JUDGMENT : ; N. P. Singh, J.-The writ application has, been filed for quashing an ORDER :of termination issued by the respondent-State Bank of India (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Bank') in exercise of the powers under paragraph 20 of the State Bank of India Officers (Determination of Terms and Conditions of' Service) ORDER :, 1979 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the ORDER :'). The said ORDER :has been framed under sub-section (1) of section 43 of the State Bank of India Act, 1955 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'). 2. Petitioner no. 1 is the State Bank of India Officer1s Association, Patna Circle. Petitioner no. 2 is Vinod Jetley (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the petitioner'). The petitioner passed B. Sc. (Hons.) in Mathematics in First Class from the Punjab University securing second position in the University. He was awarded British Council Studentship for research in Theoretical physics at the University of Manchester for 3 years from 1972 to 1975 and was awarded Diploma for Advanced Studies in Science from the University of Manchester. The petitioner joined the State Bank of India on 19.11.1977 as a Probationary Officer after having competed in an All India Recruitment Test. The petitioner was confirmed in Bank's service on 19-11-1979 as Officer Grade I. After series of selection tests he was selected for being posted as India Based Trainee Officer at Chicago Branch of the Bank. The petitioner joined the aforesaid post of the Overseas Branch at Chicago on 29.5.1980. 3. According to the petitioner, after he joined at Chicago, he noticed certain glaring irregularities which were likely to jeopardise the interest of the Bank. By a letter dated 20.7.1980 petitioner brought to the notice of the Manager of the Bank at Chicago the aforesaid irregularities. It bas been stated that the Manager of the Bank became annoyed and threatened the petitioner that he shall be removed from the service of the Bank. The petitioner requested the Manager of the Bank at Chicago for his repatriation back to India. The petitioner returned to India in the last week of December, 1980. He addressed a letter dated 29.12.1980 to the Managing Director of the Bank informing him about the glaring irregularities in- the functioning of the Chicago Branch saying that it was likely to cause sub•' 8tantialloss to the Bank and the country. 4. The petitioner returned to India in the last week of December, 1980. He addressed a letter dated 29.12.1980 to the Managing Director of the Bank informing him about the glaring irregularities in- the functioning of the Chicago Branch saying that it was likely to cause sub•' 8tantialloss to the Bank and the country. 4. On return to India, petitioner was posted in Bihar. The Regional Manager of the Bank, Region II, Muzaffarpur by a letter dated 27.3.1981 called for an explanation from the petitioner as to h9W he had addressed the aforesaid letter dated 29.12.1980 to some of the Directors of the Central Board of the Bank. On 3.4.1981 the petitioner replied saying that he bad addressed the letters in good faith, keeping in view the interest of the Bank and if there had been any lapse on his part in that respect he was expressing regrets. The Chief General Manager of the Bank at Patna on 21.5.1981 while forwarding the letter aforesaid, dated 3.4.1981 addressed by the petitioner to the Central Officer of the Bank recommended that the ends of justice would be met if an administrative warning is given to the petitioner. However, the Deputy Managing Director (Personnel and Service) of the Bank, Central Office, Bombay instructed the Chief General Manager of the Local Head Office. Patna by his letter dated 12.8.1981 to terminate the service of the petitioner. The Chief General Manager in exercise of the power under paragragh 20(1) of the aforesaid ORDER :, passed the impugned ORDER :dated 24.8.1981 saying, "In terms of paragraph 20(1) of the SBI Officers (Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service) ORDER :, 1979 your services in the Bank are hereby terminated at the close of business today." A cheque for three months' emoluments in lieu of three months' previous notice in writing was also enclosed. Copies of the communications aforesaid have been annexed to the writ application. 5. The terms and conditions of the service of the officers of the Bank are governed by the ORDER :, Paragraph 40f the said ORDER :mentions about the different Grades of the officers alongwith their scale of pay. Chapter IV of the ORDER :contains provisions regarding appointments, Probation, Confirmation, promotion, seniority, retirement and termination of service. 5. The terms and conditions of the service of the officers of the Bank are governed by the ORDER :, Paragraph 40f the said ORDER :mentions about the different Grades of the officers alongwith their scale of pay. Chapter IV of the ORDER :contains provisions regarding appointments, Probation, Confirmation, promotion, seniority, retirement and termination of service. In view of paragraph 15, a person appointed as a Probationary Officer or a Trainee Officer has to be On probation for a period of two years. Paragraph 16(1) is follows :- "An Officer referred in, Paragraph 15 - shall be confirmed in the service of the Bank, if, in the opinion of the competent authority, the officer-has satisfactorily completed the training in any institution to which the officer may have been deputed for training, and the in-service training in the Bank." Paragraph -19 is a provisions regarding the age of retirement saying that "An officer shall retire from the service of the Bank on attaining the age of fifty-eight years or upon the completion of thirty years' service..". Paragraph 20(1) is as follows: "The Bank ma) terminate the service of any officer other than a Probationary Officer, by giving him three months previous notice in writing or three mon1hs' emoluments in lieu thereof." Although the ORDER :purports to contain the terms and conditions of service of the officers of the Bank, surprisingly enough, there is no provision for dismissal of an officer on the ground of misconduct or some other charge. We are informed that dismissal from the service of the Bank is governed by Rules 49 and 50 of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Rules') which contain the different types of punishments which can be imposed against an employee and prescribes the procedure for departmental enquiry before the punishment is imposed, I am not able to appreciate as to why more or less identifiable provisions exist in the ORDER :as well as in the Rules. It may be pointed out that Paragraph 20(1) of the ORDER :, wit~ which we are concerned, is Rule 18 of the Rules. 6. It may be pointed out that Paragraph 20(1) of the ORDER :, wit~ which we are concerned, is Rule 18 of the Rules. 6. On behalf of the petitioner it was urged that the Bank will be deemed to be 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and, as such, its Rules, ORDER :s and, actions must not be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was submitted that Paragraph 20(1) of the ORDER :vests an extraordinary power in the Bank to remove a permanent/confirmed employee by the merely giving three months previous notice in writing or three months emoluments in lieu thereof without laying down any guidelines for exercise of such power which per se is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 7. The Banks in general were considered to be commercial organisations meant to cater the financial needs of the citizens and to invest their savings in the best manner. But-now most of the Banks being instrumentalities of the Central Government are 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, and its employees can enforce• the rights' guaranteed to them by Chapter III of the Constitution. Such employees may not be holders of civil posts so as to have protection of Article 311 of the Constitution, but certainly they have protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. As such it has to be examined whether Paragraph 20(1) of the ORDER :aforesaid vests unbridled power of termination of service of a permanent employee of the Bank without any guideline leaving much scope for •whimsical and arbitrary exercise thereof. On behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed on the well known case of Moti Ram Deka v. N. E. Frontier Railway ( AIR 1964 SC 600 ). In that case validity of rules 148(3) and 149(3) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code was challenged. The aforesaid sub-rules vested powers in the authorities concerned to terminate the services of permanent railway servants by notice or by paying salary for the period of notice. The Supreme Court examined the validity of the rules aforesaid in context of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as well as in the •background of Article 14 of the Constitution. The aforesaid sub-rules vested powers in the authorities concerned to terminate the services of permanent railway servants by notice or by paying salary for the period of notice. The Supreme Court examined the validity of the rules aforesaid in context of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as well as in the •background of Article 14 of the Constitution. Although it had been urged that the rules fail "to disclose any tangible or intangible or rationale purposes within the power conferred by it is intended to serve", in the majority JUDGMENT : no view was expressed as to whether the rules aforesaid vested a discretion in the authority without laying down any policy. However, rules were struck down as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because no other branch of public service had such rules for its permanent civil servants. 8. On behalf of the Bank it has been stated on affidavit that provision like Paragraph 20(1) has been incorporated in the Rules and ORDER :s governing the terms and conditions of service of employees of all nationalised Banks and in other Government undertakings, vesting powers in the authorities specified to terminate the services of their permanent employees by service of prior notice or by payment of emoluments for the period of notice; Copies of the relevant Rules/ORDER :s in respect of Allahabad Bank, Bank of India, Central Bank of India" Punjab National Bank have been enclosed to the affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank. This statement bas not been challenged on behalf of the petitioner. As such, now Paragraph 20(1) of the ORDER :cannot be held to be discriminatory having been framed only for the employees of the Bank in question as was the position in the case of Moti Ram Deka (supra). Now the validity of Paragraph 20(1) of the ORDER :has to be tested only on the ground as to whether it bas vested a discretion in an authority without laying down any policy and has failed to "disclose any tangible or intangible or rationale purpose within the power conferred by it is intended to serve". 9. On behalf of the Bank it has been pointed out that the Bank being primarily a commercial undertaking must have power to terminate the services of even permanent employees in public interest. 9. On behalf of the Bank it has been pointed out that the Bank being primarily a commercial undertaking must have power to terminate the services of even permanent employees in public interest. It was urged that in all cases it is not possible to frame regular charges and. to hold regular departmental enquiries and then to pass ORDER :of dismissal against the employees. It was also submitted that action for termination of service of an employee is taken only after taking into consideration suitability and over all performance of the officer concerned and not for any particular lapse on the part of the officer which amounts to misconduct, for which he can be dismissed from the service of the Bank. According to the respondent Bank, an ORDER :of termination simpliciter is also in the interest of the officer concerned because his removal from the service of the Bank is without any stigma. 10. Conflicting opinions have been expressed by different High Courts while examining the validity of a rule like Paragraph 20(1) in different Government undertakings which are 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In the case of T.G. Srinivasa Murthy v. Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. [1982 (1) Labour Law Journal 268], a learned Judge of the Karnataka High court held rule 17.2 of the Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. Service Rules, rule 20.1 of the Hindusthan Machine Tools (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, rule 2.21 of the Karnataka Agro-Industries Corporation Limited (Recruitment and Promotion) Rules and Regulation 25 (2) of the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948 providing for termination of the service of their permanent employees ,by a simple notice, ultra vires of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. The aforesaid view has been taken primarily on basis of the JUDGMENT : of the Supreme Court in. the case of Moti Ram Deka (supra). It was observed :- " .,. The aforesaid view has been taken primarily on basis of the JUDGMENT : of the Supreme Court in. the case of Moti Ram Deka (supra). It was observed :- " .,. the decision in so far it relates to the striking down of Rules 148(3) and 149 (3) of the Railway Establishment Code on the ground that they were violative of Article 14 and the view taken, as to the real nature of termination of service simpliciter of permanent civil servants are relevant for these cases." It was also held that the provisions in question confer arbitrary power on an authority of the State to take action to the prejudice of a person, and, as such, it was manifestly unreasonable, therefore, violative of Article 14. 11. On the other hand, a Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of Manohar P. Kharkhar and another v. Raghu-raj and another [1981 (2) Labour Law Journal 459) upheld the validity of Article 48 of the Air India Employees’ Service Regulation under which the service of a permanent employee can be terminated without assigning any reason by giving notice in writing or pay in lieu of notice. The attack on the validity of the rule was more or less on similar ground that it confers absolute, unguided and uncanalised power on the authority to terminate the service of a permanent employee, and, as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was held that although the Regulation did not prescribe any condition for exercise thereof it bas to be exercised in over-all interest of the Corporation, under the exigency of its administration and for efficiency of the personnel involved. On behalf of the petitioner, the view expressed in the aforesaid Bombay case was challenged on the ground that the ratio laid down in Moti Ram Dekas' case (supra) was not properly appreciated. I have already pointed but that the majority JUDGMENT : in the case Moti _Ram Deka (supra) did not hold the rules ultra vires because no guideline had been prescribed, but because no. such rule was in force in other Department of the Government of India. 12. Reference was made on behalf of, the petitioner to the case of Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. such rule was in force in other Department of the Government of India. 12. Reference was made on behalf of, the petitioner to the case of Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd ,and others [1984 (3) Supreme Court Cases 369] where it was observed by the Supreme Court as follows: "...our Constitution envisages a Society governed by rule of law. Absolute discretion uncontrolled by guidelines which may permit denial of equality before law is the antithesis of rule of law. Absolute discretion not judicially reviewable inheres the pernicious tendency to be arbitrary and is there fore violative of Article 14. Equality before law and absolute discretion to grant or deny benefit of the law are diametrically opposed to each other and cannot co-exist." Reliance was also placed on the case of A. L. Kalta v; Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. [1984(3) Supreme Court Cases 316] where it was pointed out by the Supreme Court :- “Conceding for the present purpose that legislative section follows a legislative policy is not judicially review able, but while giving concrete shape to the Legislative policy in the form of a statute, if the law, violates any of the fundamental rights including Article 14 the same is void to the extent as provided in Article 13." 13. Whenever a Statute vests an absolute power in an authority without prescribing any condition for exercise thereof, the courts have always been inclined to examine the' object which is sought to be achieved by such provision all(~ whether there is scope for arbitrary exercises thereof. On behalf of the respondents, it was pointed out that although Paragraph 20(1) does not put any condition or prescribes the circumstances under which power has to be exercised; the power has to be exercised in the public interest. In this connection our attention was drawn to section 17 of the Act which says that the general superintendence and directions of the affairs and business of the Bank shall be entrusted to the Central Board which may exercise powers and do all such acts which may be exercised or done by the Bank. In this connection our attention was drawn to section 17 of the Act which says that the general superintendence and directions of the affairs and business of the Bank shall be entrusted to the Central Board which may exercise powers and do all such acts which may be exercised or done by the Bank. Sub-section(2) of section 17 is as follows : "The Central Board in discharging its function shall act on business principles regard being had to public interest.” It was submitted that the aforesaid guideline for the function by the Central Board is applicable to all the authorities of the Bank who are exercising the power on behalf of the Central Board or under the authority of the Central Board. 14. While judging the arbitrariness of a provision regulating the condition of service of employees of a Government undertaking, it must be borne in mind, that rules governing such employees need not be at par with the rules governing the services of the employees of the Central Government and the State Governments. Most of the Government undertakings have a different object for their existence than the Government of India and the State Governments. Their functions are also different in many respects. One broad object which such Government undertaking have to achieve is the efficiency of service for a higher output to meet ever increasing need of the society. If it is held that permanent employees, even of Government undertakings, cannot be removed from service without institution of a departmental proceeding, such employees without having protection of Article 311 (2) shal1 enjoy the right like holders of the civil posts. On behalf of the petitioner reference was made to the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation v. Mr. On behalf of the petitioner reference was made to the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation v. Mr. Vinay Narayan Vajpayee ( AIR 1980 SC 840 ) ; "I find it very hard indeed to discover any distinction, on principle between a person directly under the employment of the government and a person under the employment of an agency or instrumentality of the government or a corporation, set up under a statute or incorporated but wholly owned by the government." In my opinion, when the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case pointed out as to how the Government undertakings are the instrumentalities of the Government, the Supreme Court never purported to lay down that employees of such Government undertakings are for all practical purposes holders of civil posts to whom protection against removal from service as contained under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution has to be extended directly or indirectly. In my view, paragraph 20 (1) of the ORDER :cannot be held to be ultra vires because it vests power in the Bank to terminate the service of a permanent employee. At times it is proper to terminate the service of a permanent employee taking into consideration his over-all performance which is not in the interest of the public and the Bank. However, I hasten to add that whenever the exercise of such power is challenged in court of law, the Bank cannot take a plea that as the ORDER :under which the power has been exercised does not prescribe any condition for exercise thereof, the Bank is not required to satisfy the court that it has been exercised in the interest of the Bank and public. Mr. Basudeva Prasad, learned counsel for the Bank, while defending the constitutional validity of the aforesaid ORDER :, submitted that whenever an allegation is made that the power has been exercised with an oblique motive or for an ulterior purpose which has no nexus with the interest of the Bank and public, courts, on being satisfied, can certainly quash such ORDER :s as having been passed for extraneous consideration. 15. 15. This leads to the next question as to whether the ORDER :of termination has been passed in the interest of the Bank taking into consideration the over-all performance of the petitioner, or it is an ORDER :of dismissal in garb of an ORDER :of termination, as urged on behalf of the petitioner. In support of the contention that the petitioner has become a victim of an arbitrary action on the part of the authorities of the Bank, our attention was drawn to the different communications addressed by the petitioner and received by him. In this connection, first reference was made to a letter dated 20.7.1980 addressed by the petitioner while at chicago to the Manager of the Bank at Chicago pointing out certain defects in the functioning of the Bank including security arrangement. It has also been mentioned in that letter that when the petitioner had pointed out about the aforesaid factors to Mr. Roy, Assistant Manager of that Branch of the Bank~ the petitioner was 'immediately called into office where he found Mr. Roy "in a feet of range as he misunderstood the query made by the' petitioner" as an act of disobedience. In that letter the petitioner stated that disobedience "was the least thing in his mind specially to Mr. Roy whom he considers as a gentleman". In reply, on 1.8.1980 Mr. Pillai, the Manager of the Bank, inter alia, said: "Your rather stormy and unconventional entry into the Branch and your subsequent conduct-particularly your insistence on office ORDER :and later refusal to accept it-have all the portents of a disquieting time." It bas been on affidavit that the Manager after the letter aforesaid dated 1.8.1980, threatened the petitioner that he shall be removed from the Bank’s service. The petitioner, thereafter, requested the Manager, State Bank of India, Chicago Branch for repatriation back to India. The petitioner reached Delhi in the last week of December, 1980. He wrote a letter to the Managing Director, State Bank of India on 29.12.1980 informing him about the glaring irregularities in the functioning of the Chicago Branch which was likely to cause substantial loss to the Bank and the country. A copy of that letter has been annexed to the writ application. He wrote a letter to the Managing Director, State Bank of India on 29.12.1980 informing him about the glaring irregularities in the functioning of the Chicago Branch which was likely to cause substantial loss to the Bank and the country. A copy of that letter has been annexed to the writ application. Thereafter, by a letter dated 27.3.1981, as already stated above, the petitioner was called upon to explain the circumstances under which he addressed communications to some of the Directors of the Central Board of the Bank. On 3.4.1981 the petitioner replied saying that he had addressed, letter only taking into consideration the interest of the Bank. He, however, expressed his regret for any lapse on his part while doing so. The letter dated 3.4.1981 aforesaid was forwarded by the Chief General Manager, Patna on 21.5.1981, to the Central Office of the Bank recommending for an administrative warning only saying the it shall meet the ends' of justice. Ignoring that recommendation of the Chief General Manager of the Local Head office, Patna, the Deputy Managing Director (Personnel and Service), State Bank of India, Bombay, 'who, according to the petitioner, had been influenced by the Manager, Chicago Branch, advised by letter dated 12.8.1981 the termination of the service of the petitioner. A copy of that letter dated 12.8.1981 has been produced by the Bank and is Annexure A/3. The relevant portion thereof is as fol1ows:- “...... we have examined the matter. Shri V. Jetley Officer, was sent to Chicago Branch for training at considerable expense to enable him to equip himself with knowledge and experience in international banking. By his various acts of indiscretion and 'misconduct, he has not only misused this scarce opportunity but has also spoiled the image of the Bank and tried to vitiate the atmosphere at the Branch in a foreign country. Besides, his action in addressing imprudent letters to the Central Board Directors is in gross violation of the Rules of Conduct. The attitude displayed by the official so early in his career portends ominous potential and it would not be in the interests of the Bank to continue his services. We do not think that Shri Jetley has realised his mistake nor do we think that even any further counseling would be of help. Disciplinary action could be thought of. The attitude displayed by the official so early in his career portends ominous potential and it would not be in the interests of the Bank to continue his services. We do not think that Shri Jetley has realised his mistake nor do we think that even any further counseling would be of help. Disciplinary action could be thought of. This would however, be a very long drawn out affair and may even worsen the Situation and render the employee not only useless to the Bank but also he will be a drag and burden on it in - case the disciplinary action should end up short of cessation of service in anyone of the forms under the disciplinary procedure. We are, therefore, of the view that continuing him in the Bank's service any longer would be prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. 2. Accordingly, It has been decided that the services of Shri Jetley may be terminated by giving him three months pay in lieu of notice in terms of paragraph 20(1) of the SBI Officers (Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service) ORDER :, 1979" Soon thereafter, by ORDER :dated 24.8.1981 the services of the petitioner was terminated which is under challenge. 16. On behalf of the petitioner it was submitted that letter dated 12.8.1981 aforesaid addressed by the Deputy Managing Director (Personal and Services) itself establishes the Contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that he has been dismissed from the service of the Bank for the misconduct alleged without affording him any opportunity to explain the charges which had been levelled against him. It was also pointed out that action has been taken not after judging the over-all performance of the petitioner, but for his alleged misconduct in addressing the letter to the Central Board Directors complaining against the then Manager of the Chicago Branch. 17. From the ,materials on record it does appear that the action against the petitioner has been taken solely on the ground that he had addressed letters to the Directors of the Central Board making allegations against the Manager and Assistant Manager, Chicago Branch which amounted to a misconduct in the opinion of the authorities of the Bank. In such a situation can it be said that over-all suitability of the petitioner has been examined in light of the interest of the public and the Bank? In such a situation can it be said that over-all suitability of the petitioner has been examined in light of the interest of the public and the Bank? Petitioner was confirmed in the service of the Bank on 19.11.l979 after two years of the period of probation. The Bank terminated his service on 24.8.1981 because he was found to be unsuitable. Inhere is a charge of misconduct against an officer he cannot be removed On basis of an ORDER :of termination merely because the departmental proceeding on that charge is likely to take some time. In the case of Indra Pal Gupta v. The Managing Committee Model Inter College, Thora (AIR 1984 SC 11-10), the petitioner of that writ application had been appointed on probation as Principal of a College. His service Was terminated. From the records it appeared that the managing committee had passed the resolution to termll1atc the service of the petitioner with reference to a report of the Manager. The report said: - "It is also evident that the seriousness of the lapses is enough to justify dismissal but no educational institution should take that botheration." The Supreme Court, while quashing the ORDER :of termination observed :- "The above report was the real foundation on which the decision of the Managing Committee was based. This is a case where the ORDER :of termination issued is merely a camouflage for an ORDER :imposing the penalty of termination of service on the ground of misconduct." In tile case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India and another ( AIR 1984 SC 636 ) it was observed as follows :- "It is, therefore, now well settled that where the form of the ORDER :is merely a camouflage for an ORDER :of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the Court before which the ORDER :is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the ORDER :. If the Court holds that the ORDER :though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a clock for an ORDER :of punishment, the Court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the ORDER :, in giving effect to the rights conferred by raw upon the employee. If the Court holds that the ORDER :though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a clock for an ORDER :of punishment, the Court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the ORDER :, in giving effect to the rights conferred by raw upon the employee. " It was then pointed out :-- "Though the noting in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the ORDER :cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the ORDER :should be read along with the ORDER :for the purpose of determining its true character. If on reading the two together the Court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the ORDER :and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the ORDER :of discharge should fall to the ground as the appellant has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself." In the instant case also in the letter dated 12-3-1981, the Deputy Managing Director having found that the act or omission on the part of the petitioner amounted to misconduct advised termination of his services because, in his opinion, any disciplinary action "will be a drag and burden". Even in the well known case• of Shamsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 ), the Supreme Court held that it is open to the Court on being satisfied that an ORDER :of dismissal has been passed ,in garb of an ORDER :of termination, to quash such ORDER :. Similar view has been expressed in the cases of Madan Mohan Prasad v. State of Bihar and others ( AIR 1973 SC 1133 ) and Smt. S.R. Venkataraman vs. Union of India and another ( AIR 1979 SC 49 ). 18., If it is held that the Bank can terminate the services of an employee even where a misconduct has been prima facie established against that employee then on no occasion the Bank will like to exercise its power of dismissal, because for dismissal from service a particular procedure has been prescribed. In my view, if a charge has been levelled against an employee of the Bank which amounts to misconduct, the procedure prescribed for dismissal should not be circumvented. In my view, if a charge has been levelled against an employee of the Bank which amounts to misconduct, the procedure prescribed for dismissal should not be circumvented. In the instant case, it appears that the charge against the petitioner was of insubordination which amounts to misconduct. For that charge a departmental enquiry should have been initiated in accordance with Rule 50 of the Rules. That may he a time taking procedure, but once a separate rule provides the procedure for dismissal of an employee of the Bank, the Bank cannot adopt a short cut method for achieving the same object. That is all the more important when the officer who is sought to be terminated is holding the post on permanent basis having been confirmed after the period of probation, as is the case of the petitioner. 17. On behalf of the Bank reliance was placed on the cases of Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India ( AIR 1964 SC 449 ), State of Punjab vs. Shri Sukhraj Bahadur ( AIR 1968 SC 1089 ), Somnath Sahu v. State of Orissa and others [1969 (3) Supreme Court' Cases 384], Delhi Transport Undertaking, v. Balbir Saran Goel ( AIR 1971 SC 836 ), Oil and Natural Gas Commission and other v. Dr. Md. S. lskander Ali (AIR 1980 SC 1242) and Union of India and others v. P. S. Bhatt ( AIR 1980 SC 957 ) in support of the contention that it is permissible to the appointing authority to terminate the services of an employee after holding some preliminary enquiry or on basis of some allegation. All these cases related to temporary employees. Apart from that while upholding the ORDER :s of termination, the Supreme Court was satisfied in these cases that the ORDER :s of dismissal had not been passed in garb of ORDER :s of termination. In my opinion, the facts of the aforesaid cases were different than the one with which we are concerned. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, in my view, it cannot be herd that the ORDER :of termination has been passed on basis of over-all, assessment of the petitioner. 20. In the result, this writ application is allowed and the ORDER :of termination as contained in Annexure-I is quashed. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, in my view, it cannot be herd that the ORDER :of termination has been passed on basis of over-all, assessment of the petitioner. 20. In the result, this writ application is allowed and the ORDER :of termination as contained in Annexure-I is quashed. The petitioner has continued in service of the Bank on basis of an ORDER :of stay passed at the time of admission of the writ application, as such there shall be no ORDER :for costs.