Judgment :- 1. The defendants Nos.1 and 4 are the appellants in this action. The plaintiff filed the suit for injunction-mandatory and prohibitory and for damages. The plaint reveals the following facts. 2. Plaintiff is the owner of 7 acres 10 cents in R.S.No.85/1C/4/6. Two items of properties are scheduled in the plaint. These two items of properties are parts of the 7 acres 10cents described earlier. In between plaint items 1 and 2 there is a road with an average width of 3 metres. This road connects a place by name Thannikuzi with Manimala-Ranni Road. 3. Plaint item No. I lies on the southern side of this road while plaint item No.2 is on the northern side of the road. The defendants, according to the plaintiff, without any authority, under the pretext of widening the above road, trespassed into the plaintiff's property described in the plaint schedule, cut down rubber trees and other trees and caused damages to certain other trees standing in the plaint property. On account of the culpable and tortious acts of the defendants, the plaintiff suffered damages. Plaintiff estimated the damages at Rs.l, 980/-. He claimed this amount in the suit. He also prayed for a mandatory injunction to direct the defendants to restore the property to the original state and a prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from further trespassing into the plaint schedule properties. 4. The suit was filed impleading 21 defendants, who committed the wrongful acts. Plaintiff sought sanction of the court for filing the suit as a representative suit under Order I R.8 C. P. C. 5. The contentions raised by the defendants are almost identical. According to the defendants, the road mentioned in the plaint was a road vested with the Manimala Panchayat. The area used as the road as well as the plaint schedule properties belonged to one Konnika Mannil Francis Joseph, who had leasehold interest in the property. The said Francis surrendered the land required for widening the road and that included the plaint schedule properties. Since the Panchayat had no funds the public by contributing their labour ({iaZmw) attempted to widen the road. When the road was widened, some rubber trees, according to the defendants, 7 rubber trees were cut and removed. The defendants contended that the plaintiff has not sustained any damage. Since the Panchayat had no funds the public by contributing their labour ({iaZmw) attempted to widen the road. When the road was widened, some rubber trees, according to the defendants, 7 rubber trees were cut and removed. The defendants contended that the plaintiff has not sustained any damage. It was emphasised that the widening of the road was done by the public only on the land duly surrendered by the owner and it cannot be regarded as an encroachment of the civil rights of the plaintiff. The defendants submitted that no ground exists for granting a decree of injunction either prohibitory or mandatory. They also contended that the damages claimed are excessive and that the suit is not maintainable. 6. The trial court raised the necessary issues, considered the evidence both oral and documentary, and after hearing the counsel on both sides, decreed the suit. The trail court passed a decree restraining the defendants permanently by an injunction, from trespassing into any portion of the plaint schedule property and interfering with the enjoyment of the property by the plaintiff, and restrained them from committing any act of waste in the property. The trial court also decreed a sum of Rs. 980/-to be realised from the defendants 1, 2, 4 to 11 and 13 to 21. The relief for restoration of the status quo of the property was negatived finding that it was not feasible or practical in the circumstances of the case. The trial court held that the case of surrender by Francis Joseph has not been established. It was also found that there is no evidence to show that any resolution was passed by the Panchayat to show that its funds have been expended for the road. The court found that the plaintiff has both title and possession over plaint items 1 and 2 at the relevant point of time. In regard to damages the court found that the plaintiff sustained damage on account of cutting off the rubber trees and damaging certain other rubber trees. The damage was fixed at Rs.980/-. The Court further considered the question whether all the defendants are liable for causing the damages and held that defendants 3,12 and 21 are not liable since they have not participated in the act of trespass. 7. The aggrieved defendants filed an appeal before the District Court, Kottayam and the plaintiff filed cross objections. The damage was fixed at Rs.980/-. The Court further considered the question whether all the defendants are liable for causing the damages and held that defendants 3,12 and 21 are not liable since they have not participated in the act of trespass. 7. The aggrieved defendants filed an appeal before the District Court, Kottayam and the plaintiff filed cross objections. The appellate court after a thorough re-appraisal of the evidence in the case confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Now, defendants Nos.1 and 4 appeal before this court. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants in his appeal memorandum raised four questions as important and substantial questions of law arising for consideration in this appeal. The questions of law raised by the counsel for the appellants are given below: 1. How far the courts below are right in entering a finding on Issue No. 3 against the appellants in the facts proved in this case in the light of the decision of this Hon'ble Court in O. P. No. 421 of 1971, regarding the vesting of roads in Panchayat? 2. How far the courts below are right in passing a decree of injunction "restraining the defendants from making use of the trespassed property" without ascertaining the limit from where the trespass was made, especially in the facts of this case where the plaintiff alleges that there was an Eruvakayala separating his property from the road and its demolition, and the courts finding the non-existence of the kayala and its demolition? 3. Whether it is legally correct on the part of the courts below to accept the quantification of the damages by the Commissioner solely basing on his personal opinion without adopting any acceptable date? 4. Whether the suit is maintainable in view of S.123 and 124 of the Kerala Panchayat Act?". While admitting the appeal, notice was issued only on question No.1 9. The counsel for the appellants submits that his main point is that the suit without the junction of the Panchayat is not maintainable. He urges that in view of certain provisions in the Panchayat Act, the suit is not maintainable. He refers me to S.123 and 124 of the Panchayat Act. 10. S.123 and 125 read thus: "123. The counsel for the appellants submits that his main point is that the suit without the junction of the Panchayat is not maintainable. He urges that in view of certain provisions in the Panchayat Act, the suit is not maintainable. He refers me to S.123 and 124 of the Panchayat Act. 10. S.123 and 125 read thus: "123. Notice of action against Panchayat etc:- (1) Subject to the provisions of S.124, no suit or other legal proceeding other than a suit for injunction shall be brought against any Panchayat or its President or executive authority or any member, or officer or servant thereof or against any person acting under the direction of such Panchayat, President, executive authority, member, officer or servant, in respect of any act done or purporting to be done under this Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act or any rule, bye-law, regulation or order made under it, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing stating the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed and the name and place of residence of the intended plaintiff has been left at the office of the Panchayat, and if the proceeding is intended to be brought against any such President, executive authority, member, officer, servant or person, also delivered to him or left at his place of residence. (2) Every such proceeding shall, unless it is a proceeding for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced within six months after the date on which the cause of action arose or in case of a continuing injury or damages, during such continuance or within six months after the ceasing thereof. (3) If any Panchayat or person to whom notice is given under sub-section (1) tenders amends to the plaintiff before the proceeding is commenced and if the Plaintiff does not in such proceeding recover more than the amount so tendered, he shall not recover any costs incurred by him after such tender and the plaintiff shall also pay all costs incurred by the defendant after such tender. 124. 124. Protection of President and Officers etc., acting in good faith: No suit or other legal proceeding shall be brought against the President, executive authority, or any member, officer or servant of a Panchayat, or any person acting under the direction of a Panchayat or of such President, executive authority, member, officer or servant, in respect of any act done or purporting to be done under this Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default on his part in the execution of this Act, or any rule, bye-law, regulation or order made under it, if such act was done or such neglect or default occurred in good faith; but any such proceeding shall, so far as it is maintainable in a court, be brought against the Panchayat except in the case of suits brought under S.126." According to the counsel for the appellants, the defendant did the acts complained of at the instance of the Panchayat and even if what has been done by the defendants are wrongful acts, since they have been done in the purported exercise of discharging an obligation of the Panchayat, both the provisions contained in S.123 and 124 are attracted. In support of his argument, he points out that the plaintiff has impleaded the first defendant as the President of Manimala Panchayat. The counsel draws my attention to the address given in the plaint and said that the first defendant has been impleaded in the plaint in bis official capacity. I give hereunder the description of the first defendant as given in the plaint. sP. Nmtim Section 123 of the Panchayats Act provides that no suit other than a suit for injunction shall be brought against any Panchayat or its President or executive authority or any member or officer or servant in respect of any act done or purporting to be done under the Panchayats Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of obligations under the Panchayats Act or the bye-law without issuing a notice and until the expiration of the two months next after the receipt of the notice. S.124 gives protection to the President and other officers of the Panchayat from being impleaded in a suit or other legal proceedings in respect of any act done or purported to have done under the Panchayats Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default on the part of the President in the execution of the obligations under the Panchayats Act add the Rules, by providing that such a suit shall be instituted only against the Panchayat. 10. The counsel submits that the defendants are entitled to the protection given under S.124 of the Panchayats Act even if the findings of the court below are correct that the acts committed by the defendants are wrongful. According to him, the matter has to be considered on the legal premise of good faith on the part of the defendants. The counsel re-enforces his argument by stating that all acts purported to be acts for discharging the obligations under the Panchayats Act are protected under S.124. In this context, he submits that maintaining the Panchayat road including widening the road is an obligation of the Panchayat under the Panchayats Act. 11. The counsel cited the decisions reported in Azimunnissa v. Deputy Custodian, E P (A.I. R.1961 S.C.365) and Nemichand v. Gram Panchayat, Thanvla (A. I. R.1974 Rajasthan 1). He relies on the observations of J L. Kapur, J. to highlight the true content and import of the word 'purport'. In A.I. R.1961 S.C. 365, Kapur, J. said: "The word "purport" has many shades of meaning. It means fictitious, what appears on the face of the instrument, the apparent and not the legal import and therefore any act which purports to be done in exercise of a power is to be deemed to be done within that power notwithstanding that the power is not exercisable. Purporting is therefore indicative of what appears on the face of it or is apparent even though in law it may not be so." In A.I. R.1974 Rajasthan 1, the Court said: "But, if ex facie the apt is purporting to be one under the Act, then merely because the act was not done according to law will not take the case out of the ambit of sub-section (2) of S.79 of the Act. The question has to be determined, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. The question has to be determined, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. There is no manner of doubt that it lies within the administrative powers of the Gram Panchayat to remove encroachments on a public way (Vide S.26(ii) of the Act). Therefore when the Gram Panchayat had called upon the plaintiff to remove the encroachment from the public way, it was undoubtedly purporting to act under this Act. The land may not be included in the public way and the action of the Panchayat may be found to be wrong, but nonetheless, it cannot be gainsaid that the Panchayat was purporting to act under the Act." 12. It is true that the protective shields under S.123 and 124 of the Panchayats Act extend and cover all acts done in good faith even if those acts are impermissible in law the condition being that the act should have been done or purported to have been done under the Panchayats Act. Any act which purports to have been done in exercise of a power is for all intends and purposes to be deemed to have been done within the competence of that power; notwithstanding that all the conditions for the exercise of that power are not present, provided the acts are done in good faith under the purported exercise of that power. It has to be remembered that any power given to any authority or person under any law must be exercised reasonably and in good faith. This is because 'Power' is defined as ability conferred upon a person by the law to alter by his own will directed to that end, rights, duties, liabilites or other legal relations of other persons. But in this context, "In good faith" means merely'for legitimate reasons'. Contrary to the natural sense of the words, they impute no noral obliquity. 13. The first defendant in his written statement has said: The above statements clearly shows that the acts that have been done, which constitute the stereo bate of the complaint of the plaintiff are not acts purported to have done at the instance of the Panchayat. The Panchayat was not in a position or had no intention to widen the road is clearly revealed from the above quoted statement. The reason for the inaction of the Panchayat is made explicit in the written statement, viz. paucity of funds. The Panchayat was not in a position or had no intention to widen the road is clearly revealed from the above quoted statement. The reason for the inaction of the Panchayat is made explicit in the written statement, viz. paucity of funds. When the Panchayat failed to discharge their obligation of widening the road, the public of the Panchayat thought of widening the road. 14. The counsel for the respondent points out that no records have been produced in the case to show that the Panchayat has taken any decision to widen this road. No official of the panchayat has been examined in the case. The interest of the Panchayat in widening the said road has not been, even remotely, established. There is absolutely no evidence in the case that the attempt to widen the road was under the behest or under the auspices of the Panchayat. It was pointed out by the Counsel for the respondent that no specific plea to the effect that the defendants acted for the Panchayat or at the behest of the Panchayat has been taken in the written statement. The case was defended on the basis that the acts were done in the property which was surrendered to the Panchayat The case is that the said surrender was taken from a person by name Francis Joseph who had absolutely no right in the property. The proof given in respect of the surrender is Ext. B2. Ext. B2 has not been properly proved insofar as the person who claims to have surrendered the property has not been examined. P. W. 3 is the son of the said Francis Joseph. He has said that his father, Francis Joseph was only a tapper of the plaintiff. In the written statement, there is only a broad statement that the suit is not maintainable. I find it difficult to say in this context that the unauthorised acts of the defendants which form the basis of the complaint in the plaint have been done as acts purported to have been done under the Panchayats Act by the Panchayat or at the instance of the Panchayat. Hence S.123 and 124 have no application in this case. Hence I find no merit in this contention. 15. Even though this court issued notice only on one of the questions raised in the appeal memorandum, the counsel argued two other questions also. Hence S.123 and 124 have no application in this case. Hence I find no merit in this contention. 15. Even though this court issued notice only on one of the questions raised in the appeal memorandum, the counsel argued two other questions also. He submitted that the quantum of damages has not been assessed in accordance with law. He elaborated his argument by saying that there is no legal evidence worth the name to fix the quantum of damages. 16. The courts below have granted only an amount of Rs. 980/- for the rubber trees destroyed by the defendants. It is in evidence that eight rubber trees were cut and removed. In the plaint itself, the defendants have admitted that they have cut and removed seven rubber trees. There is also the evidence in the case that the roots of a number of rubber trees were cut and destroyed thereby those trees were rendered unyielding. The Commissioner has given the evidence in regard to the prospective life of the trees and also datas relating to the yield of the trees and the cost of rubber per kilogram. The trial court has accepted the evidence and granted a decree fixing Rs. 35/-as the value per rubber tree. The appellate court also confirmed the finding of the trial court. This, according to me, is a correct finding recorded by the courts below on a pure question of fact and so I should not interfere. Further I have no doubt that there will be any risk of failure of justice when I confirm these concurrent finding of fact. I should always be informed of that equitable rule of decision, that considerations of justice are directly relevant to the justification of any decision and that courts are dominantly coerced not by the essays of their predecessors but by a surer thing by an intuition of fitness of solution to problem. (See Oliphient A Return to stare decises). 17. The counsel for the appellant also urged that no injunction should be granted in this case since there is a finding by the courts below that the plaintiff was not able to prove the existence of an "Eruvakayyala" referred in the plaint item No.1 property. The contention of the counsel is that no injunction should be granted in respect of a property which has been described vaguely in the plaint. The contention of the counsel is that no injunction should be granted in respect of a property which has been described vaguely in the plaint. I have verified the description of the property given in the schedules in the plaint. I think there is no difficulty for identifying the properties described in the plaint. In the written statement, these contentions are not seen to have been raised. This point is not seen urged before the lower courts. Even though a question of law on this point was raised in the appeal memorandum, the court did not issue notice on this question when the second appeal was admitted. I see no merit in the appeal. It is only to be dismissed. I do so. No order as to costs.