JUDGMENT P. D. Desai, C. J.—Rule. To be heard today. 2. The learned Advocate General waives service of the Rule. 3. On April 24, 1976, a first information report was lodged at the police station for an offence punishable under Section 409 I. P. C. in which the petitioner was named as an accused. The petitioner was consequently detained in police custody for a period exceeding 48 hours. Thereupon, under an order dated May 11, 1976, Annexure PA, the petitioner was placed under suspension on and with effect from May 7, 1976 in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter called "the Rules"). The order directed, inter-alia, that the petitioner would remain under suspension till further orders. 4. Pursuant to the investigations held consequent upon the lodgement of the first information report, two separate challans were presented by the prosecuting agency against the petitioner each for an offence punishable under Section 409 I.P.C. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solan, who tried those two cases, convicted the petitioner under Section 409, I.P.C. and sentenced him to imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and, in default, to rigorous imprisonment for six months, in each case. The orders of conviction and sentence were passed on April 11, 1980. The petitioner preferred two separate appeals against the said orders of conviction and sentence. Those appeals were heard by the Sessions Judge, Solan Sessions Division, at Nahan By two separate judgments and orders, rendered on November 30, 1981, the appeals were accepted and the petitioner was acquitted in both the cases. 5. After the acquittal, the petitioner made written applications requesting that he be re-instated in service in view of his having been exonerated by the criminal court as regards the charges levelled against him. Those applications were made on September 4, 1982, October 18, 1982, January 18, 1983, April 22, 1983 and January 28, 1984. The petitioners request for re-instatement does not appear to have been favourably considered since he is still not re-instated and his applications have not been even acknowledged. Those applications were made on September 4, 1982, October 18, 1982, January 18, 1983, April 22, 1983 and January 28, 1984. The petitioners request for re-instatement does not appear to have been favourably considered since he is still not re-instated and his applications have not been even acknowledged. Hence the present petition praying, inter alia, that the impugned order of suspension be revoked and that the pay and allowances of the petitioner be directed to be paid from the day when the petitioner was put under suspension till the day of his actual reinstatement. 6. Rule 10 of the Rules deals with suspension. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10, in so far as it is relevant for the present purposes, enables the appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the President, by general or special order, to place a Government servant under suspension in any of the following situations : (a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending ; or (aa) where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State ; or (b) where a case against him in respect of criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial. 7. Sub-rule (2), inter-alia, provides that a Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of appointing authority : (a) with effect from the date of his detention ; if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours ; (b) with effect from the date of his conviction if, in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsory retired consequent to such conviction. 8. 8. Sub-rule (3) provides that where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a government servant under suspension is set aside in appeal or on review under the Rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in force until further orders. 9. Sub-rule (4) provides that where a penalty or dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a court of law and the disciplinary authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. There is a proviso to sub-rule (4) which enacts that no such further inquiry shall be ordered unless it is intended to meet a situation where the Court has passed an order purely on technical grounds without going into the merits of the case. 10. Sub-rule (5) provides that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been under the Rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or rovoked by the authority competent to do so. However, where a government servant is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise) and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the Government servant shall continue to be under suspension until the termination of all or any such proceedings. An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under the Rule may at any time be modified or revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate. 11. The impugned order of suspension was apparently made in order to give effect to the fiction created by sub-rule (2) of Rule 10. At the point of time when the order was made, the conditions for the exercise of such power may be presumed to have been duly satisfied. The question, however, is whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the continued operation of the order of suspension is legal, proper and reasonably justified in the eye of law. 12. It may be recalled in this connection that as a result of the lodgement of the first information, the petitioner was detained in custody and that after investigation, he was put up for trial in two cases before a criminal court. The trial court convicted him but the appellate court acquitted him in both the cases. The orders of acquittal are indubitably under challenge in the High Court. The preferment of acquittal appeals cannot, however, be regarded as the continuance of the trial. The trials have concluded with the judgment of acquittal. [See State v. B.C. Dwivedi, 1983 (21 XXIV GLR 1315). The initial presumption of innocence must, therefore, be regarded as having been doubly reinforced by orders of acquittal passed in favour of the petitioner. Under such circumstances, the continued operation of the order of supension as from the date of acquittal cannot be regarded as reasonable, fair and just. Merely because the petitioner was, at one point of time, detained in custody for a period exceeding forty-eight hours, he cannot be kept under suspension perpetually, especially when the allegations on the basis of which he was detained and which ultimately became the subject matter of two trials before the criminal court, are found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been not established beyond reasonable doubt. Under the circumstances, in our opinion, on a rational and just view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is required to be re-instated in service on and with effect from the date of the orders of acquittal. Under the circumstances, in our opinion, on a rational and just view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is required to be re-instated in service on and with effect from the date of the orders of acquittal. If the acquittal appeals are allowed and the petitioner is convicted, there is nothing to prevent the competent authority from dealing with the petitioner in accordance with law. If, on the other hand, the acquittal appeals fail and a departmental inquiry, if any, is ordered to be instituted on the same charges, it would not be fair and just and reasonable to suspend the petitioner once again in view of the initial presumption of innocence having been reinforced twice over. 13. It would be pertinent, in this connection, to refer to the decision in Corporation of Nagpur City v. Ramachandra, [1981 (2) SCC 714]. In that case, the order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on September 23, 1974. The order was confirmed by the Corporation on the same day. The suspension was ordered in connection with a departmental enquiry relating to two accidents which occurred during the construction of a stadium which was being looked after by the delinquents and which resulted in the death of seven persons and injuries to eight others. A complaint was also filed before the police as a result of which a charge-sheet under Section 304-A, I.P.C, was filed against the delinquents on September 25, 1976. In view of the charge-sheet submitted by the police, another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on January 12, 1977 with effect from October 8, 1976. The delinquents filed an unsuccessful appeal to the departmental appellate authority and thereafter moved a writ petition which was allowed and the order" of suspension was quashed on the ground that the competent authority to pass the order of suspension was the Corporation itself and not the Chief Executive Officer. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Municipal Commissioner was fully competent to suspend the delinquents and that, therefore the decision rendered in the writ petition was not sustainable. The Supreme Court, however, proceeded to make the following observations : "The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. The Supreme Court, however, proceeded to make the following observations : "The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court............................................... If, however, the authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the inquiry, it can certainly do so. In case the respondents are acquitted, we direct that the order of suspension shall be revoked and the respondents will be reinstated and allowed full salary thereafter even though the authority chooses to proceed with the inquiry.................If the respondents are convicted, then the legal consequences under the rules will automatically follow." (Italicised words supplied) The direction given in the aforesaid case indicates that, ordinarily, when a delinquent, who has been hauled up before a criminal court for trial on certain charges, is acquitted, the order of suspension should be revoked and the delinquent should be reinstated, even if the authority chooses to proceed departmentally against the delinquent. The view which we are herein inclined to take finds support in the observations made and directions given in the aforesaid case by the Supreme Court. 14. Be it stated that the Gujarat High Court has-also taken the view similar to that, which is being taken by us herein, in B.C. Dwivedi’s case (supra) in analogous fact-situation. 15. For the foregoing reasons, the respondents are directed to revoke the order of suspension and to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith with effect from the date on which the orders of acquittal were recorded by the appellate court-in the criminal proceedings instituted against him, that is, November 30, 1981. As regards the treatment of the period actually spent by the petitioner under suspension from May 7, 1976 till November 29, 1981, and the reification of his pay and allowances for the said period, the competent authority will make suitable orders in accordance with law and in light of the provisions of F.R. 54. As regards the treatment of the period actually spent by the petitioner under suspension from May 7, 1976 till November 29, 1981, and the reification of his pay and allowances for the said period, the competent authority will make suitable orders in accordance with law and in light of the provisions of F.R. 54. As regards the period commencing from November 30, 1981 till the date of actual reinstatement of the petitioner pursuant the order made here-in above, the petitioner will be entitled to all the benefits following upon such reinstatement including back wages which shall be adjusted against the suspension allowance already drawn. 16. Rule made absolute accordingly, with no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.