JUDGMENT - Jamdar, M. S. J. - The petitioners, Who are the legal heirs of deceased tenant Lokumal Sindhi, seek to challenge the order dated 25-8-1983 passed by the Competent Authority under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Slum Areas Act'), granting permission to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 22(1) of the said enactment to continue the suit filed by them against the petitioners for evicting them from the premises in their possession. 2. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 applied for permission on 23-2-1983 long after filing the suit for ejectment. They filed an application without prejudice to their contention that the house in question does not fall in a slum area within the meaning of the Slum Areas Act and hence no permission under Section 22(1) is necessary. 3. The competent authority viz. the City Engineer, Nagpur, grant ed the permission to continue suit/proceedings and to institute suit/ proceedings for obtaining decree/order for eviction of the tenants, present petitioners. 4. The impugned order is challenged on two grounds viz.. that no permission for continuation of the suit filed without previous permis sion can be granted, and secondly, in granting permission the Compe-tent Authority did not take into account the factors enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 22 of the Slum Areas Act. 5. Shri Manohar, learned advocate for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 contended that the present petition is not maintainable because the petitioners have not availed of the alternative remedy by way of an appeal provided by Section 35 of the Slum Areas Act. 6. Section 35(1) of the Slum Areas Act lays down that except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act. any person aggrieved by any notice, order or direction issued or given by the Competent Autho rity may appeal to the Administrator within a period of thirty days from the date of issue of such notice, order or direction. According to-Shri Mehadia, learned advocate for the petitioners, an appeal against an order under S. 22 can be filed, only under Section 23 and not under Section 35, and as Section 23 makes the remedy of appeal available only to a person aggrieved by an order refusing to grant permission. there was no remedy to the petitioners except by way of a writ peti tion to this Court. 7. there was no remedy to the petitioners except by way of a writ peti tion to this Court. 7. Section 23 no doubt lays down that any person aggrieved by an order of the Competent Authority refusing to grant the permission re ferred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 22 may, within thirty days of the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final. It is, therefore, clear that a person who is aggrieved by an order granting the permission cannot file an appeal to the Tribunal under Section 23. There its no other provision which enables a person aggrieved by an order granting the permission under Section 22(1) to prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. But, Section 23 does not take away the general remedy by way of an appeal available to a person aggrieved by any order passed under the Act to prefer an appeal to the Administrator within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. Hence, even if a person aggrieved by an order granting the permission cannot file an appeal to the Tribunal under Section 23, he can prefer an appeal to the Administrator under Section 35(1) and in that sense an alternative remedy is available even to such a person. But, an alternative remedy does not necessarily prevent this Court from exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution if the impugned order or action is on the face of it illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the authority passing the order. The present case is one such a case. 8. Section 22(1) of the Slum Areas Act. But, an alternative remedy does not necessarily prevent this Court from exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution if the impugned order or action is on the face of it illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the authority passing the order. The present case is one such a case. 8. Section 22(1) of the Slum Areas Act. under which the impugn ed permission is granted reads as follows : “22(1) Notwithstandnig anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall except with the previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority,- (a) institute, after the commencement of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of any occupier from any building or land in a slum area; or (b) where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or pro ceeding instituted before such commencement for the eviction of an occupier from any building or land in such area, execute such decree or order, or (c) apply to any Judge or the Registrar of the Small Cause Court, under Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, in its application to the State of Maharashtra, or to any Court of Small Causes under Chapter IV-A of the Provincial1 Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, in its application to the State of Maha rashtra, for a distress warrant for arrears of rent against any occupier of a house or premises in a slum area.” A plain reading of this provision makes it clear that previous permis-sion contemplated is for instituting a suit after commencement of the Slum Areas Act. Permission must be obtained before instituting the suit. No post faci permission can be granted. Section 22(1) does not empower the Competent Authority to grant retrospective permission allowing continuation of a suit which was filed without permission in writing of the Competent Authority. . Hence, that part of the order which permits respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to continue the suit already filed without permission is illegal and without jurisdiction. 9. This brings me to the second challenge viz, that the competent authority while passing the order did not take into consideration the factors enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-section (4) of Sec tion 22 of the Slum Areas Act. 1 and 2 to continue the suit already filed without permission is illegal and without jurisdiction. 9. This brings me to the second challenge viz, that the competent authority while passing the order did not take into consideration the factors enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-section (4) of Sec tion 22 of the Slum Areas Act. Sub-section (4) reads as follows : “(4) In granting or refusing to grant permission under Clause (a) or (b) of Sub-section (1), the Competent Authority shall take into consideration the following factors namely : (a) whether alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would be available to him, if he were evicted; (b) whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area; (c) any other factors, if any, as may be prescribed.” It is apparent from the order passed by the Competent Authority that he did not take any of these factors into consideration, There is not even a whisper about it in the order passed by the Competent Authority. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 also have not averred in the petition that alternative accommodation within the means of the petitioners would be available to them if they are evicted, nor have they stated that eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area. Shri Mahohar contended that the factors in Clauses (a)' and (b) or the factors prescribed under Clause (c) are not conditions precedent to the granting of permission under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 22 (1) and hence non-consideration of these factors would not be fatal to the order granting permission. According to him, even if the Competent Authority domes to the conclusion that no alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would be available to him if he were evicted or that the eviction of the occupier is not necessary in the interest of the improvement and clearance of the slum area, the Competent Authority would be competent and justified in granting the permission under Clause (a) or (b) of Section 22 (1),. 10. No doubt, the opening clause of sub-Section (4) is capable of being interpreted to mean that the Competent Authority is only expected to take into consideration the factors enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) and nothing more. 10. No doubt, the opening clause of sub-Section (4) is capable of being interpreted to mean that the Competent Authority is only expected to take into consideration the factors enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) and nothing more. The relevant provision also does not specifically lay down that no permission under clause (a) or (b) of subsection (1) of section 22 can be granted unless alternative accommoda-iion within the means of the occupier would be available to him, if he were evicted and the eviction of the occupier is in the interest of the improvement and clearance of slum ares. But, to hold otherwise, would be to defeat the very purpose of the enactment. As stated in the preamble, the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Cllearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 is enacted to make better provision for the improvement and clearance of slum areas in the State and for their redevelopment and for the protection of occupiers from eviction and distress warrants and for matters connected with the purposes aforesaid. It is to give concrete shape to the object of affording protection from eviction to the occupiers of the slum areas that the prbvisions contained in section 22 are incorporated. Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of section 22 bars institution of any suit, after commencement of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, and also any proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of any occupier from any building or land in a slum area, while Cl. (b) bars execution of a decree or order for eviction obtained in a suit or proceeding instituted before the commencement of the Act, without previous permission in writing of the Competent Aluthority. These provisions which make the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts subject to the previous permission) of the Competent Authority are incorporated in order to afford protection to the Occupiers of the slum areas from being evicted. Granting of permission, therefore, is not an empty formality and considering the object of the Act the Competent Authority would be obliged to refuse the permission if the authority comes to the conclusion that no alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would be available to him if he were evicted or that the eviction is not in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area. These two factors have nexus to the purpose for which the provision about permission is incorporated viz., to afford protection to the slum dwellers from eviction. Hence, even though it is not specifically stated that the Competent Authority shall refuse permission unless alternative accommodation is available to the occupier and the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area, the factors mentioned in clauses (a) (b) and (c) are cond-bons-precedent to the grant of permission under clauses (a) and (by of section 22(1). Subjection (4) enjoins a duty on the Competent Authority to take into account the factors mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) The obvious interpretation, therefore, is that the Competent Authority must refuse permission if alternative accommodation is not available to the occupier or if the eviction is not in; the interest of the improvement and clearance of the slum area. 11. I would like to quote the observations from the treatise Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes' on modification of the language to meet the intention of the legislature in Chapter 'Exceptional Con-struction (Chapter 11, 12th Edition, page 228). “Where the language of a statue, in its ordinary meaning and in gammatical instruction, leads to a manifest Contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended a construction and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really given the true meaning. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the law, language used. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a deliberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule: 'the canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic soulution.” 12. As observed above, the object of the enactment is to make better provision for the improvement and clearance of slum areas and their redevelopment and to afford protection to occupiers from eviction and distress warrants. The eviction of an occupier of the premises falling in slum area must, therefore, be in the interest of, improvement and clearance of the slum area. The eviction of an occupier of the premises falling in slum area must, therefore, be in the interest of, improvement and clearance of the slum area. Further if the object of the enactment is to give better protection to occupiers of the premises situated in slum areas than the protection afforded by the relevant legislations governing relationship of landlord and tenant, then the factor whether alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would be available to him if he were evicted assumes equally decisive character and the Competent Authority would be bound to refuse permission if alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would not be available to him or if the eviction is not in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area. The main object of the enactment would be reduced to a nullity if sub-section (4) is interpreted to mean that the finding either way on the factors enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) would not affect the grant of permission and the only thing the Competent Authority is expected to do is to consider these factors before passing the order. 13. Sub-section (4) of section 22 lays down that the Competent Authority shall take into account the factors enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) This provision is not merely directory as is sought to be urged, because as observed above, it has vital! relation to the general object intended to be secured by the Act. Looking to the subject matter, importance of the provision cannot be disregarded, In this context, the observations of Lord Penzance in (Howard v. Bodington)1 quoted on pages 314 and 315 of 'Maxwell pn the Interpretation of “Statutes' may be fruitfully reproduced ; “I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that; in each case you must look to the subject-matter; consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded, and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory. “ In my view, therefore, sub-section (4) of section 22 is mandatory and hence the Competent Authority must take into consideration the; factors enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) of the said sub-section while considering an application for permission under sub-section (1) of section 22, and grant permission only if it comes to the conclusion that alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would be available to him if he is evicted and that the eviction is in the interest of the improvement and clearance of the slum area. 14. In the result, the petition is allowed. The permission granted to continue the pending civil suit is quashed, being without jurisdiction. Permission to institute a new suit is also quashed and the matter is remitted back to the Competent Authority to decide the question about granting pen mission1 for instituting a new suit in the light of the observations made above. No order as to casts. Petition allowed. -----