepted on his behalf by some body who is competent to accept it, namely his guardian i.e. his father in absence of his father, his executor, in absence of his executor, the grand father, and in his absence the executor of the grand-father. If none of them is available it may be accepted by any body who is competent to act as guardian. According to Mr. N.K. Prasad, as respondent no. 3 was below the age of 15 years and his father, respondent no. 2, being alive he only was competent to accept the gift and also take delivery of possession of the property on behalf of the minor. As there was nothing on record to show that respondent no. 2 had accepted the gift as well as has taken delivery of possession on behalf of the minor, two of the essentials for valid gift being absent, the gift was not complete and it never came into effect. As there was nothing on record to show that respondent no. 2 had accepted the gift as well as has taken delivery of possession on behalf of the minor, two of the essentials for valid gift being absent, the gift was not complete and it never came into effect. He submitted that recital in exhibit 6 to the effect that respondent no. 3 had accepted the gift and taken delivery of possession of the property was of no consequence. Reliance was placed by him in Valia Peedikakkandi Kathessa Umma and ors. v. Pathakkalan Narayanath Kunhammu (deceased) : A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 275. 11. One must, therefore, understand what is the law on this point. The parties are Hanifis. In Mt. Fatma (supra) the gift was by grand mother and great-grand-mother to a minor. It was held on fact in that case that the donors did every thing to make the gift complete and the deed of gift was handed over to the donee, Fakir Mohammad. Fakir Mohammad was married and he had his own independent earning. But it does not appear from the judgment whether he had attended the age of discretion, i.e. the age of 15 years when the property was gifted to him. It was observed by the learned Judge that there was nothing in the Mahommedan Law or outside it which prevents a minor from accepting the gift or taking possession of the property. If the learned Judge by this held that a minor who has not attended age of discretion may also accept gift, that cannot be held to be correct in law. For this proposition, none of the established authors of Mahomedan Law was referred nor any decision was cited. In Munni Bai (supra) it was held that a donee was not precluded by minority from accepting the gift. But this finding was recorded on the basis of the concession made by the parties before the Bench. Reliance was placed by the Bench in Mt. Fatma (supra). This case was considered by the Supreme Court in Valia's case (supra) in which one of the learned Judges in Munni Bai (supra) was there. But this finding was recorded on the basis of the concession made by the parties before the Bench. Reliance was placed by the Bench in Mt. Fatma (supra). This case was considered by the Supreme Court in Valia's case (supra) in which one of the learned Judges in Munni Bai (supra) was there. It was observed by the Supreme Court in Valia's case (supra) with reference to Munni Bai (supra) that it was held in that case that when a document embodying the intention of the donor was delivered to the minor possessing discretion and accepted by her, it amounted to acceptance of gift. Although it did not appear from the judgment in Munni Bai (supra) that the donee, a minor, had attended the age of discretion, that appeared to be position from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Valia's case (supra). From this one may infer that in Mt. Fatma (supra) which was relied upon in Munni Bai, the donee had attained the age of discretion. I have already noticed that the donee Fakir Mohammad in Mt. Fatma (supra) at time when the gift was made was married and was earning independently. In Valia's case (supra) it was observed that: "It is only actual or constructive possession that completes the gift and registration does not cure the defect nor is a bare declaration in the deed that possession was given to a minor of any avail without the intervention of the guardian of the property unless the minor had reached the years of discretion." It appears from the judgment that the donee minor wife of the donor had attained the age of discretion. She was competent to accept the gift and take delivery of possession. Instead of her, gift was accepted, i.e. gift deed was accepted, by her mother. The donor was ill and was in the mother-in-laws house along with his wife. It was held in that case that if these gift would have been complete by acceptance of deed by the wife-donee, the acceptance of it by her mother in whose care she then was, also made the acceptance complete. It will appear from this that law is that on behalf of minor who has not attained discretion some body must take possession of the property and accept the gift. It will appear from this that law is that on behalf of minor who has not attained discretion some body must take possession of the property and accept the gift. Declaration to that effect in the deed that possession was given to the minor or he accepted it is of no avail. In the present case, father of the donee, a minor, was then alive. Mother of the donee was also alive. In view of the judgment in Valia's cas (supra) it was the father who could have accepted the gift and taken possession of the property because he was guardian of the minor. Even if it was accepted and possession had been taken by the mother of the minor on behalf of the minor on the footing that he was under her care then that would also have been sufficient to record a finding of fulfilment of these two conditions. 12. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, recital in the deed is of no avail. Mr. Debi Prasad had relied in Ismail's case (supra) for the proposition that if there was recital of giving possession of the property to the donee in the gift deed itself, that was sufficient to hold that possession had been given. From the judgment in Ismail's case (supra) it appears that the donor had three sons and he by a registered deed of gift gave it to two of his sons and excluded one of his sons. All the sons were major. The son who was excluded filed the suit for partition. There was recital in the deed that the son who had been excluded was residing elsewhere. There was also recital that the donees were put in possession of the property. After noticing number of judgments, it was held in ismail's case (supra) that the finding of the trial court that the donees never came in possession of the property was not correct. The decisions relied upon in Ismail's case (supra) and observations made by the Bench in that case was with regard to the recitals in the deed of gift in which none of the donees were minor. They were competent to accept the gift and also take possession of the property. The decisions relied upon in Ismail's case (supra) and observations made by the Bench in that case was with regard to the recitals in the deed of gift in which none of the donees were minor. They were competent to accept the gift and also take possession of the property. I have already noticed the observation of the Supreme Court in Valia's case (supra) which was made in a. case where the donee was a minor and had not reached the age of discretion, i.e. below 15 years. In the facts of this case, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Valia's case (supra) shall apply. The recitals made in exhibit 6 with regard to acceptance and possession will not help the appellant in this case. 13. Further, as a finding of fact it has been recorded by the lower appellate court that respondent no. 2 was not present when exhibit 6 was executed. He did not signify by any of his subsequent action acceptance of the gift and taking possession of the property after the execution of exhibit 6. The minor even was not present at the time of execution and registration of exhibit 6. The donor did not hand over the original deed either to the minor or to his father, respondent no. 2. Even if there had been evidence of acceptance of the gift and taking possession of the property by respondent no. 2 not at the time when exhibit 6 was executed and registered, but immediately thereafter, the position would have been different. If any of the essentials of a valid gift under the Mahomedan Law is absent, it must be held that there was no gift in the eyes of law. 14. Mr. Debi Prasad urged that in view of the fact that the donee was residing with the donor, it must be held that the donor gave constructive possession of the property to the donee. - He urged that in view of relationship between the donor and the donee there-was no question of formal acceptance by the donee of the gift and formal delivery of possession of the property to the donee. The subject matter of exhibit 6 is agricultural land. - He urged that in view of relationship between the donor and the donee there-was no question of formal acceptance by the donee of the gift and formal delivery of possession of the property to the donee. The subject matter of exhibit 6 is agricultural land. If the donor and the donee are residing in the same house and that house is gifted, it may be argued that the donor gave constructive possession of the property to the donee. But in this case, the subject matter of exhibit 6 is an agricultural land and there was no question of giving constructive possession of that property. Actual possession of the property was required to be delivered by some overt act. 15. Mr. Debi Prasad submitted that if the recital in exhibit 6 about acceptance and possession is of no concern, the court below could not have discarded the evidence of D. W. 3 that the gift was accepted and possession was taken by respondent no. 2. The reason on which the court below discarded the evidence of D. W. 3 may not be available, but in view of the fact that respondent no. 2 was not present when the deed of gift was executed and registered, he could not have accepted the gift then. There is nothing in the record to show that thereafter by any act he signified acceptance of the gift and taking possession of the property on behalf of the minors. 16. In view of finding of facts by the courts below and in view of the legal position noticed above, there is no ground to interfere with the findings of the courts below that the gift did not affect plaintiff's title. 17. So far substantial question no. (ii) is concerned, I have already held that exhibit 6 did not come into effect and, therefore, there was no question of cancelling it. So far exhibit A executed by respondent no. 2 in favour of the appellant is concerned it was not necessary for respondents no. 1 to pray for cancellation of that deed. She was not claiming the property through either the vendor or the vendee of exhibit A. The courts below have held that possession of the property was with respondent no. 1. It cannot, therefore, be held that the suit was hit by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 18. 1 to pray for cancellation of that deed. She was not claiming the property through either the vendor or the vendee of exhibit A. The courts below have held that possession of the property was with respondent no. 1. It cannot, therefore, be held that the suit was hit by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 18. In the result, I find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed but without costs.