Deena Nath Banerjee v. Govind Singh — 1984 DIGILAW 360 (PAT)

JUDGMENT : B. P. Jha, J.- This civil, revision Petition arises out of a compromise entered into between plaintiff no. 2 on one side and defendants nos. 1 and 2 on the other. The compromise was challenged by defendant no. 2, Deena Nath Banerjee. The court below held that the compromise was valid and enforceable under ORDER :23, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). 2. The compromise petition is Annexure 1 to the civil revision petition. On a perusal of the compromise petition (Annexure 1), it is clear that the compromise petition was filed on behalf of plaintiff no. 2, defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 2. It is relevant to quote the topical portion of the compromise petition which is as follows: “Humble petition on behalf of plaintiff 2, Lal Subhagya Sharan Singh and defendant no. 1, Sri Granth Saheb and defendant no. 2, Sri Dinanath Banerjee, Most respectfully sheweth :" 3. It is, therefore, clear that the compromise petition was filed in respect of the compromise entered into between plaintiff no. 2 on the one hand and defendants nos. 1 and 2 on the other hand. The compromise petition was duly signed by plaintiff no. 2 as well as by Dinanath Banerjee (defendant no. 2). The compromise petition also bears the signature of Deomuni Das, an authorised representative of Granth Saheb. The advocates of the abovementioned persons also signed the compromise petition. Defendant no. 2 also mentioned the date on which he signed the compromise petition. 4. Before entering into the compromise, an agreement was entered into between defendant no. 1 (Granth Saheb) and defendant no. 2 Dinanath Banerjee. The agreement (Ext. 7) dated 2nd February, 1978 was a registered one. By this agreement, Dinanath Banerji (defendant no. 2) delivered possession of the suit properties along with other properties to Deomuni Das, authorised representative of defendant no. 1. This fact is mentioned in paragraph no. 13 of the compromise petition. Paragraph no. 14 of the compromise petition is as follows: "That defendant no. 2 as such is no longer in possession and management of the suit property i.e. the haat and therefore the question of recovery ofpossessi0n of the haat from him in the suit does not arise." 5. 13 of the compromise petition. Paragraph no. 14 of the compromise petition is as follows: "That defendant no. 2 as such is no longer in possession and management of the suit property i.e. the haat and therefore the question of recovery ofpossessi0n of the haat from him in the suit does not arise." 5. The present suit was filed by the plaintiffs for a declaration of their title over the haat (market) and for recovery of possession from defendant no. 2 (Dinanath Banerjee). In view of the registered agreement dated 2nd February, 1978, it is clear that there was no need to recover possession from defendant no. 2 as defendant no. 2 had already delivered possession of the haat (suit property) to defendant no. 1. It is, therefore, clear that defendant no. 2 had no concern with the haat in view of the registered agreement dated 2nd February, 1978. It is for this reason that the plaintiff no. 2 and defendants nos. 1 and 2 entered into the compromise. The very signature of defendant no. 2 (Dinanath Banerjee) clearly suggested that Dinanath Banerjee supported the compromise. 6. The properties in suit originally belonged to Sri Kedar Nath Banerjee. He executed a will in the year 1914 in favour of Granth Saheb (defendant no.1). Defendant no. 1 was the Jega1ee under the will. One Sri Haridas Banerjee was appointed executor under the will, and, after his death, his male heirs were to act as executors of the will. Under the terms of the will, Srimati Hemangini Devi, widow of Sri Kedarnath Banerjee, got life interest during her lifetime. Srimati Hemangini Devi settled the haat (suit properties) in favour of Devendra Mohan Mukherje and Purnendu Mohan Mukherjee under a registered deed in 1936. Subsequently, Devendra Mohan Mukherjee and Purnendu Mohan Mukherjee sold the suit properties to Mahabir Singh by a registered sale deed dated 27th February, 1962. Plaintiff no. 1 is the son of Mahabir Singh. Mahabir Singh sold the haat (suit properties) to plaintiff no. 2 by a registered sale deed dated 8th June, 1965. 7. Dinapath Banerjee (defendant no. 2) is the son of Hari Das Banerjee. He is simply the executor of the will. The legatee of the will is Granth Saheb. The authurised representative of Granth Saheb is Deomuni Das. By the registered agreement dated 2nd February, 1978, defendant no. 2 by a registered sale deed dated 8th June, 1965. 7. Dinapath Banerjee (defendant no. 2) is the son of Hari Das Banerjee. He is simply the executor of the will. The legatee of the will is Granth Saheb. The authurised representative of Granth Saheb is Deomuni Das. By the registered agreement dated 2nd February, 1978, defendant no. 2 delivered the possession of the haat (suit properties) to defendant no. 1. The finding of the court below in paragraph no. 20 of the JUDGMENT : is that the correctness and genuineness of the registered deed dated 2nd February, 1978 (Ext. 7)• has been accepted by defendant no. 2. It has also been found that no objection was raised on behalf of defendant no. 2 against the agreement. If the agreement is correct and genuine, then defendant 110. 1 is only interested in the haat in question (suit properties) and defendant no. 2 has no interest in the haat, as defendant no. 2 had already delivered possession of the haat to defendant no. 1. 8. Defendant no. 2 is only the executor of the will and not the legatee of the will. The legatee of the will is only defendant no. 1. There was no need to obtain the signature of Dinanath Banerjee on the compromise petition in view of the agreement dated 2nd February, 1978, but the signature of defendant no. 2 was obtained only for caution sake. The topical portion of the compromise petition suggests that the compromise was entered into between plaintiff no. 2 on 0l1e hand and defendants nos. 1 and 2 on the other hand. 9. The case of defendant no. 2 in this connection is that he put his signature on a blank paper and not on the compromise petition (Annexure-I). The court below held in this connection in paragraph no. 13 of the JUDGMENT : that defendant no. 2 is a highly educated and wordly person and he has read up to M. A. He has also been a teacher in a High English School. In this circumstance, the court below held that it was not possible for a literate man like defendant no. 2 to hand over a blank paper with his signature to Deomuni Das. Therefore it was alleged by defendant no. 2 in the objection petition that fraud was practised in respect of the compromise petition. In this circumstance, the court below held that it was not possible for a literate man like defendant no. 2 to hand over a blank paper with his signature to Deomuni Das. Therefore it was alleged by defendant no. 2 in the objection petition that fraud was practised in respect of the compromise petition. The finding of the court below is that the theory of fraud as set up by defendant no.2 with regard to the compromise, petition is wholly falsified. The trial court further held that the compromise was effected after due deliberation between the parties concerned, and no element of fraud was established on behalf of defendant no. 2. In, my opinion, the finding of fact arrived at by the court below is a correct one, and, there is no question of any jurisdictional error or injustice caused to defendant no. 2 as he ceased to have any interest in the suit properties in view of the registered agreement dated 2nd February, 1978. 10. Plaintiff no. 1 has no interest in the haat in question as the father of plaintiff no. 1, Sri Mahabir Singh already sold the haat in question to defendant no. 2. Therefore, only two persons have interest in the suit properties, namely, defendant no. 2 (executor) and defendant no. 1 (legatee) of the will. No challenge has been made either by plaintiff no. 2 or defendant no. 1 in respect of the validity of the compromise. So far as defendant no. 2 is concerned, he has no concern with the haat in question in view of the registered agreement dated 2nd February, 1978. As such, I affirm the findings arrived at by the court below in this connection. 11. The next question raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the compromise petition (Annexure-1) was not duly verified in accordance with the procedure laid down under the Code. In my opinion, it is not necessary. ORDER :23, rule 3 of the Code provides that the court must be satisfied that the compromise is in writing and signed by the parties. It is, therefore, clear that it is not at all necessary that the compromise petition should be verified. The court is required to be satisfied as provided under ORDER :23, rule 3 of the Code that the compromise is in writing and is signed by the parties. It is, therefore, clear that it is not at all necessary that the compromise petition should be verified. The court is required to be satisfied as provided under ORDER :23, rule 3 of the Code that the compromise is in writing and is signed by the parties. In my opinion, the court below was right in holding that the compromise was duly signed by plaintiff no. 2, defendants nos. 1 and 2. The signature of defendant no. 2 is not denied by defendant no. 2. 12. Over and above, defendant no. 2 filed two objection petitions in respect of the compromise. The first objection petition was filed On 15th June 1978 (Ext. 4) In that petition, he admitted to have signed the compromise petition on 8th May, 1978 (see paragraph no. 11 of the JUDGMENT :). In the second objection petition dated 29th June, 1978, defendant no. 2 stated that he banded over his signature on a blank paper to Deo Muni Das. In my opinion, it is an after thought story and, hence, this story was rightly disbelieved by the court below. 13. Apart from these facts, the compromise petition bears the signature of Sri Nand Nandan Nanakuliyar, Counsel for Dinanath. Banerjee (defendant no. 2). He was also examined as P. W. 1. He supported the plaintiffs' case and stated that Dinanath Banerjee and Deo Muni Das put their signatures on the compromise petition. He also accepted the vakalatnama. This fact has been discussed in paragraph no. 14 of the JUDGMENT :. In the same paragraph, the evidence of P. W. 2 has also been discussed. P.W. 2 is the typist. He stated that the compromise petition was typed by him. He further stated that defendant no. 2 had given the draft of the compromise petition to him for typing •out. The lawyer for the plaintiff was also examined. It is on the basis of these facts the court below was justified in holding that defendant no. 2 was a party to the compromise petition (Annexure 1). I, therefore, hold that the objection as raised by defendant no. 2 was rightly rejected by the court below. I also hold that defendant no. 2 was a party to the compromise petition (Annexure 1) which was. duly signed by him. I uphold all the findings of the court below. 2 was a party to the compromise petition (Annexure 1). I, therefore, hold that the objection as raised by defendant no. 2 was rightly rejected by the court below. I also hold that defendant no. 2 was a party to the compromise petition (Annexure 1) which was. duly signed by him. I uphold all the findings of the court below. In my opinion, the compromise is a genuine and correct document which was duly signed by plaintiff no. 2 and defendants nos. 1 and 2. 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not raised any jurisdictional question or error of jurisdiction committed by the court below. In my opinion, even if the ORDER :is allowed to stand, it would occasion no failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to defendant no. 2 as be has no interest in the suit properties in view of the registered agreement dated 2nd February, 1978. 15. In these circumstances, I dismiss the revision petition but without any costs.