JUDGMENT B. D. Agarwal, J. 1. This revision is directed against an order of the Second Additional Civil Judge, Varanasi dated September 20, 1983. 2. The dispute relates to a house situate in Varanasi city. The house belongs to Sudarshan Mukherji (hereinafter referred to as the owner). On May 25, 1970 the owner allegedly entered into an agreement to sell this house in favour of the opposite party for a consideration of Rs. 40,000/-of which a sum of Rs. 4,000/- was received as earnest. An agreement was entered into by the owner thereafter on July 31, 1970 with the revisionist whereby he stipulated to sell this house to him for Rs. 43,000/- and obtained Rs. 5000/- as earnest. The sale was to be executed within six months of the agreement. This period was extended from time to time until May 5, 1973. On May 24, 1973 the owner executed sale of the house in favour of one Shyam Sunder Khemka described hereinafter as the subsequent vendee. The revisionist instituted Original Suit No. 78 of 1973 in the court of the Civil Judge, Varanasi for specific performance of the agreement dated July 31, 1970 against the owner and the subsequent vendee. The trial court decreed the suit on June 1, 1974 for refund of the earnest money, but not for specific performance. The revisionist filed First Appeal No. 103 of 1973 in this Court which was allowed on September 13, 1978 and decree was passed in favour of the revisionist for specific performance of the agreement against the owner and the subsequent vendee above mentioned. A special Leave Petition filed in the Supreme Court against this decision was dismissed. The opposite party instituted Original Suit No. 56 of 1981 against the owner, the subsequent vendee and the revisionist seeking the relief of specific performance of the agreement claimed to be entered into on May 25, 1970. This suit was decreed on May 18, 1982, by the First Civil Judge, Varanasi against the owner and the subsequent vendee directing them to execute the sale in favour of the opposite party. The revisionist has filed First Appeal No. 388 of 1982 against this decree of the trial court. This suit was decreed on May 18, 1982, by the First Civil Judge, Varanasi against the owner and the subsequent vendee directing them to execute the sale in favour of the opposite party. The revisionist has filed First Appeal No. 388 of 1982 against this decree of the trial court. In this appeal there was an ad-interim order made on July 26, 1982, on the application of the revisionist to the effect that the execution of the deed of sale in favour of the opposite party shall remain stayed pending disposal of this appeal. The revisionist has moved an application in execution with respect to the decree obtained by him in Original Suit No. 78 of 1973. The execution is registered as No. 4 of 1979. It was instituted in the court of the Civil Judge, Varanasi, but upon the application made by the opp. party under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this has been transferred to the court of the Second Additional Civil Judge, Varanasi. The opposite party applied on September 14, 1983 for this execution being stayed under Order 21, rule 29, read with section 151, CPC. Under the impugned order the court below has directed stay of the execution pending decision in First Appeal No. 388 of 1982, aforementioned. Aggrieved against the order dated September 20, 1983 the decree holder in Original Suit No. 78 has preferred this revision. The opposite party has made an application to vacate the interim stay granted to the revisionist in capacity as the appellant in First Appeal No. 388 of 1982 on July 26, 1982. With the consent of the counsel for the parties, this revision and the application for vacation of the aforementioned interim stay in the First Appeal have been heard together. 3. Sri V. K. S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the opposite party, raised a preliminary objection that revision against the impugned order does not lie under section 115, CPC as amended in Uttar Pradesh. The argument is that there is no case decided. It was submitted that the lower court had directed the matter to be put up on November 19, 1983 and, therefore, the stay granted was only interim. I am unable to agree. The argument is that there is no case decided. It was submitted that the lower court had directed the matter to be put up on November 19, 1983 and, therefore, the stay granted was only interim. I am unable to agree. The court below has under this order stayed proceeding in Execution Case No. 4 of 1979 for so long as the First Appeal No. 388 of 1982 arising from Original Suit No. 56 of 1981 is not decided. The revisionist claims that having obtained decree in Original Suit No. 78 of 1973, which has become final, he is entitled to the fruits thereof. The impugned order obstructs him in the exercise of this right. This cannot, therefore, be legitimately claimed to be an interlocutory order. It is not material that this order by itself does not dispose of either way the execution proceeding. That is not the required test. The crucial fact is that the impugned order does affect adversely the right of the decree holder revisionist to proceed in execution. That makes this a case decided in my opinion applying the criteria laid by the Supreme Court in Major S. S. Khanna v. Brig F. J. Dillon, (1964) 4 SCR 409 and Baldeodas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. ltd., AIR 1970 SC 406 . 4. Upon merit, Rule 29, Order 21, CPC, as amended by this Court with effect from June 1, 1957, read as under :- "Where a suit is pending in any court against the holder of a decree of such Court on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed or any person whose interests are affected by the decree, or by any order made in execution thereof, the court may, if it thinks fit stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided. Provided that in all cases where execution of the decree is stayed under this rule the court shall require the person seeking such stay to furnish such security as it may deem fit. Provided that in all cases where execution of the decree is stayed under this rule the court shall require the person seeking such stay to furnish such security as it may deem fit. " With effect from February 1, 1977, the text of this Rule 29 in original, as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, would read as follows :- "Where a suit is pending in any court against the holder of a decree of such court or of a decree which is being executed by such court on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as the security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided. Provided that if the decree is one for payment of money, the Court shall, if it grants stay without requiring security, records its reasons for so doing. " 5. Section 97 (1) of the Central (Amendment) Act, 1976, provides, inter alia, that any amendment made or any provision inserted in the principal Act by a High Court before the commencement of this Act (1-2-1977) shall except in so far as such amendment or provision is consistent with the provisions of the principal Act, as amended by this Court, stand rejected. It would be noticed that under Rule 29, as it was prior to February 1, 1977, the suit might be pending at the instance of the person against whom the decree in execution was passed or any person whose interest is affected by the decree. This Court had inserted the words "or any person whose interests are affected by the decree, or by any order made in execution thereof, in this rule with effect from June 1, 1957. If we exclude from consideration this amendment introduced by the High Court, the suit pending has necessarily to be at the instance of the person against whom the decree under execution was passed. It does not cover a case where suit is by some other person though adversely affected as a result of the decree. The instant case is illustrative on the point. Original suit no. 56 of 1981 was filed by the opposite party. That decree is only against the owner and the subsequent vendee. It does not cover a case where suit is by some other person though adversely affected as a result of the decree. The instant case is illustrative on the point. Original suit no. 56 of 1981 was filed by the opposite party. That decree is only against the owner and the subsequent vendee. That being so, if the rule, as unamended by this Court were to be applied, one of the essential conditions provided for in the rule remains unfulfilled. On the contrary, if the rule, as amended by the High Court, is made applicable, it can be said that this condition is fulfilled because in that event there can be no denying that the opposite party is a person whose interest is affected due to the execution at the instance of the revisionist being proceeded with. Rule 29, as amended by this Court, would provide relief also where the suit pending in the relevant court is not against the holder of the decree under execution but against any person whose interest is adversely affected. But the rule, as amended by the Central Act, 1976, excludes from consideration a case where the suit pending is not against the holder of the decree in execution. Sri R. N. Singh, learned counsel for the revisionist, submitted not without force in my view that the amendment incorporated by the High Court cannot be claimed to be consistent with the rule as amended by the Central Act, 1976 and, therefore, the amendment made by this Court is to be treated as repealed. Final opinion is not required, however, to be expressed upon this aspect because, as will presently appear, Rule 29 is not attracted to the facts of the case even for other reasons. 6. Rule 29, Order 21, CPC came up for interpretation in Shaukat Hussain alias Ali Akram v. Smt. Bhumeshwari Devi, AIR 1973 SC 528 . The Supreme Court held that it is not enough that there is a suit pending by the judgment-debtor, it is further necessary that the suit must be against the holder of a decree of such Court. The words "such Court" were interpreted as meaning in the context of that rule, the Court in which the suit is pending. In other words, the suit must be one not only pending in that court but also one against the holder of a decree of that court. The words "such Court" were interpreted as meaning in the context of that rule, the Court in which the suit is pending. In other words, the suit must be one not only pending in that court but also one against the holder of a decree of that court. This was stated to be the plain meaning of the rule. It was further observed that RULE 29 clearly shows that the power of the Court to stay execution before it flows directly from the fact that the execution is at the instance of the decree holder whose decree had been passed by that court only. If the decree in execution was not passed by it, it had no jurisdiction to stay the execution. In that case the decree under execution was passed by the Subordinate Judges in exercise of Small Cause Court jurisdiction. The order of stay purporting to be under RULE 29 was made by the Munsif and it was held that the same was incompetent and without jurisdiction. This view was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, AIR 1982 SC 686 . The suit was decided by the Munsif Varanasi, who passed the decree. It was held that an application for stay of execution, if any, could have been made before that court and not before any other court including the Civil Judge. The matter came up before this Court recently in Murli Manohar Chaubey v. I Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1983 ALJ 847. Brother Varma, J. following the Supreme Court decisions laid down that the power of stay is exercisable only by the court where the suit may be pending against the decree holder at the instance of the judgment-debtor, provided that such a suit is directed against either the holder of a decree of such court or of a decree which is being executed by such court. The decree sought to be executed in that case was passed by the Second Additional Civil Judge, Banda. The suit was pending before the Civil Judge, Banda. The decree sought to be executed in that case was passed by the Second Additional Civil Judge, Banda. The suit was pending before the Civil Judge, Banda. It was held on these facts that the Second Additional Civil Judge Allahabad, could not assume jurisdiction to grant stay under Order 21, rule 29 because it is basic that the power to stay can be exercised only by the court where a suit may be pending against the holder of a decree of such court or of a decreee which is being executed by that court at the instance of the judgment-debtor. 7. Learned counsel for the opposite party urged that an appeal is continuation of the suit and on this footing First Appeal No. 388 of 1982 be taken as in continuation of Original Suit No. 56 of 1981 in which the revisionist is arrayed as one of the opposite parties. It was argued also that no court of the Second Additional Civil Judge be treated to be the court of Civil Judge itself for all practical purposes. Assuming all that to be true, the fact remains that First Appeal No. 388 of 1982 arising out of Original Suit No. 56 of 1981 is pending in the High Court, and not in the court of the Civil Judge or the Additional Civil Judge, Varanasi for that matter. It is not pending in any case "in such court" as understood for the purpose of Rule 29. This essential requirement of the rule being not satisfied, Sri R. N. Singh, rightly submitted that the court below could not exercise jurisdiction under Rule 29 in this behalf. 8. It was next argued by Sri V. K. S. Chaudhary for the opposite party that the order impugned for stay is under section 151, CPC. The application made by the opposite party is on the record and it shows also that section 151 was specifically referred to apart from Rule 29, Order 21. If the execution arising from Original Suit No. 78 of 1973 is allowed to proceed, the revisionist may be in a position to obtain deed of sale for the house from the owner and the subsequent vendee in his favour. In that event the legal estate would come to vest in the revisionist. If the execution arising from Original Suit No. 78 of 1973 is allowed to proceed, the revisionist may be in a position to obtain deed of sale for the house from the owner and the subsequent vendee in his favour. In that event the legal estate would come to vest in the revisionist. That might, it is urged, render the decree in Original Suit No. 56 of 1981 existing in favour of the opposite party otiose. The opposite party's decree is, as mentioned above, against the owner and the subsequent vendee and not against the revisionist for the obvious reason that as at present there is claimed to be only an agreement to sell existing in favour of the revisionist and that by itself does not create interest in the immovable property vide section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Further, the revisionist has preferred First Appeal 388 of 1982 against the decree dated 18th May, 1982 passed in Original Suit No. 56 of 1981. In this appeal he applied for, and has got, stay of execution made. The subject matter of dispute involved in both the decrees is the same. IT is plainly just that so long as the appeal filed by the revisionist is not disposed of, the execution of the decree existing in favour of the opposite party remains stayed. In case that interim stay in the First Appeal were to be vacated, the result may be anomalous. There would obviously be a race between the revisionist on one side and the opposite party on the other to get the sale executed from the owner and the subsequent vendee. Both of them cannot under the law at the same time obtain sale in respect of the same property from the same person. The claim laid by the opposite party is, it is urged, on the footing of an agreement prior in point of time to that relied by the revisionist. IT would be inequitable and unfair besides being unjust that while the execution in Original Suit No. 56 of 1981 filed by the opposite party remains stayed by this court at the instance of the revisionist, the latter proceeds ahead and obtains sale for himself. IT would be inequitable and unfair besides being unjust that while the execution in Original Suit No. 56 of 1981 filed by the opposite party remains stayed by this court at the instance of the revisionist, the latter proceeds ahead and obtains sale for himself. Both should in this situation be placed at par so far as possible and in the circumstances the jurisdiction exercised by the court below under section 151, CPC cannot be said to be arbitrary or non-judicious. Sri R. N. Singh argued that section 151 CPC could not be invoked in face of specific provision made in Rule 29. I am not impressed with this line of reasoning. The provisions of the Code are not exhaustive. The inherent powers are not controlled by the provisions of the Code as is clear from the text of section 151, CPC. It is true that these powers are not to be exercised when their exercise may be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intention of the legislature. But it cannot be overlooked that the inherent powers of the court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Civil Procedure Code. They are complementary to these powers and, therefore, it has been held that the court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intention of the legislature vide Paaam Sen v. State of U. P., AIR 1961 SC 218 ; Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 327; Ram Chandra and Sons Sugar Mills v. Kanhaiya Lal, AIR 1966 SC 1899 . In Babu Ram v. Additional District Judge, Dehra Dun, AIR 1983 Alld. 170= 1982 AWC 874 , brother K. C. Agarwal, J. speaking for the Division Bench considered the nature and scope of inherent powers of the Court under section 151, CPC. It was observed that section 151 does not confer but only saves the inherent jurisdiction. In Babu Ram v. Additional District Judge, Dehra Dun, AIR 1983 Alld. 170= 1982 AWC 874 , brother K. C. Agarwal, J. speaking for the Division Bench considered the nature and scope of inherent powers of the Court under section 151, CPC. It was observed that section 151 does not confer but only saves the inherent jurisdiction. Every Court is constituted for the purpose of doing justice according to law and must, therefore, be deemed to possess as a necessary corollary and as inherent in its very constitution such powers as may be necessary to do the right and undo the wrongs in the course of the administration of justice. The inherent power has its roots in necessity and its breadth is co-extensive with the necessity.-See N. S. Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1152 . 9. In Manohar Lal Chopra (supra) the Supreme Court held that temporary injunction can issue even where the case does not fall within the purview of section 94/Order 39, CPC. Commission may issue even where it is outside the scope of Order 26, as laid in the case of Padam Sen (supra). In Ganga Dhar v. Raghubar Dayal, AIR 1975 Alld. 102 a Full Bench of this Court affirmed that section 144 of the Code is not exhaustive. Restitution can be granted by the Court under its inherent powers to secure the ends of justice. A learned Single Judge took the view in Jado Rai v. Onkar Prasad, AIR 1975 Alld. 413 that in an appropriate case stay can be granted in exercise of inherent powers under section 151, CPC though the case does not fall within the limitations of section 10 of the Code. In Bhagwan Kaur v. Rani Harbans Kaur, (1910) 7 Indian Cases 1017 the Punjab High Court was of the view that where the case of the petitioner for stay of execution of a decree is not met by Order 21, Rule 29, the appellate court has under Sec. 151 power to stay execution pending the appeal. 10. Having regard to the discussion made above, I am of the opinion that the court below was within its jurisdiction in exercising inherent powers under section 151 and the discretion exercised is in the circumstances not justifiably open to interference. 10. Having regard to the discussion made above, I am of the opinion that the court below was within its jurisdiction in exercising inherent powers under section 151 and the discretion exercised is in the circumstances not justifiably open to interference. The interim stay dated July 26, 1982 in F. A. No. 388 of 1982 may be confirmed, but the revision fails. The revision is accordingly dismissed. Costs on parties. Revision dismissed.