NARAYANA RAI KUDOOR, J. ( 1 ) THIS Criminal Revision under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal procedure (for short 'the Code') is directed against the judgment and order dated 17th January, 1983, passed by the 1st Additional JMFC, Sirsi, in Crl. Mis. No. 16/82 dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioners and several others under Section 20 (2) of the Minimum wages Act, 1948 (for short 'the Act' ). I shall refer to the parties in the course of this order as they were referred to in the court below for the sake of convenience. ( 2 ) FEW facts relevant for the disposal of this Revision may be stated as under : the petitioners are the employees of the opponent-industry-Karnataka Veneers Limited, Kavachur, in Siddapur taluk of North Kanara District. The government of Karnataka fixed the minimum wages payable to different classes of employees in ply-wood industries as per the notification dated 16th may, 1978 published in the Official gazette on 30-5 1978 commencing with effect from 1-6-1978. The petitioners claimed that the opponent-industry of which they are the employees is a plywood industry and as such they are entitled for the minimum wages as fixed by the State Govenment under the said notification However, the opponent- industry contended that the Veneers industry is not a part of the ply-wood industry to which alone the notification in question is applicable. So, the opponents claimed exemption from the application of the provisions of the notification. The petitioners are paid salaries less than the minimum wages fixed under the notification. So, they approached the 1st Addl. J. M. F. C. , Sirsi, for enforcing their claim for wages as fixed under the notification. The learned Magistrate, after hearing the arguments and considering the material placed before him, came to the conclusion that the opponent-industry did not fall within the ambit of the notification and as such, the petitioners are not entitled to claim minimum wages fixed therein and accordingly, the application filed by the petitioners was dismissed as per the judgment and order stated supra. Hence, this Revision by two of the several petitioners who had filed the application before the Magistrate. ( 3 ) SRI. K. N. Patil, learned Advocate appearing for the responent, raised a preliminary point at out-set questioning the maintainability of the Revision. Hence, this Revision by two of the several petitioners who had filed the application before the Magistrate. ( 3 ) SRI. K. N. Patil, learned Advocate appearing for the responent, raised a preliminary point at out-set questioning the maintainability of the Revision. Pursuant to this point, further he contended that the order of the learned magistrate is not amenable to the Revi- sional jurisdiction of this Court under the provisions of the Code as the Magistrate while passing the impugned judgment and order did not act as an inferior criminal Court but acted as Persona designata, being the Authority constituted under the Act to dispose of the claims arising under Section 20 of the act. Besides, he has also pointed out that the decision or direction of the magistrate is made final under sub-section (6) of Section 20 of the Act. On these grounds, he contended that the order passed by the Magistrate is not revisable by this Court under the provisions of the Code. Per contra, it is contended by Sri r. G. Hegde, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners that there is no substance or force in this contention. He argued that the authority who exercised jurisdiction and decided the claim of the petitioners being a sitting Magistrate presiding over a regular Criminal Court, the Magistrate has acted as an inferior criminal Court in deciding the question and as such, his decision is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under the provisions of the Code. ( 4 ) I shall first deal with the preliminary point raised by Sri K. N. Patil before considering the other questions raised in this revision on merits if found necessary. ( 5 ) BEFORE examining the rival contentions, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of law, ( 6 ) SECTION 20 of the Act deals with claims. ( 4 ) I shall first deal with the preliminary point raised by Sri K. N. Patil before considering the other questions raised in this revision on merits if found necessary. ( 5 ) BEFORE examining the rival contentions, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of law, ( 6 ) SECTION 20 of the Act deals with claims. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 which is material for our purpose reads:"the appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint any Commissioner for workmens compensation or any Officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a labour Commissioner for any region or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of the Labour Commissioner or any officer with the experience as a judge of a Civil Court or a judicial Magistrate to be the Authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of payment of less than minimum rates of wages or in respect of payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under clause (b) or clause (c) of subsection (1) of Section 13 or of wages at the overtime rates under Section 14 to the employees employed or paid in that area. " (emphasis is supplied) sub-sections 2 to 5 deal with procedure in disposing of any application presented to the authority under sub-sert;cn (2) of Section 20 of the Act by an employee. Sub-section, f6) of Section 20 provides that every direction by the Authority under Section 20 of the Act shall be final. Sub-section (7) stipulates that every Authority appointed under subsection (1) shall have all the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5/1908) for the purpose of taking evidence and enforcing attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and every such Autho- rity shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of Section 195 and chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1898. ( 7 ) IN exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act, the State Government by notification No. LLH. ( 7 ) IN exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act, the State Government by notification No. LLH. 78 MNW 57 dated 18/27 october, 1958, appointed the Magistrate of Sirsi to be the Authority in respect of the area Sirsi, Siddapur and Mundgod taluks and empowered to hear and decide all claims arising out of payment of less than minimum rate of wages and other claims specified in sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act. The question now for consideration is whether the magistrate at Sirsi appointed as the authority specified under sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act, is a 'persona designata' or that the power was given to the Magistrate being the Presiding officer of the Court, in other words, to the pre-existing Court of the Magistrate to hear and decide all claims of the employees specified in sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Act. ( 8 ) IN M/s. Vasudeva Traders v State of Karnataka 1977 (1) Kar L. J. , 339), this court while holding that the Sessions judge functioning under Section 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, was functioning as an inferior Criminal court, proceeded on the basis that while exercising power of appeal under the said act, he was functioning as a Court and not as Persona Designata. In the case of public Prosecutor v Linga Setty (1975 crl. L. J , 144) the Andhra Pradesh High court has taken the same view. The view taken by Andhra Pradesh High Court was based mainly on two reasons namely that the intention of the Legislature was to confer the appellate power under section 6-C of the Essential Commodities acton the pre-existing Judicial authority and secondly, the decision of that appellate authority has not been made final. In Thakurdas v. State of Madhya pradesh (A. I. R. 1978 S. C. I) the Supreme court while examining the question whether the decision of the appellate authority under Sec. 6-C of the Essential commodities Act should be revised by the Court exercising its revisional power, approved the decision in Ramaiah's case (1975 Crl. L. J. , 144 ). In Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v gurupad Shivram Kavalekar and others (I. L R. 1978 (2) Kar. 1585) which was under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 two questions were referred to the full Bench. L. J. , 144 ). In Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v gurupad Shivram Kavalekar and others (I. L R. 1978 (2) Kar. 1585) which was under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 two questions were referred to the full Bench. The questions referred were : (1) Whether the District Judge referred to under Sec 50 (2) of the rent Control Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court against whose order a petition under Sec. 115 C. P. C. lies or he is a persona designata, and (2) Whether the second sentence in section 50 (2) namely, "the order of the District Judge shall be final" precludes the High Court from exercising jurisdiction under Sec. 115 C. P. C. , if it is held that the District Judge as a court subordinate to the High Court. The Full Bench held that the District judge referred to in Section 50 (2) of the rent Control Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court and is not a persona designata and that a petition under Sec. 115 would lie notwithstanding the fact that the revisional order under Sec. 50 (2) of the District Judge is made final. The full Bench in deciding so, has relied upon the previous decision of this Court in Ganesh Rao v Sarphina D'souza Bai (1975 (2) Kar. L. J. 352) which in turn relied on a Full Bench decision of the allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1964 All. 562 . The ratio of these decisions in deciding the question whether a particular authority named either to decide the claim or appeal is 'persona designata' or 'not' depends upon the intention of the Legislature whether the power was given to decide such questions to the pre-existing Court of which the authority named is the Presiding Officer or to the named officer. If the intention is to confer power to a pre-existing court then even if the authority is named by mentioning the presiding officer of that Court, the power conferred to the Magistrate cannot be said to be in his capacity as 'persona Designata'. If the intention is to confer power to a pre-existing court then even if the authority is named by mentioning the presiding officer of that Court, the power conferred to the Magistrate cannot be said to be in his capacity as 'persona Designata'. But, on the other hand if it could be gathered from the provisions of the statute that the power is conferred to the authority and not to the pre-existing court of which he is the Presiding Officer, then the power conferred under the Statute to the authority named in his capacity as 'persona Designata' and not by virtue of the office he holds. In this background let me now proceed to consider whether the Magistrate at Sirsi was appointed as the Authority under sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Act as "persona Designata" or that the power was conferred upon the pre-existing Magistrate Court at Sirsi. ( 9 ) IT is seen from sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Act that the power is given to the appropriate Government to appoint any person who falls within the specified class of officers enumerated therein, to be the Authority to hear and decide, for any specified area, all claims of the employees arising under the provisions of the Act stated therein. The officers specified under sub-section (1) are any Commissioner for Workmens' compensation or any officer of the central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner or any other officer with experience as a Judge of a civil court or as a judicial Magistrate. After enumerating the three class of officers who are eligible for being appointed as the 'authority', provision is made respecting any other officer, provided such officer possessing the experience as a Judge of a civil Court or as a Judicial Magistrate. Thus, it is clear that whenever the appropriate Government appoints other officers to the Authority under the Act other than those specifically mentioned in subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Act, should possess the experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a Judicial Magistrate and the choice should not fall beyond or outside these category of officers. Thus, it is clear from the above provision that the intention of the parliament while enacting sub-section (1) of Sec. 20 of the Act appears to be not to confer the power of the Authority under the Act to the pre-existing Civil or Criminal Courts but to an officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a Judicial Magistrate. In other words, it is obvious that the power of the Authority under sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Act was conferred on the officer with experience as a Judge of the Civil Court or as a Judicial Magistrate as 'persona Designata'. Provision is not made to empower the appropriate government to appoint any Judge or magistrate of a court having jurisdiction in the specified are under the Act. Instead it is specifically provided that the officer to be appointed as the Authority should be an officer with experience as a judge of Civil Court or as a Judicial magistrate, without limitation of any territorial jurisdiction in which jurisdiction is exercised by the Judge or the magistrate of any existing Court. This would indicate that if the Officer with the experience as Judge of a Civil Court or as a Judicial Magistrate is appointed as the Authority, he is so appointed as 'persona Designata' and not as the presiding Judge of the existing Court either civil or Criminal. ( 10 ) THE view I take in this regard gains support from the notification issued by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act in appointing the magistrate of Sirsi as the authority under the Act. SI. No. 27 of the Notification refers to the Judicial Magistrate first Class, Sirsi, as the authority appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act for the area covered by Sirsi, siddapur and Mundgod Taluks. I am told, besides at Sirsi, there is a regular magistrate Court at Siddapur and an itinerate Court at Mundgod at present, thereby the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Court at Sirsi is confined to Sirsi taluk. I am told, besides at Sirsi, there is a regular magistrate Court at Siddapur and an itinerate Court at Mundgod at present, thereby the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Court at Sirsi is confined to Sirsi taluk. Even if the position as on the date of issue of the notification was not the same as at present, certainly, if the legislature intended to confer the power of the Authority under the Act to the respective jurisdictional Magistrate, there would have been a notification appointing the jurisdictional Magistrate as the Authority under the Act to exercise power within their respective local jurisdictions. Admittedly, this was not dore. The Judicial Magistrate First class at Sirsi is still the Authority under the Act to exercise powers in Sirsi, siddapur and Mundgod Taluks. This would go to show that the power conferred on the Magistrate, Sirsi, to be the authority under the Act to deal with the claims of the employees arising under the provisions of the Act in the areas of sirsi, Siddapur and Mundgod Taluks is in his capacity as Persona Designata and not as Presiding Magistrate of the existing Magistrate Court. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, it was argued by Sri hegde placing reliance on sub-section (7) of Section 20 that when an authority appointed under sub-section (1) is empowered with all the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure for taking evidence and of enforcing attendance of witnesses and compelling production of documents and when such authority is deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of Section 195 and chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal procedure, it would imply that such powers are given to the authority not in his capacity as Persona Designata but in his capacity as the Presiding Officer of the Court over which he presides. ( 12 ) THIS submission was strongly refuted by Sri K. N. Patil, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, contending that sub-section (7) of Section 20 is intended to clothe the authority appointed under sub-section (1) with necessary powers for effectively discharging its functions, and such powers are not conferred upon a pre-existing court over which the officer appointed as an authority under sub-section (1) presides. ( 13 ) IT seems to me that the argument advanced by Sri K. N. Patil sounds reasonable. ( 13 ) IT seems to me that the argument advanced by Sri K. N. Patil sounds reasonable. From the content and the language of sub-section (7) it is reasonable to hold that the authority appointed under sub-section (1) is conferred with the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure to enforce his directions touching the matters mentioned in the first part of subsection (7) and that such authority shall be deemed to be a court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter xxxv of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is the additional power conferred upon the Authority for discharging its functions effectively. It is difficult to draw sustenance from sub-section (7) that the powers of the civil court conferred upon the authority under sub-section (7) were in effect conferred upon a pre-existing court over which he presides as it is provided under subsection (1) that the appropriate government may by notification in the official gazette appoint not only the officer with experience as a judge of a civil court or as a judicial Magistrate but also other officers detailed in subsection (1) of Section 20. Thus I hold that sub-section (7) of Section 20 does not help to conclude that the authority appointed under sub-section (1) is not a persona Designata. ( 14 ) THUS, viewed from any angle, it seems to me that the Judicial Magistrate First Class at Sirsi who is appointed as the Authority under the Act is an officer appointed as Persona Designata and not by virtue of Magistrate exercising jurisdiction within the local limits of Sirsi Magistrate Court. ( 15 ) ONCE it is held that the magistrate at Sirsi is functioning as the authority under the Act as 'persona designata' he will not fall within the classification as an inferior Criminal court while discharging the functions under the Act. Necessarily it follows that the orders passed and the directions given under the Act by him are not amenable for correction by this Court in exercise of its revisional power under the Code. In that view, this revision filed by the petitioners is not maintainable. Necessarily it follows that the orders passed and the directions given under the Act by him are not amenable for correction by this Court in exercise of its revisional power under the Code. In that view, this revision filed by the petitioners is not maintainable. ( 16 ) IN the view I take that revision is not maintainable and this Court has no power to deal with it on merits, I do not consider it proper to express any opinion on the other points canvassed in the revision. ( 17 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, this Revision fails and the same is dismissed. --- *** --- .