Judgment A writ of certiorari can never be issued to call for the record or papers and proceedings of an Act or Ordinance and for quashing such Act or Ordinance. The writ of certiorari and the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto were known in English common law as "prerogative writs Prerogative writs" are to be distinguished from "writs of right' also known as "writs of course". Writs issued as part of the public administration of justice are called "writs of right" or "writs of course" because the Crown is bound by Magna Carta of 1215 to issue them, as for instance, a writ to commence an action at common law. Prerogative writs are (or rather, were) so called because they are issued by virtue of the Crown's prerogative, not as a matter of right but only on some probable cause being shown to the satisfaction of the Court why the extraordinary power of the Crown should be invoked to render assistance to the party. The common law regards the Sovereign as the source or fountain of justice, and certain ancient remedial' processes of an extraordinary nature, known as prerogative writs, have from the earliest times issued from the Court of King's Bench in which the Sovereign was always present in contemplation of Jaw. (See Jowitt's Dictionary of Law, vol. 2, p. 1885 and Halsbury's Laws of England, fourth Edition, vol. 11, para 1451.f.n.3). We are concerned here with the writ of certiorari. "Certiorari" is a late Latin word being the passive form of the word "certiorare" meaning 'inform' and occurred in the original Latin words of the writ which translated read "we, being desirous for certain reasons, that the said record should by you he certified to us". Certiorari was essentially a royal demand for information; the King. wishing to be certified of some matter, orders that the necessary information be provided for him. We find in De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, fourth Edition, page 587, some interesting instances where writs of certiorari were so issued. Thus, these writs were addressed to the escheator or the sheriff to make inquisitions; the earliest being for the year 1260. Similarly, when Parliament granted Edward II one foot-soldier for every townsl1ip, the writ addressed to the sheriffs to send in returns of their townships to the Exchequer was a writ of certiorari. Thus, these writs were addressed to the escheator or the sheriff to make inquisitions; the earliest being for the year 1260. Similarly, when Parliament granted Edward II one foot-soldier for every townsl1ip, the writ addressed to the sheriffs to send in returns of their townships to the Exchequer was a writ of certiorari. Very soon after its first appearance this writ was used to remove to the King's Court at Westminster the proceedings of inferior courts of record: for instance, in 1271 the proceedings in an assize of darrein presentment were transferred to Westminster because of their dilatoriness. This power was also assumed by the Court of Chancery and in the Tudor and early Stuart periods a writ of certiorari was frequently issued to bring the proceedings of inferior courts of common law before the Chancellor after however, the Chancery confined its supervisory founctions to inferior courts of equity. In A New Abridgement of the Law, seventh edition, volume 11 at pages 9 and 10, Matthew Bacon bas described a writ of certiorari in these 'words: A certiorari is an original writ issuing out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, directed in the Kings name, to the judges or officers of inferior courts, commanding them to return the records of a cause pending before them, to the end the party may have the more sure and speedy· justice before him, or such other justices as he shall assign to determine the cause. By the time of King Charles II however applications for certiorari as also for habeas corpus and prohibition came to be made usually in the Court of King's Bench. The different functions of the prerogative writs of prohibition certiorari and mandamus have been thus described in Halsbury's Laws of England, fourth edition volume I, in para 80: Historically prohibition was a writ whereby the royal courts of common law prohibited other courts from entertaining matters falling within the jurisdiction of the common law courts; certiorari was issued to bring the record Of an inferior Court in to the King's Bench for review or to remove indictments for trial in that Court; mandamus was directed to inferior courts and tribunals, and to public officers and bodies, to order the performance of a public duty. All three were called prerogative writs. All three were called prerogative writs. ....During the seventeenth century certiorari evolved as a general remedy to quash the proceedings of inferior tribunals and was used largely to supervise justices of the peace in the performance of their criminal and administrative functions under various statutes, In 1700 [in R. v, Glamorganshire (Inhabitants) and Groenvelt v, Burnelt] it was held that the Court of King's Bench would examine the proceedings of all jurisdictions. erected by Act of Parliament, and that, if under pretence of such an Act they proceeded to arrogate jurisdiction to themselves greater than the Act warranted, the Court would send certiorari to them to have their proceedings returned to the Court, so that the Court might restrain them from exceeding that juerisdiction. If bodies exercising such jurisdiction did not per form their duty the King's Bench would grant, a mandamus. Prohibition would issue if anything remained to prohibit. The ambit of certiorari and prohibition was not limited to the supervision of functions that would ordinarily be regarded as strictly judicial, and in the nineteenth century the writs came to be used to control the exercise of certain administrative functions by local and central government authorities which did not necessarily act under judicial forms. By the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938 (1 & 2 Geo. 6 c .63) a more expeditious procedure was introduced under which instead of writs, orders of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari are to be issued and the writ of quo wareanto was abolished and in its place an injunction is to issue against the usurper to the office in question restraining him from acting in that office and, if the case so requires, declaring that office to be vacant. These were, however, procedural changes only. These were, however, procedural changes only. By Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1965, substituted for the old Order 53 by Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment No.3), 977 (S. I. 1977 No. 1955), far-reaching changes, not merely in the form but in the substance of procedural law, were introduced whereby reliefs by way of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, declaration and injunction have been joined together under the general head of 'judicial review' for which an application can be made for any or all of these reliefs in the alternative or in addition to other reliefs arising out of the same matter and the Court is also conferred the power to award damages. An application, however, cannot be made with bout leave of the Court and unless the Court "considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates". The expression 'sufficient interest' has enabled the Court in England to enlarge the rule of locus standi by giving to that expression a liberal interpretation. In India, prior to the Constitution, the power to issue prerogative writs was vested only in three High Courts. that is, the High Courts established by Letters Patent issued by Queen Victoria under authority given by the Indian High Courts Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 104) for the establishment of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal and at Madras and at Bombay for these three Presidencies, namely, the 'High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. Hence this Act is generally called the Charter Act and the High Courts established there under the Chartered High Courts. These High Courts were the successors so far as their original jurisdictions were concerned of the Supreme Courts which were esablished in these three Presidency-towns and inherited from those Courts the powers of the Court of King's Bench which included the power to issue prerogative writs. Apart from these three High Courts, none of the other High Courts in India possessed this power. The position was changed when the Constitution of India came into force. Article 225 continues the jurisdiction of existing High Courts.-Article 226, however, confers upon every High Court the power to issue to any person or authority. Apart from these three High Courts, none of the other High Courts in India possessed this power. The position was changed when the Constitution of India came into force. Article 225 continues the jurisdiction of existing High Courts.-Article 226, however, confers upon every High Court the power to issue to any person or authority. including in proper cases, any Government, within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, "directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose". It may be mentioned that under Article 32 of the Constitution, the same power as has been conferred upon the High Courts is conferred upon this Court without any restriction as to territorial jurisdiction but, unlike the High Court, restricted only to the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part HI of the Constitution, namely, the Fundamental Rights. Referring to Article 226, this Court in Dwarkanath, Hindu Undivided Family v. I.T.O. ( AIR 1966 SC 81 ) said: This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex-facie confers a wide power on the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is fond. The Constitution designedly used. wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England: but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression nature", for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the. English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of government into a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of government into a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels The face that the High Courts and a fortiori this Court have power to mould the reliefs to meet the requirements of each case does not mean that the draftsman of a writ petition should not apply his mind to the: proper relief which should be asked for and throw the entire burden of it upon the Court. An advocate owes a duty to his client as well as to the Court-a duty to his client to give of his best to the case which he has undertaken to conduct for his client and a duty to assist the Court to the utmost of his skill and ability in the proper and satisfactory administration of justice. In our system of administration of justice the Courts have a right to receive assistance from the Bar and it is the duty of the advocate who drafts a writ petition or any other pleading to ask for appropriate reliefs. The true nature of a writ of certiorari has been pointed out by this Court in several decisions. We need refer to only one of them, namely, Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar. ( AIR 1963 SC 786 ) In that case Subba Rao, J. as he then was, speaking for the Court, said : Certiorari lies to remove for the purpose of quashing the proceedings of inferior Courts of record or other persons or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to notice the distinction between a writ of certiorari and a writ in the nature of certiorari: in either case the High Court directs an inferior tribunal or authority to transmit to itself the record of proceedings pending therein for scrutiny and, If necessary, for quashing the same. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to notice the distinction between a writ of certiorari and a writ in the nature of certiorari: in either case the High Court directs an inferior tribunal or authority to transmit to itself the record of proceedings pending therein for scrutiny and, If necessary, for quashing the same. A writ in the nature of certiorari is thus a wholly inappropriate relief to ask for when the constitutional validity of a legislative measure is challenged and it is surprising to find that in spite of repeated pronouncements of this Court as to the true nature of this writ it should have been asked for in the Sangh's petition. As pointed out in Dwarkanath case, under Article 226 the High Courts have the power to issue directions, orders and writs, including prerogative writs. This power includes the giving of declarations as also consequential reliefs including relief by way of injunction. The proper relief for the petitioners in the Sangh's petition to have asked was a declaration that U. P. Ordinance 22 of 1978 was unconstitutional and void and, if a consequential relief was thought necessary, a writ of mandamus or writ in the nature of mandamus or a direction, order or injunction restraining the State and its officers from enforcing or giving effect to the provisions of that Ordinance. The High Court granted the proper relief by declaring that Ordinance to be void but it should have, before "proceeding to hear the writ petition, insisted that the petitioners should set their house in order by amending the petition and praying for proper reliefs. The High Court was too indulgent in this matter. After all, it was not a petition from a prisoner languishing in jail or from a bonded labourer or a party in person or by a public-spirited citizen seeking to bring a gross injustice to the notice of the Court. Here, the High Court had before it as the main petitioner a union which had taken collective action to enforce its demands and had defied the Government by flouting its orders and an Ordinance promulgated by the Governor, namely, U. P. Ordinance 25 of 1977, and had by reason of its collective might ultimately made the Government come to terms with it The petitioners were pepresented by well-known counsel, one of them practising in this Court. It is true that neither this Court nor any High Court should dismiss a writ petition on a" mere technicality or just because a proper relief is not asked fur; but from this it does not follow that it should condone every kind of laxity. We would not have dwelt upon this aspect of the case but for the fact that we find that laxity in drafting all types of pleadings is becoming the rule and a well drafted pleading, an exception. An ill-drafted pleading is an offspring of the union of carelessness with imprecise thinking and its brothers are slipshod preparation of the case and rambling and irrelevant arguments leading to waste of time which the Courts can ill afford by reason of their overcrowded dockets. AIR 1966 SC 81 and AIR 1863 SC 786 relied on. Appeal Allowed.