Judgment :- The tenant is the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition, which is directed against the order of eviction passed against the petitioner by the authorities below on an application taken out by the deceased first respondent herein under section 10(3) (a) (ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 18 of 1960, as amended by Act 23 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The deceased first respondent herein was the landlord of a room in the occupation of the petitioner and situate in No. 66, Sattanna Naicken Street, Vepery, Madras-7. The petitioner has been using that room for the purpose of keeping cycles. Claiming that the premises in the occupation of the petitioner was required for the purpose of keeping the vehicles, namely, scooter and cycles belonging to his son, the deceased first respondent issued a notice on 25th November, 1980 demanding vacant possession of the premises by 1st January, 1981 and since that was not complied with, the deceased first respondent filed H.R.C. No. 3232 of 1981 before the Rent Controller (XIV Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras, under section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act praying for an order of eviction against the petitioner. 2. In the counter filed by the petitioner, in opposition to the application for eviction, he contended that owing to the refusal by the deceased first respondent to receive rents, proceedings had to be taken in H.R.C. No. 614 of 1981 that there was a demand for enhanced rent by the deceased first respondent herein at the rate of Rs. 100 per mensem and the petitioner refused to accede to such a demand and that led to the filing of the application for eviction and therefore, the requirement was not bona fide. Besides, the petitioner also put forth the plea that sufficient space was available for the purpose of parking the vehicles and that having regard to the non-residential nature of the premises where the petitioner was carrying on business, the deceased first respondent was not in order in seeking an order for eviction on the ground that he bona fide required the premises for keeping the vehicles of his son and the petitioner, therefore, prayed for the dismissal of the application for eviction. 3. 3. Before the learned Rent Controller (XIV Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras on behalf of the deceased first respondeat, his son was examined as P.W.1 and Exhibits P-1 to P-4 were marked, while, on behalf of the petitioner, he was examined as R.W. 1 and Exhibits R-1 to R-4 were filed. On a consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, the learned Rent Controller found that the son of the deceased first respondent owned scooter as well as cycles, that no separte space was available to keep those vehicles, that the application filed by the deceased first respondent under section 10(3) (a) (ii) of the Act was maintainable and that his requirement was bona fide. On the aforesaid conclusions, an order for eviction was passed against the petitioner. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner preferred an appeal in R.C.A. No. 188 of 1982 before the Appellate Authority (IV Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras. The Appellate Authority, on a reconsideration of the evidence, concluded that the son of the deceased first respondent was keeping his vehicles in the portion occupied by him for residential purposes, that section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act would stand attractes and section 10 (3) (c) of the Act would be inapplicable and that the requirement of the deceased first respondent was nothing but bona fide. In view of these findings, the Appellate Authority upheld the order of eviction and dismissed the appeal. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this Civil Revision Petition. 4. During the pendency of the Civil Revision Petition, the landlord Krishtappa Chetty, who initiated the proceedings, died and in C.M.P.No. 575 of 1984 taken out by the petitioner, Sri Kannan (P.W. 1) was brought on record as the legal representative of the deceased first respondent Krishtappa Chetty for purposes of prosecuting the further proceedings. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner first contended that the application for evict-tion filed under section 10 (3)(a) (ii) of the Act was not maintainable, as, on the facts of this case, the appropriate section that would be applicable is, section 10 (3) (c) of the Act in which case. the question of relative hardship has also to be adverted to and considered. the question of relative hardship has also to be adverted to and considered. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that having regard to the admitted non-residen-tial user of the premises by the petitioner for keeping cycles therein, there is no question of the respondent seeking additional accommodation under the Act, when the respondent was in occupation of a building for residential purposes and that section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act provides for a situation where a landlord is enabled to recover possession of a premises used for non-residential purposes, namely, keeping the vehicles irrespective of whether he is in possession of other premises. In this connection reliance was also placed by the learned counsel upon the decision in Jawanthari Mehta v. Ramachandra Chetty (C.R.P. Nos. 1294 and 1893 of 1962. 6. Before proceeding to embark upon a consideration of the aforesaid contention, it is necessary to notice a few undisputed facts. The petitioner is keeping cycles in the premises in his occupation. The respondent is keeping his vehicals in the portion occupied by him for purposes of residence. The petitioner has also further admitted that there is no separate space available in the premises under the occupation of the respondent to keep his vehicles. The ownership of the scooter as well as two cycles by the respondent is also not in dispute. Equally, there is no dispute that the premises in the occupation of the petitioner is a non-residential building used for the purpose of keeping cycles and that the respondent is not occupying any such nonresidential building for the purpose of keeping his vehicles. Under section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act, a landlord is enabled to seek an order of eviction with reference to a nonresidential building used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use. No question of adaptation of the building in question for the purpose of keeping a vehicle arises in this case as it is not disputed that the premises is used for keeping cycles. The further requirement of that pro-vison is that the landlord requires it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and that he or any member of his family is not in occupation of any such building. The further requirement of that pro-vison is that the landlord requires it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and that he or any member of his family is not in occupation of any such building. It is not the case of the petitioner that the respondent or any member of his family is in occupation of a non-residential building used or adapted for use for the purpose of keeping vehicles. Plainly, therefore, subject to establishing his requirement for his own use or for the use of any member of his family, the respondent would be ordinarily entitled to an order of eviction under section 10(3) (a) (ii) of the Act. But what is contended on behalf of the petitioner is that since the respondent is in occupation of a building for residential purposes, his remedy would be to proceed under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act and pray for additional accommodation, in which case, under the proviso following section 10 (3) (c) of the Act, therelative hardship would also be a relevant circumstance, which, when considered, may even result in the diamisal of the application for eviction. Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act contemplates occupation by the landlord of a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, and his requiring further accommodation is addition to what he has already. In such a situtation, notwithstanding section 10(3) (a) (ii) to (iii) of the Act, it would be open to the landlord to apply for an order directing the tenant in occupation of the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be. This is well settled by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Tirupathi Nadar and Sons v. Dr. S.L. Kantha Rao, (1980) T.L.N.J. 155. The use of non-obstance clause in section 10 (3) (a) of the Act clearly shows that it would apply even in cases where section 10 (3) (a) of the Act does not stand attracted. In other words, a landlord not entitled to apply for eviction under section 10 (3) (a) of the Act may nevertheless invoke section 10 (3) (c) of the Act and apply for eviction. In other words, a landlord not entitled to apply for eviction under section 10 (3) (a) of the Act may nevertheless invoke section 10 (3) (c) of the Act and apply for eviction. Therefore, while dealing with an application under section 10(3) (a) (ii) of the Act, the consideration which would be relevant to an independent light to secure additional accommodation under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act cannot be imported into section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act. Besides, from the provisions of the Act, despite the distinction made between residential and non-residential buildings, it is mainfest that a premises used for keeping a vehicle is treated as a non-residential building. It is also fuither seen from section 10 (3) (c) of the Act that to secure additional accommodation, whether of residential or non-residential building, the requirement of the landlord must be for residential purposes or for purposes of a business. This postulates that additional accommodation of a non-residential building, as we have in this case, can be had under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act only for] purposes of business which the landlord was carrying on and since in this case the landlord is admittedly not carrying on any business, he cannot apply under section 10 (3) (a) of the Act for an order of eviction in respect of a non-residential building for the purpose of keeping his vehicles. It is thus obvious that no application under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act could have been made. That this is so is laid down in Jawanthraj Mehta v. Rama-chandra Chetty, (1965) 78 Law Weekly (Short Notes) 65. In that case, the landlord was residing in the first-floor and the tenants were in occupation in the ground-floor in two portions and with reference to that building an application was made under section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act for the purpose of adapting the same as a garage to park the car as well as the cycle-rickshaw of the landlord. The Rent Controller was of the view that the application made by the landlord should be considered as one for additional accommodation under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act and taking into account the relative hardship, it was found it would cause undue hardship on the tenant than the advantages that may accrue to the landlord and on that conclusion, the application for eviction was dismissed. On appeal, the Appellate Authority however upheld the contention of the landlord that the application was sustainable under section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act and found that the requirement was also bona fide. Yet, the application for eviction was dismissed in part on the ground that there was no necessity to direct possession of both the rooms as the cycle-rickshaw could be parked elsewhere and car alone required to be parked in one of the rooms. The order so passed was challenged by the landlord as well as the tenant. One of the contentions urged was that the remedy of the landlord was by way of an application under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act and not under section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act. Dealling with this contention Natesan, J., pointed out that while the Act makes a distinction between residential and non-residential buildings, there are no specific definitions and, therefore, guided by the ordinary usage and connotation it was clear that a premises used for keeping vahi-cles is treated as non-residential building and that under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act,the additional accommodation could be for either residential or non-residential purpose and as such the landlord could apply for additional accommodation under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act only for purposes of a business which he is carrying on and be cannot under that provision apply for a nonresidential building for purposes of keeping his vehicle. This decision would squarely apply to the facts of this case to hold that the application filed by the landlord under section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act was quite in order and rightly entertained by the authorities below. There is, therefore, no substance in the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. This decision would squarely apply to the facts of this case to hold that the application filed by the landlord under section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act was quite in order and rightly entertained by the authorities below. There is, therefore, no substance in the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the requirement of the landlord was not bona fide at all as he was only anxious to ensure enhanced rent from the petitioner and did not genuinely require the premises in question for parking the aconter and the cycles. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the petitioner is not consistent at all in his case with reference to the so-called demand for payment of higher rent and that there is absolutely no material in support thereof and, therefore, the conclusion of the authorities below that the requirement is bona fide does not deserve to be disturbed. It is seen from the evidence as to the two cycles that he has no separate space to park those vehicles. In view of this admission of the petitioner himself, the bona fides of the requirement are clearly made out. Whether there was any demand for enhanced rent which would detract from the bona fide has next to be considered. It is seen from Exhibit P-1 that the landlord issued a notice to the petitioner stating that the monthly rental in respect of the premises is Rs.80 and that he requires the premises in the occupation of the petitioner for keeping his son’s vehicles. Exhibit P-2 in the reply sent by the petitioner to Exhibit P-4. Therein, the petitioner states that the monthly rent payable by him is only Rs.40 and not Rs. 80 and that certain payments are made in accordance therewith. The requirement for the purpose of keeping the vehicles of the son of the landlord is denied. It is further seen from Exhibit. P-2 that though the petitioner stated that the landlord had made a claim falling under section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act with a view to somehow evict the petitioner, that was only because the petitioner had not agreed to the demand to pay an enhanced rent. It is further seen from Exhibit. P-2 that though the petitioner stated that the landlord had made a claim falling under section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act with a view to somehow evict the petitioner, that was only because the petitioner had not agreed to the demand to pay an enhanced rent. The petitioner has not stated how much was demandad by the respondent and when, In the counter, the petitioner would say that a higher rent at Rs. 100 per mensum was demanded. Examined as R.W.1, the petitioner would say that the landlord demanded rent at Rs. 80 per mensem. There is no dispute that after the exchange of Exhibits P-1 andP-3, an application in H.R.C. No. 614 of 1981 was filed by the petitioner and rents had been deposited at the rate Rs. 40 per mensem pursuant to the orders pasrsd therein and this is established by Exhibit P-1 produced by the petitioner. There is no evidence, to show that subsequent to the passing of the order in H.R. C. No. 614 of 1981 and prior to the filing of application for eviction on 15th July, 1981, there was any demand whatever for payment of enhanced rent by the petitioner. If really there was such a demand and landlord had refused to receive the rent, one would have normally expected the petitioner to have issued a notice calling upon the landlord to receive the rent or informing him that he will resort to the remedies provided under the Act for payment or deposit of the rents. In the absence of evidence of steps taken by the petitioner, it is obvious that the so-called demand for enhanced rent at the rent of Rs. 100 per mensem is a total myth. The authorities below have adverted to the evidence in rela-tion to the demand stated to have been made by the landlord for enhanced rent and have found that it is not made out by the evidence on record. It, therefore, follows that the authorities below were quite in order in having pronounced upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord for the purposes of keeping the scooter and the cycles of his son, P.W.1. It, therefore, follows that the authorities below were quite in order in having pronounced upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord for the purposes of keeping the scooter and the cycles of his son, P.W.1. In any event, on the evidence, the authorities below have found as a fact that the requirement of the landlord was bona fide and no material has been placed before this Court to show that conclusion based on the appreciation of evidence is in any manner erroneous. No other point was urged. Consequently, the order of eviction passed by the authorities below is upheld and the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs.