Judgment :- 1. The second defendant-judgment debtor is the petitioner in this revision. The first respondent is the plaintiff-decree holder. Respondents 2 and 3 are defendants I and 3-judgment-debtors. The decree is dated 9th August, 1066. Earlier, E.P. 45 of 1979 was filed and while the same was pending, the second defendant took out R.E.A. 750 of 1979 on 20th September, 1979 under S. 18 of the Tamil Nadu Dapt Relief Act XL of 1979, hereinafter referred to as the Act, to stay the execution until the Court which passed the decree has passed orders on an application to be made under S. 16 of the Act. This application was ultimately allowed on 28th April, 1980. As a result, E.P. 45 of 1979 was closed on the same day, namely, 28th April, 1980. The present execution proceedings, E.P. 72 of 1982 were initiated on 22nd January, 1982. The second defendant contested the same raising a plea of limitation. This plea has been rejected by the Court below and hence this revision. 2. Mr. K. Sarvabhauman, learned counsel for the second defendant, tried his best to demonstrate that the decree being of the date 9th August, 1966, the present execution petition filed on 22nd January, 1982, was beyond twelve years, the period prescribed under Art. 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and hence the execution petition ought to have been dismissed by the court below as time barred. Learned counsel for the second defendant admits that a period of two years, eleven months and twenty-three days may have to stand excluded as per the provisions Ss. 5 and 6 of the Tamil Nadu Indebted Persons (Temporary Relief) Act XLVIII of 1975 and Ss. 5 and 6 of the Tamil Nadu Indebted Persons (Temporary Relief) Act XVI of 1976 read with the amendment introduced by S. 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Laws Second (Amendment) Act I of 1977. The application, R.E.A. 750 of 1979 under S. 18 of the Act was preferred on 20th September, 1979 and it was disposed of on 29th April, 1980. Learned counsel for the second defendant would state there was no stay pending that application and if at all, the stay coud be operative only for a period of sixty days after that application was allowed on 8th April, 1980. Ths period of pendency of this application was admittedly seven months and eight days. Learned counsel for the second defendant would state there was no stay pending that application and if at all, the stay coud be operative only for a period of sixty days after that application was allowed on 8th April, 1980. Ths period of pendency of this application was admittedly seven months and eight days. If this period is not excluded, the execution proceedings levied on 22nd January, 1982, will be barred by limitation. But Mr. T. Somasundaram, learned counsel for the plaintiff, relying on a pronouncement of Ramanujam, J. in Nachimuthu Chettiar v. Moorthammal , 1 would submit that once an application for stay under S. 18 of the Act is filed, claiming the benefits of the Act, the jurisdiction of the executing Court to execute the decree is suspended and kept in abeyance until the said application is disposed of and S. 18 has got to be treated as a fetter on the power of the executing Court to execute the decree during this period. The judgment of Ramanujam, J. is one rendered under the Tamil Nadu Agriculturists Relief Act IV of 1938 and the provision dealt with by the learned Judge is S. 20 of the said Act. The language of S. 20 of the said Act is in pari materia with the language of S. 18 of the Act. S. 18 of the Act reads as follows:— “ Stay of execution proceedings ;—Every Court executing a decree passed against a person entitled to the benefits of this Act shall, on application, stay the proceeding until the Court which passed the decree has passed the decree has passed orders on an application made or to be made under S. 19 Provided that, where within sixty days after the application for stay has been granted, the judgment-debtor does not apply to the Court which passed the decreefor relief under S.)9 or where an application has been so made and is rejected, the decree shall be executed as it stands, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act to the contrary; “Explanation.—The expression” the court which passed the decree’ shall have the same meaning as in the Cods of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908”. The purpose and intendment of filing an application under S. 18 of the Act is to enable the judgment-debtor to seek the regular process under S. 16 of the Act for amendment of the decree as set out therein. In case the application under S. 18 is allowed, the judgment-debtor will have the time of sixty days to prefer the requisite application under S. 16 and only if he does not apply or where such an application has been so made and is rejected, the decree shall be executed as it stands, not-withstanding anything contained in the Act to the contrary. Though S. 18 does not say so in specific terms that on the very filing of the application execution will stand stayed, the only implication deducible from this provision is that the very filing of the application under S. 18 will operate as a fetter for prosecuting the execution proceedings further. Otherwise, the said provision, S. 18 of the Act, will not serve the purpose for which it is intended. If the execution proceedings are allowed to be prosecuted further when an application under S. 18 is pending, the result will lead to an in-congruous and sometimes irreconcilable position involving the rights of third parties also. On the application under S. 18 getting ultimately allowed, the judgment-debtor may prefer a regular application under S. 16 within the time and he may succeed in getting the decree amended or a full satisfaction entered thereof as contemplated under S. 16 of the Act, and in such a case the prosecution of the execution proceedings may have to fall down. By that time execution safe would have taken place and third party purchaser would have come to the picture and all these proceedings will have to be ignored as the result of the ultimate order under S. 16 of the Act. The view expressed by Ramanujam, J. In Nachi Muthu Chettiar v. Moorthammal , 1 supports this view of mine. Of course, the learned Judge held that the very holding of the execution sale when an application under S. 20 of the Tamil Nadu Agriculturists Relief Act was pending will be vitiated. There is no need to go thus far on the facts of the present case. Of course, the learned Judge held that the very holding of the execution sale when an application under S. 20 of the Tamil Nadu Agriculturists Relief Act was pending will be vitiated. There is no need to go thus far on the facts of the present case. Suffice it to lay down the principle that by legal implication and by a cohesive reading of the provisions of the Act, the filing of the application under S. 18 of the Act, will operate as an automatic stay of the execution proceedings until the application is disposed of. If this is the legal position to be applied to the facts of the present case, there is a warrant for excluding she period of seven months and eight days during which R.E A. 750 of 1979 was pending. If so excluded, the total period of exclusion will come to three years, seven months and one day. If this period is added on to the regular period of 12 years, the available period within which the execution could be levied is 15 years, seven months and one day. Clarifying this position Mr. T. Somasundaram, learned counsel for the plaintiff, has filed a memo for the period of limitation and it will stand annexed to this order. In my view, the calculation in the said memo has been correctly done. The facts being what they are, the execution levied on 22nd January, 1982 was well within time and the court below did the (sic) right thing in rejecting the contention put forth by the second defendant on the question of limitation. 3. There is another view which is also possible to be taken on the facts disclosed and that is, on 28th April, 1980, the execution petition was merely closed and there was no adjudication of the rights of the parties on merits and there was no disposal of the application conclusively. In that case, such an order cannot be held to be a final one and must be deemed to be an order passed for statistical purposes. But, in view of the fact that the execution could be held to be within time, as per the ratio discussed above, learned counsel for the plaintiff did not pursue this line of submission. In the said circumstances, this revision is dismissed. No costs.