JUDGMENT R.C. Deo Sharma, J. - The petitioner Aruna Shanker alias Anna has been detained by an order dated 3-11-83 passed by the District Magistrate, Lucknow under section 3(3) read with sub-section (2) of S. 3 of the National Security Act, 1980, on the ground that it was necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public order. The detention order is annexure-1 to the petition. The grounds of detention were also served on the detenu on the same date and they are contained in annexure-2 to the petition. The approval of the detention order was accorded by the State Government under S. 3(4) of the said Act on 11-11-83. The matter was, as usual referred to the Advisory Board and thereafter the order of detention was confirmed by the State Government under S. 12(1) by an order dated 27-12-83.' It is against this detention order that the petitioner has preferred this petition in the nature of habeas corpus and prayed that the detention order annexure-1 be quashed and the petitioner be released from jail. 2. The grounds of detention are five in number. Firstly it was alleged that the petitioner used to indulge into nefarious activities and in the Galla Mandi he used to terrorise people and realise money from them. One such incident dated 5-2-82 was reported. When the people objected to the behaviour of the petitioner he fired from his country made pistol at them but it did not cause any injury to anybody. The second incident related to 29-7-82 when the petitioner with his companions gave a chase to Gurbux Singh Bakshi and others in a jeep after they were coming out from the court where they had gone in connection with an auction of liquor. The petitioner's party fired at Gurbux Singh and others resulting into injuries. Gurbux Singh in a report lodged, named the petitioner, his brother Chhotey and two other persons, namely, Tinni and Rup Yadav, besides one unknown person. The case was pending. 3. The third incident related to 4.6-83 when Ramanand Bajpai and others were taking betal at a shop and the petitioner with his companions arrived and because of past enmity opened fire. Ramanand Bajpai died on the spot. A case under S. 302 Indian Penal Code is pending on this score. The case was pending. 3. The third incident related to 4.6-83 when Ramanand Bajpai and others were taking betal at a shop and the petitioner with his companions arrived and because of past enmity opened fire. Ramanand Bajpai died on the spot. A case under S. 302 Indian Penal Code is pending on this score. The fourth incident related to 6-6-83 when S. I. Surya Narain Shukla was returning to the police station and he found that the petitioner and his companions were terrorising the people by saying that they should not appear as witnesses in the case relating to the aforesaid incident of 4-6-83, otherwise they would be shot dead. An attempt was made to arrest the petitioner but he made good his escape after firing in the air. 4. Lastly, it was mentioned that in case the petitioner was granted bail and he was allowed to come out in public he would be a terror to others and would indulge into activities resulting into breach of public order. 5. Being satisfied on these grounds the District Magistrate passed the detention order as aforesaid. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the instances cited in the grounds of detention do not relate to public order as they were merely matters of law and order. He has also laid stress on the point that two of the grounds, namely, third and fourth ground, referred to above, were common in the case of the petitioner and one Vinod Kumar Dwivedi and in the case of Dwivedi Advisory Board did not approve of the detention and consequently the Government revoked the same. The contention was that the fact of the Advisory Board not approving the detention of Dwivedi and of the revocation of the detention order was not taken into consideration by the State Government while approving the detention order under section 3(4) and again while confirming the same under S. 12(1) of the said Act. The learned counsel has forcefully argued that the State Government could not approve or confirm the detention mechanically or in a ministerial act sort of thing but it required positive application of mind and exercise of discretion after taking into consideration not only the grounds mentioned in the detention order but also all other relevant facts then existing. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on Mohd. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on Mohd. Shakeel Wahid Ahmad v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 2 SCC, 392 : AIR 1983 SC 541 . In that case one Shamsi was detained under COFEPOSA and after considering the material Shamsi was released in pursuance of the Advisory Board's opinion. The petitioner in that case was then detained and one ground was common in the case of Shamsi and Mohammad Shakeel Wahid Ahmad. It was observed that the State Government was in possession of the material in pursuance of which Shamsi was released in pursuance of the Advisory Board's opinion and because the ground was common in the case of Shamsi and Mohammad Shakeel Wahid Ahmad, this fact should have been brought to the notice of the detaining authority. In that case the order of detention of the petitioner was passed subsequent to the order of release of Shamsi. It was observed that the State Government had a duty to place that opinion before the detaining authority in order to enable it to consider whether an order of detention could be passed against the petitioner despite that earlier opinion when one of the grounds on which the two detention orders were passed was identical and related to the same incident. On facts the instant case is slightly different inasmuch as the detention in respect of the petitioner was passed on 3-11-83 whereas the Advisory Board's opinion in the case of Dwivedi was received by the Government on or about 6th of November, and the revocation orders were also passed on 11 -11-83. That being so it was not possible for the State Government to send the opinion of the Advisory Board to the detaining authority which had already passed the detention order on 3rd November but all the same the State Government while approving the order under S. 3(4) and later confirming the order under S. 12(1) was in possession of the material and should have taken into consideration the fact of the Advisory Board not approving the detention of Dwivedi. Learned counsel appearing for the State has contended that whereas Sections 3(2) and 3(3) contemplate the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in respect of the grounds of detention, there was no corresponding provision in sub-section (4) of S. 3 or sub -section (1) of S. 12 which could demand of the State Government the arriving at satisfaction like that of the detaining authority. We are not inclined to accept this contention for the simple reason that the State Government while approving the detention order or confirming the same has to apply its mind and cannot mechanically take a decision to approve it or disapprove it. Naturally if the Government has to record its approval or disapproval to a particular detention order it cannot be recorded without the application of mind as to in what particular circumstance an order is to be approved and in what other circumstances it is not to be approved. 7. The word 'approval' has been defined in 'Black's Law Dictionary' (Fifth Edition) at page 94 as below : "The act of confirming, ratifying, assenting, sanctioning, or consenting to some act or thing done by another. "Approval" implies knowledge and exercise of discretion after knowledge." 8. The term has also been defined in 'Stroud's Judicial Dictionary' in the following manner : "A thing done with the "approval" of A, means that, and only that, which he has, with full knowledge, approved......" 9. A reference may also be made to 'Words and Phrases' (Permanent Edition) where the term has been defined like this : "Generally, when the "approval" of a distinct officer or body of officers is made necessary to validate, the act of another, the legislature intends that such officer or board should be vested with discretion to sanction officially, or disapprove the act submitted to him or them. Gustafson v. Wethersfield Tp. High School Dist., 191, 49 N.E. 2d 311, 313, 319, 111. App. 255. The very act of "approval" imports the act of passing judgment, the use of discretion, and the determination as a deduction therefrom unless limited by the context of the statute. Fuller v. Board of University and School Lands of State of North Dakota, 129 N.W. 1029, 1032, 21 N.D. 212". 10. App. 255. The very act of "approval" imports the act of passing judgment, the use of discretion, and the determination as a deduction therefrom unless limited by the context of the statute. Fuller v. Board of University and School Lands of State of North Dakota, 129 N.W. 1029, 1032, 21 N.D. 212". 10. The matter also came up for consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhut Nath Mate v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 1 SCC 645 : AIR 1974 SC 806 . While rejecting the contention that the State Government while recording approval should make speaking order, the Hon'ble Court emphasised that what was necessary in the circumstances was a "fair consideration by the Executive". We are therefore, satisfied that while recording approval or confirmation the State Government was bound to apply its mind and take into consideration the entire material before it. When in Mohammad Shakeel's case the Hon'ble Supreme Court went to the extent of saying that the State Government was bound to convey to the detaining authority the result of the previous detention of Shamsi, it was all the more necessary for the State Government to have taken into consideration in the instant case the result of quashing of the detention of Dwivedi as a result of the Advisory Board's opinion while it proceeded to record its approval and later confirmed the detention order in the petitioner's case. This was so because the entire material was in possession of the State Government itself. Whatever would have been the result of the consideration is a different matter, but what was necessary was that this fact should have been taken into consideration. The relevant record has been placed before us by the learned counsel appearing for the State and it is obvious that the aforesaid circumstances have not been taken into consideration by the State Government at all. On this ground alone therefore, the petition deserves to be allowed. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider the other submissions made on behalf of the petitioner to show that some of the grounds of detention were not germane or were relatable to mere law and order. 11. The petition is accordingly allowed and the order of detention contained in annexure-1 is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be released forthwith unless/he is required to be detained in connection with some other case.