Judgment :- 1. Parambikulam is a forest area. There is a teak plantation also, around. Bamboo is transported from that area for the Gwalior Rayons pulp factory. The Divisional Forest Office has its headquarters at Thonikadav nearby. PW1. was the Forest Range Officers of Range No.3. Two other Range Officers, of ranges 1 and 2 are P.Ws 7 and 8. P.W1 was having the use of a car. It belonged to his brother-in law. P.W.6 was the driver. Accused No.1 is the transport agent of Gwalior Rayons. (There was suggestion that his uncle P. T. Devassia was a Conservator of Forest and that relationship secured him the transport contract). 2. The 2nd accused is the brother-in law of the 1st accused. 3rd accused is a worker there, who according to P.W 1, is known in the Parambikulam area as 'Choodan Vasu', the nickname perhaps indicating his volatile temperament. A8 is a member of the Panchayat. 3. According to the prosecution, at about 4.30.P.M., accused No.1 and 2 called at the office of P.W.1 and demanded passes for the transport of bamboo. P.W.1 replied that passes had already been issued to officials of the Gwaliyor Rayons. This had infuriated accused No.1 and 2. The 1st accused then showered P.W.1 with obscene words. Accused Nos.1 and 2 even obstructed P.W1 when he attempted to proceed in the car. The driver was in the car at that time. Threatening P.W 1 with dire consequences, the two accused left the place. P.W.1 accompanied by the other Range Officers P.Ws 7 and 8 proceeded to the Office of the D.F.O. by car; they transacted official business. P.W 1 informed him about the incidents that had taken place at his office in which accused Nos.1 and 2 were involved. The D.F.O. assured that proper steps would be taken in the matter. 4. P.W1 along with others returned in the same car, with P. Ws 6 and 7 in the front seat and PWs 1 and 8 in the back. When they reached the Para-mbikulam-Kuriyarkutty road junction, they came acorss an obstruction created by a log of timber placed across the road. The driver then stopped the car. From both sides of the wooded area, about 20 persons approached the car shouting obscene words. The 2nd accused opened the front door at the driver's seat and drew out the driver and beat him. The driver then stopped the car. From both sides of the wooded area, about 20 persons approached the car shouting obscene words. The 2nd accused opened the front door at the driver's seat and drew out the driver and beat him. P. Ws 7 and 8 opened the door on their sides and took to their heels for safety. PW1 was, however, closetted inside the car. The 3rd accused inserted his hand through the front left door and opened the lock of the back door. A1 and A8 opened the door and drew out P.W.1 from the car. Then followed an attack on him, A2 beating him with a torch, A1 beating him on the two shoulders and A8 cutting him with a chopper which caused injury on his right ear. The 3rd accused inserted his hand through the front left door and opened the lock of the back door. A1 and A3 opened the door and drew out P W1 from the car. Then followed an attack on him, A2 beating him with a torch, A1 beating him on the two shoulders and A8 cutting him with a chopper which caused injury on his right ear. The 3rd accused also cut him with a chopper. In his attempt to ward off the cut. the right palm of P. W1 was injured. A further attempt on the part of the 3rd accused was foiled by PW1 warding it off. The clothes of P. W.1 were drenched in blood. The accused caused hurt to the driver also. After thus mounting the attack, the accused caused damages to the car and escaped into the forest. 5. P. W1 was taken to the hospital at Chittur. The Doctor P. W4. examined P. W1 at 12.30 A. M. and P. W6 at 1.20 A.M. The Doctor proved, Exts. P4 and P5, the respective wound certificates. She sent an intimation to the police by Ext. P6. On receipt of the same, P. W5. Sub Inspector recorded the statement of P. W.1 and prepared Ext. P1 from the hospital. A case was registered and the FIR was prepared, marked as Ext.P7. The case was transferred as the case happened to take place in the Parambikulam area. P. W10 Sub Inspector of Parambikulam Police Station thereupon registered the case, (Ext.P8 being the FIR in that case) and conducted investigation. He prepared the mahazar Ext. P1 from the hospital. A case was registered and the FIR was prepared, marked as Ext.P7. The case was transferred as the case happened to take place in the Parambikulam area. P. W10 Sub Inspector of Parambikulam Police Station thereupon registered the case, (Ext.P8 being the FIR in that case) and conducted investigation. He prepared the mahazar Ext. P2, noted therein the articles including the glass pieces of the damaged car, and took to custody M, Os 3 to 6 under Ext. P9, M. 0.6 being the bamboo stick. He questioned P. W.1 on 27-11-1980. His clothes were taken into custody under the mahazar. P. Ws 2 and 3 are attesting witnesses, to the scene mahazar and recovery mahazar respectively. M. Os 1 and 2 are the shirt and banian worn by him. P. W9, Assistant Sub Inspector had arrested accused 10 and 20. 6. The 2nd accused was absconding during the trial. The case was therefore split and the trial against other accused proceeded. 7. The trial court acquitted accused 10 to 20 of all the charges. Accused 1 and 3 to 9 were convicted of offences, under S.143,147.148,324 and 332 I.P.C. Varying sentences were imposed including rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence under S.324 I. P. C. 8. In appeal, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused other than accused 1, 3 and 8. The conviction under S.324 and 427 of IPC was confirmed. They were acquitted of other offences. Rigorous imprisonment for six months was the sentence for the offence under S.324. No further sentence was imposed for the offence under S.427. 9. Accused 1, 3 and 8 have come up in revision complaining about the conviction and sentence. 10. Mr. James Koshy, appearing on behalf of the accused-Revision petitioners, put forward the following points. (1) There was a basic error in the investigation. (2) The motive alleged had not been satisfactorily proved. (3) No offence under S.427 had been made out and (4). As regards the 1st accused the offence under S.324 I.P.C. had not been made out. He also made a plea for release of the accused on probation, in the event of the convictions being confirmed. 11. The prosecution story had been proved by the evidence of P. Ws 1. 6, 7, and 8. Accused were persons familiar and known to those witnesses. He also made a plea for release of the accused on probation, in the event of the convictions being confirmed. 11. The prosecution story had been proved by the evidence of P. Ws 1. 6, 7, and 8. Accused were persons familiar and known to those witnesses. The evidence of P. Ws 1 and 6 had received corroboration from the evidence of Exts P5 and 6 wound certificates and the evidence of P.W5. The courts below have rightly believed the evidence of the witnesses and based the conviction on the solid evidence so furnished by their testimony. The conclusions of the courts below could not be shown to be erroneous in any way. It is perhaps in that background that counsel attempted projecting the case of the accused in the manner indicated above. 12. The evidence in the case clearly establishes that P. Ws 1 and 6, who are the victims of the cruel attack, had to proceed to the Chittur hospital due to the nonavailability of adequate medical facilities in other places nearby. This is easily understandable as the area is hilly and isolated. And promptly they were attended to by P. W 5; and intimation to the police given with all reasonable despatch. The FIR was recorded- by the Sub Inspector without delay. It was duly transmitted to P. W9, as the crime was committed within the jurisdiction of that station. There is absolutely nothing strange or suspicious in the conduct of P. Ws 1 and 6 or on the part of the Police in acting in the manner they did. As soon as the obstruction was noticed and the attack commenced, P. Ws 7 and 8 had intimated the police about the same. The criticism is about the omission to record the first information. If the Sub Inspector thought it fit to rush to the spot with a view to save the victims from the attack, that conduct could not be treated as suspicious and is not fatal to the Prosecution. It must, in this context, be noted that no prejudice to the accused had been suggested as a result of the omission of the Parambikulam Police to prepare the first information report. The plea of the accused was one of complete denial. No suggestion was made to any of the prosecution witnesses, P. Ws 9 and 10 about any delay in the preparation of the FIR. The plea of the accused was one of complete denial. No suggestion was made to any of the prosecution witnesses, P. Ws 9 and 10 about any delay in the preparation of the FIR. There was no cross-examination on this aspect when P. W5, Sub Inspector of Chittur Police Station gave evidence in the case. There is therefore no substance in the first contention. 13. The submission that the motive has not been proved is also without any merit. P. Ws 1, 6, 7 and 8 have given evidence about the incidents at 4.30 P. M. on the same day at the office of P. W.I. The threatening and obscene words used by accused 1 and 2 when P.W.1 informed about the issue of passes to the officials of the Gwalior Rayons have been spoken to by them. That evidence has been accepted and acted upon by the courts below. The courts below have acted correctly in so doing. 14. The submission that an offence under S.427 has not been made out also fails in the light of the evidence available in the case. The destruction of car is amply proved by the oral and documentary evidence in the case. P. Ws 1, 6 and 7 have given evidence about the damage caused to the car. It must be noted that the prominent and leading roles played by accused 1, 3 and 8 have been clearly spoken to by P.W.1 in particular. The statement about damage caused by the accused as occurring in the testimony of PW.1 has to be understood in that background. After a discussion of the entire evidence on that aspect, the appellate court observed: "The evidence of PWs.1, 6, 7 and 8 show that the car in which they were travelling had been damaged and the total damages was far more than Rs. 50/-. The damages could have been caused only by those persons who obstructed the vehicle, Al, A3 and A8 have also therefore to bear the responsibility for that offence as well. Therefore they are guilty of the offence punishable under S.427 I. P. C.-also." The evidence in the case fully supports the above conclusion. This contention also has therefore to be repelled. 15. The contention that an offence under S.324 I.P C. had not been made out had been put forward as regards the 1st accused. Therefore they are guilty of the offence punishable under S.427 I. P. C.-also." The evidence in the case fully supports the above conclusion. This contention also has therefore to be repelled. 15. The contention that an offence under S.324 I.P C. had not been made out had been put forward as regards the 1st accused. As noted by the court below, he beat PW1 with a bamboo stick. The evidence of PW1 about his having been beaten by the 1st accused with the bamboo stick has been correctly accepted by the courts below. Ext. P10 recovery mahazar indicates that the bamboo stick is 103 centimetre long and 11 centimetre in circumference. The question whether a weapon is one which is likely to cause death, is one of fact. The courts below on the basis of the evidence and materials before them were satisfied that the weapon was one which was likely to cause death. P.W4, the Doctor, has noted among others, abrasions on the face and mouth of P.WI. There was no suggestion at any time earlier that the weapon referred to in Ext. P9 was not one likely to cause death. The observations of the Rangoon High Court in Nga Po Nyan v. Emperor (AIR 1937 Rangoon 8) have to be understood in the background of the factual finding there that the blow awarded in that case by the accused was of comparatively harmless kind. In the present case, there is positive evidence about the size and nature of the bamboo stick. Cases where such evidence is absent have therefore to be distinguished from the present case. No case exists for any interference with the conviction and sentence of the courts below on this count either. 16. The plea for release of the accused under S.4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 was considered by the court below but rejected with the following observations: "The circumstances of the case do not justify the benevolent provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act being applied to them. They have waylaid responsible Officers of Government and physically assaulted them, for some official order passed by one of them. It was a pre-meditated act and they cannot be pardoned for the outrageous act committed by them. The prayer for release of these appellants under the Probation of Offenders Act cannot therefore be allowed. 17. As noted earlier, the last submission of Mr. It was a pre-meditated act and they cannot be pardoned for the outrageous act committed by them. The prayer for release of these appellants under the Probation of Offenders Act cannot therefore be allowed. 17. As noted earlier, the last submission of Mr. James Koshy on behalf of the revision petitioners was regarding the benefit of S.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While considering that plea, the court must necessarily have an overall view of the facts of the case and matters pertinent to the object underlying the section. As observed by the Supreme Court in Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramachandra Dange, AIR 1974 SC 228, the kindly application of the probation principle cannot be invoked in the case of a man "whose anti-social operations, disguised as a respectable trade, imperil numerous innocents." It was noted that "economic offences committed by white collar criminals are unlikely to be dissuaded by the gentle probationary process." The Supreme Court noted that the 27th report of the Law Commission had recommended the exclusion of the Probation of Offenders Act to social and economic offences by suitable amendments. There was a reiteration of the view, in Prem Ballab v. State, Delhi Administration, AIR 1977 SC 56. A similar approach was made by the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 Crl. Q. 1218 in the context of the sentencing policy for offenders connected with illicit liquor. 18. The interaction of S.360 and 361 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the duty of the court in that context had been neatly analysed by a Bench decision of the Punjab High Court, where the questions appear to have been debated exhaustively and effectively, in the context of a reference made to the Division Bench when the correctness of some of the earlier decisions of this Court was doubted. The court observed: "It is not as if S.360 of the Code is an inflexible mandate to grant probation to eligible persons but indeed casts only a duty on the Court to consider the expediency or otherwise of the grant of probation. There is no gainsaying the fact that since S.361 of the Code requires special reasons for declining it in the case of persons eligible for its benefit, the broad rule would be the grant of the same and its refusal would be for good reasons. There is no gainsaying the fact that since S.361 of the Code requires special reasons for declining it in the case of persons eligible for its benefit, the broad rule would be the grant of the same and its refusal would be for good reasons. It may then be noticed that the equally significant words in S.360(1) are "the Court may instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment. The word used herein again is "may" and there is no reason to read it as "shall" and it was not even remotely argued before us that this should be so construed. Again the aforesaid words expressly leave the alternative to the discretion of the Magistrate by using the word "instead" for the two alternatives of sentencing him to punishment or the grant of probation. It is thus manifest that S.360 vests a discretion in the sentencing Court." Guidelines in the matter of exercise of the discretion was thereafter considered by the aforesaid decision. It was observed that 'the policy of the law is that where an offence is an overly heinous one grant of probation is ruled out as a matter of law. The heinousness of the offence and its deleterious effect on the body politic is, in the eye of law, "if not fundamental, a very relevant factor for the grant or refusal of probation." I am in respectful agreement with the analysis of the section and the summing up of the legal position. 19. A distinction has to be made between crimes which are not temperamental or committed on the impulse of the moment but is a part and parcel of an organised underworld set up. Where there is evidence of an organised activity for commercial gain, an inflexible inference that the offender is connected with an organised racket can be safely drawn. In that context, a plea that he is a first offender may not be an innocent one. As observed by the Punjab High Court in the decision, 1980 Crl. L.J 1218 supra the mere fact that no earlier connection stands proved against him would not necessarily imply that it is the first offence which he had in fact committed. It perhaps indicates only the fortuitous circumstance that he may have been caught for the first time." 20. As observed by the Punjab High Court in the decision, 1980 Crl. L.J 1218 supra the mere fact that no earlier connection stands proved against him would not necessarily imply that it is the first offence which he had in fact committed. It perhaps indicates only the fortuitous circumstance that he may have been caught for the first time." 20. As regards the offence with which the present revision petitioners are concerned, the observations made by the Punjab High Court in the background of a case where a substantial quantity of opium was hauled, have fuller application. In a sense, the crime in relation to the forest, and those engaged in the protection of the forest, is more heinous. The Constitution of India, emphasises in more places than one, the importance of the forest wealth. Art.48 A. enunciates the Directive Principles of State Policy whereunder the State shall endeavour to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country. A Fundamental Duty, is cast on a citizen under Art.51 A, "to protect and improve the natural environment including forest Organised activities to loot the forest wealth going on in the State cannot go unnoticed. The deleterious effect on the depredation of forest which will inevitably lead to the desertification of the country, cannot be missed except by those having a mental pres myopia. A mighty financial organisation, influences spreading in very many spheres, and organization of unruly elements-are all part and parcel of such rackets mounting attacks on forest wealth and those who guard the forests. Those who are found guilty of offences in such cases cannot claim with grace the benefit of S.360 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It will be a proper sentencing policy to have appropriate deterrent sentences for such offenders. The special features relating to offence under the Forest Act, in relation to the declining of the benefit under S.360, have been noted by the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court reported in Inder Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1983 Crl. L.J.N.O.C.198. 21. The submission of counsel based on S.360 of the Criminal Procedure Code overlooks the decision of this Court in State of Kerala v. George, 1983 KLT 811. L.J.N.O.C.198. 21. The submission of counsel based on S.360 of the Criminal Procedure Code overlooks the decision of this Court in State of Kerala v. George, 1983 KLT 811. That decision has held that as regards the State of Kerala, the provisions of S.360 of the Code are inapplicable, for the reason that a State enactment the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958-is in force in the State. The learned Sessions Judge was therefore correct in considering the question of probation under the State enactment, in the manner noted earlier. The provisions of the State enactment have also come up for judicial interpretation. In the context of a conviction under the Abkari Act, 1950, Bhat J. observed in Ammini v. State of Kerala 1981 K. L. T. S.N.28, Case No. 50: "Of course, courts must always bear in mind that the offences rendered punishable under the Abkari Act are serious offences not only involving revenue of the State but also involving public health. This background must be present in the mind of the Court when assessing whether probation treatment could be given to a particular offender." 22. Janaki Amma J. was more emphatic in Mathai John v. State of Kerala, 1978 K. L. T. 154. The learned judge repelled a contention that the Act was not applicable when a statute like the Abkari Act prescribed a minimum sentence; and continued: "This does not, however, mean that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act should be applied to all cases arising under the Abkari Act. Like adulteration of food, illicit manufacture of liquor is also an offence which has an adverse impact on society and on the economy of the State. Prohibition of the consumption of intoxicating liquor except for medicinal purpose is included in the Directive Principles of State Policy as will be seen from Art.47 of the Constitution. A deliberate and calculated move to defy the provisions of the Abkari and Excise law prompted by profit making motive does not deserve sympathetic consideration. The salutary provisions contained in the Probation of Offenders Act may not serve their purpose by indiscriminate application of its provision." 23. The necessity to have much circumspection in extending probation treatment in cases where there is a social abhorrence towards the offence and a necessity that 'such offences should be stopped with 'stern hand' had also been emphasised therein. The salutary provisions contained in the Probation of Offenders Act may not serve their purpose by indiscriminate application of its provision." 23. The necessity to have much circumspection in extending probation treatment in cases where there is a social abhorrence towards the offence and a necessity that 'such offences should be stopped with 'stern hand' had also been emphasised therein. (The decision of Janaki Amma J. does not appear to have been brought to the notice of Bhat J. while rendering the decision in Ammini v. State of Kerala supra). 24. In the light of the above principles, the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of S.360 of the Criminal Procedure Code, or S.4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 25. In the result, the criminal revision petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed.