DEVI DATT v. UNION OF INDIA — 1984 DIGILAW 367 (DEL)

J. D. JAIN, J. ( 1 ) THE facts giving rise to this suit in brief are that the plaintiff is a displaced person from West Pakistan, having migrated to India in the wake of partition of the country and settled here. He was allotted a plot of land bearing No. 6, Block 2, East Patel Nagar, New Delhi, measuring 800 sq. yards under a lease-deed executed in his favour by the President of India on 1st November 1950 on payment of Rs. 8,720. 00 as initial premium which was paid, by him in cash. Thereafter, on coming into force of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) a fresh lease deed was executed by the Managing officer in favour of the plaintiff as the said plot formed part of Compensation Pool created under S. 14 of the Act. The balance cost of-the land was paid by the plaintiff by adjustment of a part of the compensation payable to him under the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, viz: the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 (for short the Rules ). The lease deed was executed in the name and on behalf of the President of India (copy Ex. D18) on 22nd of June 1961. The lease was for a term of 99 years commencing from 16th of July 1959. One of the stipulations contained in the lease deed was that the lessee would not, without the written consent of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, carry on or permit to be carried on the said land and the buildings erected thereon during the period of the lease any trade or business whatsoever or use the same or permit the same to be used for any purpose other than that of a single-storeyed or double- storeyed residential flats. However the plaintiff let out a part of the ground floor of the building constructed by him on the aforesaid plot to the Union Bank of India Limited (for short UBI ) for carrying on their banking business sometime in 1964. On 24th May 1968 the Land and Development Officer, Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply, Govt. of India (for short the L and DO ) issued a show-cause notice to the plaintiff for and on behalf of the President of India (copy Ex. On 24th May 1968 the Land and Development Officer, Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply, Govt. of India (for short the L and DO ) issued a show-cause notice to the plaintiff for and on behalf of the President of India (copy Ex. D3) stating therein that he had been using the premises at 2/6, East Patel Nagar, for commercial/business purpose having let the same to the Union Bank of India in contravention of clause I (vi) of the lease deed under which he was restrained from using or permitting or suffering to be used the premises for any other purpose except that of residence. So, he was called upon to get the breach remedied or regularised within 15 days failing which the Chief Commissioner. Delhi, would be requested to permit exercising the right of re-entry as provided in clause II of the lease deed. Thereupon, the plaintiff made representation dated 31st May 1968 to the Lt. Governor, Union Territory of Delhi (copy Ex, D8) as being successor-in-office to the erstwhile Chief Commissioner of Delhi for according ex post facto sanction permitting the use of a portion of the ground floor of his building No. 2/6, East Patel Nagar, by UBI for the purpose of banking and residence of their staff. While giving reasons for grant of ex post facto sanction he, inter alia, requested that the technical breach on his part in not obtaining his prior sanction of the Chief Commissioner for use of the premises for a purpose other than residence be also condoned. He also informed the L and DO vide another letter of even date (copy Ex. D10) that he had written to the Lt. Governor to accord the necessary sanction and requested him for allowing a reasonable time for a decision to be given on his application by the Lt. Governor. The aforesaid representation was forwarded to the L DO by the Secretary, Land and Building Department, Delhi Administration, for necessary action under his covering letter dated 27th June 1968 (copy Ex. D7) and a copy of the same was forwarded to the plaintiff with the direction that further correspondence in the matter be addressed to the L and DO. On receipt of the said letter the plaintiff wrote letter dated 1st July 1968 to the Secretary, Land and Building Department, Delhi Admn. D7) and a copy of the same was forwarded to the plaintiff with the direction that further correspondence in the matter be addressed to the L and DO. On receipt of the said letter the plaintiff wrote letter dated 1st July 1968 to the Secretary, Land and Building Department, Delhi Admn. , with a copy to the L and DO to apprise him as to who was the competent authority to regularise the brea which under the terms of the lease could be done by the erstwhile Chief Commissioner of Delhi. It would appear that neither Delhi Administration nor the L and DO sent any reply to the said letter of the plaintiff informing him of the authority competent to accord the necessary sanction and a period of more than two years rolled by when a fresh show-cause notice dated 18th November 1970 (copy Ex. D4) termed as final show-cause notice was given by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner in the office of the L and DO to the plaintiff. He was called upon to remedy the aforesaid breach within 30 days of the issue of the letter by paying charges to the Government on submitting application for compromise. He was warned that in the event of failure on his part to remedy the breach within 30 days from the issue of the said letter action would be taken against him which may amount to exercising the right of re-entry upon the premises. The said notice too was given for and on behalf of the President of India. Some more correspondence followed between the parties and eventually final notice dated 12th December 1974 (copy Ex. D14) was served by the L and DO on the plaintiff apprising him that reply dated 6th September 1971 given by him was not found to be satisfactory and the breach of the covenant embodied in clause I (vi) of the lease deed having remained unremedied the lessor in exercise of the powers conferred on him by clause II of the indenture of lease hadre-entered upon the said premises with effect from 30th September 1974 and upon such re-entry the lease would cease and stand determined and the entire plot along with the building standing thereon would vest in the lessor. He was further called upon to hand over peaceful possession of the premises including land, building, fittings and fixtures etc. He was further called upon to hand over peaceful possession of the premises including land, building, fittings and fixtures etc. to an Assistant Engineer named therein on 31st December 1974. On receipt of the said notice, the plaintiff served a notice dated 29th December 1974 purporting to be under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure upon defendant No. 1 (copy Ex. D15) calling upon the latter not to proceed against him under aforesaid order of re-entry dated 12th December 1974. Thereafter, on 3rd January 1977 he instituted the instant suit against the defendants for a declaration to the effect that the impugned order dated 12th December 1974 of forfeiture and re-entry upon his property 2/6, East Patel Nagar and the subsequent proceedings commenced against him by the Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 are null and void being without jurisdiction. He also claimed token damages in the sum of Rs. 100. 00 for the aforesaid illegal and unwanton acts of the defendants. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff has contended, amongst other grounds, that since the plot in question formed part of Compensation Pool the lease in favour of the plaintiff could, if at all, be forfeited or cancelled by the Managing Officer under Rule 102 of the Rules and defendant No. 2 was not at all competent to order forfeiture and re-entry on the property in question. In the next breath, however, he has urged that at any rate Rule 102 is ultra vires the Act in so far as Govt. built properties and plots of land acquired under the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 are concerned. Hence, the lease of the plaintiffs plot could not be cancelled under Rule 102 which was void. He has challenged even the legality of clause II of the lease deed as being ultra vires the Act and the Rules as it vested the power of forfeiture/cancellation in an authority other than that mentioned in Rule 102. In the alternative he has contended that even if clause II of the lease deed were held to be ultra vires the permission of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was required before forfeiture/cancellation and no such permission having been obtained, the impugned order is bad in law. In the alternative he has contended that even if clause II of the lease deed were held to be ultra vires the permission of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was required before forfeiture/cancellation and no such permission having been obtained, the impugned order is bad in law. Another contention raised by the plaintiff is that he had not committed any breach of clause I (vi) of the lease deed because the said clause stipulated misuser of the whole of the land and the buildings erected thereon and not any part thereof. Further it is pleaded that the use of a portion of the building by UBI, which has since been nationalised and is a public undertaking, would per se implies the consent of the Govt. to the change of the user and no breach of the terms of the lease can be said to have been committed by him in view of letters dated 30th January 1961 and 10th July 1972 circulated by the Govt. of India to all its ministries. ( 3 ) THE suit is resisted by the defendants who contend that the premises in question were re-entered upon after approval of the Lt. Governor and this fact was communicated to the plaintiff vide tetter dated 12th December 1974 as the plaintiff had failed to remedy the breach of clause I (vi) of the lease deed. The re-entry, according to them, was effected in exercise of the power vesting in them under clause II of the lease deed. They have pointed out that despite final notice issued to the plaintiff vide L and DO letter dated 18th November 1970 and subsequent letters dated 11th February 1971 and 2nd September 1971, neither any satisfactory reply nor any unconditional request for compromise was received from the plaintiff. They assert that the plea of the plaintiff that the commercial user of the premises is condonable in view of the Ministry of Works and Housing letters dated 30th January 1961 and 10th July 1972 is not tenable for the property in question has not been requisitioned through the Director of Estates. They further assert that the representation made by the plaintiff was duly considered by the Lt. Governor of Delhi but was found to be wholly unsatisfactory. ( 4 ) THE following issues were framed on 16th August 1978 by Kapur, J. : 1. Whether the suit is barred by time? 2. They further assert that the representation made by the plaintiff was duly considered by the Lt. Governor of Delhi but was found to be wholly unsatisfactory. ( 4 ) THE following issues were framed on 16th August 1978 by Kapur, J. : 1. Whether the suit is barred by time? 2. Whether the suit is not maintainable? 3. Whether this court has no jurisdiction? 4. Assuming that the property was a part of the compensation pool can the President of India or the Land and Development Officer acting on his behalf not cancel the lease for its breach? 5. Relief. ( 5 ) SUBSEQUENTLY on 24th November 1981 the following additional issues were framed by G. C. Jain, J. on an application having been made to this effect by the plaintiff : 4. Whether the impugned order dated December 12, 1974 and subsequent proceedings before the Estate Officer, Land and Development Officer are illegal, void, mala fide and without jurisdiction? If so its effect. 5. Whether Rule 102 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules 1955 are ultra vires of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954? If so its effect. 6. Whether clauses 2 and 3 of the lease deed are ultra vires of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954? If so its effect. 7. Whether the property in dispute formed part of the compensation pool? If so its effect. 8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages? If so to what amount? ( 6 ) THE learned Judge, inter alia, observed that issue No. 4 framed on August 16, 1978, did not survive in view of specific issue framed on the points involved and issue No. 5 regarding relief was re-numbered as issue No. 8. At the time of arguments, the learned counsel for the defendants did not press issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Thus, only the additional issues 4 to 8 survive for decision. At the time of arguments, the learned counsel for the defendants did not press issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Thus, only the additional issues 4 to 8 survive for decision. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the plaintiff has canvassed with all the vehemence at his command that the plot in question forms part of Compensation Pool inasmuch as only the leasehold rights were granted to the plaintiff while the proprietary rights still vest in the Central Government and as such only the Managing Officer in exercise of the powers conferred on him under Section 19 of the Act read with Rule 102 of the Rules can cancel the lease on any of the ground stated in the said rule (assuming the same to be valid as being ultra vires the Act ). Secondly, clauses II and III of the lease being ultra vires the Act could not confer any power of forfeiture/cancellation of the lease deed on any other authority much less the Chief Commissioner of Delhi as being repugnant to the provisions of S. 19 etc. of the Act. This argument obviously stems from the fact that the lease being for a period of 99 years the property will revert to the lessor on the expiry of the term of the lease. On a close scrutiny and examination of the various provisions of the Act and the Rules, however, this contention is absolutely untenable. Chapter III of the Act deals with the formation of Compensation Pool for the purpose of payment of compensationand rehabilitation grants to displaced persons. S. 12 empowers the Central Government to acquire evacuee property for rehabilitation of displaced persons and the Central Government becomes the owner after an evacuee property is acquired thereunder. In other words, the effect of a notification of acquisition issued under the said Section is to deprive the property of its character as evacuee property and to divest the Custodian who becomes functus officio thereafter. Section 14 of the Act contemplates constitution of a Compensation Pool comprising of various types of assets including all evacuee properties acquired under Section 12 and such contributions in any form whatsoever, as may be made thereto by the Central Government or any State Government etc. Section 14 of the Act contemplates constitution of a Compensation Pool comprising of various types of assets including all evacuee properties acquired under Section 12 and such contributions in any form whatsoever, as may be made thereto by the Central Government or any State Government etc. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 lays down that the Compensation Pool shall vest in the Central Government free from all encumbrances and shall be utilised in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Obviously, therefore, the Compensation Pool was created for payment of compensation to the displaced persons. Section 16 of the Act empowers the Central Government to take such measure as it considers necessary or expedient for the custody, management and disposal of the Compensation Pool in order that it may be effectively utilised in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Central Government is further empowered to appoint managing officers for this purpose. Section 19 confers powers on the managing officers to vary or cancel lease or allotment of any property acquired under the Act and Section 20 empowers the managing officer to transfer any property out of the Compensation Pool by sale or by lease of such property to a displaced person etc. Obviously the lease in respect of the plot in question was executed by the managing officer on behalf of the President of India in exercise of the power conferred on him by Section 20 of the Act. However, it may be noticed that the power has to be exercised by the managing officer subject to any rules that may be made under the Act. Rule 40 of the Rules provides for adjustment of compensation against purchase price of the Govt. built property and plots. Admittedly the plot in question was a Government plot as distinct from acquired evacuee property before it was put into Compensation Pool. So, it had to be disposed of in terms of Rule 40. Explanation to sub-rule (3) of Rule 40 is very pertinent to note in this context. It reads as under : "in the case of an urban area of the town of Delhi the terms and conditions of the lease shall be as in appendix XI but the purchaser shall have the option to continue to hold the site on the terms and conditions originally agreed upon by him as in appendix XII and XIII. It reads as under : "in the case of an urban area of the town of Delhi the terms and conditions of the lease shall be as in appendix XI but the purchaser shall have the option to continue to hold the site on the terms and conditions originally agreed upon by him as in appendix XII and XIII. " ( 8 ) ADMITTEDLY, the lease-deed in question was executed in accordance with the prescribed pro forma contained in appendix XI which is applicable to Government owned sites in Delhi State with revised terms. This is printed quite prominently at the top of the lease deed Ex. D18 itself. Thus, there can be no room for doubt that the lease-deed in question was executed in compliance with the statutory provisions contained in Section 20 read with Rule 40 (3) of the Rules and as such all the terms and conditions contained therein must be deemed to be statutorily binding on the parties. Indeed, the managing officer or for that matter the President could have no other option but to execute the lease-deed in the form prescribed by the Rules in view of the opening words of Section 20 (1) "subject to any rules that may be made under this Act" which are mandatory in nature. 1 am fortified in this view of the matter by a reported decision of Avadh Behari, J. in Ghanshyam v. Union of India, ILR (1982) 2 Delhi 807. Said his Lordship : "the lease granted by the President in this case is what may be called for want of a better terms a statutory lease . A statutory form is given in annexure XI in the Rules. Rules are also statutory. So the entire transaction of lease has a strong statutory flavour. It is not a case of a contractual obligation. It is a case of statutory rights and liabilities. The legislature has defined the rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. The form of the lease cannot be altered by the President. The rules say that the lease shall be given in the form in annexure XI. It is therefore a statutory instrument for all purposes. " ( 9 ) I am in respectful agreement with these observations. The form of the lease cannot be altered by the President. The rules say that the lease shall be given in the form in annexure XI. It is therefore a statutory instrument for all purposes. " ( 9 ) I am in respectful agreement with these observations. Once it is held that the lease in question is statutory in character, it will follow as a necessary corollary that forfeiture or reentry cannot be effected except as provided in clauses II and III of the lease itself. In other words, the power of the managing officer to deal with the plot in question stood determined by the statutory provisions adverted to above and he was no longer competent to invoke the provisions of Section 19 of the Act for cancelling the lease or causing forfeiture thereof. ( 10 ) THIS conclusion finds further support from a bare reading of Section 19 of the Act which empowers the managing officer to cancel any allotment or terminate any lease or amend the terms of any lease or allotment under which any evacuee property acquired under the Act is held or occupied by a person. Admittedly the plot of land in question was not an evacuee property, rather it was Government plot having been acquired under the provisions of the Re-settlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 as contended by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, highly doubtful that the managing officer could exercise the power conferred on him of varying or cancelling a lease under S. 19 of the Act in the instant case. No doubt, the language of Rule 102 is wider in its ambit, in that it covers all the properties comprised in the Compensation Pool and entrusted to a managing officer for management but obviously the said rule has to be construed in the light of the parent section and it cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of Section 19 itself. It is a well settled canon of construction that the rules made under a statute must be treated exactly as if they were in the Act and are of the same effect as if contained in the Act. There is another principle equally fundamental to the rules of construction, namely, that the rules shall be consistent with the provisions of the Act. There is another principle equally fundamental to the rules of construction, namely, that the rules shall be consistent with the provisions of the Act. Hence, Rule 102 has to be construed in conformity with the scope and ambit of Section 19 and it must be ignored to the extent it appears to be inconsistent with provisions of Section 19. [see State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 ]. It may be pertinent to notice here that even sub-section (2) of S. 19 which requires an occupant of a property comprised in the Compensation Pool to surrender possession to the managing officer envisages two distinct categories of properties, namely, (i) any evacuee property to the possession of which the occupant has ceased to be entitled by reason of any action taken under sub-section (1), and (ii) any evacuee property or other immovable property forming part of the compensation pool which is otherwise in unauthorised possession of any person. So, Section 19 read as a whole leaves no room for doubt that a managing officer has no power thereunder to cancel or vary any lease or allotment of a Government built property or Government plot of land, unless it is in unauthorised possession of any person; (emphasis supplied ). ( 11 ) THERE is yet another reason which strongly repels the contention of the plaintiff that only the managing officer was competent to take action under the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. As already stated, S. 19 of the Act confers powers on the managing officer to vary or cancel lease or allotment of any evacuee property acquired under the Act. It does not in terms deal with the case of forfeiture of a lease. No doubt, forfeiture is one of the modes for determination of a lease by the lessor but it has a technical meaning and it is not used in the same sense in which the word cancellation is used. Its connotation is quite different. The word forfeiture is defined in Murray s Oxford Dictionary as under. "the fact of losing or becoming liable to deprivation of goods in consequence of a crime, offence or breach of engagement. Its connotation is quite different. The word forfeiture is defined in Murray s Oxford Dictionary as under. "the fact of losing or becoming liable to deprivation of goods in consequence of a crime, offence or breach of engagement. " ( 12 ) HENCE, forfeiture in its technical sense is incurred in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter even though in such a case the lessor has to give notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. Hence, the provision in the lease for re-entry on the breach of an express condition of the lease is a must and it must be preceded by a notice by the lessor expressing his intention to determine the lease. Reference in this context may be made with advantage to Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act although the said provision may not in terms apply to a statutory lease which has to be interpreted on its own terms and conditions. Under clause II of the lease-deed the right of re-entry in the event of forfeiture of the lease entitles the lessor to re-enter upon not only the leasehold plot but also the building constructed thereon by the lessee and the latter is not entitled to any compensation whatsoever or to return of any premium paid by him. Obviously there is no such provision in S. 19 of the Act and in the absence of any such express condition the managing officer is not competent to re-enter upon the building constructed by the plaintiff on the plot in question. Obviously the object of the Act is to provide for payment of compensation and rehabilitation of the displaced persons. The plot of land in question was, therefore, leased to the plaintiff at a nominal ground rent or Rs. 8. 00 per annum with a view to enable him to construct a residence for himself and the provision for re-entry was made to deter him from committing breach of the express terms and conditions of the lease. So, recourse has to be taken by the authorities mentioned in the lease itself for effecting forfeiture and reentry and the managing officer is no longer seized of the matter in view of the explicit language of the lease-deed. So, recourse has to be taken by the authorities mentioned in the lease itself for effecting forfeiture and reentry and the managing officer is no longer seized of the matter in view of the explicit language of the lease-deed. Further such a provision was considered essential because the Compensation Pool was not intended to be a permanent feature and it would cease to exist as soon as it is utilised and the task of payment of compensation to and rehabilitation of displaced persons is over. Consequently covenants and stipulations incorporated in the lease-deed itself have been designed with a view to take the property out of the Compensation Pool and place the same at the disposal of the President of India, who is the lessor, to deal with it in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease-deed etc. Thus, I find considerable merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants that the plot of land in dispute no longer forms part of Compensation Pool and the stand taken by the plaintiff in this respect is absolutely misconceived. ( 13 ) THE next contention, which is correlated to this question, raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff is that the various show-cause notices were issued and impugned order dated 12th December 1974 was made by officers of the Land and Development Department which was not at all competent to deal with the property in question and as such the same are absolutely illegal and invalid. The first show-cause notice dated 24th May 1968 (Ex. D3) was issued by the L and DO for and on behalf of the President of India. The two subsequent show-cause notices dated 18th November 1970 (Ex. D4) and 11th February 1971 (Ex. D5) were issued by C. J. Motwani, an Assistant Settlement Commissioner in the Land and Development Office. Similarly letter dated 2nd September 1971 (Ex. D6) was issued by Shri Motwani. Of these, notice (Ex. D5) was issued by him for and on behalf of the President of India, while the other two letters are not expressed to have been issued for and on behalf of the President of India. Lastly, notice of forfeiture and reentry dated 12th December ,1974 (Ex. D14) was made by U. N. Bhuyan, Deputy Land and Development Officer (defendant No. 2) for and on behalf of the President of India. Lastly, notice of forfeiture and reentry dated 12th December ,1974 (Ex. D14) was made by U. N. Bhuyan, Deputy Land and Development Officer (defendant No. 2) for and on behalf of the President of India. So, the precise question which falls for consideration is whether these officers were duly authorised and competent to act and make orders, which are apparently executive in character, for and on behalf of the President of India. ( 14 ) UNDER the General Clauses Act, the expression president means the Central Government, Article 77 of the Constitution of India provides for the conduct of business of the Government of India. Under clause (1) of the said Article, all executive action of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President and under clause (2) thereof, orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the President shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the President, and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the President. Clause (3) provides that the President shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business. The said Article and the Article 166 of the Constitution which corresponds to it in relation to the executive orders made by a State Government have been the subject-matter of consideration in various decisions of the Supreme Court. In Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay, AIR 1952 SC 181 at page 185, Das, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed thus : "strict compliance with the requirements of Article 166 gives an immunity to the order in that it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. If, therefore, the requirements of that article are not complied with, the resulting immunity cannot be claimed by the State. This, however, does not vitiate the order itself. If, therefore, the requirements of that article are not complied with, the resulting immunity cannot be claimed by the State. This, however, does not vitiate the order itself. ( 15 ) SIMILARLY, following this authority it was held in Major E. G. Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1762 , that: "if an order is issued in thname of the Governor and is duly authenticated in the manner prescribed in R. (2) of the said Article, there is an irrebuttable presumption that the order or instrument is made or executed by the Government. Any non-compliance with the provisions of the said rule does not invalidate the order, but it precludes the drawing of any such irrebuttable presumption. " ( 16 ) REFERENCE in this context be also made to Ghalo Mal and Sons v. State of Delhi, AIR 1959 SC 65 and Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 870 . As seen above, the show-cause notices and the final order excepting Ex. D4 are expressed to have been made for and on behalf of the President of India by various officers viz. Land and Development Officer, Assistant Settlement Commissioner and Deputy Land and Development Officer of the Land and Development Office. So, the only question which falls for determination is whether the said officers had the requisite authority to act and authenticate the same on behalf of the President of India. The defendants have placed on record copies of certain notifications, orders, business and authentication rules etc. issued by the Government of India from time to time under Articles 77 (2) and 299 (1) of the Constitution of India. These are marked annexures a to e . The Authentication (Orders and Other Instruments) Rules, 1958 (Annexure c ) provide that: "orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the President shall be authenticated. (s) in the case of orders and other instruments relating to the Land and Development Office of the Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development by the Land and Development Office or the Deputy Land and Development Officer or Assistant Settlement Commissioner, or. . . . (s) in the case of orders and other instruments relating to the Land and Development Office of the Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development by the Land and Development Office or the Deputy Land and Development Officer or Assistant Settlement Commissioner, or. . . . "vide notification dated 1st February 1968 (GSR 585) the President directed that the under mentioned contracts and assurances of property made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union may be executed on his behalf as follows : "in the case of Land and Development Office : (i ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii) all contracts, deeds or other instruments relating to or for the purpose of enforcement of the terms and conditions of the sale/lease deeds of the Government property in Delhi/ New Delhi; (iii ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . by the Land and Development Officer, Deputy Land Development Officer and Assistant Settlement Commissioner. " ( 17 ) ON a combined reading of these two orders, it is crystal clear that the Land and Development Office was competent to deal with all contracts, deeds and other instruments relating to or for the purpose of enforcement of the terms and conditions of the sale, lease-deeds of the Government property in Delhi/ New Delhi which will, inter alia, include the plot in dispute. On a parity of reasoning the aforesaid officers were also competent to authenticate the same when expressed to have been made for and on behalf of the President of India. Besides that, the defendants have placed on the record copies of decisions taken by the Government of India with regard to the transfer of work connected with the administration of Government built properties in Delhi from the office of the Regional Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi to the office of the L and DO. Ex. D1 is copy of office order dated 12th October 1962 issued by the Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply, Government of India (Department of Rehabilitation), inter alia, stating that it had been decided to transfer Government built properties, where sale/lease-deeds have been executed, to the L and DO, New Delhi, with immediate effect. Ex. Ex. D1 is copy of office order dated 12th October 1962 issued by the Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply, Government of India (Department of Rehabilitation), inter alia, stating that it had been decided to transfer Government built properties, where sale/lease-deeds have been executed, to the L and DO, New Delhi, with immediate effect. Ex. D2 is copy of order dated 13th March 1963 conveying the sanction of the President to the transfer of work connected with the administration of all Government built properties, where sale/lease-deeds had been executed, from the office of the Regional Settlement Commissioner to that of L and DO with effect from 1st November 1962, It is thus manifest that after the execution of lease- deeds of Government built properties by the Relief and Rehabilitation Department of the Govt. of India in favour of the displaced persons, the remaining work for enforcement of the terms and conditions of the lease-deeds/ conveyance deeds was to be carried out by the office of the L and DO. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has pointed out that orders (Ex. D1 and D2) relate to Government built properties and not Government plots. However, having regard to the fact that rules 39 and 40 of the Rules specifically deal with disposal of Govt. plots which formed part of Compensation Pool, I do not think that the Govt. plots were intended to be excluded from the purview of the orders, Exs. D1 and D2. This conclusion is further countenanced by the powers of authentication and making orders etc. conferred on the officers of the Land and Development Office vide annexures c , d and e . So, taking into account all the aforesaid documents cumulatively there can be no shadow of doubt that the impugned show-cause notices and final order of forfeiture and re-entry were issued and made by officers who were duly authorised in this behalf by the Government. Hence, this contention of the plaintiff too falls to the ground. So, taking into account all the aforesaid documents cumulatively there can be no shadow of doubt that the impugned show-cause notices and final order of forfeiture and re-entry were issued and made by officers who were duly authorised in this behalf by the Government. Hence, this contention of the plaintiff too falls to the ground. ( 18 ) THE learned counsel for the plaintiff has next urged with considerable vehemence that even if the lease deed were held to be valid and in order the plaintiff has not committed any breach of the covenant embodied in clauses I (vi) of the lease by letting out a portion of the ground floor of his building to the Union Bank of India because the said clause imposes a prohibition on the plaintiff "not to use the said land and buildings" which would obviously refer to the entire plot leased out to him and the buildings constructed thereon and not to a portion of the said land and buildings. In order to countenance this plea he has specifically adverted to clauses I (vii) and I (viii) of the lease-deed which specifically incorporate the words "said land or building erected thereon or any part thereof and "premises or any part thereof respectively and has contended that if it were the intention of the lessor to apply the prohibition contained in clause I (vi) even to a part of the buildings/ plot there was nothing to prevent him from using phraseology similar to that used advisedly and deliberately in the two subsequent clauses I (vii) and I (viii) specifically mentioning "the said land and building or any part thereof. Reliance is also placed in this context on reported decisions, both of English Courts and Indian Courts, viz. Grove v. Portal, (1902) 1 Ch 727, Cook v. Shoesmith, (1951) 1 KB 752 and A. Venkataramana Bhatta v. Krishna Bhatta, (1924) 81 Ind Cas 1006 : (AIR 1925 Mad 57 ). The view taken in all these cases is that the covenant by the lessee not to underlet, assign or transfer the demised premises without the consent in writing of the lessor is not broken by underletting or transferring a part of the premises only. The view taken in all these cases is that the covenant by the lessee not to underlet, assign or transfer the demised premises without the consent in writing of the lessor is not broken by underletting or transferring a part of the premises only. The reason given for this view is that the covenant did not expressly apply to any part of the premises as well as to the whole and, therefore, the lessee was not precluded from granting a sub-tenancy to another person. Joyce, J, in Grove v. Portal, said : in effect that covenants of this kind must be construed strictly; in other words, that the tenant s prima facie right to assign or sublet is not to be cut down unless clear words are used. Similarly, Jenkins, L. J. in Cook v. Shoesmith (supra) said that : ". . . . THERE is no justification for treating the object as including also any part of the premises. On the contrary, any doubt should be resolved in favour of the tenant whose prima facie right to dispose as he thinks fit of the interest vested in him under the tenancy is cut down by the stipulation in question. " ( 19 ) IT is no doubt true that clauses I (vii) and I (viii) specifically prohibit not to sub-divide the demised land or building erected thereon or any part thereof without the prior permission of the lessor in writing but having regard to the blanket ban imposed by clause I (vi) of the lease on the user of the demised plot and the buildings which may be constructed thereon forany purpose other than that of a residence it cannot be held by stretch of any reasoning that letting for business purposes even a portion of the demised land or the building built thereon would not constitute a breach of the covenant enshrined in clause I (vi ). This question came up for consideration before Avadh Behari Rohatgi, J. in Ghansyam v. Union of India (ILR (1982) 2 Delhi 807) (supra) and on a juxtaposition and analytical examination of clauses I (vi), I (vii) and I (viii) of a similar lease-deed which were couched in identical terms with the corresponding clauses in the lease in question, the learned Judge in a refreshingly clear and lucid judgment repelled the contention of the lessee. His Lordship observed that : "only residential flats can be built not shops or offices. The lessee cannot carry on "any trade or business whatsoever". Nor can he use the land and the buildings erected thereon for any purpose other that of residence. The clause is explicit and emphatic. The word "whatsoever" in the clause is an eloquent testimony of parties intention to use the land and the built up property only for residence and no other purpose. "whatsoever" implies that the preceding words are used in a comprehensive sense. The language excludes trade and business positively. "he proceeded to say further that: "here we are not to interpret a statute. We have to interpret the terms of a document. . . . . . . . . . . . . These documents clearly attest the fact that the lessee or the purchaser cannot carry on trade or business in the premises or any part thereof. The whole will include the part. On the interpretation of the lease and the conveyance deeds in this case I have no manner of doubt that the absence of the words in any part thereof in clause (vi) does not give a licence to the lessee to use a part of the land or for that matter a part of the house for purpose of trade or business. " ( 20 ) I am in respectful agreement with these observations and I am of the firm view that clause I (vi) is not susceptible to any other interpretation notwithstanding the fact that the words "in any part thereof do not appear therein. Though the law abhors forfeiture, a covenant or condition entailing forfeiture on breach thereof according to the lease (even according to English cases) has to be construed fairly having regard to the intention of the parties. Said Lord Ellenborough, C. J. in Goodtitle v. Saville, (1812) 104 ER 1022 : "in the construction of covenants of this sort, they are neither entitled to favour or disfavour, whether they are to create a forfeiture or to continue an estate; but we are to put the fair construction upon them, according to the apparent intention of the contracting parties. " ( 21 ) THESE observations will apply with greater force while construing a statutory lease like the one before us. " ( 21 ) THESE observations will apply with greater force while construing a statutory lease like the one before us. As for the cases adverted to above by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, suffice it to say that they are all cases of sub-letting of a part of the demised premises by the lessee and, therefore, the view was expressed that in the absence of any explicit stipulation to that effect the covenant did not bar sub-letting of a part of the lease premises because under the Common Law a tenant has ordinarily the right to sublet and that right cannot be curtailed on the language of the lease referred to therein. Obviously the instant case stands on a different footing because the very purpose of the lease is defeated if the lessee is permitted to use a part of the building for a purpose other than residential. It bears repetition that the Government charged nominal ground rent apparently with the object to enable the plaintiff to build his own house and rehabilitate himself. The ground rent would have been much higher had the plot been leased for a non-residential/commercial purpose. Incidentaly that also explains the reason why the L and DO as representing the lessor was demanding compensation for regularisation of the breach of the lease by permitting commercial user of a part of the building. Hence, this contention too is devoid of any substance. ( 22 ) THIS brings me to the last and perhaps the most crucial question in the whole case. It bears repetition that in reply to show-cause notice. Ex. D3, the plaintiff made a representation dated 31st May 1968 (Ex. D8) to the Lt. Governor and requested him as the authority that had replaced the Chief Commissioner of Delhi to accord ex post facto sanction permitting the use of a portion of the ground floor of the building constructed by him on the plot in question by the Union Bank of India for the purpose of banking and residence of their staff. In the said representation he, inter alia, pointed out that there was a genuine need for such a change of use because the Government itself including the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and other agencies had taken residential buildings foruse as offices and commercial houses. In the said representation he, inter alia, pointed out that there was a genuine need for such a change of use because the Government itself including the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and other agencies had taken residential buildings foruse as offices and commercial houses. So, he prayed that the technical breach on his part in not obtaining his prior sanction to permit the use of the premises for a purpose other than residence be condoned and user of the premises in question be regularised by grant of necessary sanction. However, he was informed by the Secretary, Land and Building Department, Delhi Administration, vide letter dated 27th June 1968 (Ex. D7) that his representation had been forwarded in original to the L and DO and that further correspondence in the matter be addressed to him i. e. the L and DO. Thereupon, he wrote letter dated 1st July 1968 (Ex. D9) to the Secretary, Land and Building Department, Delhi Administration, pointing out that he had written to the Lt. Governor earlier because under the terms of the lease the breach could be regularised only by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi who had since been replaced by the Lt. Governor of Delhi, So, he sought clarification on the point and forwarded copy thereof to the L and DO also. Still later, in his letter dated 26th November 1970 (Ex. D11) addressed to the Assistant Settlement Commissioner in answer to the final show-cause notice dated 18th November 1970 (copy Ex. D4) he represented that user of a part of the demised plot did not constitute breach and even if it did he had already taken action to get the so-called breach condoned and he was awaiting the result of his representation to the Lt. Governor. Subsequently, he wrote another letter dated 11th March 1971 to the Assistant Settlement Commissioner (Ex. D12) reiterating his previous stand and praying that in case his plea was not accepted a speaking order be made assigning reasons for rejection. He, inter alia, adverted to Prem Nath v. S. Venkatesan, (1967) 3 Delhi 210, in which it was observed by this Court that: ". . . . . A duty is cast on the assessing or deciding authority to make its order a speaking one. " ( 23 ) IT was then that the Assistant Settlement Commissioner for the first time vide his letter dated 2nd September 1971 (Ex. . . . . A duty is cast on the assessing or deciding authority to make its order a speaking one. " ( 23 ) IT was then that the Assistant Settlement Commissioner for the first time vide his letter dated 2nd September 1971 (Ex. D6) informed him that his representation dated 31st May 1968 addressed to the Lt, Governor had already been considered andfound unsatisfactory as according to clause I (vi) of the lease-deed the lessee was responsible for the breach committed at site. He was, of course, called upon to seek clarification, if any, on the point by contacting him i. e. Assistant Settlement Commissioner, in his office within a week. ( 24 ) THE contention raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, therefore, is that the said letter (Ex. D6) is silent about the authority who had rejected his earlier representation and request dated 31st May 1968. At any rate, it does not say in terms that his prayer for grant of ex post facto sanction for change in user of the leasehold plot had been considered and rejected by the Lt. Governor who alone was the competent authority under the terms of the lease to do so. Even at the trial the defendants have not placed on record any order purporting to have been made by the Lt. Governor rejecting his request for grant of ex post facto sanction for change of user. Thus, the precise argument advanced by the learned counsel for the plaintiff is that his aforesaid application dated 31st May 1968 (Ex. D8) not having been disposed of by a competent authority the subsequent proceedings and the order of forfeiture of lease is absolutely unwarranted by law and wholly invalid. ( 25 ) ON a consideration of the whole matter I find considerable merit in this connection. Clause I (vi) of the lease-deed opens with the words "not without the written consent of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi" which leave no room for doubt that the permission for change of user could be accorded only by the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, or for that matter the Lt. Governor of Delhi, who succeeded him as Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi and none else. It is true that the said clause envisages prior consent of the Chief Commissioner for change of user for trade or business etc. Governor of Delhi, who succeeded him as Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi and none else. It is true that the said clause envisages prior consent of the Chief Commissioner for change of user for trade or business etc. but there is no impediment in the way of the Chief Commissioner granting ex post facto sanction, it is significant to note that even with regard to breach of any covenant or condition of the lease the decision of the Chief Commissioner has been made final by virtue of clause II of the lease-deed. Still more, the lessor is debarred from effecting forfeiture or re-entry without the permission of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi and in case the breach is capable of remedy it is incumbent upon the lessor to require by notice in writing the lessee to remedy the breach. It is thus manifest that the Chief Commissioner, Delhi or for that matter the Lt. Governor who was his successor authority was alone competent to grant the requisite permission for change of user and there is no bar to his exercising such power ex post facto. Indeed the very fact that the Land and Development Office was calling upon the plaintiff to get the breach regularised implied that such power did exist and the breach could be condoned or regularised. However, that power could be exercised by none eke than the Lt. Governor himself. Needless to say that the Lt. Governor is not a mere constitutional head in the sense the Governor is in a State. So, even though the Lt. Governor could seek the assistance of his officers in collecting and sifting of the relevant facts and also give their comments on the objections raised by the plaintiff before the Land and Development Office as representing the lessor, viz. the President, it was his bounden duty to bring to bear upon the whole matter his own unbiased mind, especially when the threat of forfeiture entailed serious civil consequences and the valuable property of the plaintiff was very much in jeopardy. Unfortunately, however, nothing has come on the record till date which would show that the Lt. Governor applied his own mind to the application for grant of ex post facto sanction. To say the least, it is a serious lapse resulting in grave prejudice to the plaintiff. Unfortunately, however, nothing has come on the record till date which would show that the Lt. Governor applied his own mind to the application for grant of ex post facto sanction. To say the least, it is a serious lapse resulting in grave prejudice to the plaintiff. It is a clear instance of an administrative authority failing to observe the duty cast upon him by the lease-deed itself. ( 26 ) IT is also pertinent to note that letter Ex. D6 was not written by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner for and on behalf of the President. In other words, it was not one purporting to emanate from the President and in the absence of a valid authentication no presumption arises that the prayer of the plaintiff for according ex post facto sanction was duly considered and rejected by the authority competent to do so. It was, however, open to the defendants to lead evidence that rejection was in fact made by the Lt. Governor and none else. Even otherwise the law is well settled that what the authentication makes conclusive under Art. 77 is that the order has been made by the President but the further question as to whether in making the order the President has acted in accordance with law remains open for adjudication. Reference in this context may be made to Bijoya Lakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1967 SC 1145 . In Ghaio Mal and Sons v. State of Delhi, AIR 1959 SC 65 , both the appellant and M/s. Gainda Mall Hem Raj, respondent No. 2 therein, had applied for grant of L-2 licence for wholesale and retail vend of foreign liquor to the public in the area of New Delhi. The said licence was granted to respondent No. 2 and this fact was conveyed by the Under-Secretary (Finance) to Govt. of Delhi State to Commissioner ofExcise, Delhi State, vide letter dated 14th December 1954. The letter, inter alia, read that : "i am directed to say that the Chief Commissioner is pleased to approve under R. 5. 1 of Delhi Excise Manual. . . . . . . of Delhi State to Commissioner ofExcise, Delhi State, vide letter dated 14th December 1954. The letter, inter alia, read that : "i am directed to say that the Chief Commissioner is pleased to approve under R. 5. 1 of Delhi Excise Manual. . . . . . . " ( 27 ) UNDER Rule 1 of Chapter 5 of the Delhi Liquor Licence Rules, 1935, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was the only competent authority empowered to grant L-2 licence for wholesale and retail vend of foreign liquor to the public. However, it transpired that on the basis of an office note L-2 licence was granted to M/s. Gainda Mall Hem Raj by the Chief Minister on September 14, 1954 and the application of the appellant for grant of L-2 licence was rejected. There was nothing on the record to show that concurrence with the order of the Chief Minister was obtained from the Chief Commissioner. On these facts it was held by the Supreme Court that there was no valid order granting the L-2 licence and the letter in question viz. dated 14th December 1954 was an inter-departmental communication written with reference to an earlier communication made by the Excise Commissioner. Their Lordships observed that: "a document which conveys the sanction can hardly be equated with the sanction itself. " ( 28 ) THIS authority to my mind is quite apposite as having considerable bearing on the facts of the instant case. Hence, it was incumbent upon the defendants to establish that the representation dated 31st May 1968 of the appellant had been considered and rejected by the appropriate authority viz. Lt. , Governor and none else. However, the defendants have led no such evidence and the I whole matter still remains shrouded in mystery and it is not known as to who was the officer in the Land and Development Office who found the representation of the plaintiff unsatisfactory and rejected the same. Under the circumstances, the validity of the subsequent order of forfeiture of lease would be open to serious challenge. ( 29 ) COMING to the question of forfeiture of the lease itself, the defendants have placed on record a copy of office note prepared by the Land and Development Office (Ex. D24) requesting the Lt. Governor that he as lessor may re-enter upon the premises under clause II of the lease-deed. ( 29 ) COMING to the question of forfeiture of the lease itself, the defendants have placed on record a copy of office note prepared by the Land and Development Office (Ex. D24) requesting the Lt. Governor that he as lessor may re-enter upon the premises under clause II of the lease-deed. The said note purports to have been approved by the Lt. Governor on 20th September 1974 in the usual manner by appending his signatures against his designation. A perusal of the said note shows that besides mentioning the factum of premises being misused by the Union Bank of India and issuance of show-cause notice dated 24th May 1968 by the Land and Development Office it was stated that lessee s reply dated 31st May 1968 was duly considered but not found satisfactory, (emphasis supplied ). Hence, a final show-cause notice was issued on 18th November 1970. Obviously there is a catch in the words underlined by me above because they tend to give an impression that the lessee s reply was considered by the Lt. Governor and the possibility of the Lt. Governor by having been misled by this fact cannot be ruled out. It is further stated in the said note that subsequent replies dated 26th November 1970 and 6th September 1971 given by the lessee to show-cause notices dated 18th November 1970 and 12th February 1971 respectively too were found unsatisfactory. It was again not made clear by whom the said replies were considered to be unsatisfactory. Further it was mentioned in the said note that since the lessee did not appear to be in a mood to compromise or remedy the breach they may re-enter upon the premises and the Deputy Land and Development Officer thereupon advised that the case be processed for re-entry to safeguard the Government interest. Thus, on a perusal of the whole of this office note it becomes abundantly clear that all the relevant facts were not culled out truthfully and faithfully by the Land and Development Office. Indeed, I am constrained to say that the Lt. Governor never had the occasion to look at the representation, much less consider it, of the plaintiff for according ex post facto sanction to the change of user. Indeed, I am constrained to say that the Lt. Governor never had the occasion to look at the representation, much less consider it, of the plaintiff for according ex post facto sanction to the change of user. In forfeiture cases there is invariably a threat to take awaysome existing right for some reason and, therefore, the right to an unbiased tribunal, the right to notice of the charges and the right to be heard in answer to the charges which are the three essential features of natural justice become absolutely relevant. In other words, strict adherence to the rules of natural justice becomes absolutely necessary in cases dealing with interference of property rights of a person by an administrative tribunal, As has been observed by the Supreme Court in several decisions especially in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 : "the law must, therefore, now be taker, to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. " ( 30 ) HOWEVER, the audi alteram partem rule which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is only one of the basic principles of natural justice and even if this rule may be said to have been complied with in the instant case in the sense that show-cause notices were sent to the lessee before order of forfeiture was made by the Lt. Governor, the other essential attribute of natural justice requiring application of unbiased mind by the competent authority has not been adhered to. Good administration and an honest or bona fide decision must, as it seems to me, require not merely giving an opportunity to the other side to be heard but also impartiality, bringing one s mind to bear on the problem and acting fairly by the authority concerned. As has been often said, natural justice is only "fair play in action". So, even though the Lt. Governor is an administrative authority, nevertheless on the modern authorities, it was incumbent on him to act fairly and impartially. In other words, he ought to have held the scales even between the Department of Works and Housing as representing the lessor and the objector i. e. the plaintiff and not favoured one party at the expense of the other by not bringing his mind to bear on the whole problem. In other words, he ought to have held the scales even between the Department of Works and Housing as representing the lessor and the objector i. e. the plaintiff and not favoured one party at the expense of the other by not bringing his mind to bear on the whole problem. Unfortunately, the impugned order smacks of total non-application of judicious, unbiased and independent mind by the Lt. Governor to the whole of the problem. In other words, he seems to have recorded his consent to the forfeiture of the lease merely on the basis of the office note which, as observed earlier does not correctly and faithfully depict a true picture of the whole correspondence between the Landdo and the plaintiff. It does not even say a word about the stand taken by the plaintiff in his representations. In this context it may be pertinent to advert to a couple of circular letters issued by the Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply, Government of India, regarding conversion of user of Govt. properties/properties constructed on the Nazul land taken on lease from Govt; Ex. D22 is letter dated 30th January 1961 which deals with the subject of breaches in the lease terms such as change of purpose in premises taken over by the Government under requisition or on lease. Its para 2 reads as under : "when the Govt. themselves take property on lease from their lessee (Owner of the premises built up on nazul land) for purpose not authorised under the lessee s lease, they are clearly to be understood to have given their consent to the change of purpose of the user or alteration, if any, in the premises. No breach is thus committed by the lessee in such cases also. " ( 31 ) AGAIN a similar letter was issued by the Government of India on 10/19th July 1972. Alluding to the aforesaid letter dated 30th January 1961, it was pointed out that the use of residential premises by Govt. departments as office amounted to loss to public exchequer of revenue which the lessee would have otherwise paid to the Land and Development Office on account of conversion of user as office etc. So, the Govt. Alluding to the aforesaid letter dated 30th January 1961, it was pointed out that the use of residential premises by Govt. departments as office amounted to loss to public exchequer of revenue which the lessee would have otherwise paid to the Land and Development Office on account of conversion of user as office etc. So, the Govt. departments were advised that before taking a residential house on lease or by requisition for office use they would also take into account the charges that the lessee would have to pay to the Land and Development Office if that property was given on rent for similar use to a private party. Admittedly the Union Bank of India was nationalised on the coming into force of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 and the aforesaid Bank became a wholly Government owned company. So, the contention raised by the plaintiff is that at any rate the misuser of a part of the premises by the said Bank as an office ceases to exist on its nationalisation. I need not comment upon the validity of this submission and I may simply say that this circumstance too ought to have been taken into consideration by the Lt. Governor while ordering forfeiture of the lease and permitting re-entry on the demised plot and the building constructed thereon by the lessor. There is no shred of evidence on the record to show that this aspect of the matter was ever considered by the Lt. Governor. ( 32 ) TO sum up, therefore, I am constrained to hold that the order of forfeiture and re-entry passed by the Lt. Governor on 20th September 1974 (Ex. D24) and the subsequent order of the President dated 12th December 1974 (Ex. D14) cannot be sustained as being bad in law. ( 33 ) AS a result, I decree the suit of the plaintiff against the defendants for a declaration to the effect that the impugned order of forfeiture of lease and re-entry upon the leasehold plot and the buildings constructed by the plaintiff thereon passed by defendant No. 2 for and on behalf of the lessor viz. the President of India, vide letter dated, 12th December 1974 (Ex. D14) being null and void is ineffective and not binding on the plaintiff. the President of India, vide letter dated, 12th December 1974 (Ex. D14) being null and void is ineffective and not binding on the plaintiff. However, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.